Why The West Is Losing The Global Shadow War with Iran, Russia and China | Seth Jones
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With the war in Ukraine still ongoing, it’s not surprising that conventional warfare usually dominates the headlines but underneath this traditional battlefield there are other types of conflict taking place as well that are a lot more quiet but just as consequential. From covert influence operations, proxy militias to economic pressure and cyberattacks, countries like Iran, Russia, and China have become extremely good at waging wars that don't look like wars in the traditional sense. But that can be just as powerful and sometimes even more effective. And while this kind of warfare isn’t new, it feels like we’ve entered a golden age of it.
And so in this conversation, I spoke with Seth Jones, Director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and one of the leading experts on irregular warfare on the different tactics and strategies of the three leading hybrid warfare powers —Iran, Russia, and China. We discuss the strengths and vulnerabilities of each country's approach, the effectiveness of their influence operations, why the U.S. seems to lag behind in this area or what role hybrid warfare plays in the war in Ukraine and much more.
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Jones argues that Iran, Russia, and China have each developed distinct irregular warfare strategies suited to their geopolitical constraints and capabilities, with Russia emphasizing kinetic aggression, China focusing on information dominance, and Iran leveraging proxy networks—and that recent setbacks to Iran's network do not represent strategic failure but rather tactical adjustment within a durable long-term approach.
- Each power has adapted irregular warfare to circumvent nuclear deterrence and avoid conventional military escalation with peer competitors
- Iran's proxy network collapse is temporary weakness, not abandonment of strategy, because irregular warfare remains structurally central to Iranian military doctrine post-revolution
- Russian irregular attacks have increased dramatically but may not be achieving behavioral change in Western support for Ukraine, suggesting activity level does not equal effectiveness
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Irregular warfare—actions below the threshold of conventional war including offensive cyber operations, covert action, information operations, and support to state or non-state allies—has become the dominant mode of competition among major powers because direct conventional war between nuclear-armed states risks escalation to nuclear conflict.
“these kinds of irregular action, they don't risk escalation in the same way. which is why, and we can talk about this in a moment, we've seen the Russians, including the GRU very active in Europe uh in this arena of irregular or or hybrid warfare.”
We have entered a golden age of irregular warfare, with increased investment by US adversaries and increasing use of these strategies, particularly within the last 10 years as state-based competition has intensified, especially following the 2018 Trump administration national security strategy and Secretary Mattis's national defense strategy that focused on state-based threats (China, Russia, Iran).
“in sort of the modern period of focusing on this type of warfare, it never stopped. But I think it received renewed attention with a shift to uh state-based competition. And part of the reason is if you look at these major powers, the Chinese have nuclear weapons, the Russians have nuclear weapons... conventional war among these countries is very risky... But these kinds of irregular action, they don't risk escalation in the same way.”
Hamas did not give advance notice of the October 7th attack timing to Hezbollah or Iran, including the Quds Force, so it was not a concerted effort across Iranian agencies and proxy forces, though this lack of coordination may have contributed to Iran's subsequent difficulties.
“the challenge I think is October 7th in Israel. Uh first of all, it likely surprised everyone but Hamas uh the timing uh and and and Israeli officials have said uh publicly, but also privately on a couple of trips I've taken to Israel uh that they're pretty confident that Hezbollah and uh Iran, including the Kuds force, were not given advanced noting notice of the timing of the attacks.”
Following the Soviet Union's collapse, irregular warfare activity was put on hold for the moment; then after 9/11, the US became much more involved in campaigns against terrorist organizations (first al-Qaeda, then ISIS), representing a shift away from state-based competition toward counterterrorism focus.
“Once the Soviet Union collapsed, I think a lot of that activity, at least for the moment, uh was put on hold. Um and then when 911 happened, the US became much more involved in uh campaigns against terrorist organizations, first al-Qaeda, then the Islamic State.”
Irregular warfare encompasses actions below the threshold of conventional war and nuclear war that are designed to weaken adversaries and strengthen oneself in a comparative perspective, including offensive cyber operations, covert action, information and influence operations, misinformation and disinformation, and support to state or non-state allies and partners such as guerrilla organizations.
“when I talk about irregular warfare, I mean it in the sense of activities below the threshold of conventional war that are designed really to weaken adversaries and to strengthen oneself sort of in a comparative perspective. Um and they include a range of activities. Uh they include things like offensive cyber operations, they include covert action. uh the they include uh actions like information or influence operations. In a number of cases uh states may use misinformation or disinformation. It may also include support to state or non-state allies and partners.”
The US operation in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001 involved a very small number of CIA and special operations forces linking up with largely tribal and ethnic forces (Northern Alliance and Pashtun tribes) to overthrow the Taliban, representing a 'by, with, and through' irregular warfare approach similar to US support to the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
“the way the US was involved in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001. It was a very small number of both CIA and special operations forces um linking up with with uh largely tribal or ethnic forces. So Northern Alliance and then Poshune tribes um to uh overthrow the Taliban regime. So it was it was operating by with and through partner forces. So the way the US aided the mujahaden in Afghanistan in the 1980s sort of by with and through partner forces. So these are all examples for me of uh irregular warfare.”
China's irregular warfare approach focuses primarily on information and cyber operations—including targeting universities, establishing surveillance 'police stations' to monitor diaspora Chinese citizens, and conducting offensive cyber operations through the PLA—while avoiding kinetic actions like killing or destroying targets overseas due to concerns about international impact.
“when I look at their irregular or political warfare activities, um, much of that has been in the influence and information spheres, um, a number of it has been targeting universities and, you know, developing and, uh, building some establishing some what some have called police stations to keep an eye on uh Chinese citizens, including ones that have criticized the government.”
Russia's attacks in the US and Europe, termed 'active measures' using Russian terminology, have tripled between 2023 and 2024 and quadrupled between 2022 and 2023, with primary targets including transportation, critical infrastructure like pipelines and undersea fiber optic cables, industry targets especially defense companies providing weapons to Ukraine, and attacks involving explosives, blunt or edged instruments, and electronic warfare.
“the number of Russian attacks uh in the US, we would term these irregular warfare. Actually, the terminology Russia has generally used or active measures. Uh number of attacks in Europe tripled between 2023 and 2024. Um and they had quadrupled between 2022 and 2023. Uh the primary targets of of uh Russian attacks included transportation targets, government critical infrastructure like pipelines and fiber optic uh undersea cables, industry targets.”
Iran's irregular warfare strategy differs fundamentally from Russia and China by relying heavily on networks of proxy forces and allied groups—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, Palestinian groups including Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen—to which Iran provides weapons, technology, and support rather than conducting operations directly.
“What what is different about the goods force is just the sheer amount of allies and partners that the Iranians work through. In in Lebanon, it's been Hezbollah. Syria, it's been a range of Shia and other militia forces. Iraq, it's generally been the popular mobilization forces. Uh often Shia, but not always. um Palestinian groups including Hamas and then in other places Yemen we've seen them work uh by with and through the Houthis uh providing a range of different types of assistance weapons technology”
During the Cold War, irregular warfare was a main focus of the KGB against the US, specifically through KGB Service A; more recently it has been conducted by the GRU, SVR (Foreign Intelligence Agency), elements of the FSB, and other Russian agencies, with the Russians characterized as generally competent, aggressive, and more willing to go kinetic than the Chinese.
“During the Cold War, it was a main focus of the KGB uh against the US. That was service A of the KGB. More recently, it's been um GRU, it's been SVR, Foreign Intelligence Agency, and then it's been some elements of the S FSB and then some other uh there there are a number of other Russian agencies. I would say, you know, car the I would characterize the Russians as being generally pretty competent in conducting these actions, aggressive, probably more aggressive than the Chinese in their willingness to go kinetic.”
Israeli covert operations against Hezbollah included compromising supplies of communications devices (walkie-talkies and pagers) and laptop computers in the supply chain to cause them to explode, devastating Hezbollah's command and control structure and killing important senior leaders.
“what's what struck me is actually how effective the Israelis have been at least in temporarily weakening Hezbollah with the with the uh walkie-talkies, the pagers, and even even some laptop computers that they were able to get into the supply chain and explode. But it devastated the command and control uh structure, killed some very important senior leaders of Hezbollah.”
The Cold War featured major competition between the US and USSR in irregular warfare, with the Soviet KGB Service A conducting influence campaigns, misinformation, sabotage, and subversion in multiple locations including Western countries, while NATO countries reciprocated through Latin America, Africa, and other regions.
“KGB service A was heavily involved in a range of actions, influence campaigns, miss and disinformation, uh some sabotage and subversion in multiple locations and Western countries including the US were as well. They fought each other but never directly working with partners and allies across Latin America. So think Guatemala or El Salvador in Africa uh and in a range of other locations.”
After the Soviet Union collapsed, irregular warfare activity was temporarily reduced until after 9/11, when the US shifted focus to counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaeda and ISIS for roughly two decades.
“Once the Soviet Union collapsed, I think a lot of that activity, at least for the moment, uh was put on hold. Um and then when 911 happened, the US became much more involved in uh campaigns against terrorist organizations, first al-Qaeda, then the Islamic State.”
The Trump administration's 2018 National Security Strategy under National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, combined with Secretary of Defense Mattis's 2018 National Defense Strategy, refocused US efforts on state-based threats—primarily China but also Russia and Iran—marking the beginning of modern emphasis on countering state-based irregular warfare.
“I think I would say sort of where we sit today, the biggest change probably happens in the late 2010s. Uh in 2018, the Trump administration really under HR McMaster, the the first national security adviser for President Trump, puts together a national security strategy. And then uh Secretary Mattis, the uh Secretary of Defense in the first Trump administration puts out a national defense strategy focusing the US efforts on statebased threats uh primarily the Chinese but also the Russians and the Iranians.”
Hamas's October 7th attack caused severe Israeli casualties, particularly in the Gaza envelope and in kibbutzim like Berry and Nuros, which lost huge chunks of their populations, prompting a major Israeli offensive response.
“the severe uh damage that Israel felt particularly down in the Gaza envelope and in kibbutim like Barry and um Nuros that lost huge chunks of the individuals in those kibbutim is uh that the Israelis then went on the offensive.”
Russia has also leveraged private military companies (PMCs) in regions like Africa—Mali, Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya—to conduct training, advising, and assistance to governments, while extracting resources, in a way that China has not pursued as extensively.
“the Russians have also done something that Chinese really haven't as much of is is also leverage a range of private military companies uh in regions like Africa where they have extracted resources but done a lot of train advise and assist to governments whether it's in Mali or Central African Republic or Sudan or a number of Libya.”
Iran has suffered significant recent setbacks—particularly in the past year including the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, severe weakening of Hezbollah through Israeli covert operations (pagers, walkie-talkies, laptop explosions), Israeli strikes on Hezbollah's short-range ballistic missile stockpiles, and continued Houthi involvement in Yemen's civil war—but these do not represent strategic failure or abandonment of the proxy network strategy.
“Iran has suffered some pretty significant setbacks certainly in the last year... the severe uh damage that Israel felt particularly down in the Gaza envelope and in kibbutim... the Israelis then went on the offensive... what's what struck me is actually how effective the Israelis have been at least in temporarily weakening Hezbollah with the with the uh walkie-talkies, the pagers, and even even some laptop computers that they were able to get into the supply chain and explode. But it devastated the command and control uh structure, killed some very important senior leaders of Hezbollah.”
The Houthis are engaged in a civil war in Yemen which has ebbed and flowed over several years.
“the Houthi Houthis are engaged in uh in a civil war in Yemen which has ebbed and flowed over the last several years”
Russia's irregular warfare approach is characterized by competence, aggression, and willingness to conduct kinetic operations including assassinations (e.g., Russian defectors in Spain), poisonings (e.g., in the UK), and explosions of facilities, making Russia more willing than China to directly kill or destroy targets overseas.
“I would characterize the Russians as being generally pretty competent in conducting these actions, aggressive, probably more aggressive than the Chinese in their willingness to go kinetic. So, as we've seen in Europe, they have blown things up. uh which warehouses. Uh they've conducted some pretty aggressive assassinations including against Russian defector in in in Spain. Uh we've seen the Russians conduct poisoning of individuals that have defected to the west, resided in countries like the UK.”
Hamas did not give Iran or Hezbollah advance notice of the timing of the October 7th attacks, meaning it was not a coordinated Iranian strategy but rather a surprise that the Israelis then responded to by targeting Iranian proxy capabilities.
“uh first of all, it likely surprised everyone but Hamas uh the timing uh and and and Israeli officials have said uh publicly, but also privately on a couple of trips I've taken to Israel uh that they're pretty confident that Hezbollah and uh Iran, including the Kuds force, were not given advanced noting notice of the timing of the attacks.”
The Russians have blown up warehouses, conducted aggressive assassinations including against Russian defectors in Spain, poisoned individuals who defected to the west and resided in countries like the UK, and leveraged private military companies in regions like Africa where they extract resources while conducting train, advise, and assist operations to governments in Mali, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, and other locations.
“they have blown things up. uh which warehouses. Uh they've conducted some pretty aggressive assassinations including against Russian defector in in in Spain. Uh we've seen the Russians conduct poisoning of individuals that have defected to the west, resided in countries like the UK. So uh a and then in addition the Russians have also done something that Chinese really haven't as much of is is also leverage a range of private military companies uh in regions like Africa where they have extracted resources but done a lot of train advise and assist to governments whether it's in Mali or Central African Republic or Sudan or a number of Libya.”
Chinese irregular and political warfare activities have been primarily in the influence and information spheres, including targeting universities, developing and establishing police stations to monitor Chinese citizens including government critics, with arrests in New York and similar activities across the globe, while Chinese have been much more cautious about kinetic activity, though they have recently engaged in some cable cutting around Taiwan and PLA offensive cyber operations.
“the Chinese on the other hand, I I think when I look at their irregular or political warfare activities, um, much of that has been in the influence and information spheres, um, a number of it has been targeting universities and, you know, developing and, uh, building some establishing some what some have called police stations to keep an eye on uh Chinese citizens, including ones that have criticized the government. Uh there have been arrests in New York, but there have also been a number of other similar kinds of activities across uh across the globe. The Chinese have done a little bit recently of what I would call more sort of kinetic activity like some cable cutting in and around Taiwan, but it's mostly information and cyber operations.”
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, referred to as 'goods force'), particularly through the Quds Force, is the primary paramilitary arm conducting irregular warfare for Iran, and the Iranians work through a distinctly larger network of allies and partners—Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Shia and other militia forces in Syria, popular mobilization forces in Iraq, Palestinian groups including Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen—with whom they provide various types of assistance, weapons, and technology.
“the Iranians particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards could force which is the primary paramilitary arm that does these kinds of activities uh within the Iranian national security apparatus. There are others like the MOIS uh Iranian intelligence that have been active but it's the goods force um that has been most active. What what is different about the goods force is just the sheer amount of allies and partners that the Iranians work through. In in Lebanon, it's been Hezbollah. Syria, it's been a range of Shia and other militia forces. Iraq, it's generally been the popular mobilization forces. Uh often Shia, but not always. um Palestinian groups including Hamas and then in other places Yemen we've seen them work uh by with and through the Houthis uh providing a range of different types of assistance weapons technology”
Khani, Soleimani's successor as head of the Quds Force, is a very competent actor in irregular warfare space and was Soleimani's deputy for years before the 2020 assassination, and has continued as the critical lynchpin of the Quds Force since then.
“Kasum Sulmani's deputy who is the head of the Kudz force is Khani uh is a very competent actor in this irregular warfare hybrid warfare space. Uh he was Sulmani's deputy for years up until the assassination of 2020. Um and he has continued to uh to to be the the critical lynch pin of the Kutz force since then.”
Hybrid warfare differs from irregular warfare in that it typically includes a mixture of both conventional war elements (pitched battles) and irregular actions, whereas irregular warfare encompasses only sub-conventional activities.
“I mean the one distinction I would make is hybrid typically uh in many definitions includes a mixture of both conventional and uh irregular. uh so elements of uh pitch battles as well as actions below that”
The US supported the Northern Alliance and Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan in 2001 through a small CIA and special operations force contingent working 'by, with, and through' partner forces—an example of irregular warfare through proxy support.
“the way the US was involved in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001. It was a very small number of both CIA and special operations forces um linking up with with uh largely tribal or ethnic forces. So Northern Alliance and then Poshune tribes um to uh overthrow the Taliban regime. So it was it was operating by with and through partner forces.”
Israel's October 2024 operations against Hezbollah—using exploding pagers, walkie-talkies, and laptop computers seeded into the supply chain, plus strikes on short-range ballistic missile stockpiles—temporarily devastated Hezbollah's command and control structure and killed senior leaders, significantly weakening Iranian proxy capabilities.
“what's what struck me is actually how effective the Israelis have been at least in temporarily weakening Hezbollah with the with the uh walkie-talkies, the pagers, and even even some laptop computers that they were able to get into the supply chain and explode. But it devastated the command and control uh structure, killed some very important senior leaders of Hezbollah. And then also uh the Israelis um in addition supplemented these activities by striking some of the short-range ballistic missile stockpiles that Hezblah otherwise would have used to uh to hit back against uh against Israel”
The Syrian Assad regime's collapse represents a major loss for Iran's proxy network strategy, as Syria had been a critical hub for Iranian influence and military presence in the Levant.
“and then obviously we talked about Assa the Assad regime collapsing.”
Russian irregular warfare operations in Europe and the US—termed 'active measures' by Russia—have dramatically escalated: attacks tripled between 2023 and 2024, and quadrupled between 2022 and 2023, targeting transportation, critical infrastructure like pipelines and undersea fiber optic cables, defense contractors, and government facilities.
“uh number of attacks in Europe tripled between 2023 and 2024. Um and they had quadrupled between 2022 and 2023. Uh the primary targets of of uh Russian attacks included transportation targets, government critical infrastructure like pipelines and fiber optic uh undersea cables, industry targets. They've bombed they've bombed uh and conducted bombings against defense companies that have provided weapons or other material to Ukraine.”
Iran's strategic decision not to be a major conventional military power (made after the 1979 revolution) was driven by its earlier reliance on conventional weapons during the Shah era and the loss of those weapons supplies during the Iran-Iraq War when countries supplied Iraq; instead, Iran under leaders like Kasim Suleimani built its primary military power center around irregular warfare.
“the Iranians made a decision really after the revolution not to be a major conventional power. uh they did that I think in part because they were so reliant uh during the sha year on conventional weapons uh that that uh subsided during the Iran Iraq war because a lot of countries were giving those weapons to the Iraqis. So instead um particularly under individuals like Kasums Sulammani uh the Iranians built really their breadandut uh power center in the military realm which is irregular war”
The GRU (Russian Main Intelligence Directorate) is the primary actor in modern Russian irregular warfare campaigns, particularly in Europe, replacing the Cold War-era KGB as the lead organization.
“Recently, it's been um GRU, it's been SVR, Foreign Intelligence Agency, and then it's been some elements of the S FSB and then some other uh there there are a number of other Russian agencies. I would say, you know, car the I would characterize the Russians as being generally pretty competent in conducting these actions, aggressive, probably more aggressive than the Chinese in their willingness to go kinetic. So, as we've seen in Europe, they have blown things up... the the main actor is the GRU the main intelligence directorate.”
Russian irregular warfare effectiveness in changing the behavior of US and European states is questionable—the attacks have not clearly deterred European governments like the UK from escalating aid to Ukraine—suggesting that the true objective may not be behavioral change but rather demonstrating capability, attrition, or signaling.
“I think if it's if one is talking about changing the behavior of the US or European states during this activity probably not I mean hard to know why the the main actor is the GRU the main intelligence directorate. uh probably have not changed behavior, but it is interesting to note whether that was really their objective in the first place. I think certainly it's um influencing uh uh governments to think twice about escalating aid to Ukraine. Have they done that? Maybe in some cases, but probably not in all. uh you know hard to see that the British government for example has significantly uh changed its behavior because of some of these attacks.”
Despite high activity levels, there is an interesting distinction between Russian activity level in irregular warfare and actual effectiveness in achieving behavioral change; Russians may not have changed US or European state behavior during their irregular warfare campaigns, and it is unclear whether behavioral change was even their primary objective.
“I think there is an interesting difference between effectiveness meaning achieving specific results and active. The Russians are definitely active by our analysis... I think certainly it's um influencing uh uh governments to think twice about escalating aid to Ukraine. Have they done that? Maybe in some cases, but probably not in all. uh you know hard to see that the British government for example has significantly uh changed its behavior because of some of these attacks. Um you know so I I I'm not sure that they you know that if if I were to grade the Russians in effectiveness I I don't think I'd give them an A. Maybe like a B minus or C plus.”
A key difference between Kasim Suleimani and his successor Khani is operational style: Suleimani was publicly blusterous, taunted President Trump publicly, and was frequently photographed in Lebanon and Syria, while Khani has adopted a more circumspect approach of letting actions speak louder than words, staying under the radar screen.
“between Sulammani and and Khani is how much is Khani has decided to largely let his actions speak for themselves. The last couple of years while while Kasumsmani was alive, he taunted President Trump. He was very active publicly in speaking and also had his picture taken in numerous locations in Lebanon, in Syria and in other places. Hani, I think one lesson he has taken away is uh not to be publicly blusterous, not to brag, not to publicly insult, certainly along those lines, but to largely let actions speak louder than words.”
Khani has adopted a strategic shift from Soleimani's approach: rather than taunting adversaries, being publicly blusterous, publicly insulting, or publicizing his location (as Soleimani did with public appearances in Lebanon, Syria), Khani has chosen to let his actions speak for themselves and go under the radar screen, likely as a lesson from increased Western attention to Soleimani.
“one interesting difference though with uh between Sulammani and and Khani is how much is Khani has decided to largely let his actions speak for themselves. The last couple of years while while Kasumsmani was alive, he taunted President Trump. He was very active publicly in speaking and also had his picture taken in numerous locations in Lebanon, in Syria and in other places. Hani, I think one lesson he has taken away is uh not to be publicly blusterous, not to brag, not to publicly insult, certainly along those lines, but to largely let actions speak louder than words.”
Kasim Suleimani's successor as head of the Quds Force, Khani, is a competent actor in irregular warfare, and while Suleimani's death in 2020 was significant, it probably did not cause Iran's current difficulties—which stem more from Israeli responses to October 7th and the inherent complexity of conducting proxy operations.
“Kasum Sulmani's deputy who is the head of the Kudz force is Khani uh is a very competent actor in this irregular warfare hybrid warfare space. Uh he was Sulmani's deputy for years up until the assassination of 2020. Um and he has continued to uh to to be the the critical lynch pin of the Kutz force since then. I I suspect uh I suspect the could force and the Iranians would still be in this position if October 7th had happened”
Weak state capacity in Syria, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern regions creates structural opportunities for Iran to rebuild proxy networks, meaning Iranian setbacks are temporary vulnerabilities rather than permanent strategic losses.
“the future of Syria is a big question mark and as long as the central government remains weak, which it is in many ways, uh certainly weak in Kurdish areas of the east of the country, there will be opportunities by the Iranians to try to rebuild networks in Lebanon, in Syria, to continue to keep them in Iraq, and then also in other areas including Yemen.”
The Israelis were going to respond harshly to October 7th regardless of whether Kasim Soleimani was alive or dead, because the scale of Israeli casualties meant a severe response was inevitable, suggesting Soleimani's 2020 assassination did not significantly cause Iran's current proxy network collapse.
“I I suspect uh I suspect the could force and the Iranians would still be in this position if October 7th had happened uh because I think the Israelis were going to respond pretty harshly with such a largecale set of casualties on their soil.”
Israel did not want to be surprised from the north (by Hezbollah) after October 7th, which motivated a range of covert and other activities against Hezbollah to preempt capabilities before full-scale conflict.
“one of the areas that I think has been most striking was not wanting to be surprised again from the north and what that meant is a range of covert and other activities against Hezbollah.”
The GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) is the primary Russian actor conducting irregular warfare attacks in Europe, as indicated by prosecution of individuals involved in IKEA (likely infrastructure or operations) attacks in Lithuania.
“We've seen recently um the uh uh prosecution of individuals involved in I the IKEA attacks in Lithuania. Um and and those Russian attacks have included explosives.”
If assessed on effectiveness in changing adversary behavior, Russia would receive a grade of B-minus or C-plus rather than A, suggesting substantial gap between operational activity and strategic achievement in irregular warfare.
“you know so I I I'm not sure that they you know that if if I were to grade the Russians in effectiveness I I don't think I'd give them an A. Maybe like a B minus or C plus.”
The Israel's harsh response to the October 7 attack and subsequent proactive operations against Hezbollah would likely have occurred even if Suleimani had been alive, suggesting that Israel's response was driven by the attack itself rather than by Suleimani's absence from the leadership of the Quds Force.
“I suspect the could force and the Iranians would still be in this position if October 7th had happened uh because I think the Israelis were going to respond pretty harshly with such a largecale set of casualties on their soil... I I don't think again that uh uh the challenges Iran has had probably have had as much to do with the change in leadership from Sulammani and more that um you know the Israelis have responded pretty proactively once October 7th happened.”
Irregular warfare represents a method that major powers have used for centuries to fight each other below the conventional threshold, making it a durable feature of international competition rather than a novel phenomenon.
“this is a way that major powers have for centuries uh fought each other kind of below the conventional threshold”
The MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran) has been active in irregular warfare operations but ranks below the IRGC Quds Force in scale and prominence within the Iranian national security apparatus.
“There are others like the MOIS uh Iranian intelligence that have been active but it's the goods force um that has been most active.”
The fundamental concern about Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is escalation to nuclear war, reflecting the high risk of direct conventional conflict between nuclear-armed powers.
“it's been the big concern since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is escalation to nuclear war”
The podcast host notes that there is a cut-off in the transcript at the point where Jones was about to answer whether Russian irregular warfare goals were different from changing government behavior.
“You've said that um maybe the effectiveness was not the goal or the changing of the behavior was not the goal of this ongoing campaign. If that wasn't the goal, what would be the goal? Thank you for listening to this conversation. If you'd like to hear the rest of it, you can find it on my Patreon.”
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