
Why is high debt different now v. prior instances of people “fear-mongering” about the debt?
What this covers
Stay connected by joining our weekly updates at https://fftt-llc.com/
Subscribe to FFTT Tree Rings here: https://fftt-treerings.com/
Check out Luke's books, including:
Mr. X Interviews Volume 2: World Views from a Fictional US Sovereign Creditor here: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Luke-Gromen/e/B07MXNYH2X%3Fref=dbs_a_mng_rwt_scns_share
Intro/Outro Music by: https://www.purple-planet.com/
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Luke Groman argues that sovereign debt dynamics are fundamentally broken across historical precedents—interest expense exceeding defense spending, entitlements plus interest exceeding receipts, and the Fed running quasi-fiscal deficits—and that resolution will unfold as a multi-year process of asset price inflation relative to Treasury bonds rather than a sudden collapse event, requiring policymakers to continuously support Treasury markets and the stock market which implicitly backs them.
- US interest expense has never exceeded defense spending in 110 years until now; entitlements plus interest have never exceeded receipts for extended periods until now; Fed has never run a quasi-fiscal deficit in 112-year history until now
- The unraveling manifests as a process (secular inflation, gold/Bitcoin/equity/home/farmland appreciation relative to Treasuries) not an event; policymakers have repeatedly intervened to prevent Treasury dysfunction
- US stock market now functions as de facto backing for Treasury market, forcing nominal equity returns of 10-15% annually to maintain fiscal math, which means sustained periods of equity softness are impossible without debt devaluation first
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
US interest expense has never exceeded US defense spending in any 110-year historical period until the current era, marking an unprecedented structural break in fiscal dynamics.
“Well, go back 110 years. US interest expense has never never been above US defense spending in 110 years.”
Evidence of the unraveling process already visible includes: China offshoring, the Great Financial Crisis, 1 million Americans dead from drug overdoses since 2010, political populism at 60-year highs, domestic political instability, and elite/policymaker panic about Chinese competition.
“China offshoring part of the process. The great financial crisis, part of that process. 1 million Americans dead of drug overdoses just since 2010. Part of that process. When did you see that before in America? Never. Maybe not since the 1870s when it was happening to Native Americans with alcohol. Political populism worst in 60 years. Process domestic instability process. Elite and policymaker panic.”
Previous periods of debt-driven inflation (1967-1980) were not crises for everyone: they were crises only for bond holders, because gold rose 20x in nominal terms over that period (1971-1980), transferring real wealth from creditors to other asset holders without systemic collapse.
“Sure. And it didn't blow up then. Sure. As long as you weren't a bond holder, because guess what? From 1971 to n excuse me, to 1980, gold rose 20x. Yeah. So basically, how do we get out of that? We had a big period of inflation. Bond holders got destroyed on a real basis. No crisis. No crisis unless you know, unless you had a bunch of bonds, right?”
Historical claims that US debt was unsustainably high in 1967–1969 were not falsified by subsequent collapse because bond holders experienced severe real losses: from 1971 to 1980, gold rose 20x, meaning bond holders were destroyed on an inflation-adjusted basis even though no formal debt crisis occurred.
“We've seen people say, 'Oh, is this just fear-mongering about the debt? They were fear-mongering in 1967, 1968, 1969.' We've talked about this before in some of our work. Sure. And it didn't blow up then. Sure. As long as you weren't a bond holder, because guess what? From 1971 to n excuse me, to 1980, gold rose 20x.”
Bitcoin uniquely enables the transfer of billions of dollars to anyone globally in under one minute through a Zoom call or video screen using only two phones and a QR code, with no permission from any authority—a capability no other asset (gold, stocks, bonds, bank transfers) can match.
“Okay, I can transfer billions with a B of dollars to someone on the other side of the world in under a minute through a Zoom call or a TV screen with no permission from anybody using nothing more than two phones and a QR code. Voila. Try to do that with your bank. Try to do that with gold. Try to do that with stocks. Try to do that with bonds. Try to do that with anything. very powerful freedom.”
Over the past 110 years, US interest expense has never exceeded US defense spending; entitlements plus interest expense combined have never exceeded receipts for more than momentary periods (always met with dollar liquidity injection); the Fed has never run a quasi-fiscal deficit in 112 years of existence. These represent historically unprecedented conditions.
“US interest expense has never never been above US defense spending in 110 years... US entitlements have never when added with interest expense been above receipts for more than a moment and it was always met with more dollar liquidity. Never. Never. 100 years plus. Blast. The Fed has never run a quasi fiscal deficit, aka an operating loss, in its 112year history. Never.”
The last central bank in US history to run a quasi-fiscal deficit was the Confederate central bank during the Civil War, after which the Confederate dollar became worthless, providing a cautionary historical precedent.
“Last central bank in the US reportedly to do so, according to my friend Jeffrey Fry, was the Confederate central bank as they were losing the Civil War. Anyone remember what happened to the Confederate dollar? Wasn't good.”
Repeated Federal Reserve interventions to prevent Treasury yields from rising (repo market intervention, balance sheet expansion) represent part of the ongoing process of managing sovereign debt dysfunction, indicating systemic stress rather than resolution.
“repeated US policymaker interventions to keep treasury yields at a sustainable level. Repo rates spike went to 8 to 10%. They could have stood aside. We would have had 9 to 11% treasuries, 10 to 12% mortgages. That would have been an ugly environment, but no. Fed began regrowing their balance sheet. Fed's balance sheets much higher than it was 5 years ago when that happened. Again, process.”
Bitcoin's unique feature is the ability to transfer billions of dollars internationally in under a minute via Zoom or TV call using only two phones and a QR code, with no permission from any authority—a capability unavailable to banks, gold, stocks, or bonds.
“I can transfer billions with a B of dollars to someone on the other side of the world in under a minute through a Zoom call or a TV screen with no permission from anybody using nothing more than two phones and a QR code. Voila. Try to do that with your bank. Try to do that with gold. Try to do that with stocks. Try to do that with bonds.”
The debt unraveling process is not an event (like a sudden crash or 'zombies in the street') but a slow process visible over years and decades through rising gold, Bitcoin, equities, real estate, and farmland prices despite rising interest rates—which contradicts normal economic relationships.
“Look, if id have told you four years ago gold was going to be at $3,500 or 10 years ago gold was going to be at $3,500, most investors or many investors certainly would say, 'Oh, there's going to be zombies in the street. It's the end of the world.' And yet gold hit 3500 last week. I look outside. It's a beautiful sunny day here in Cleveland. It sun's risen every single day since. No zombies, no collapse, spider fly. You know that big bang that some people are looking for. What if it doesn't come? It's a process, not an event.”
The Switzerland discussion of negative interest rates is a form of capital control intended to discourage foreign investment and keep the Swiss franc from appreciating.
“I did notice that the Swiss are starting to talk about negative rates possibly again. Uh and that's a form of some sort of capital control. Basically, take your money somewhere else. We don't want it. Uh you're making our currency too strong.”
The price of homes has risen despite rising interest rates, which contradicts normal market mechanics where rate increases should reduce home prices due to higher borrowing costs.
“Rising price of homes despite rising interest rates, which is not how it's supposed to work.”
Michael McNair has described a mechanism by which the US Treasury can legally and without congressional approval weaken the dollar by buying foreign currency using gold derivatives and gold as collateral, which Groman characterizes as a form of surreptitious Treasury-level currency intervention.
“At the very least what Michael Maner described and you can find it on X uh appears to my eyes to be a way for Treasury to legally and without congressional approval surreptitiously weaken the dollar without the Fed's help by buying foreign currency using gold derivatives and gold as collateral.”
For non-professional investors in the current regime, the goal should not be to maximize returns in a narrow asset class but to preserve and transition wealth across multiple dimensions (monetary, health, family, relationships, community) from this side of the transition to the other side.
“My goal is getting from this side of what's ever in front of us to the other side with not just wealth but a full picture of wealth, monetary, health, family, relationships, community, etc.”
Bessent cannot weaponize access to Fed swap lines because three constraints prevent it: (1) dollar fungibility—dollars obtained via one channel flow to other markets, (2) US deficits mean new dollars are continually created and distributed globally, and (3) the Treasury market dysfunction would force Bessent and Powell to inject liquidity anyway, defeating the constraint.
“Fungeability of US dollars, number one, number two, US deficits, and number three, the US Treasury market. What do we mean? Uh okay, let's let's let's run that scenario through Bessant weaponizes access to swap lines. Foreigners that can't get swap lines sell treasuries. Treasury market then dysfunctions, which we've seen repeatedly happen in recent years. Bessent then faces a choice himself. Does he let the US and the global sovereign debt market go into a debt death spiral? rates up, equities down, receipts down, deficits up like we saw starting to happen last month or or does Powell and Bessant or both inject dollar liquidity jawbone the market down and then when they do that via US trade deficits that dollar's fungeability finds its way to the creditors we were trying to choke off and the answer is and has been and continues to be and in my opinion will continue to be the latter.”
The unraveling of the current fiscal regime will manifest as a prolonged process of relative asset price inflation (gold, Bitcoin, equities, real estate, farmland) versus Treasury bonds rather than as a sudden catastrophic collapse event, and this process is already visibly underway.
“Look, if id have told you four years ago gold was going to be at $3,500 or 10 years ago gold was going to be at $3,500, most investors or many investors certainly would say, 'Oh, there's going to be zombies in the street. It's the end of the world.' And yet gold hit 3500 last week. I look outside. It's a beautiful sunny day here in Cleveland. It sun's risen every single day since. No zombies, no collapse, spider fly. You know that big bang that some people are looking for. What if it doesn't come? It's a process, not an event.”
The Taiwan dollar has experienced an unprecedented move stronger against the US dollar, likely signaling early implementation of a 'Mar-a-Lago accord' or currency arrangement where Trump and Bessent are pushing currencies toward balance-of-payments-driven exchange rates (surplus countries stronger, deficit countries weaker).
“maybe everything Trump and Besson are trying to do uh ultimately appears to my eyes to be trying to get currencies to trade more on a balance of payments basis. I.e. surplus countries stronger deficit countries weaker. Dollar is the dirtiest dirty shirt on that basis. And the Taiwan dollar is actually one of if not the single biggest surplus country in the world. So maybe this this unprecedented move in the Taiwan dollar stronger against the US dollar. Is it an early sign of some sort of Mara Lago accord or currency deal being discussed? Maybe.”
Michael McNair has described a mechanism called 'gold QE by the Treasury' that would allow the Treasury to legally weaken the dollar without congressional approval or Fed involvement by buying foreign currency using gold derivatives and gold as collateral.
“at the very least what Michael Maner described and you can find it on X uh appears to my eyes to be a way for Treasury to legally and without congressional approval surreptitiously weaken the dollar without the Fed's help by buying foreign currency using gold derivatives and gold as collateral.”
Americans are uniquely inclined to interpret current debt/debasement dynamics as requiring catastrophic collapse, whereas people globally interpret similar processes as periodic phenomena that are manageable and compatible with normal life.
“Like everyone I've talked to around the world, the only people that equate sort of what we're going through with like like absolute collapse event, zombie apocalypse are Americans. Everyone else is like we equate it to something that happens periodically and life goes on.”
Policymakers will never allow US Treasury market dysfunction because (1) they have proven this repeatedly in recent years and (2) the costs of an auction failure—debt death spiral with rising rates, falling equities, falling tax receipts, rising deficits—are politically intolerable.
“They are never going to let the Treasury market dysfunction. They are never going to let an auction fail. And as long as they refuse to do that, weaponizing weaponizing uh uh swap lines is like me threatening to uh uh become the point guard of the of the Cleveland Cavaliers. Ain't going to happen.”
Capital controls cannot remain isolated—once one country imposes them, others must follow quickly because open capital accounts become sources of capital flight to more closed systems, creating an unstoppable cascade of protectionism.
“And once that starts, assets down, bond yields up, currency down, more of what we saw in April for those two, three fund weeks that we all enjoyed. And so then that's when you'd have to see capital controls. And once one starts, they're all going to have to do it relatively quickly.”
The Goldilocks scenario (dollar/treasury remaining reserve asset, US industrial resurgence, US stocks rising, mild inflation) is impossible because reversing offshoring and the global reserve currency structure will be inflationary, making mild inflation unachievable simultaneously with other conditions.
“Uh in my opinion no uh inflation mild was the result or was the outcome of the US global reserve currency plus US technology growth plus US offshoring. Uh if you're going to reverse two of the three of those, the global reserve currency structure and the offshoring, it's going to be inflationary.”
High conviction exists that the long cycle will end in significant broad fiat debasement, but zero or near-zero conviction exists about the path to get there, making tactical positioning dangerous and strategic positioning (gold/Bitcoin + liquidity) preferable.
“I have very high conviction how this long cycle is going to end, how this fourth turning is going to end as it relates to assets. It has to I have extremely high conviction that is going to end with significant broad fiat debasement. I have zero or near zero conviction in the path we get there. And there's a lot of different ways we can.”
Jerome Powell's optimal decision given political constraints would have been to resign in December 2021 while his reputation remained intact, because regardless of path forward from that point, either bond holders, consumers, boomers, the DoD, Republicans, Democrats, or some combination thereof will be extremely unhappy with monetary policy outcomes.
“I would get into a time machine. I would set the date for December 2021 and then I'd resign while everyone was still singing my praises...somebody's going to be extremely unhappy with him. Uh, at least somebody at least one big group of consumers or or constituents, uh, bond holders, uh, boomers, consumers, uh, the DoD, um, you know, the Republicans, the Democrats”
The Federal Reserve has never run a quasi-fiscal deficit (operating loss) in its 112-year history until recently, and the last central bank in the United States to do so was the Confederate central bank during the Civil War, whose currency subsequently became worthless.
“Blast. The Fed has never run a quasi fiscal deficit, aka an operating loss, in its 112year history. Never. Last central bank in the US reportedly to do so, according to my friend Jeffrey Fry, was the Confederate central bank as they were losing the Civil War. Anyone remember what happened to the Confederate dollar? Wasn't good.”
Repeated US policymaker interventions to prevent Treasury yield spikes are part of the visible unraveling process; when repo rates spiked to 8-10% in 2019, the Fed could have allowed 9-11% Treasury yields and 10-12% mortgage rates to emerge (painful but market-clearing), but instead began balance sheet expansion, which is now much higher than pre-2019 levels.
“repeated US policymaker interventions to keep treasury yields at a sustainable level. Repo rates spike went to 8 to 10%. They could have stood aside. We would have had 9 to 11% treasuries, 10 to 12% mortgages. That would have been an ugly environment, but no. Fed began regrowing their balance sheet. Fed's balance sheets much higher than it was 5 years ago when that happened. Again, process.”
Attempting to perfectly time or trade a historic period involving the first sovereign debt bubble burst in 100 years, first Fed quasi-fiscal deficit in 113 years, first time interest expense exceeds defense budget, first currency system transition in 50+ years, and unprecedented AI/robotics deflation is likely to lead to poor outcomes for non-professional traders.
“Trying to time for for anyone who is not a trader. Trying to time or trade perfectly. The first bursting global sovereign debt bubble in a 100 years. The first Fed quasi fiscal deficit in 113 years ever. The first time the US interest expense has been above defense budget ever. The first currency system transition in 50 plus years.”
No Goldilocks scenario exists in which the dollar and Treasury remain the preeminent reserve assets while the US reshores industry, stocks rise, and inflation stays mild, because mild inflation was historically the product of three factors: (1) US global reserve currency status, (2) US technology growth, and (3) US offshoring. If you reverse two of these three, inflation must accelerate.
“Um in my opinion no uh inflation mild was the result or was the outcome of the US global reserve currency plus US technology growth plus US offshoring. Uh if you're going to reverse two of the three of those, the global reserve currency structure and the offshoring, it's going to be inflationary.”
Swap line access can only be weaponized against foreign governments if three constraints are absent: (1) dollar fungeability (once printed, dollars are fungible and cannot be controlled), (2) US trade deficits (which means dollars flow to other countries regardless of swap line policies), and (3) the US Treasury market must function. As long as these three remain binding, weaponizing swap lines is ineffective.
“Uh fungeability of US dollars, number one, number two, US deficits, and number three, the US Treasury market. What do we mean? Uh okay, let's let's let's run that scenario through Bessant weaponizes access to swap lines. Foreigners that can't get swap lines sell treasuries. Treasury market then dysfunctions, which we've seen repeatedly happen in recent years. Bessent then faces a choice himself. Does he let the US and the global sovereign debt market go into a debt death spiral? rates up, equities down, receipts down, deficits up like we saw starting to happen last month or or does Powell and Bessant or both inject dollar liquidity jawbone the market down and then when they do that via US trade deficits that dollar's fungeability finds its way to the creditors we were trying to choke off and the answer is and has been and continues to be and in my opinion will continue to be the latter.”
Multiple concurrent processes signal debt unraveling: China offshoring, the 2008 financial crisis, 1 million American drug overdose deaths since 2010 (unprecedented in modern US), worst political populism in 60 years, and policymaker panic about Chinese competition. Each is part of a larger unraveling process, not isolated events.
“China offshoring part of the process. The great financial crisis, part of that process. 1 million Americans dead of drug overdoses just since 2010. Part of that process. When did you see that before in America? Never. Maybe not since the 1870s when it was happening to Native Americans with alcohol. Political populism worst in 60 years. Process domestic instability process. Elite and policymaker panic.”
Transferring money via Bitcoin with permission-free, borderless capability should be understood as 'freedom' not 'money laundering,' and law-abiding citizens should be able to move their money wherever they want because it's their money.
“People say, 'Oh, that's moneyaundering.' That's freedom. You should be able to move your money if you're a law-abiding citizen. You should be able to move your money wherever you want. It's your money.”
The goal should not be narrow maximization in one asset but rather understanding the operating environment and achieving full wealth (monetary, health, family, relationships, community) across the transformation, not just monetary wealth.
“My goal is getting from this side of what's ever's in front of us to the other side with not just wealth but a full picture of wealth, monetary, health, family, relationships, community, etc.”
Peak cheap oil in dollar terms remains real because capex cuts and falling rig counts are occurring with oil below $60, proving that producers cannot profitably produce at those prices—contradicting the claim that cheap oil will persist.
“we're starting to see capex cuts and falling rig count with oil below 60 which suggests strongly to me that peak cheap oil in dollar terms is absolutely not dead otherwise they wouldn't be cutting production.”
There are two distinct phases: wealth accumulation periods (during which getting rich is easy) and wealth destruction periods (during which getting poor is easy). The current period is a wealth destruction period, making precise trading extremely difficult for non-professionals.
“There are times of wealth accumulation and there are times of wealth destruction. Getting rich is relatively easy during times of wealth accumulation. Getting poor during times of wealth destruction is also relatively easy. And we are in a time of wealth destruction.”
The first legendary investor (described as being in his 80s) told Groman that 'there are times of wealth accumulation and times of wealth destruction. Getting rich is relatively easy during times of wealth accumulation. Getting poor during times of wealth destruction is also relatively easy. We are in a time of wealth destruction.'
“There are times of wealth accumulation and there are times of wealth destruction. Getting rich is relatively easy during times of wealth accumulation. Getting poor during times of wealth destruction is also relatively easy. And we are in a time of wealth destruction.”
AI and robotics will create deflation at unprecedented pace, making changes that 'none of us can fathom' happen faster than anyone can predict, adding a sixth dimension of unpredictability to the current period.
“The unprecedented pace of AI and robotics deflation that is likely to make changes none of us can fathom faster than any of us can fathom.”
Export-driven economies with open capital accounts (Germany, Japan, Korea) will likely experience capital controls as capital repatriates from US markets during a trade war, with negative interest rates in places like Switzerland already signaling this dynamic.
“Short answer, yes. Uh I don't know where it will start. I did notice that the Swiss are starting to talk about negative rates possibly again. Uh and that's a form of some sort of capital control. Basically, take your money somewhere else. We don't want it. Uh you're making our currency too strong.”
If capital controls do not emerge implicitly, the US government may implement them explicitly through pension regulations requiring 30% allocations to 30-year Treasuries to maintain tax-deferred status on 401(k)s and IRAs, as an alternative to direct capital controls.
“it would be things like hey to maintain the taxable uh the tax deferred status of your pension or your 401k or your IRA etc you now need to hold 30% of the assets in 30-year treasuries have a good day”
Trump and Bannon's policy agenda appears aimed at shifting currency markets toward balance-of-payments-driven exchange rates, meaning surplus countries' currencies strengthen and deficit countries' currencies weaken; the US dollar is the 'dirtiest dirty shirt' on a balance-of-payments basis (largest deficit), so it should weaken significantly.
“Maybe everything Trump and Besson are trying to do uh ultimately appears to my eyes to be trying to get currencies to trade more on a balance of payments basis. I.e. surplus countries stronger deficit countries weaker. Dollar is the dirtiest dirty shirt on that basis.”
Non-American observers globally equate current US fiscal stress with periodic sovereign debt problems that occur regularly and life continues afterward; only Americans interpret it as an absolute collapse/zombie apocalypse event.
“Like everyone I've talked to around the world, the only people that equate sort of what we're going through with like like absolute collapse event, zombie apocalypse are Americans. Everyone else is like we equate it to something that happens periodically and life goes on.”
Gold strengthening in dollar terms and the yuan strengthening against the dollar align with the same underlying policy objective of a gold pivot and balance-of-payments-driven system, which are exactly what is being observed.
“They've been saying it for years on a balance of payments. Yuan should rise a lot against the dollar. Maybe through the gold pivot and and we would see gold rising in dollars a lot. It's exactly what we're seeing.”
Capital controls should be expected to emerge in export-driven surplus economies (Germany, Japan, Korea) as capital repatriates from US markets during a trade war, and the Swiss discussion of negative rates again is an early form of capital control designed to discourage inflows of foreign capital.
“Uh short answer, yes. Uh I don't know where it will start. I did notice that the Swiss are starting to talk about negative rates possibly again. Uh and that's a form of some sort of capital control. Basically, take your money somewhere else. We don't want it. Uh you're making our currency too strong.”
A sustained period of nominal US equity softness comparable to 1929–1955 or 1966–1982 or 2000–2013 is not possible unless the US first devalues the national debt, because the fiscal math requires stock market appreciation of 10–15% annually without fail.
“Regarding the first not unless they devalue the debt first. If they don't devalue the debt then no that's not possible because ultimately the way US policy makers have allowed the system to evolve means that the stock market de facto backs the treasury market and that means that given US debt and deficits the stock market's got to rise 10 or 15% or more per year every year without fail or else the fiscal math for the United States of America does not work”
The US Treasury market will never be allowed to dysfunction or auctions to fail, regardless of trade war pressures or foreign capital controls attempts, because the alternative (allowing rates to spike and causing debt death spiral) is politically unacceptable to both Powell and Bessent.
“They are never going to let the Treasury market dysfunction. They are never going to let an auction fail.”
Policy makers will inject dollar liquidity and jawbone markets down when Treasury yields spike, rather than allowing auction failures or Treasury market dysfunction, establishing this as a confirmed pattern with historical repetition.
“They are never going to let the Treasury market dysfunction. They are never going to let an auction fail. And as long as they refuse to do that... and the answer is and has been and continues to be and in my opinion will continue to be the latter.”
Groman does not know anyone who has lived through all of the unprecedented events currently converging (multiple 100-110+ year phenomena happening simultaneously) and therefore cannot consult historical precedent—forcing a new approach rather than repeating historical patterns.
“Listen, if you know somebody who is has has lived through all of these once in 110, 120 never times, great. ask them how they did it last time, but you're not going to find them because they're all dead, even if they ever existed because some of this stuff's never happened before.”
What is labeled as 'money laundering' in Bitcoin transfers is fundamentally an expression of monetary freedom—the right of law-abiding citizens to move their own money wherever they choose without permission from authorities.
“People say, 'Oh, that's moneyaundering.' That's freedom. You should be able to move your money if you're a law-abiding citizen. You should be able to move your money wherever you want. It's your money.”
The proper framework for understanding the current environment is to acknowledge that multiple simultaneously unprecedented conditions exist with no historical precedent from anyone alive today, making personal experience-based forecasting impossible.
“Listen, if you know somebody who is has has lived through all of these once in 110, 120 never times, great. ask them how they did it last time, but you're not going to find them because they're all dead, even if they ever existed because some of this stuff's never happened before.”
Groman would rather own gold and Bitcoin years early than be one day late, because once capital controls begin, liquidity disappears and asset sales become impossible.
“my my read of it for my personal, I would rather be years early owning a decent little chunk of gold and Bitcoin than one day late because when you're one day late, too late.”
Capital controls in the US may not be implemented explicitly but rather through disguised mechanisms such as requiring 30% of pension/401k/IRA assets be held in 30-year Treasury bonds to maintain tax-deferred status, which would function as a soft capital control.
“But it would be things like hey to maintain the taxable uh the tax deferred status of your pension or your 401k or your IRA etc you now need to hold 30% of the assets in 30-year treasuries have a good day um because if they don't do those kinds the things the longer the trade war drags on”
Jerome Powell should have resigned in December 2021 while still popular, because any major fiscal or monetary decision now will anger large constituencies (bondholders, boomers, consumers, Department of Defense, Republicans, Democrats), making his position politically untenable regardless of policy choice.
“I would get into a time machine. I would set the date for December 2021 and then I'd resign while everyone was still singing my praises... somebody's going to be extremely unhappy with him. Uh, at least somebody at least one big group of consumers or or constituents, uh, bond holders, uh, boomers, consumers, uh, the DoD, um, you know, the Republicans, the Democrats, who knows?”
The peak cheap oil thesis in dollar terms remains valid because oil companies are cutting capital expenditures and rig counts despite oil being below $60, which would not occur if oil were truly in a long-term bull market.
“Uh the other point I think in my favor is that we're starting to see capex cuts and falling rig count with oil below 60 which suggests strongly to me that peak cheap oil in dollar terms is absolutely not dead otherwise they wouldn't be cutting production.”
A 20% portfolio allocation to gold and Bitcoin provides adequate downside protection if Groman is even approximately correct about fiat debasement, while preserving optionality; the primary risk is owning too much and getting the operational sequencing wrong, leaving no liquidity for opportunistic purchases.
“20% golden Bitcoin, if I'm even close to right, you're going to be just fine. Um the biggest risk in that case is you're you own too much and you get your order wrong, your order of operations, and you've got no cash, you've got no liquidity. Now what? Now you're selling at the exact wrong time.”
Doomberg's claim about peak cheap oil being 'nonsense' is actually aligned with Groman's position—both argue oil prices are declining in gold terms, which is equivalent to saying the gold-to-oil ratio is rising inexorably.
“I respect Duneberg's work a lot. Uh when he and I've talked about this issue actually uh my understanding is that he is saying lower oil in gold terms. If you read what he talks about uh he's talking about oil prices declining uh in gold terms which is exactly what I say. Uh I say the gold to oil ratio is going inexorably higher.”
Groman has extremely high conviction that the current long economic cycle will end with significant broad fiat currency debasement, but has zero or near-zero conviction about the specific path to that outcome because multiple pathways are possible.
“I have very high conviction how this long cycle is going to end, how this fourth turning is going to end as it relates to assets. It has to I have extremely high conviction that is going to end with significant broad fiat debasement. I have zero or near zero conviction in the path we get there. And there's a lot of different ways we can.”
The 'operating loss' of the Federal Reserve occurs when its interest paid to reserves exceeds income from bond holdings, representing a quasi-fiscal deficit where the Fed is losing money operationally.
“The Fed has never run a quasi fiscal deficit, aka an operating loss, in its 112year history.”
Fourth turnings are periods characterized by particularly difficult political and social conditions where major constituencies will be harmed by policy choices, making consensus on solutions impossible.
“this is what happens at the end of fourth turnings, high levels of deficits, etc.”
Groman respects Doomberg's work and understands that Doomberg is claiming oil prices will decline in gold terms (not dollar terms), which is exactly consistent with Groman's 'peak cheap oil' thesis, not contradictory to it.
“Uh I respect Duneberg's work a lot. Uh when he and I've talked about this issue actually uh my understanding is that he is saying lower oil in gold terms. If you read what he talks about uh he's talking about oil prices declining uh in gold terms which is exactly what I say.”
Near-term, the US dollar is expected to move modestly lower in the absence of Fed rate cuts, suggesting current Fed policy is already in a weak-dollar regime.
“Uh near-term, I think the dollar is going modestly lower. Uh over the next three years, if Trump and Bessant come close to achieving what it appears they are trying to do, I think dollar goes to 70 to 80 on the DXY.”
Near-term dollar movement will be modestly lower; longer-term movement depends on whether Trump and Bessent succeed in their apparent policy objectives.
“Near-term, I think the dollar is going modestly lower. Uh over the next three years, if Trump and Bessant come close to achieving what it appears they are trying to do, I think dollar goes to 70 to 80 on the DXY.”