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Is liberalism obsolete? Two great political philosophers debated this question on 22 March 2022.
Professor Francis Fukuyama was joined in conversation by John Gray, the British political philosopher, who rejects the idea of universal liberal values and human progress. Despite the view held by many that the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks the end of the post-Cold War era, Fukuyama believes that it is a wake-up call for the West to rekindle the spirit of 1989, while Gray argues that the triumph of liberalism is far from inevitable.
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Liberalism remains the most viable political framework despite internal contradictions and external threats, but its future depends on whether societies can sustain tolerance and limit state power while managing new challenges from authoritarianism, populism, woke ideology, environmental crisis, and social media fragmentation.
- Liberalism's pragmatic selling point—enabling diverse societies to coexist peacefully—has proven durable across centuries despite repeated challenges from religious wars, nationalism, authoritarianism, and ideological extremism
- Contemporary threats to liberalism come both from outside (autocratic regimes like Putin's Russia) and inside (neoliberalism eroding the welfare state, woke progressivism abandoning tolerance for enforced ideological conformity)
- The core liberal principle of tolerance—tolerating people and beliefs you disagree with—is being replaced by demands for uniformity of thought, fragmenting society into identity-based zero-sum contests rather than enabling coexistence
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Liberalism's main pragmatic selling point is that after 150 years of religious warfare and sectarian killing (including the Thirty Years' War which killed roughly a third of Central Europe's population), liberal thinkers argued that instead of building communities around shared religious truth claims about the good life and ultimate purpose, diverse societies should focus on survival together by tolerating people fundamentally different from themselves and building rules for peaceful coexistence.
“after the Protestant Reformation you have 150 years of religious warfare between Protestants and Catholics and different sects of you know, each religion. 30 years war kills you know, maybe a third of the population of Central Europe Uh, and at the end of this you know, you get liberal thinkers that say, "Hey, maybe it's not such a great idea to tightly bound a community around one set of ideas about what the good life is, you know, what the ultimate purpose of life is as a religion would do. Maybe what we ought to do is focus on survival in a diverse society uh in which we tolerate people that are fundamentally different from us and, you know, build rules so that we can all live in uh peace with one another and therefore lower the temperature of politics."”
Liberalism has historically been defeated in the short term by rising ideologies (nationalism and ethnic identity in the 19th-20th centuries) but has come back repeatedly because it alone enables diverse societies with different religions, nationalities, and ethnicities to actually coexist and cooperate rather than engage in zero-sum conflict.
“it next has to deal with, you know, nationalism in the 19th and early 20th century. You go through two horrendous world wars in Europe in which there's this assertion of national identity that's aggressive and not at all inclusive. And then at the end of all that destruction, once again, you know, people say, "Hey, maybe we should not build our states around, you know, a folk or a you know, a certain ethnicity. Maybe we should have a liberal society in which we can tolerate people that are fundamentally different. And so, I think that, you know, liberalism has, in a way, been defeated in the short term and then it's come back because it does have this pragmatic uh characteristic of allowing societies that are diverse in either by religion or nation or ethnicity or other characteristics uh to actually uh uh work together.”
Liberals believe humans are progressive beings who can achieve cumulative advance in science and technology, and they believe this same pattern of cumulative, incremental, melioristic progress can be replicated in ethics and politics—that humankind can become more rational over time, not lose what was gained, and advance to ever greater heights.
“Man as a progressive being. Humans are essentially quintessentially progressive in that they want to improve themselves, they want to become better than they are and they go on doing it and this is the key and this is where I'll leave it. Liberals believe that there can be something like the cumulative advance in science and technology which is undoubtedly real...liberals believe that the established fact if you like of cumulative advance moving on piecemeal, incrementally in a melioristic kind of gradual way in which there are periods of decline but not everything is lost and then the advance continues. They think that that sort of advance which is absolutely real in scientific and technology can be replicated in ethics and politics.”
The End of History refers to the direction that modernization and social evolution is pointing toward (the end as destination, not as stopping), not to a prediction that history will cease or that all societies will immediately become liberal democracies.
“let me explain what the end of history, those words, mean. So, history is history with a capital H. Today, we would call it something like modernization or development. Uh that is to say, the slow evolution of human social organization over the millennia...the end is not a stopping, it is the direction that that progress is uh pointing us towards.”
The biggest question about politics in the West is still the fate of liberalism—whether it will revive, further deform into neoliberalism or woke liberalism, or simply drift without clear direction.
“I think one thing we have in common, which is that in a sense, the big question about politics, at least in the West, is still about the fate of liberalism. That's the big question. If you haven't thought that through and thought through it seriously, you haven't thought through what's about to come, whether it's a revival of liberalism or a further uh um deformation of it in some way or other, uh like neoliberalism was and woke liberalism is, um or um some kind of drift, which may be the most likely”
Without economic growth, liberal societies cannot maintain themselves because in a no-growth Malthusian world the only way to get rich is by taking from someone else, making predation a major way people amass fortune and undermining the redistributive policies that make inequality tolerable.
“if you have economic growth then inequality can be managed in certain ways because if everybody is getting a little bit richer, fact that some people are getting more rich, you know, more quickly is tolerable. If you basically move into a world where growth doesn't happen, then you're back in this Malthusian world where the only way I can get rich is by taking something from you. And so predation becomes a major way that entrepreneurs then you know amass fortune by stealing from other people. And yeah, I think that it's pretty hard to maintain a liberal society in a world without economic growth.”
Liberals tend to assume that all humans are fundamentally rational in the liberal sense—that they want freedom, peace, and prosperity—which is a dangerous error because rulers like Putin have different goals based on historical narratives (reviving Russia as a world historical force) and will pursue these goals even if it means bringing down the house, making assumptions of liberal rationality catastrophic.
“I think there's a great error actually an extremely dangerous error being unfolding at the moment which is to say that um Putin is mad. Now he may be solid, he may be isolated...But when one says that one is making the the the classic error of liberals which is to say that underneath all human beings are rational in the sense that liberals understand rationality. What they really want is freedom, peace, prosperity. Always...this can lead to catastrophe because it leaves out the possibility of that uh um a ruler like Putin with goals uh goals about reviving uh Russia in its Zarist or or perhaps its Soviet form uh unifying it having it as not being a a kind of a world historical uh force in the world um um in in in human affairs”
Liberalism is historically a way of life that emerged from the conflicts of the Reformation and religious wars in Europe, not primarily a universal philosophy, and its claimed universality was only seemingly vindicated by the collapse of communism in 1989, which was not primarily due to liberalism but to religious institutions (Catholic Church in Poland), working-class movements (Solidarity), national self-determination, and Gorbachev's failed reformism.
“I think of liberalism to start with not as a philosophy or a set of principles but actually as a way of life. One that emerged in modern Europe out of the wars of religion...in particular I think in the reformation in Christianity and before that in Judaism. So, it's a particular historical way of life which later on maybe even then claimed to be universal.”
Some people want to expand their realm of autonomy and have more choices, while other people want the opposite—they want to be told who they are because they're confused, and the variety of identities available in liberal society overwhelms rather than liberates them.
“some people want to expand their realm of autonomy. They want more choice. They want to be left alone to make their decisions. But other people want the opposite. Mhm. You know, they actually want to be told who they are, because they're confused. And uh you know, one of the big problems in a liberal society is there's so many identities that you could adopt. Uh and the society gives you no guidance as to, you know, which is the best way of life that you should pursue. And that is what I think makes people join cults and join movements that anchor their identity in something, you know, stable”
The Katyn massacre and history of Soviet treatment of Polish intelligentsia demonstrates that Soviet leaders were rationally pursuing the goal of destroying the Polish intelligentsia, not acting irrationally, and Polish soldiers who believed Soviets would need their labor for economic reasons were themselves being irrational because they misunderstood the Soviets' actual goals.
“if the Soviet goal at the time was the same as the Nazi goal which I think it was which is to destroy the Polish intelligentsia then what they were doing by killing was rational. And what the soldiers who were marching unknown to their deaths what what the captive soldiers what was doing was irrational because they were counting on liberal rationality. They were saying well they'll need our labor...the Germans after the the Soviets they aren't efficient but they'll need our leader they'll need our labor. They didn't. They had different goals.”
Fukuyama's claim in 1989 was not that everybody would end up in peaceful democracies, but that the historical process of modernization is valuable and real—people don't want to live in poor, chaotic, underdeveloped countries but rather in wealthy stable developed places like Switzerland, Canada, or Britain where they can educate their children and not worry about physical security.
“I did not predict that everybody would end up being a peaceful, you know, democracy, but I said that there is this larger process, you know, call it modernization, that is valuable. You know, people don't want to live in poor, chaotic, less developed countries. They want to live in, you know, Switzerland or Canada or, you know, Britain uh that has a high level of wealth where you can um you can educate your children, you don't have to worry about your physical security the way you do in many poor societies.”
Ukraine has become a genuinely liberal society with a Westernized elite that actually wants to be part of Europe, which Russia completely failed to understand, leading to the expectation of a 48-hour war with Ukrainian surrender and pro-Putin collaborators, a fundamental intelligence failure resulting from Putin's isolation and the fact that everyone around him is too afraid to deliver bad news.
“the Russians had no idea that Ukraine has actually become at least with its elites quite a liberal society. That they have a very westernized elite there that really want to be European and that across the country they don't want to be part of Russia. You know, they simply did not understand that and that's why they thought you could wage a 48-hour war there Ukrainian army would surrender. You get a lot of collaborators that would run a pro-Putin Ukraine.”
There have been historical experiments in toleration outside the West and outside liberalism (Buddhist India, certain periods in Ottoman history, even a half-hearted version in Prussia under Frederick the Great), showing that coexistence of different communities is not uniquely Western or liberal.
“there've been experiments in toleration outside the West and outside of liberalism. It's not uniquely Western. Uh Buddhist India, for example, um certain periods in the history of um uh the Ottoman Empire, a different example. They weren't liberal because they weren't autonomous choices being made there. But communities learned to live together. Uh religions learned to live live together...Frederick the Great said something like, "All religions will be tolerated as long as there aren't too many."”
Although environmental crisis and climate change pose serious challenges to liberalism's dependence on economic growth, authoritarian regimes also need growth and will emit as much carbon as liberal ones—China is the major carbon emitter between now and 2050 despite being authoritarian, so regime type doesn't solve the environmental challenge.
“I don't believe that uh the regime type actually makes a difference in you know, in your attitude towards growth cuz authoritarian regimes want to grow too, right? China wants to grow and in fact it's going to be the major emitter of carbon, you know, between now and 2050 and it's got an authoritarian regime. And so I don't think that moving away from liberal you know, so the environmental crisis may uh may weaken uh our commitment to liberalism, but I don't think that authoritarian government is a solution to the you know, environmental crisis.”
A serious problem with liberalism is that we no longer even agree on basic factual information—vaccine safety, election results—because the internet and social media create parallel information universes with no authority distinguishing good from bad information.
“a liberal society, we agree that we're not going to agree on the most important ultimate questions. But we used to at least agree on factual information. Uh like who won the last election, you know, are vaccines safe and effective, you know, this sort of thing. And because I think of the rise of of the internet, uh we no longer agree on that, because we can live in parallel information universes, since there's no authority on these social media platforms that distinguishes good information from bad information. And that is a very serious problem. And we've not figured out how to solve that.”
If you create an identity for yourself you need it to be recognized and validated by society, which creates competitive struggle where members of groups demand acceptance, fragmenting society into zero-sum contests for recognition among different identity groups.
“you've also got to have it recognized by society. You've got to have it validated by society. And then the kind of Hobbesian war, the war in which you can only get power or position from someone else, you can only get resources from other people, breaks out again because then you say, "Well, I'm a member of this group and this group isn't get what it wants and I demand that it gets acceptance." And sometimes, of course, as both Helen and um Frank have said there's There's a There's a huge background of oppression and discrimination, which makes this a legitimate claim in many ways. The trouble is it fragments society. It creates a kind of professional struggle.”
Liberalism is fundamentally based on seeing human societies as collections of autonomous individuals with equal rights that must be protected through a state bound by rule of law and constitutional limits on power, rejecting the idea that the state can do anything it wants.
“liberalism builds on a philosophical tradition that sees human societies as collections of autonomous individuals. These individuals are they're equal and the humanity that they share is something that's universal to all human beings. Those human beings need to be protected in their basic rights and in a liberal society you do them by having a state that protects those rights through a rule of law in some cases through constitutional mechanisms that limit power and so one of the chief characteristics of a liberal society is the fact that the state cannot do anything that it wants.”
The Western response to Ukraine has not been a truly global alliance of democracies against autocracy—India, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, and China have not joined, and the fact that Western commentators look to China as the only power that can save Ukraine from Putin suggests how weakened Western power actually is.
“it has not been a global alliance of democracies against the axis of autocracy. This has not happened. India has not joined us. South Africa has not joined us. The United Arab Republics have not joined us. And China has not joined joined it...the people who say that the West is resplendent as never before look to China as the only the world's greatest, most powerful, most formidable autocracy for salvation. Maybe they and they alone can pull the rug from under Putin. Not any of the West. So, that tells you something about the state of power in the world.”
There is a deeply rooted psychological tendency in a significant portion of humans (about a third) to value oneness and sameness in society, and in liberal societies where diversity is managed through tolerance rather than enforced uniformity, this produces intense psychological strain on authoritarians leading them to seek escape through exclusionary movements.
“about a third of people in any society have what she calls the authoritarian predisposition. They value oneness and sameness in societies...as you say, if you live in somewhere that's chaotic and anarchic, what you fundamentally want is people not to come knocking on your door and stealing your stuff. But in in liberal democracies, that becomes a problem, because as you say, they're set to manage diversity. The cacophony of them, of people's competing ideas, this marketplace of ideas, for those people is intolerable and makes them want to be everyone to be the same.”
There is an implicit Marxist critique in contemporary progressivism (following Herbert Marcuse) that treats liberalism as a sham—that apparent freedom masks underlying patriarchal, racial, or capitalist domination—which is explicitly anti-liberal even as it claims to fulfill liberalism's promise.
“a lot of the critique that you know on which this kind of understanding of identity politics is based is explicitly anti-liberal. It regards a little bit like Herbert Marcuse in an earlier age that liberalism is just a sham. You know you may think that you're living in a free society but in fact you're living in a racial patriarchy that is manipulated by you know sinister people behind the scenes. They want to make you think that you're living in a free society but you're really not.”
Tolerance is fundamentally a judgmental practice—you tolerate things you actually dislike or hate and think are pernicious, not things you love or respect, and unless tolerated things pass certain strong boundaries, you must put up with them as a condition of modus vivendi in diverse society.
“the practice of toleration, which essentially is a judgmental practice because what you tolerate when you tolerate something is not something you like Mhm. or love or even respect. You might actually hate it and think it's completely false and pernicious. But unless it passes beyond some really strong boundaries, you put up with it uh because that's the condition of living together in a kind of modus vivendi.”
Liberalism is not universal and cannot be seen as a universal goal—most of humankind cannot actually want to be American or Western, and despite real weaknesses in Western liberalism (financial crisis, incompetent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya), populations under autocracy don't necessarily long for Western liberalism.
“I can't see them as a universal goal and not only that I can't, most of humankind can't actually now. Is it the case that beneath these autocracies there are populations which just long to be American? Just can't wait to be I don't think so. I think that they perceive deep weaknesses in Western liberalism that are real. What has happened in the last 20 year? Well, there was a huge financial crisis. There were a series of spectacularly incompetent and hubristic wars. Not just Afghanistan and then Iraq but also Libya.”
Identity politics is an important and historically necessary way of mobilizing people to consciousness of injustice, but the problem arises in what you do about it afterward—if the objective becomes to essentialize fixed identity characteristics (race, gender, etc.) into permanent determinants of social position, this moves away from liberal universalism and toward sectarian systems like Lebanon or Bosnia.
“identity politics is an important and time tested way of mobilizing people right and making them conscious of injustice. Uh but I guess the question then is what do you do about it and what is your ultimate objective and uh if the objective is actually to you know do things that in effect do essentialize these characteristics then you're moving away I think from a liberal society that really does see a kind of underlying universal humanity...I think you know there are many societies that are organized that way. You know Lebanon is organized that way. Iraq is organized that way. Bosnia is organized that way where you have these fixed identity groups and they're all engaged in a kind of zero sum contest over resources you know among each other.”
Western response to Ukraine has not been as unified or sustained as it appears—Germany spent 4 billion euros on Russian gas in the first 3 weeks of war, effectively funding Russia; Germany's dramatic foreign policy shift lasted less than a week before backsliding; and most promised weapons have not yet arrived, with Germany and other European countries particularly failing to deliver despite their initial commitments.
“The huge change in German foreign policy lasted less than a week...it back it it backslid because they're um nothing yet as far as I know. Most of the weapons that they Zelenskyy complained about this just 2 days ago...most of the weapons that they were supposed to have haven't arrived.”
There is no ideal form of government, only different ones that are better or worse at different times depending on various values that sometimes conflict with each other—peace and security sometimes compete with freedom, and no regime perfectly maximizes all values.
“my whole belief is that there isn't an ideal form of government. There are just lots of different ones. And at any particular time, some are better than others. And the reason um the reasons they're better are sometimes liberal reasons about freedom and rule of law, but sometimes they're about peace and security. And they don't always go together because they're at conflict, actually. These values”
People empirically vote with their feet and choose to migrate to liberal societies rather than to Russia, China, or North Korea, which demonstrates that liberal societies are superior in what people actually want—law-governed stability, high wealth, education opportunities, and social advancement possibilities.
“people are voting with their feet, right? There are hundreds of thousands of people every single year that escape from chaotic uh poor, you know, badly governed places. And where do they choose to go? Do they go to Russia? Do they go to China? Do they go to North Korea? No. They go to liberal societies because I think that everybody has this perception that they want to live if they had the opportunity, they want to live in a law-governed, you know, stable country that is well-to-do, gives their children opportunities, education for education, for you know, socially advancing themselves.”
Russia has approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons with which it can use first according to official military doctrine, compared to NATO's 200 total of which only 100 are in America, creating an asymmetric nuclear risk if Ukraine continues winning and Putin faces humiliation.
“Russia has um many mini nukes as they tactical nukes um which it's the official doctrine the public doctrine of the Russian state can be used first. And has 10 times as many as NATO. Has about 2,000. NATO has about 200 of which 100 are in America.”
India is no longer a secular republic as imagined by its British founders, the Arab Spring did not lead to the spread of liberal democracy, and parts of Eastern Europe have developed illiberal democracies—together these demonstrate that Gray's 1989 prediction of liberalism's decline as a universal creed has been borne out.
“India is no longer a secular republic as imagined by the British. The Arab Spring did not end many there are illiberal democracies in parts of Eastern Europe. It has not been that has not happened. That hasn't been the universal um um uh uh advance of liberalism.”
The danger with liberal societies is that populist-authoritarian successors can emerge by winning elections on a democratic mandate and then using that mandate to further erode liberal institutions, making the institutional checks weaker and more vulnerable to future autocratic takeover.
“like all of these other populists, he is going to use a democratic mandate, if he manages to get into power again, to further erode those liberal institutions. And that's the point at which I think your question will then become really relevant. But John, let me put the same question to you. Surely, as you said, some of the discontent in the US with liberal democracy is due to the financial crisis”
Liberalism and democracy are distinct things—populist leaders can win democratic elections while immediately attacking liberal institutions like judicial independence, free press, and constitutional checks on executive power (the pattern with Erdogan, Orban, Law and Justice in Poland).
“there's a phenomenon on the populist right where you get popularly elected leaders that are democratically legitimated through elections. So that's Erdogan, Orban, you know, the Law and Justice Party in Poland. There's no question that democratically they represent a very powerful part of their societies. And the first thing they attack is not democracy, it's the liberal part. Uh it's the rule of law. They want to undermine the judiciary's independence. They want to uh muzzle the the free press”
If Putin's actual goals are what he states in his extraordinary 5,000-word essay on Polish and Ukrainian history (reviving Russian power and unifying historical Russian territory), then he may be prepared to bring the house down to achieve those goals, making him extremely dangerous.
“if Putin's goals are really what he says they are in his extraordinary 5,000 word essay on Polish and Ukrainian history if that's what he really thinks...is he prepared to bring the house of is he bring the house down for it? Well, I think he might be.”
Some people on the right, including figures like Tucker Carlson and Jordan Peterson, have become drawn to figures like Viktor Orban and by extension Putin because of opposition to 'woke' culture, prioritizing cultural grievances over liberal democratic values and international stability.
“Tucker Carlson, the um TV host...just the other day said, "Well, I'm no I'm I'm on the side of Putin, at least he's uh you know, he's not woke."...is the anti-wokeness has tipped them into a softness. Is that Is that something that you see as a problem on the on the right? Oh, definitely. I mean, it's not a softness, it's a madness. Mhm. Because although the issues around woke are important and we I think we should treat them seriously. Um they're not as important as having your whole city ravaged and reduced to rubble.”
Young academics and journalists are now extremely careful about what they research, say, and even discuss in canteens because statements could be held against them, representing a departure from liberalism's protection of a private realm where people could express views without fear of career ruin.
“I left academia before um the problem. I left academia in 2007 before this became an issue in academia. But I know that within academia young academics are extremely careful in what they research what they say what they even say in um canteens because it could be held against them. And that's a sign of a society that's or a culture or a way of life that's gone a long way from liberalism. Because there used to be a private realm when you could say what you like and there would be no comeback.”
The proposal for a second Nuremberg tribunal to prosecute Putin and his cronies as war criminals, while justified by their actual war crimes, is extremely dangerous because it removes any incentive for Putin and his circle to de-escalate or seek peace—instead it makes their choices existential (life or death), likely pushing them toward nuclear escalation.
“Now they have committed war crimes. There's no doubt about that. But there's a difference between where we are now in 2022 and 1942. In 1942, Hitler didn't have the bomb. If they if this becomes official policy and Putin and his cronies realize that they can be standing in the dock there what does that do to give them any incentive to wind down, to de-escalate? It means it's an existential choice of life and death with them. Then I think that as the as if the Ukrainians continue winning uh um they'll up the ante. They'll escalate.”
Liberalism's core vulnerability is that it depends on restraint—on people who could grab power choosing not to, on officials accepting defeat rather than overturning elections—but this restraint cannot be enforced once it is lost, and there may be no good institutional way to prevent its erosion.
“Well, if it makes you feel better, I had my voice removed from a video game for saying that biological sex exists, which must be one of the most absurd cancellations of of the 21st century”
For most of the life span of everyone in this room and beyond, there will coexist slightly tattered liberal democracies, illiberal democracies, autocracies, theocracies, ethnic and civic nationalist states, and zones of anarchy—not a universal advance toward liberalism nor a definitive answer.
“for the rest of the life of everyone in this room I think there will be slightly tattered liberal democracies. There'll be illiberal democracies. There'll be autocracies. There'll be theocracies. There'll be ethnic nationalist states. There'll be civic nationalist states and there'll be parts of the world where there's no state at all just zones of anarchy. That's what will be for every single person in this room in in in my view.”
Conservatives and progressives are guilty of different types of intolerance—conservatives don't tolerate changing racial and gender characteristics of society, while progressives don't tolerate conservative or religious people—and both are creeping toward uniformity rather than genuine liberal tolerance.
“a lot of conservatives in the United States, basically they don't want to tolerate, you know, the changing racial, gender characteristics of their society. Uh on the left, they don't want to tolerate conservatives or they don't want to tolerate, you know, religious people and they want, you know, uniformity of thought uh from those groups as well. And so, there's different types of intolerance that are uh creeping into the society, but pushing from tolerance to actually, you know, demanding that people think a certain way, I think is is fundamentally illiberal”
Liberal societies also have an ameliorative trend in that liberals believe society can actually get better, making them reformist rather than revolutionary, though they fundamentally believe people are free to make their own choices.
“I believe there's also a kind of ameliorative trend in liberalism because liberals believe that society can actually get better. So, they're reformist, they're usually not revolutionary but they do believe that institutions can be improved and that human behavior in certain ways can be shaped but fundamentally people are free to you know to make choices on their own.”
The liberal paradox is that if you build a society where people have maximal autonomy to create themselves, you also create a situation where people demand that their created identities be socially recognized and validated, inevitably fragmenting society into competing identity groups and destroying the liberal consensus.
“And I think that's what he was thinking...if you create an identity for yourself you've also got to have it recognized by society...the kind of Hobbesian war...breaks out again...it fragments society...There's a Russian theorist I mentioned...surplus elites. Just too many of them about...They're battling it out...under...ideology of self-promotion”
The Western response to Ukraine shows that despite challenges, there is significant continued life in the Western alliance—countries like Switzerland have joined sanctions regimes, Europe has united behind supporting Ukraine, and the American response under Biden has been dignified in allowing Europe to lead.
“one of the things I think has been surprising is how unified the Western response has been. How dignified the American response has been in letting Europe lead on it. Even countries like Switzerland joining sanctions regimes against Russia. That is that does show there's a bit of life in the old Western alliance yet, right?”
Even 30 years after 1989, there hasn't been the universal advance of liberalism, but rather there might be slightly more or slightly fewer liberal democracies—not the universal adoption Fukuyama predicted.
“There might be slightly more liberal democracies or slightly fewer. But there won't be a universal or even anywhere near a universal liberal democracy because there's been 30 odd years since this prophecy or prediction or whatever it was that Frank didn't predict that there'd be no major conflicts.”
One should protect free speech of Nazis and antisemites in the American absolutist way, but most European countries wisely protect people from hate speech rather than protecting hate speech, because one should consider the freedom and dignity of those being spoken about, not just the freedom of speakers.
“if you're not one of the hundreds of thousands...deaths of despair in the colossal opioid um epidemic there. People don't only want free speech very important. I've lived by it...I'm not going to I'm not going to attack it...But there's no one single ideal type of government...I'm happy that most countries in the world, including most European countries and Britain, protect other people from hate speech. Because one shouldn't think only of the freedom of the speaker. One should also think of the freedom and dignity of those who are spoken about.”
The contemporary 'woke' progressive left poses a genuine cultural threat to liberal values by replacing the liberal principle of tolerance with demands for uniformity of thought, and by treating liberalism itself (with its commitments to free speech and due process) as a sham obscuring patriarchal domination.
“the cultural threat that's posed by the progressive left is also serious. Uh uh you know there it it comes out of a different interpretation of identity politics that is definitely illiberal...the way that the progressive understanding of identity has evolved the particular you know fixed characteristics like race gender ethnicity and so forth become essential characteristics that then determine the way that society distributes rewards um it becomes something that um you know where social justice is allowed to override other liberal principles like freedom of speech like due process and a lot of the critique that you know on which this kind of understanding of identity politics is based is explicitly anti-liberal. It regards a little bit like Herbert Marcuse in an earlier age that liberalism is just a sham.”
Liberalism is strongly associated with and dependent on the cognitive style of modern natural science—the assumption that there is external reality we can perceive, measure, and experiment with through scientific methods to understand and manipulate the external world, giving rise to modern technology.
“liberalism has also been closely associated with a certain cognitive style which is that of modern natural science and so there's an assumption that liberals have that there is a external reality. We can perceive that, we can measure it, we can experiment with it and we can use the methods of modern natural science to both understand that external world and to manipulate it which then gives rise to modern technology”
Russians who cannot stand Putin are now emigrating in numbers reminiscent of the 'philosophers' steamships' that Lenin sent 100 years ago to expel Russian intellectuals, theologians, musicians, and ballerinas who wouldn't accept diminished freedom.
“let's think uh by the way, one slightly tragic fact is that the efflux now, the exiting of liberal or not necessarily liberal but of Russians who can't stand living under Putin. It's happening in almost to the day that uh uh the philosophers steamships left Russia. I don't know if any of you know about those 100 years ago. Lenin sent out a message throughout the intelligentsias, theologians, ballerinas, musicians, linguists. You've got to follow uh if you want to stay in Russia, he told this was Lenin, not Stalin. You've got to um uh accept that your freedom will be curtailed.”
John Stuart Mill's chapter on individuality in On Liberty—arguing that people who don't create and invent themselves aren't really human—contributed intellectually to the modern woke tendency by severing autonomy from its broader cultural and religious contexts.
“Mill...has something in him too. He has some responsibility for this cuz in a crucial chapter in his On Liberty...the chapter on individuality says that anyone who doesn't make themselves, doesn't define themselves, doesn't create themselves aren't really human. In other words, if you're a traditional religious practitioner, if you're an Orthodox Jew or traditional Catholic or Muslim, or you're just somebody who knocks through life without ever working out what you want or who you are, you're quite happy just to bumble your way through life, you haven't really made it as a human being.”
Liberalism without tolerance is something else entirely—specifically, it becomes 'woke' liberalism, which is liberalism with the emphasis on autonomy but stripped of toleration and stripped of the cultural, civilizational, and religious matrices in which it developed.
“if you ask what woke is, it's liberalism without tolerance. It's hyper-liberalism. It's It's It's the idea of autonomy understood in a certain kind of way but taking out of it the cultural and civilization and religious and other matrices in which it developed and taking out of it toleration, tolerance.”
The United States is still a liberal society with significant rule of law and institutional checks, demonstrated by courts preventing Trump from doing things he wanted to do, though these checks are weaker and more vulnerable than they once were.
“I think that the United States, yes, it is a it is still a liberal society...the limitations on freedom...you're getting some conservative state legislatures that are passing rules...it's not a huge impact. Basically, you can say whatever whatever the hell you please...and nobody is going to hold you to account. And I think the rule of law is still very powerful. Uh that um uh Trump was not allowed to do a lot of the things that he wanted to do uh because you had jurists that and then judges that wouldn't let him do that.”
One should not look to politics for human salvation or for the meaning in life—politics should be understood as a protective mechanism allowing you to pursue your own meaning and values, and the overvaluation of politics (especially in the 20th century) was one of the great errors of that era.
“I think one shouldn't look to politics for salvation, Mhm. for human salvation. And one shouldn't look to politics, even more, for a meaning in life. If you do, you'll be terribly disappointed. Uh I mean that very seriously, not as a joke. Uh you should look at um politics as a way of protecting yourself, people you care about, the things you you value so that you can enable to find or make a meaning in life and um uh um promote pursue the values that you like. I think the overvaluation of politics, especially in the 20th century, um is what was one of the great um errors of that time”
Gray predicted in 1989 that 'the days of liberalism are numbered' not because liberalism would disappear entirely but because he believed liberalism as a universal creed would decline as history resumed in traditional classical fashion governed by resource wars, nationalism, and religion rather than liberal ideology.
“I didn't mean that there would be no liberal societies left in the world. The view I expressed in there as you remember what I said in that article 33 years ago was it wasn't history that it ended. What had happened was that history had resumed in a traditional classical fashion. That history and future would be governed by resource wars, nationalism, religion all the kind of forces that moved it in the past.”
Part of Russia's failure to liberalize could have been avoided if different leaders had been chosen—Boris Yeltsin could have appointed someone other than a KGB agent (Putin) to be the next president of Russia, and the country might have been on a very different path.
“But you could have imagined other outcomes. You know, Boris Yeltsin could have appointed somebody other than you know, a KGB agent to be the next president of Russia and we may have been on a very different path.”
Despite the unprecedented unity among Western countries in the Ukraine response, if there had been no American security guarantee for Europe (if Trump had happened earlier or won 2024), the Baltic states and Poland would not have the American nuclear umbrella, and this creates enormous uncertainty about the future of Western alliances.
“what will that mean for the West? Because frankly, with all this stuff about the revival of Europe, supposing there wasn't the American security guarantee of Europe. Supposing it wasn't there. Supposing it had gone with Trump or before Trump, so that the Baltic states and all these peripheral states like Poland didn't have the American nuclear umbrella. What would have happened if Putin We are still rely really completely on the Americans.”
Russia did not become a liberal democracy after the Cold War due to several factors: bad economic policy from American advisors who pushed too-rapid market liberalization without understanding that a functioning state is necessary for markets to work, the shock of losing an empire, and a tradition of Russian national identity understood in terms of regional domination that didn't disappear.
“I really do think that a lot of the especially the American economic advisors that were talking to Russian policy makers after the Soviet Union fell apart gave them bad advice. They made a much too rapid transition to a market economy. They didn't have the and it was based on a really fundamental misunderstanding. They didn't understand you need a state in order to have a market economy. A functioning state in the you know, the Soviet Union had just dismantled its state”
Putin's system lacks distributed power and checks on leadership—unlike China which after 1978 created a system of collective leadership where the top leader couldn't make all decisions and had to get consensus, Russia has no such constraint, and this is why Putin is cut off from accurate information and makes catastrophically bad decisions.
“this is you know a general argument for more distributed power. You know, some constraints where you can't just do whatever you want where you need to consult at least with a you know larger Council. I mean the Chinese created something like this after 1978 it was collective leadership where you know, the the guy at the top couldn't make all the decisions you'd have to get consensus. That didn't exist in in Russia and they're paying a really heavy price for this.”
If Ukrainian military victory forces a Russian retreat, Putin will likely be removed but probably by someone from within the security apparatus rather than by any external force or democratic movement, and whoever replaces him may be no better and could potentially be worse.
“If that happens, there will be somebody in his security apparatus you know, maybe somebody in the army that will say look he's humiliated the country...Some of my Russian friends tell me that that's actually a very common feeling among the senior officer corps...I don't think that the successor is going to be worse. You know, I don't think that the successor is going to have even greater ambitions to use this military in a more yet more terrible way than Putin”