A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
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A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
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Spinoza represents a historical pivot point in Western philosophy who reconciles the rationalist geometrical method of Descartes with a pantheistic metaphysics that rejects Cartesian dualism, grounding a stoic ethics in monistic metaphysics and transmitting nature-pantheism to 19th-century romanticism.
- Spinoza adopts Descartes' geometrical method while fundamentally rejecting Cartesian mind-body and God-nature dualism in favor of double-aspect monism
- Spinoza grounds his ethics of reason controlling emotion in a pantheistic metaphysic where God and nature are identical, creating a stoic-type ethics with a nature-pantheistic foundation unlike Descartes
- Spinoza's work becomes the philosophical bridge transmitting pantheistic thought from the rationalist 17th century to 19th-century romanticism through thinkers like Hegel and Schopenhauer
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Descartes's theory of passions explains that passions mislead us through lack of clarity and confusion accompanying emotion, but when the mind achieves clear and distinct ideas, the confusion is dispelled and the power of the passion is broken, which explains what psychological counselors do when they help clients think more clearly about circumstances—dispelling emotion through clarity of thought.
“they mislead us by virtue of lack of clarity which accompanies emotion. Consequently, when the mind achieves clarity and distinctness of thought, clear and distinct ideas, you see, uh that um confusion that goes with emotion is dispelled and the power of the passion is broken. Okay? So, it's clarity of mind.”
Spinoza transmits a nature-pantheism—the view that nature itself is divine—from the 17th century to 19th-century Romantic thinkers like Hegel and Schopenhauer who speak favorably of Spinoza, and this influence appears in Romantic literature through figures like Coleridge, Goethe, and Matthew Arnold, though the Romantics abandon Spinoza's rationalism and ethics of reason controlling emotion.
“Spanodza tends to transmit he does transmit to the 19th century. He's remember in the 17th century, but he's the link that transmits that monistic kind of approach, a pantheistic kind of approach, a nature pantheism to the 19th century romanticists.”
Spinoza insists that his technical terms—particularly substance, mind, God, and good—must never be understood in their vulgar common or figurative sense but only in the specialized sense given to them in his definitions, a caution that is essential for correctly reading his work.
“Spenoza insists that his words and particularly his words about God and his attributes must never be understood in their vulgar, that is to say, their common and figurative sense, but only in the special sense given to them in his definitions. Now, keep that caution in mind.”
God has infinite attributes, but only two attributes—thought and extension—are known to us; Spinoza does not claim we know all of God's attributes but only that there may be infinite other attributes beyond what we experience as thought and mind or extension and body.
“in God there is both thought and extension. God is infinite extension as if God is the whole arena of space. But God at the same time is uh infinite in uh in thought. And you get echoes here of the Platonic tradition or perhaps of the stoic logos concept. You see thought and extension. These are two attributes of God. One God and two known attributes. There may be other attributes we don't know.”
Spinoza's definition of God as 'a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality' logically follows from his definitions of self-causation and substance, with the conclusion that God necessarily exists because God's essence involves existence.
“By that which is selfcaused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence. That of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.”
Since the medieval and classical periods when metaphysical monism was common, Western philosophy has been dominated by Judeo-Christian influence emphasizing dualism (God vs. creation, soul vs. body), making pantheistic or monistic metaphysics rare until Spinoza revives it as a systematic philosophical framework.
“Spinodza is a metaphysical monist. And um we haven't metaphysical monists for a long time because of the Judeo-Christian influence. We did meet um Plotinus and of course Palmenades.”
The major difference between Spinoza and Descartes is that Spinoza cannot assert the freedom of the will because he is a determinist, whereas Descartes affirms free will, making this difference quite significant for their ethical systems.
“Spinodes are likewise. Okay. The big difference in Spinodza we'll see is that Spinodza cannot assert the freedom of the will. He's a determinist and that makes quite a difference.”
If one dislikes Spinoza's conclusions, there are two primary ways to respond: first, one can question his definitions and axioms by asking whether the axioms are truly axiomatic and whether the definitions are arbitrary or defensible; or second, one can examine his logical reasoning.
“Now um I suppose it follows from that that um if you don't like his conclusions there are two things you can do. One is to question his definitions and axioms. Are the axioms axiomatic? Really? Are the definitions arbitrary, defensible? You know, how do you def how do you define definition?”
Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: opinion or imagination (fragmentary awareness of particulars), reason or knowledge of the second kind (universal truths commonly known to all), and intuition (knowledge from adequate ideas of absolute essence, which is intuitively certain, clear, distinct, and beyond all doubt), and he gives little credence to opinion and imagination because they are fragmentary, confused, and merely empirical.
“he distinguishes three kinds of knowledge. Three kinds of knowledge uh which are one opinion, two reasoning and three intuition.”
Spinoza adopts the geometrical method from Descartes—proceeding from definitions and axioms to logically prove theorems—but applies it systematically to metaphysics and ethics in a way Descartes did not, eliminating rhetoric and appeals to imagination to present philosophy as objectively and impersonally as Euclid's Elements.
“He thus eliminated from the presentation of his philosophy any concealed means of persuasion and of engaging the imagination of the reader which are part of ordinary pros writing. no rhetoric, just plain logical form.”
Spinoza is a pantheist who rejects both of Descartes's dualities—the mind-body dualism and the God-nature dualism—in favor of a metaphysical monism where God and nature refer to one and the same thing, with God emphasizing the intelligible rational side and nature emphasizing the material changing side, mirroring the Stoic double-aspect monism of logos and matter.
“Daycart was a dualist in two senses. The duality of mind and body and the duality of God and nature. Spinodza rejects both dualities. Spinodza is a metaphysical monist.”
The crisis of authority regarding human knowledge in the 17th century prompted both Bacon and Descartes in their separate ways to establish certain rational bases for scientific knowledge, with mathematics being the one science from the medieval period that was least subject to skeptical doubt and most suitable as a foundation for rigorous knowledge.
“Remember that this is the age where there was a crisis of authority with regards to human knowledge, where skepticism had again reared its head, and where Bacon and Daycart had in their separate ways tried to establish certain bases on which we could build a truly scientific knowledge.”
In Spinoza's system, there is no notion of separate substances; there are only distinguishable attributes and modes, so one finite mode can be distinguished from another finite mode but not by virtue of substance distinction.
“So there there is no notion of separate substances in daycart sense. There are distinguishable attributes, distinguishable modes. You can distinguish your body from the body sitting next to you. You can distinguish your thoughts from somebody else's. But that's not a distinction of substances. That's a distinction of modes. One finite mode from another finite mode.”
In Descartes's metaphysics, because mind and body are separate substances with different essential properties, the mind is not subject to the deterministic causation that governs bodily processes, and the mind's clarity and distinctness allows it to assert its independence from bodily determination and avoid being dominated by bodily passions.
“Similarly with regards to mind and body in as much as the mind is a separate substance from body and passions are physically caused. The fact that the mind is separate means that it need not be subject to deterministic kinds of causation from bodily passions. But the mind by its clarity and distinctness can assert its independence and gain the same conclusion um results.”
Plotinus, a Neoplatonist pantheist, attempted to solve the problem of how to maintain meaningful distinctions (like good vs. evil) within a monistic system through his theory of emanations—a hierarchical account of degrees of being flowing from the One—which provides a framework for preserving distinction within unity.
“The way in which Plutinus tried to handle it was with his theory of emanations then degrees of so forth.”
Spinoza publishes in 1663, at age 30, a work titled 'Parts One and Two of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated in the Geometrical Manner,' explicitly formatting his exposition of Descartes' philosophy as a geometry textbook with definitions, axioms, theorems, and proofs concluding with QED (quod erat demonstrandum).
“His first philosophical publication in 1663 when he was just 30 years of age had this interesting title parts one and two of Daycart's principles of philosophy demonstrated in the geometrical manner. And what he did was to spell it out literally in the format of a geometry textbook with definitions and um axioms and theorems with proofs and so forth.”
In Descartes's Discourse on Method, when he is about to undertake his attempt to overcome skepticism, he lays down a provisional morality that he will follow while living in uncertainty, which is essentially the same principle as his other ethical positions: restraint of judgment and action until one knows what is good.
“in his discourse on method um as he is about to launch into this attempt to overcome skepticism, he lays down what he calls a provisional morality that he will follow um while he's living in such um uh uncertainty. And the provisional morality is essentially this same kind of thing. He will restrain judgment. He will restrain action until such time as he knows and so on and so forth.”
In Descartes's theory of will and intellect, error is a cognitive evil arising when the will jumps ahead of the intellect and makes judgments beyond what it knows clearly and distinctly; therefore, restraining the will within the limits of clear knowledge is the way to avoid error and evil.
“his discussion of will and intellect uh because um what he says in that regards about error he says with regards to a will that jumps the gun ahead of the intellect. But a will which needs to be restrained to making judgments about what it knows. Now error is a cognitive kind of evil.”
For a pantheist, any special kind of divine act of self-revelation is impossible because if there is no being outside of God, what would it mean for God to act in a self-revealing way to an external being? Pantheism necessarily implies an immanentistic theology where all phenomena occur within God, not to an external other.
“But for a pantheist, any special kind of divine act of self-revelation is meaningless. Because if there is no being outside of God, what would it mean for God to act to some being in a self-revealing way? What you get in a pantheistic scheme is what um is often called an imminentistic theology. That is to say, if everything is God and God is everything, then everything that is ascribed to God is simply going on within God. Not to the outside of God, but going on within God.”
Regarding the question of whether Spinoza is a realist about universals or a conceptualist, the instructor leans toward conceptualism: Spinoza does really think in universal and abstract terms (so he's no nominalist), but he does not believe in universal principles separable from particulars (so he's not a realist), with the Stoic picture guiding his view.
“Is Spanodza a realist about universals or just a conceptualist? Well, I'm inclined to say, just a conceptualist. That is to say, we do really think in universal terms, in abstract terms. We do. Yeah. He's no nominalist. But if a realist means are there universal principles which are separable in some way from particulars? No. No. So closer to a conceptualist I think.”
The instructor analyzes Spinoza's Proposition 1 ('Substance is by nature prior to its modifications') as clearly following from the definitions of substance and mode, Proposition 2 ('Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common') as evident from definition 3, and Proposition 3 ('Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of another') as the solution to Descartes' mind-body problem, showing the logical chain through proposition 15.
“Proposition number one. Proposition number one, substance is by nature prior to its modifications. Proof. This is clear from your definitions of substance and mode. Proposition two, uh, two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common. That's evident from definition three. For each must exist in itself, be conceived through itself. The conception of one doesn't imply the conception of another. Proposition three, things which have nothing in common cannot be one. The cause of another. You see? And then uh proposition five, there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.”
Spinoza's rationalistic critique of religious language and traditional religion is fundamentally a critique of the epistemological status of religious language itself: religious language has historically been treated as descriptive of God and divine truth through analogy, but analogy lacks the literality of definition and the explicitness of mathematical reasoning that Spinoza requires for genuine knowledge.
“his rationalistic critique of religion and religious language is really um in terms of a critique of the kinds of language used in talking about religious matters. Traditionally, it's been called the language of analogy. But analogy is not the kind of literality of definition which Uklid wanted. It's not the kind of explicitness of mathematical reasoning, you see.”
Religious symbols and religious language have communitarian and imaginative value—they bind communities together and transmit moral ideals through narrative and heritage—but they are not descriptive of supernatural truth; this view connects to modern narrative theology and represents an influence of Spinoza's rationalism on 19th-century religious thought.
“Religious language and religious rights are no longer descriptive or reminders of a traditional God and his mighty acts. They are simply symbols that tend to bind the community together. They have communitarian values. They have they they bind the community together and provide uh imaginative language, the language of story, the language of heritage which unites the community around certain moral ideals”
The philosophy of language—how meaning is assigned to words and how definitions establish meaning—becomes a crucial philosophical problem in the 17th century, emerging explicitly in Hobbes's nominalism and continuing in Spinoza's insistence on precise technical definition, suggesting that thinking properly understood begins with properly defined terminology.
“the philosophy of language begins to emerge in the 17th century as crucial. We came across it in Hobbes with his nominalism. Um I mentioned to you that I was working on hobbs currently and even since um we did hobbs two weeks ago. I've discovered places where hobb says that the um the problems that uh that arise with with other views is because of the way people have given meanings to words. Thinking begins with definitions.”
Unphilosophical people are incapable of conceiving God clearly because they are by training incapable of understanding what they cannot imagine, being tied to their senses rather than capable of rationalist a priori knowledge.
“He considered almost everything that had been written and said about God and the creation of the universe meaningless since unfilosophical people are incapable of conceiving God clearly. Uh they are by training incapable of understanding what they cannot imagine. They're so tied to their senses and uh subsequently um Daycart was a rationalist a priori knowledge that's what they couldn't understand”
New Age movements and contemporary esotericism are essentially pantheistic in metaphysical structure, though more romanticized and less systematically developed than Spinoza's pantheism, and they exhibit the same kinds of logical problems that pantheism faces regarding determinism and the distinction between good and evil.
“Incidentally, pantheism is um not just a matter nowadays of eastern religion. Um in as much as um eastern influences have reasserted themselves in the west, well at least in the western part of this country. Um new age movements are essentially pantheistic. you see uh all the writings of new age are not systematic uh not spelled out carefully but there's enough there I think to help us see that it's a kind of pantheism a more romanticized kind of pantheism closer to the 19th century than it is to spin but the same sorts of paradigms occur”
Spinoza published the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in 1670, in which he denies that there is any specially revealed divine truth, marking a major work of theological critique.
“Um he published in 1670 uh a work entitled the tractatus uh theological [Music] politicus a political theological ical tract essay tractatus theological politicus uh in which uh for instance he uh denies that there is any uh special specially revealed truth.”
A student asks David about the difference between Descartes and Spinoza on ethics, and the instructor responds 'wait and see' for a few moments, suggesting the answer will emerge from further analysis of Spinoza's Ethics, implying that the differences are complex enough to require systematic treatment rather than immediate summary.
“Janelle ethics of right from well again I'm inclined to say wait and see for a few moments until we get down there now the few moments may be Friday so don't hold your breath too long”