The US military is highly mobile and can project power globally within moments, whereas the Chinese military operates with heavy Soviet-style armor designed for border defense and is currently transitioning toward mobile, air-based, and ship-based projection capabilities.

The US faces a combination of 'Chinese opacity' (lack of transparency in Chinese decision-making) and 'American ignorance and incompetence' (lack of understanding and capability), which is the world we live in now.

The US faces a set of faithful choices about its geopolitical strategy: whether to preserve or restore American primacy, whether to maintain current alliances or develop new structures, and whether to accommodate China's sphere of influence or contain it.

China's per capita income in 1979 was $270 per year; nominally today it is $7,500, and using purchasing power parity it is $14,000.

The rise of US power globally differs from Germany and Japan because the British yielded to US power through the 'special relationship' rather than through war, making this a different type of power transition.

We are in denial about being in a situation where the rise of China could end poorly, but this situation does not have to end badly—it can end well and be more prosperous and stable than the current situation, and the outcome depends on whether leaders choose to lead and whether pressure groups define the agenda appropriately.

The US has failed to figure out how to provide economic and social opportunity for the lower middle class and middle class, and has failed to defend democracy.

The Iranian problem and Middle Eastern problem, while 'terribly bloody and horrific,' is not of global geopolitical significance compared to the China-East Asia story.

India and South Asia represent a crucially important story geopolitically but are not yet on the level of the China story because they lack the ports and naval capacity that China has—China has 200,000 merchant ships.

The underlying story of global development is one of success—non-G7 countries have risen economically—but the West was unprepared for this success.

China's GDP in 1979 was 261 million dollars; today it is about 12 trillion dollars, representing roughly a 46,000-fold increase over approximately 40 years.

China's total economy in nominal dollar terms is now 60% of the US economy; in 1992 China was 6% of the US economy; in 2007 China was 25% of the US economy—demonstrating accelerating convergence.

China is now the world's number one manufacturer, number one exporter, number one consumer market for oil, vehicles, and smartphones.

US GDP is still significantly higher than China's GDP, and when using purchasing power parity and inclusive wealth metrics, the disparity between US and Chinese wealth is 'incomparable'—far larger than nominal GDP differences suggest.

China has built a global network of ports where it has significant ownership stake, and these ports form the same geographic pattern as US military bases; some ports are private companies, some are Hong Kong-based, but the overall capacity is already substantially in place.

China built its first overseas military base in Djibouti in Africa, which it denies is a military base and calls a 'logistical facility,' while the main US military base in Africa is also located in Djibouti.

China has 200,000 merchant ships in its fleet and is the number one trading partner of about 43 countries, whereas the US is the number one trading partner of about 32 countries, giving China greater international leverage.

China has built seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, several serving as military bases with radar stations and surface-to-air missiles, including Subie Reef (larger than Pearl Harbor) and Fiery Cross Reef with a 10,000-foot runway.

China seized Fiery Cross Reef and constructed a military base with a 10,000-foot runway in just two years (2014-2016), demonstrating rapid militarization capacity.

China has a great civilization and the Chinese are great people, but they do not have a transparent political system.