Yuval Noah Harari & Rutger Bregman: YES Online Conversations
What this covers
Prof. Yuval Noah Harari speaks with author Rutger Bregman, in a moderated conversation by Zanny Minton Beddoes, editor-in-chief of The Economist.
This event is apart of a series of online conversations on global challenges and their implications for Ukraine, organized by the Yalta European Strategy (YES) and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.
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Harari and Bregman debate whether humanity can solve existential crises (pandemic, climate, AI, surveillance) through global cooperation and a more hopeful view of human nature, with Harari emphasizing the fragility of progress and technology risks while Bregman argues that shifting our conception of human nature from selfish to fundamentally decent can enable positive systemic change.
- Individual humans are cooperative and friendly by nature, but large-scale societies produce emergent phenomena like violence, hierarchy, and exploitation that require both storytelling and institutional design to overcome
- The pandemic revealed scientific success but political failure, and created an opening for new ideas (UBI, state investment, climate action) previously dismissed as unrealistic, but only if we shift from cynicism to hope
- The greatest near-term risks are AI-enabled surveillance and control (already deployed in Israel and exported globally) and the collapse of national cohesion into tribal conflict, both of which require global cooperation and institutional change to prevent
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Even people dedicated to resistance and moral action are often not naturally heroic or friendly types; Arnold Douwes, who built a massive underground network saving Dutch Jews from the Nazis, was a cantankerous communist troublemaker and social outcast before the war—suggesting that moral action requires exceptional personal courage rather than natural kindness.
“I've I've for the past couple of months I've studied um resistance fighters in the Netherlands during the Second World War. And there's this one man called Arnold Douwes who built this huge underground network um to help Jews hide from the Nazis. And and he built this um this network in is one of the two places in all of Europe uh together with Le Chambon that you may know in in in in France that received the you know, they all received the Yad Vashem award as the Righteous Among the Nations. And um this guy Arnold Douwes is the opposite of homo puppy. You know, he was a total pain in the ass. He always got into fights with everyone. People really disliked him. He was a sort of like he he was a son of a preacher with communist sympathies before the war. His life was a total failure. Then the Second World War started and he did what no one else could, you know, because he really had the the courage to um to do something there.”
Our capacity to tell stories and convince millions of people to believe in the same narrative—whether true or false—is what allows large-scale human cooperation and why we control the planet instead of chimpanzees: we believe more fictions and nonsense than they do.
“to when you try to get a million people to cooperate, or when you try to get to get 8 billion people to cooperate against a virus, against a pandemic, I don't think that the friendliness in us, which is real, is the key to that. Um I believe that uh it's our storytelling capacity. It's the ability to convince millions, sometimes billions of people to believe in the same story. And um it doesn't even have have to be a true story. Uh to put it in a provocative way, I would say that we control the the planet and not the chimpanzees because we believe a lot more fictions, a lot more nonsense than the chimpanzees.”
Democracy in the large-scale sense was impossible until the 19th century because it requires communication and transportation systems to enable public debate and educated populations at scale; ancient democracies like Athens and Rome were confined to single cities with only 10% of the population included.
“Until the 18th century, you don't see any large-scale democracies. Even the ancient examples like Athens and Rome and the other ancient democracies, they were all confined to single cities. Within Athens, you had a sort of democracy for 10% of the population. Not women, not slaves, but 10% still had a democracy, but only within Athens. Elsewhere, Athens was an empire. It was simply impossible to have a large-scale democracy because you did not have the communication and transportation systems necessary. You couldn't have a public debate about the policies of the Roman Empire in the entire Roman Empire because communication was just too slow and people were not educated enough. Only in the 19th century, with the emergence of new technologies and new systems of communication and education, large-scale democracy becomes possible.”
Humans have a dark side rooted in our groupishness and tribalism—we are desperately motivated to be liked and part of a group, which can turn us against each other; most soldiers in war are motivated not by ideology but by comradeship and not wanting to let down their friends.
“Um there's not like this I mean, libraries full of books have been written about it. But um one really important thing to point to point out here is this sort of the dark side of friendliness or the dark side of the fact that we've domesticated ourselves. Um we are incredibly groupish. We are incredibly tribal. We just want to be liked. That's maybe the biggest problem of humanity. We just want to be part of a group. We don't want to be alone. And on the one hand, that's our secret superpower because it helps us to cooperate. Um but sometimes it also really puts us against one another. I think one really interesting phenomenon that psychologists have discovered is that during wars for example, most soldiers sort of average drafted soldiers are not motivated by ideological hatred or something like that, but by comradeship. They just don't want to let their friends down.”
Bregman argues the pandemic has revealed the limits of pure digitalization: physical contact and in-person interaction are essential for proper education and human development; humans are fundamentally embodied creatures who have not uploaded our brains to the cloud.
“For a long time it was quite fashionable to say, you know, that everything will go digital and that everyone can see the best talks by the top professors from the world on YouTube and that lots of professors around the globe would be out of a job because they wouldn't be able to compete with this you know, the superstar professor. I think what we've actually seen in the last couple of months is that physical contact, actually seeing each other is incredibly important for proper education. That we are still a very physical creature. We haven't uploaded our brain into the cloud just yet.”
Initially, civilization and agriculture were not good for the vast majority of people—they meant suffering under landlords and slavery, with only the top 1% benefiting while 99% labored in fields
“civilization and agriculture were were not really good for the vast majority of people, you know? It really meant that you had to basically um suffer in or or or, you know, be a slave to some kind of landlord. What is your expression, Yuval? History is what, like 1% of the population has been doing while 99% of of people has been working on the fields.”
However, new arms races in cyber technology, AI, and other domains are more dangerous than nuclear deterrence because they create strategic ambiguity: unlike nuclear deterrence (where it's clear that mutual destruction will occur), cyber and AI warfare create the illusion that victory is possible, raising the risk that someone miscalculates or correctly calculates they can win, bringing great power conflict back onto the table.
“with the new arms race in areas like cyber technology and AI and and so forth, there is a temptation that maybe I can win it. That when the other guy presses the button, nothing happens, because I hacked the system. The Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the nuclear confrontation, it was like a chess game. That, you know, it's very cold and rational, and you can see forward if we do this, they will do that. In the current situation, one of the frightening things about the new technologies is that they pour mist over the entire battlefield. You really have no idea what you can do and what the other side can do. You can never really be sure that in the moment of truth, if you press the button, things will actually work. And this raises the the possibility that somebody will miscalculate, or perhaps will calculate correctly, that they can win this thing.”
If an AI arms race develops, it guarantees the worst outcome: technology will be used to enslave humans rather than overcome challenges like climate change, because in competitive dynamics, the imperative to develop faster overwhelms the imperative to develop safely or beneficially.
“And if we see if if we are entering an AI arms race, it will basically guarantee the worst outcome. That there is no way to regulate these disruptive technologies and instead of using them to overcome climate change, they will increasingly be used to enslave humankind.”
Money is beneficial because people can use it to purchase what they need, rather than having external experts dictate what people should consume
“Because that's obviously one of the great things about money is that people can spend it on things they need, instead of on things that some self-appointed experts think they need.”
Humans are not born as cosmopolitans but as tribal/xenophobic creatures; however, empirical psychology shows that increased diversity and contact with people from different backgrounds can reduce tribal tendencies and increase cosmopolitan thinking.
“We're obviously not born as cosmopolitans, obviously not. Uh you could even say we're born as xenophobes, you know? We have these really tribal groupie tendencies. But there's also the possibility within human nature to overcome that. Uh for example, there's there's been numerous studies within psychology that if people have more diversity in their life, you know? Uh meet more people from different backgrounds, then they um they become a little bit more of that cosmopolitan.”
Ancient hunter-gatherer bands were the most democratic systems that ever existed because there was no place for hierarchy or dictatorship; if a bully appeared, people could simply vote with their feet and leave, taking only their personal skills and friendships, with no land or money to keep them tied down.
“democracy or some kind of a very egalitarian system in which everybody gets a right to vote, was characteristic of all human societies. Ancient hunter-gatherers, bands, were the most democratic systems that ever existed. There was no place for a hierarchy or for a dictator. If some bully came around, that the at the last result, people could vote with their feet. They could just go away. There was nothing this bully could do to them. There was, you know, there is no land, there is no money, there are I mean, to survive, you need your personal skills in climbing trees and running after gazelles and your network of friends. And you can just take that and then go somewhere else.”
Agriculture and civilization brought not just hierarchy and patriarchy to human society, but also infectious diseases like plague, measles, and COVID-19, because humans crowded together in unsanitary conditions with domesticated animals, creating conditions for zoonotic pathogen spillover.
“We got hierarchy, we got the patriarchy, we got all these infection diseases like the plague and measles and COVID-19, etc. etc.”
Mankind now faces three main interconnected crises: climate change, technological disruption, and the threat of severe pandemics, with the possibility of even bigger threats ahead.
“the mankind uh now in the center of big crises and big threats. And uh I'm afraid that huge, maybe even much bigger threats ahead of us. I mean threats related to uh climate change, um uh technological disruptions, and maybe much more severe pandemics.”
The nuclear confrontation between USSR and USA during Cold War was 'like a chess game'—rational and predictable because both sides knew the outcome of escalation was mutual destruction
“The Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the nuclear confrontation, it was like a chess game. That, you know, it's very cold and rational, and you can see forward if we do this, they will do that.”
Historically, great power competition almost always led to war; however, since the middle of the 20th century, no war has occurred between two great powers, and this is not accidental but due to deep structural changes: the development of nuclear weapons makes great power war mutually suicidal.
“traditionally in history, this kind of situation almost inevitably led to a great power, not just competition, to a great power war. But, over the last few decades, we have seen a remarkable reduction not just generally in human violence and international wars, but especially in wars between great powers. There has not been a war between two great powers since the middle of the of the 20th century, the Second World War, or maybe if you if you count the Korean War. And this is not because of accidents. This is because of deep changes in the nature of the international system, in the nature of economics and technology. Maybe the most important change is that once you have nuclear weapons, and today you even you we are developing equally destructive weapons of of different kinds, a great power war is mutual suicide.”
Global health cooperation is in everyone's self-interest, not altruism: if viruses continue to spread anywhere on Earth, they will eventually reach everywhere (the frontline of human-virus war passes through every human body); so selfish protection of one's own health requires global cooperation to protect everyone's health.
“I mentioned before the fact that everybody should realize that our health, even if we are completely selfish, it's in our interest to protect the health care of every human being on Earth. Imagine it like you have a war between the humans and the viruses. The frontline passes through the body of every human being on Earth. And if the frontline is breached anywhere in the world, in China, in Brazil, in the UK, it puts everybody in danger. A virus that jumps from some animal to a human in some remote village might be in Wall Street or Beverly Hills or London within a few days.”
In emergencies or attacks, based on camera evidence, people help each other in approximately 90% of all cases, which contradicts older assumptions about human selfishness and supports the view that humans are fundamentally cooperative and helpful.
“we now know that when there's a a small emergency or or a big emergency, someone's drowning or attacked in the street, based on camera evidence, we now know that in in around 90% of all cases, people help each other.”
Humanity cannot reverse civilization or return to nomadic hunter-gatherer life, so debates about whether pre-agricultural societies were better are somewhat moot; the practical question is how to create better large-scale societies given that we are committed to civilization.
“we are living in civilization, a very big one, and we can't go back. So, if you see civilization as the root of all evil, I think you're more pessimistic than I am. Um I think that I mean practically, there is no way back.”
Humans are capable of compartmentalizing: individuals can be highly rational in technical/practical matters (e.g., planning train schedules for genocide, calculating gerrymandering strategies, designing weapons) while simultaneously holding deeply irrational beliefs (conspiracy theories, pseudoscience) in other domains; truth and fiction coexist in the same brain.
“And humans have the ability to believe in the most nonsensical stuff in some areas and to turn to science and experts when they need to do something practical. I mean, to take an extreme example, if you think about Adolf Eichmann um developing or preparing the timetables for the trains taking people from the Netherlands or from Hungary to Auschwitz and designing the gas chambers and how how how it all work, these are extremely rational people. They rely on the latest technology, on the latest science, on experts. They don't want any fluffy fake news. And at the same time, when it comes to their motivation, why do they do all that? It's because they believe a completely nonsensical pseudo-scientific theory, which is at its heart is a conspiracy theory about the Jews controlling the world.”
During WWII, both the USA and UK underwent radical economic transformation with marginal tax rates as high as 90%, rationing (e.g., 35 mph speed limits), and limited civil liberties; achieving similar climate action would require equivalent sacrifices in wealth and freedom that modern democratic publics are unlikely to accept.
“during the Second World War, there was, for example, also the victory speed. Uh vehicles couldn't go faster than 35, you know, to save petrol. In a In a way, they also had to limit civil liberties. Freedom of of expression was limited in the United States... Now, imagine the Jeff Bezos now being dragged out of his office in Amazon by the US government because he doesn't do enough about climate change. You know, I think we're quite far removed from that from that point. Aren't they”
Climate change is happening slowly relative to politics, but requires transformation of everything—how we eat, travel, live, and build houses—all currently driven by fossil fuels; science has been clear on this for 30+ years, so the barrier is not knowledge but political will.
“When it comes to climate change, I mean it's it's so clear that it's simply not sustainable our lifestyle. And it's and it's not clear yet if we're going to make this this transition. What we have to do and the science is quite clear. We have to do something that has never been done before in peacetime. Totally transform the way we live. Everything we do now, how we eat, how we travel, how we live, the houses that we that we build, everything everywhere. It's all driven by fossil fuels and that's simply not sustainable. So And and that you don't really we don't really need more knowledge about that, right? We've known that for 30 years.”
In the 21st century, humanity has shrinking margins of error: we can get decisions right nine out of ten times, but if we get it wrong once—due to technological power and global challenges—that could be the end of us, making Harari pessimistic when looking at the historical record of human decision-making.
“my main fear is that, you know, in the 21st century, given the power we have and the challenges we face, we can get it right nine out of 10 times. If we get it wrong once, that may be the end of us. Our margins of error grow slimmer and slimmer.”
Humans' secret superpower that enabled us to conquer the globe and distinguish us from other species is our capacity to cooperate in large numbers, rooted in self-domestication theory whereby the friendliest individuals historically had the most offspring and thus passed on genes for friendliness.
“What is it that really distinguishes us? Why do we build cathedrals and spaceships? Why have we conquered this globe? And I think that it is our capacity to work together, to cooperate. You could even call it, in the words of one evolutionary anthropologist, survival of the friendliest. This This friendliness is really our secret superpower. Uh the scientific term for this is self-domestication theory. So the idea is that over the millennia, we sort of domesticated ourselves. For a very long time, it was actually the friendliest among us who had the most kids, and so had the biggest chance of passing on their genes to the next generation.”
Vaccine distribution is being treated as a sports competition with countries vaccinating only their own populations, but this is strategically self-defeating: a 100% vaccinated Israel or UK is still vulnerable if new mutations emerge elsewhere (Brazil, South Africa, India) because the virus will continue to spread and mutate in unvaccinated populations, eventually reinfecting the vaccinated.
“countries are treating it like um sports competition. Who is the winner in vaccinating the largest number of citizens in your country without realizing that if you vaccinate only your people in your country, it doesn't give you real protection because, you know, if you if you vaccinate a 100% of Israelis or or people in in the UK and there is a new mutation in Brazil or South Africa or India or anywhere, which makes the vaccine ineffective, then you will have a new wave of infection. As long as you allow the virus to continue to spread in anywhere in the world, it puts everybody in danger.”
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a year of tremendous scientific success—the virus was identified in 2 weeks, effective countermeasures were understood within months, and vaccines were developed in less than a year—but a year of tremendous political failure, with no global coordination or leadership.
“I think the main lesson I will take from the last year, looking from a very broad perspective, is that it has been a year of tremendous scientific success and political failure. I mean, compared to any previous epidemic in history, we have done better and faster in understanding the epidemic and uh understanding what to do about it... With COVID-19, it took only 2 weeks to correctly identify the virus and develop tests to know who who has got it. Um quite quickly, within a few months, we understood or the scientific community understood what countermeasures are best to stop the chains of infection. And within a year, less than a year, we have several effective vaccines... But the scientists are not politicians. It's not their job. They give us the tools. Now it's the job of politicians to use these tools. And it has been a year of a tremendous political failure.”
The 1918 influenza killed more people than World War 1 but is barely remembered in history or culture (no great art about it), which suggests that determining whether COVID-19 will be remembered in 50 years depends on decisions made now.
“there is a chance that in 50, 60 years, people will hardly reme- remember it. I mean, when you look back at uh the I I don't know, the 1918 influenza, which killed more people than the First World War, and it was hardly remembered. And um you know, there is not a I don't think a single great work of art about the 1918 1919 1919 influenza epidemic.”
The pandemic sparked a shift in the zeitgeist: the Financial Times called for reversing 40 years of neoliberal policy direction, mainstream economists (e.g., Piketty) previously dismissed as unrealistic are now central to debates, and ideas like universal basic income, higher taxation on the rich, and a reimagined role for the state have moved from fringe to mainstream.
“a very striking moment was in the beginning of the pandemic in April, I believe, when the Financial Times sort of what is it? The business paper of the of the world, basically, published an editorial, well, after the of course, uh um published this editorial where they said, uh you know, it's probably time to so quote reverse the policy direction of the last 40 years and think about ideas that used to be dismissed as unrealistic and unreasonable only just like 5 years ago and have now really moved into the mainstream. Now obviously ideas that I personally really care about such as a universal basic income, but also a higher taxation on the rich is really on the agenda now.”
Younger generations (millennials and Gen Z) are not only the most highly educated generation ever but also the most ethnically diverse and most progressive, as evidenced by Pew Research data, suggesting they will bring different values to governance and global problems.
“if you look at younger generations, um there's there's there's very interesting evidence from from Pew Re- Pew Research, for example, that young people right now, both in Europe and the US, are not only the most highly educated um generation this world has ever seen, but also the most ethnically diverse and the most progressive.”
Building large-scale projects historically requires both truth and fiction: truth (e.g., physics) is necessary for something to work technically, but fiction (mythology, ideology, religion) is necessary to motivate the millions of people (beyond specialists) who must cooperate to build and implement it; neither is sufficient alone.
“To accomplish big things, whether for good or bad in history you need both. You need both truth and fiction. Let's say you want to build an atom bomb. Now, to build an atom bomb, you need the truth of physics. If your theory of physics is wrong, you will not be able to build an atom bomb. At the same time nobody is going to come together to help build a bomb just because you tell them E = mc² That motivates nobody. That's not an election slogan. E = mc² You need some religious mythology. You need some political ideology. You need some economic theory to convince people, hundreds of thousands of people to cooperate to build the atom bomb.”
The hype around AI, algorithms, and companies like Cambridge Analytica is largely exaggerated; algorithms often cannot even correctly determine someone's gender, and the actual effectiveness of online advertising and behavioral manipulation is much more limited than tech companies and marketers claim.
“I don't know companies like Cambridge Analytica hijacking our brains is you know, not very believable. If you for example, look at the evidence of the effectiveness of online advertising, well, quite often these these algorithms can't even distinguish the you know, the gender of people, right? The with the data set of Cambridge Analytica, for example. I think that a huge part of that was just hype. And a lot of companies make a lot of money these days with talking about machine intelligence and AI while they just have some dumb algorithm that doesn't really understand the world.”
Israel's geopolitical position has strengthened in recent years not primarily through military force but through perfected surveillance technology that enables control of millions of Palestinians with minimal overt violence or bloodshed, and this technology is being exported globally.
“if you're wondering for example why Israel's geopolitical position has become much stronger in recent years and you know, with the opening to the United Arab Emirates with the fact you don't hear much about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict anymore. There are several reasons for that, but the number one reason I would say is technology. Israel in recent years, last five, six, 10 years, has perfected new surveillance technology that enables it to control millions of people, millions of Palestinians, extremely effectively with very little overt military force or bloodshed. And this is why its position is much stronger and this is why a lot of countries are opening to they want the technology.”
Positive outcomes in large-scale societies are not inevitable; much of history involved negative outcomes (violence, hierarchy, exploitation), and only in the last 200 years do we see sustained deep progress, making Harari cautious rather than optimistic about the future.
“Only in the last 200 years or so do we see real deep sustained progress in large-scale human societies. Until say at until to say the 19th century, you have immense technological development, the power of humankind goes up dramatically, but the conditions of individual humans don't improve. You don't see any clear moral or ethical improvement.”
Political and economic elites have become complacent after the end of the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall, viewing their systems as the final form (end of history); new generations are not bound by this complacency and can imagine different possibilities.
“they became a little bit complacent, especially after the end of the the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. But now there's a new generation coming that looks at this world in a very different way.”
Major protest movements have emerged recently—Black Lives Matter is the largest protest movement in US history, and the climate justice movement with Greta Thunberg has genuine influence on politicians and policy
“We've seen the Black Lives Matter movement, which is the biggest protest movement in the history of the United States. We've seen the climate justice movement with Greta Thunberg, which really has a genuine influence on politicians and policy makers.”
The pandemic did not produce global cooperation the way it could have—instead countries have been blaming each other, spreading disinformation, and engaging in vaccine nationalism
“We didn't see a lot of cooperation over the last year. They've been mainly blaming each other and spreading disinformation and so forth. So, it it didn't raise my my hopes.”
Human nature has remained fundamentally the same over 20,000 years, from ancient hunter-gatherer bands to modern times; what changes is the technology and systems of communication and organization that combine individual humans into political structures and enable different forms of society.
“Human nature did not change. Human nature was the same, basically, in an ancient hunter-gatherer band 20,000 years ago. It was the same in ancient Athens 2,000 something years ago. It was the same in the Roman Empire and it's the same today. But, the technology and the systems that combine these people into a political structure, this changed and this continues to change also in the 21st century.”
Bregman's answer to 'what should be done' is that changing the underlying view of human nature from selfish to fundamentally decent will have profound but unpredictable consequences; people will need to discover the implications themselves through lived experience, and the writer's role is to tell a different story that enables this shift.
“I believe that once you update your view of human nature, once you look at humans in a different way, you can do things in a in a in a quite different way... these are just examples because I don't know what happens if a lot of millions of people around the world have a little bit more hopeful view of human nature. I'm I'm pretty sure that it will have profound implications. But as a writer I don't know sort of what all the effects will be because if people will have to find that out in their own life.”
New movements in democratic practice like deliberative democracy, participatory budgeting, and sortition (random citizen selection into governance) depend on a more hopeful view of human nature; if people are assumed to be selfish and lazy, these approaches will not work and will produce the selfish behavior expected.
“All of these ideas depend on a more hopeful view of human nature because if you really believe that people are just selfish and lazy, then obviously that's not going to work and that's how you're going to treat people and you're that's the kind of behavior that you're going to get out of them. If you turn it around and if you have a what I think is a more realistic view of what people can do, I think you can get very different kind of behavior.”
Things that were seen as completely politically impossible 10 years ago are now politically possible—suggesting that radical change can happen faster than expected
“some things are politically possible that were, you know, as seen as completely impossible 10 years ago.”
The COVID-19 pandemic is a truly global shared experience—comparable to where people ask 'where were you on September 11?' or 'when JFK was assassinated'—that unites people across all differences and creates a foundation for mutual understanding and solidarity.
“the COVID year is really one of the most extreme shared experiences that that ever happened to humanity.”
Harari agrees that without US-China cooperation, it will be impossible to tackle not just climate change but other major threats like artificial intelligence and disruptive technologies; however, the last year showed little cooperation, mainly blame and disinformation.
“I don't know. I hope they can cooperate. I agree that without cooperation between the USA and China, it will be probably impossible to tackle not just climate change, but the other major threats and challenges we face, like the rise of artificial intelligence and other disruptive technologies. Um we didn't see a lot of cooperation over the last year. They've been mainly blaming each other and spreading disinformation and so forth. So, it it didn't raise my my hopes.”
Pre-agricultural nomadic hunter-gatherers had very little evidence of warfare for roughly 95% of human history, and the emergence of settled civilization and agriculture marked the beginning of hierarchy, patriarchy, infectious disease, and large-scale violence—what Jared Diamond called 'the biggest mistake in all of human history.'
“There's this long debate, for example, about violence and war in our history. When did it start? Or has it always been with us? Have we always, you know, been quite violent? And I am on the side of the the optimists or the hippies, I would say. I think that really, if you look at the the most recent anthropological and archaeological evidence, that you see that there's very little evidence for warfare for the biggest part of our our history, you know, when we were nomadic hunter-gatherers. You know, that's that's basically around 95% of our history. And that it was really with the moment that we became sedentary and sort of invented civilization that basically everything went downhill, you know, from that moment on. We got hierarchy, we got the patriarchy, we got all these infection diseases like the plague and measles and COVID-19, etc. etc. So, that's really sort of our original sin or as as Jared Diamond once called it, the biggest mistake in all of human history.”
Harari's main fear is not nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism but the collapse of nationalism: in many countries (USA, Israel, Brazil, others), national communities are fragmenting into warring tribes, making it impossible for nations to cooperate internationally without first restoring internal cohesion.
“what really worries me when I look at the world right now is not the clash between nationalism and globalism, it's the collapse of nationalism in many countries around the world, and the US is a prime example, but it's not the only one. To have real cooperation on a global level, you don't need to overcome nationalism, you actually need to have good, healthy, self-confident nationalism. And what we are seeing, and I don't really understand why, but in country after country, we are seeing the collapse of national communities into warring tribes. Americans now hate and fear each other far more than they hate and fear anybody else on Earth.”
The distinction between hope and optimism is critical: optimism is complacent belief that things will work out (dangerous because it breeds inaction), while hope is belief that change is possible (empowering because it motivates effort). History shows nothing is inevitable, which should inspire hope rather than optimism.
“I think it's important to make the distinction between hope and optimism here. Optimism is is I think a form of complacency where you say, "Oh, look at all these wonderful graphs. Poverty is going down. Climate or child mortality is going down. We're richer, we're healthier. Life is better than ever. Don't worry, be happy." And I think that makes people lazy. The difference with hope is that hope sort of is is about the possibility of change. It shows you that things can be different. And this is why I like history so much, by the way. History basically teaches you that there's nothing inevitable about the way we structured our economy and society right now. It can all quite radically change.”
The pandemic accelerated the digitalization of education, work, and surveillance, and these changes—especially mass surveillance adoption in both democracies and authoritarian states—are likely permanent even after the crisis ends, representing a watershed moment in the shift to digital control.
“shifting the entire educational system online, that's a huge decision. And if you think about something like the the new surveillance systems, this is really frightening. This crisis has legitimated not only in authoritarian regimes, but also in many democracies new practices of mass surveillance. And this is likely at least some of that is likely to stay with us even after the crisis is over. And you know, during the crisis there is no time to have a deep public debate about it. Decisions are just being made very very fast. So looking back from the future, if people do remember COVID-19 in 50 years, it is possible that they will remember it as the watershed moment when the world really turned digital and when mass surveillance became a normal and legitimate part of everyday life all over the world.”
Changing institutions requires changing how we organize education, workplaces, and democracy through examples like removing hierarchical school systems, enabling self-directed teams, and reducing inequality
“in my book I give a couple of case studies and examples of how you can reorganize education. Maybe you can that you can get rid of the hierarchical school system and rely more on the intrinsic motivation of kids. You can also restructure the workplace, you know, work more in self-directed teams. Have basically a lot less hierarchy and lot less inequality and things may even work better. You can reimagine how democracy is done etc. etc.”
If technology is managed correctly, it can solve climate problems; if mismanaged, it will cause faster climate deterioration, making technology more central to outcomes than climate itself
“if we manage the technology correctly, it can also solve the climate problem. And if we mismanage it, it it will cause an even faster deterioration. I mean with the climate we have, I don't know, 10, 20, 30 years. With the technology it moves much faster.”
Bregman's approach to change is intellectual/top-down (deconstructing dominant stories and ideologies), while a different approach is bottom-up (telling counter-narratives that change how people behave)—the tension between these approaches structures different activist strategies.
“Maybe that's that's where our sort of approach is a little bit different is that you you are you're sort of like the intellectual high up in the sky looking down on people, you know, and trying to deconstruct all their stories and their ideologies. Well, maybe I my perspective is more from maybe the bottom up and I I I'm trying to tell this different story that might, you know, change how people behave”
Historically, people often thought they emerged more resilient from crises like the Black Death or 1918 flu, but the pandemic showed we are actually more vulnerable now because of dependence on digital systems; whereas medieval or industrial collapses were survivable with local knowledge, a digital collapse is civilization-scale catastrophic.
“Some people came out of of 2020 with the impression that, "Hey, we are more resilient than we were in the past." If during the Black Death or during the Spanish influenza of 1918, you closed down all the schools, there is no education. There is nothing you can do. The school is shut. What can you do? Now, we are more resilient. Yes, the physical school is shut down, but we can continue school online. But, actually, it also makes us far more vulnerable. Just try to imagine a cyber war, a full-scale cyber war under the present conditions.”
Cynicism is a form of intellectual laziness that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; the shift from 1990s cynicism (Nirvana, Fight Club) to 2020s activism (50% of university students now protest, Black Lives Matter, climate justice) shows that optimism about change is possible and catalyzes action.
“if you go back like 30 years um to um the the the early '90s then it was quite fashionable to be a cynic in the West, I think. Cynicism was was quite popular... After the fall of the Berlin Wall, this is what capitalism is, you know. This is the end of history. There's nothing left to fight for. We don't have ideals, whatever. We're just enjoying our life. And indeed, if I um would ask my fellow students and this is like just 10, 12 years ago um whether they ever protested in the streets or something like that, only a very small minority would say yes, I did. If you ask that question in in universities in the US or the UK and the Netherlands or probably in Israel as well um did you protest? Did you participate in a demonstration? Then I think around, what is it? 50% would say yes, I did.”
Harari's concern with UBI is that most proposals mean national, not truly universal, basic income; nobody proposes taxing California's rich to pay basic income to Guatemalans, revealing that nationalism supersedes genuine cosmopolitanism even in progressive policy thinking.
“my problem is with the notion of universal in universal basic income. Almost always, people actually mean national basic income, not universal basic income. Nobody is saying, "Okay, we'll tax the rich in California to pay basic income to people in Guatemala."”
Whether the post-pandemic world shows greater or lesser global solidarity depends on choices, not inevitability; humans can choose which internal wolf (good or bad) to feed, and it is up to us.
“It's up to us. I mean, I think in your book there is this parable of the two wolves that live inside us, the good wolf and the bad wolf. And the question which wolf will win in this internal struggle, it's the wolf you feed. So, um I don't think there is an inevitable outcome to the present crisis. I think we have options. And I hope we made we make good choices.”
Humans have a real responsibility to create justice and change society, because there is no cosmic karma or God to reward suffering; if justice exists, it must come from human effort and moral choice, not from inevitable historical progress.
“There's no justice in history... there's no I I don't believe there's a God that will, you know, reward the people who have suffered in this life in an afterlife. There's no karma, there's no cosmic balance or anything. So, if there is justice, then it has to come from people. And and how do we how do we create that justice? How do we actually change the world?”
Harari's view of human nature rests on the claim that human nature itself is not evil or the source of problems—humans are basically kind and friendly—but when millions of people aggregate into large-scale societies, emergent phenomena like violence, hierarchies, exploitation, and slavery arise that cannot be predicted from individual human kindness alone.
“I would say that I basically agree with the view expressed in Humankind that human nature isn't evil and isn't the source of our problem. Humans are basically kind and friendly. The problem is that when you get millions of people together into large-scale societies, you have emergent phenomena like violence, like hierarchies, like exploitations, like slavery. And just knowing that the nature of individuals is kind and friendly is again, it's important, but it doesn't give us the solution for how to create better large-scale societies.”
The widespread assumption that 'truth will prevail in the end' is false—people who believe fake news can organize, manufacture weapons, and succeed practically even while holding false beliefs
“There is this kind of widespread common assumption the truth will prevail in the end because the people who tend to believe fake news and conspiracy theories and so forth, they don't know how to organize, how to manufacture new weapons, whatever. And that's just not the case.”
Harari fears that COVID will produce a K-shaped economic recovery where some countries (especially those leading in digitalization) emerge much richer and more powerful, while many other countries (those dependent on tourism, traditional production) see economies completely collapse, accelerating global inequality.
“there is a lot of talk about how we will emerge from this crisis. So, somebody says it will be a U-shape uh curve. Somebody says, "No, it will be a V-shape." And I don't know who it who it was who said, "No, it will be a K-shaped." Um K in the sense that some countries will become much more rich and powerful thanks to all everything that happened in the last year. They will actually emerge from the crisis in a far better condition than they entered it. This is especially the countries that are leading the revolutions in areas like digitalization. And other countries, many countries, they will be the downside uh half of the K. They might see their economies completely collapse.”
Machiavelli's observation that armed prophets succeed while unarmed prophets fail reveals that coercive power (violence or economic coercion like taxation) is necessary to enforce collective belief systems; people don't believe in money because they choose to, but because they'll be imprisoned if they don't pay taxes.
“the Italian philosopher Machiavelli once said that all the unarmed prophets throughout history, they failed and the armed prophets, they've been successful. Because it's much easier for someone to, you know, to get to believe your story if there's a man with an AK-47 standing behind you, right? So, it's it's also with the power of money. We don't just believe that because uh well, we just all agree to believe in the power of the dollar, but if you don't pay your taxes, well, then they lock you up. So, we don't really have an option of not believing.”
The biggest challenge to Bregman's hopeful view is that changing worldviews requires either individual moral action (rare) or systemic change; when authoritarian regimes or crises become severe, decency alone is insufficient—people must be willing to act against their own group, which is extremely difficult.
“if times get tough um if uh if we're moving for example away from democracy and into authoritarian regimes, that asks so much more of people. Then it's not good enough to be just friendly or decent anymore. It life really asks more of you then.”
UBI implementation is unlikely to happen suddenly in a single country but will occur gradually as welfare systems transform to become more basic-income-like through removing conditionalities and moving toward more universal provision.
“I don't think it will happen sort of in an instant that some country will say, "Okay, let's implement UBI. Let's have a basic income. Let's abolish poverty." I think it will happen much more gradually, that we can transform our welfare systems in the direction, make them more basic income-ish, you know, make them a bit remove condition conditionalities.”
UBI will probably be implemented in wealthy countries in Europe and the US, but the real question is what happens in Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and other developing countries facing economic collapse
“we will see more of that in countries, certainly in Europe, even in the US. The big question is what will happen in Brazil, in South Africa, in Indonesia, in these countries?”
The pandemic may be similar to the 1970s oil crises in ending an era (neoliberalism) rather than being as significant as WWI or WWII—a pivot point but not unprecedented in scale
“I think that 2020 I mean it's obviously not this big turning point like the First World War, the Second World War, but it may be similar to let's say the the oil crises of of the 1970s that really did inaugurate the end of Keynesianism, you know, the the rule of the power or of the ideas of John Maynard Keynes and inaugurated the era of neoliberalism.”
The pandemic led governments to distribute free money to citizens without means-testing, which is a form of de facto UBI; the fact that this was done signals government trust in people (if they really believed people were selfish, they wouldn't do it), and evidence shows people spent this money reasonably on things they needed, validating the UBI concept.
“governments around the globe have basically been giving people free money. You know, hundreds of dollars. And I think that act in itself signifies a certain amount of trust. Because if you really believe that most people would spend it on drugs or alcohol or whatever, then you wouldn't do that. But, they have done it, and we found that actually it works pretty well, and that most people um um you know, spend spend the money on reasonable things. Because that's obviously one of the great things about money is that people can spend it on things they need, instead of on things that some self-appointed experts think they need.”
The most important action in the immediate future is to establish a global plan to deal with the pandemic and its economic consequences, because this would (a) solve the immediate problem and (b) lay a foundation of trust and cooperation that enables cooperation on other existential threats (AI, climate change).
“in the immediate future, I would say to have a global plan to deal with the pandemic and with the related economic crisis, not just in order to overcome this immense problem, but also because this will lay a foundation of trust for cooperation on other fronts like the potential AI arms race and climate change. I think that without global cooperation, we can't really achieve much on any of these fronts.”