When Europeans have flattered and bent the knee to Trump, they have received slaps in return; when they have stood up—as Spain did by denying base access, or as Ireland did by defending Starmer, or as Europe did on Greenland—the results show that Trump's threats are often empty and the world does not fall on their heads.

Most European countries are united in their ambiguity about the Iran war—they don't like it, some recognize it as a violation of international law, but none except Spain, Norway, and Slovenia have actually condemned it, showing European reluctance to take principled stances despite consensus on the underlying issue.

Ukraine represents a middle category of European response: Europeans show willingness to say 'we stand up for Ukraine even if Washington is in cahoots with Moscow,' but they have been bending over backwards to keep Trump on side despite the fact that the US no longer provides military support and only shares intelligence.

In the 2003 Iraq war, Europe was divided into three layers: (1) core European countries (France, Germany) versus (2) willing coalition members (UK, Spain, Italy), (3) old Europe versus new Europe division as Central/Eastern European countries chose sides, and (4) transatlantic division; this division was more severe than current disagreements over Iran.

European leaders Merz (Germany) and von der Leyen (Commission President) are explicitly saying that international law is not a useful framework to understand the Iran war, which is shocking coming from European leaders, and this reflects the increasing injection of nationalist far-right ideas into center-right politics.

Europeans supported international law norms not because they were nice people but because these norms were fundamentally in European interests; abandoning them for a 'survival of the fittest' predatory power model is therefore short-sighted because Europe cannot itself become a predatory power in such a system.

Venezuela, Iran, and Gaza are cases where Europeans have been losing their soul because they follow a shallow strategic logic that 'Iran down, Venezuela down, Russia down means good for us,' when in fact the Iran war is particularly demonstrating to be good news for the Kremlin through oil prices, interceptor depletion, and shattering of international law.

The reason European defense integration is not happening is that the broader far-right problem is preventing it—the center-right's adoption of far-right agendas is dismantling the EU's ability to coordinate defense policy.

The first ingredient of a recipe for successful European leadership and pushback is policy delivery—for example, Spain's economy growing 3.6% for three years running allows it to say it's legalizing 500,000 migrants, providing legitimacy for other tough decisions.

The second ingredient is charismatic leadership, which is in very short supply across Europe and beyond, and requires a kind of Mundane zest—a visceral quality of 'I believe in this and I'm going to do it.'

The third ingredient is courage, exemplified by leaders like Volodymyr Zelensky and Mette Frederiksen (Denmark PM), whose popularity rose as a result of taking stands like the Greenland moment.

The moment when German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sat silently next to Donald Trump as Trump criticized Spain and other European countries was not merely European submission but European betrayal of itself, because it involved a European leader tacitly endorsing Trump's attacks on another European country rather than defending European interests collectively.

The real harm being done to the transatlantic relationship is not policy disagreement or the possibility of US disengagement from European security, but rather the increasing certainty of US betrayal of Europe, as evidenced by Ukraine (where US military support has stopped except for intelligence sharing and European purchases of US weapons) and Greenland.

Spain has more leverage than other European countries in resisting US pressure not because others are bending the knee and Spain isn't, but because Spain has reduced dependency on the United States through: (1) low trade dependence on the US, (2) advanced energy transition reducing fossil fuel dependence, (3) resulting lower energy prices during crises, and (4) not being on the front line with Russia, giving the US more need for Spanish bases than vice versa.

Markets reacted to the Greenland crisis not based on whether Greenland belongs to Denmark or the US, but because Europeans signaled they were willing to stand up, which spooked markets into fear of trade war; had Europeans folded, markets probably would not have reacted the same way.