Claims

Conscious experiences (like the taste of chocolate, the smell of garlic, the feeling of pain) are fundamental and primitive in the theory of consciousness—not derived from neural activity or computational functions, but axiomatic starting points similar to how spacetime was previously assumed fundamental

Neurons, brains, and the whole of spacetime emerge as projections of deeper conscious agent dynamics, not the other way around; therefore the hard problem of consciousness is reversed—instead of explaining how consciousness emerges from brains, the question becomes how brains emerge from consciousness

Panpsychism (the view that consciousness is a fundamental property added to physical particles) is a form of dualism that takes spacetime as fundamental and adds consciousness as an additional property; this is less parsimonious than conscious realism, which starts with consciousness as the only fundamental thing

Standard approaches to consciousness (integrated information theory, orchestrated collapse of quantum microtubules, global workspace theory) all assume spacetime is fundamental and all attempt to explain how conscious experiences emerge from physical dynamics; they have made no progress in explaining any specific conscious experience in decades despite talented researchers