Russian military planning shows tension between theory (military theory and the algorithms of war studied by the General Staff) and practice (actual military operations), and Russians historically have not minded this gap, accepting that the ideal form of warfare and actual warfare differ significantly.

The argument that anything done to achieve political objectives by political or economic means rather than military means is somehow bad is a dangerous argument that conflates politics as extension of war with the more dangerous trend of militarization of policy.

The problem with military signaling is that if you perceive the other side as a threat, any military action they take signals they want war and will win; if you don't perceive them as a threat, any military action short of invasion signals they fear you.

The smart way to signal is to do the things you actually intend to do, communicate with words what you're doing, do it consistently, and defend the territory you actually need to defend in a way that is as clearly defensive as possible.

Syria is a different context from Europe because the United States lacks clear sense of what it's defending or trying to attain in Syria, making it very difficult to use military force appropriately for defensive signaling.

Military signaling rhetoric is problematical from civil-military relations and security standpoints, and while it doesn't go away absent mutual decisions to stand down, there is nothing new about this pattern of rhetoric every time things spiral.

NATO does not need to deter Russia from attacking the Baltics (Russia has no particular plan to do so), but NATO does need to reassure Baltic allies, and any war in Europe will inevitably involve the Baltics because Kaliningrad is adjacent and geographic proximity makes avoidance impossible.

How NATO talks about Russia and deterrence is unhelpful and makes over-promises and over-threatens simultaneously, though this reflects structural features of political rhetoric rather than analytically-driven policy choices.

Everybody uses capability-based planning rather than threat-based planning, and both Russia and the US look at what the other side could possibly do to them and what bad things they have done to others in the past, leading both to assume worst-case intentions.

Russia's arms export sales are second-largest in the world after the United States, with a significant gap between first and second place, but Russia still sells weapons to many countries including US friends and partners as well as prospective adversaries.

Recent US Treasury sanctions on Russian arms export company used vague language that non-Americans with dealings with the company might also be subject to sanctions, which could complicate ally relationships.

Ukraine deters Russia not through military denial (defeating Russian military) but through punishment (making Russian occupation unacceptable and costly), and Russia understands that occupying Ukraine would be difficult requiring more than just military forces.

Women in Russia can be subject to conscription in certain specialties including science, math, and medicine per Russian law (same as Soviet law), and in some periods universities would require students in these fields to undergo military training.

Escalation response should be proportional and matched to specific threat type (military, political, police) rather than categorical response treating all Russian actions as attacks or all NATO actions as provocations.

NATO should study not only Russian military weaknesses and strengths but also where Russians think they have gaps and where Russians see Western advantages, particularly regarding numbers, superior air power, and the US ability to conduct contactless warfare.

Russia has shown a willingness to accept and gain advantages from civilian casualties, but starting from Georgia, Russia denies responsibility for civilian casualties beyond what might be reasonable, competing for global opinion in a way Russia did not before Georgia.