Historian Stephen Kotkin: On USA vs China power competition, American advantages, and more (1/3)
What this covers
This video presents clips from a lecture by Stephen Kotkin, one of America’s preeminent historians and authors on geopolitics and authoritarian regimes. He is a professor emeritus at Princeton University, where he taught history and international affairs for 33 years, and is currently a Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Kotkin has written several award-winning history books and textbooks, and his biography on Joseph Stalin was a Pulitzer Prize finalist.
His lecture to the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna, Austria touched on a wide range of topics, including Russia, for which he is best known, as a Stalin biographer. The first volume of his three-part biography on Stalin was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize.
In this video, I’ve edited and clipped out the parts of Kotkin’s presentation addressing China (as well as added in maps and relevant graphics at various points in his presentation). Topics include historical context for China’s rise in a U.S. dominated world, American advantages in this great power struggle, Xi Jinping and the Chinese sphere of influence in Asia , and whether we’re headed for a new global equilibrium or confrontation.
Although this presentation was given in April, 2017, Professor Kotkin’s insights are still as relevant today as they were back then.
To buy Stephen Kotkin's books (and Kindle e-book or audio versions), click the below links. As a participant in Amazon Associate program, I may earn a small commission for qualifying purchases made through these links :
STEPHEN KOTKIN BOOKS:
“Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928” by Stephen Kotkin (Pulitzer Prize finalist for biography): https://amzn.to/4duyjbQ
“Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941” by Stephen Kotkin (“Monumental.” —The New York Times Book Review): https://amzn.to/4dHp5sV
“Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000” by Stephen Kotkin. ("The clearest picture we have to date of the post-Soviet landscape.” --The New Yorker): https://amzn.to/3Wz58gI
“Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment” by Stephen Kotkin: https://amzn.to/3SHP8rC
"Documenting Communism: The Hoover Project to Microfilm and Publish the Soviet Archives” by Stephen Kotkin: https://amzn.to/3WJFk1w
Also referenced and/or recommended by Stephen Kotkin:
"Invisible China" by Scott Rozelle (“Stunningly researched.” —The Economist, Best Books of the Year, UK): https://amzn.to/3SLbTLw
“How The Farmers Changed China: Power Of The People” by Kate Xiao Zhou: https://amzn.to/4cgN8xG
“Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine” by Dali L. Yang: https://amzn.to/46IROv5
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
The rise of China as a global power alongside US dominance creates an unprecedented geopolitical inflection point with existential stakes; the outcome depends critically on whether American leaders can accommodate this shift through diplomacy and calibrated strength or whether miscalculation and opacity will drive toward confrontation.
- China's economic transformation from 6% of US GDP in 1992 to 60% today, combined with 200,000 merchant ships and a global port network, represents a power shift of historical magnitude comparable to Germany and Japan rises
- The US still maintains overwhelming structural advantages (military mobility, global alliances, dollar reserve currency, command of commons) but these are eroding, creating a dangerous window where both sides face pressure to act
- The outcome depends on American political choices: containment vs. accommodation, preservation vs. restoration of primacy, and whether leaders can avoid miscalculation despite Chinese opacity and American incompetence
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We are in denial about being in a situation where the rise of China could end poorly, but this situation does not have to end badly—it can end well and be more prosperous and stable than the current situation, and the outcome depends on whether leaders choose to lead and whether pressure groups define the agenda appropriately.
“we're now in that situation and we don't understand that we're in that situation we're in denial that we're in that situation that situation doesn't have to end badly it can end really well it can be more prosperous and stable than the situation we're in now that's up to the people we call leaders who sometimes fail to lead it's up to the pressure groups that push those leaders or Define the agenda for those leaders”
India and South Asia represent a crucially important story geopolitically but are not yet on the level of the China story because they lack the ports and naval capacity that China has—China has 200,000 merchant ships.
“and then we're also in a world where China and East Asia and then if I had had time bringing the India the south Asia story into the picture too which is crucially important right that's where the game is now and India the south Asia story is not on the level of the China story right they don't have the ports they don't have the Navy that's the right Chinese have 200,000 Merchant ships 200,000 Merchant ships right now right”
Scarborough Shoal, which China has seized but not yet built up militarily, is located 140 miles from Manila, Philippines, demonstrating China's ability to project power into the immediate vicinity of US allies.
“this Scarboro sh which is not built up yet is 140 miles from Manila that just tells you how close this stuff is”
The rise of China as a new power in the International System and the inability of the US to accommodate it in a mutually stable way represents potentially the end of the world in economic terms—the incineration of all retirement accounts and portfolios, not just deaths in conflicts.
“when we're talking about the rise of China a rise of a new power in International System and the ability or inability of the US to accommodate the rise of China in a way that's mutually stable and prosperous we're talking about potentially the end of the world we're not talking about 3,000 deaths or 10,000 deaths or 250,000 deaths we're talking about the incineration of all your portfolios you got retirement accounts they're gone they're vaporized”
Enduring shifts in the global balance of power are extremely rare historically, but when they happen they are momentous; large-scale wars are always predicted after the fact but are only obvious in retrospect.
“enduring shifts in the global balance of power are extremely rare but when they happen they are momentous that's the world we live in now momentous times large scale Wars they're always predicted the day after on cable television right they're only obvious postf facto”
China claims 95% of the South China Sea and calls it a 'core interest' using the same language as for Taiwan, signaling that China intends to use maximum force to defend its South China Sea claim.
“they claim 95% of the CH South China Sea and they call it a core interest which is the same language used for Taiwan that tells you that they're going to go to the wall for the South China Sea you should have no Illusions when they say something is a core interest they mean it absolutely”
The US military is highly mobile and can project power globally within moments, whereas the Chinese military operates with heavy Soviet-style armor designed for border defense and is currently transitioning toward mobile, air-based, and ship-based projection capabilities.
“the US military is mobile it can go anywhere in a moment's notice the Chinese military is not mobile it's the big hulking Soviet style armor you know ready to CB across somebody's border they're moving now from that kind of heavy armor military to a mobile one which is about aircraft it's about amphibious Landings that is to say it's about ships right it's about projection of power over distance the US has all that already and more”
China is hemmed in geopolitically by US military bases positioned in multiple locations (nearby and offshore) and by growing desert and ethnic unrest on land borders.
“they're completely hemmed in right they're hemmed in by us bases here here here right Taiwan here paoan right the base in the Philippines and then they're hemmed in on this side desert which is growing and eth unrest which supposedly they're managing”
Although eroding, the US still maintains command of the commons—the global maritime, air, and space commons—but not with the degree of control it had 15 years ago.
“the US also still although it's eroding right has commands of the commons for the most part not the same command they had 15 years ago but they still have command”
The US military has a completely global footprint of bases for radar and listening installations, unmatched in history, maintained on just a few percentage points of GDP.
“this is the US ability to project military power to have radar installations listening installations right there's never been a military like this whose footprint is completely Global and moreover it's that way on just a few percentage points of GDP”
President Xi Jinping stated that China does not intend to pursue militarization of the South China Sea, which US officials interpret as meaning China seeks military hegemony in East Asia.
“president XI jingping you remember famously said they don't intend to pursue militarization and here's the American understand of that right that China seeks aemy and East Asia simple as that”
The rise of German power in Europe and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia are important historical precedents for power transitions that can end in conflict.
“remember the rise of German power in Europe that's an important historical case remember the rise of Japanese power in East Asia another important historical case”
US GDP is still significantly higher than China's GDP, and when using purchasing power parity and inclusive wealth metrics, the disparity between US and Chinese wealth is 'incomparable'—far larger than nominal GDP differences suggest.
“US GDP is still significantly higher than China's GDP purchasing power parity doesn't explain the weight you have in the world the geopolitical weight you have in the world right even per capita if you use purchasing power parity right the disparity is colossal if you use something called inclusive wealth inclusive wealth is a greater concept than GDP you can see the disparity is greater still inclusive wealth is uh roads buildings machines human capital natural Capital right the wealth of the United States and the wealth of China are incomparable”
The G7 countries have only gotten immensely richer in absolute terms, but their share of global GDP has dropped from just under 70% at its peak to 47% today—this is the definition of success at the global level.
“The G7 at its height accounted for almost 70% of GDP it peaked at just under 70 the G7 what does the G7 account for now 47% of global GDP so the G7 countries have only gotten richer immensely richer than they were but their share of Glo Global GDP is dropping dropping like a stone that's called success there's no other word for”
China has more borders than any other country in the world—20 borders total (14 on land and 6 on sea)—and disputes many of those borders with neighbors.
“China has more borders than any other country in the world it's got 20 borders 14 on land and six on sea right it's also got disputes with many of those neighbors over the borders”
The Iranian problem and Middle Eastern problem, while 'terribly bloody and horrific,' is not of global geopolitical significance compared to the China-East Asia story.
“we're in a world where the Iranian problem and the Middle Eastern problem is terribly bloody and horrific but not of global geopolitical significance”
China built its first overseas military base in Djibouti in Africa, which it denies is a military base and calls a 'logistical facility,' while the main US military base in Africa is also located in Djibouti.
“the Chinese built their first overseas military base in jibuti in Africa they deny that it's a military base they call it a logistical facility where's the main US military base in Africa jibuti that's right”
China has built seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, several serving as military bases with radar stations and surface-to-air missiles, including Subie Reef (larger than Pearl Harbor) and Fiery Cross Reef with a 10,000-foot runway.
“we now have seven artificial Islands several of military bases right we have subie Reef larger than Pearl Harbor there was nothing there before now it's larger than Pearl Harbor mief Reef fiery cross I'm going to show you fiery cross in a second with the 10,000 foot Runway and then you know the power cells I got the radar stations the surface to air missiles”
China seized Fiery Cross Reef and constructed a military base with a 10,000-foot runway in just two years (2014-2016), demonstrating rapid militarization capacity.
“here is fiery cross Reef you see the coral 2014 2015 2016 that's for the ch Chinese can do they just seized it violate international law and they just militarized it and they built this base and they have a 10,000 foot runway on fiery cross Reef two years two years”
Containing China might require rebuilding a 350-ship American Fleet as a strategic option available to Washington.
“or should we try to contain them and rebuild a 300 50 ship American Fleet right”
Iran, Russia, and China are all ancient civilizations with tremendous sense of historical entitlement, tremendous historical grievances, and a 'chip on their shoulder'—a politics of resentment that can take domestic (populism) or international (populism) forms.
“Iran Russia and China are all ancient civilizations they're all spectacular ancient civilizations they all have tremendous sense of historical entitlement and tremendous historical grievances they have what we call in English a chip on their shoulder right this grievance this resentment we have a politics of resentment which takes the form of domestic or populism and then there's an international politics of resentment and international populism”
China is now the world's number one manufacturer, number one exporter, number one consumer market for oil, vehicles, and smartphones.
“China is now the world's number one manufacturer number one exporter and number one consumer market for oil Vehicles smartphones and down the line”
The US possesses unique structural advantages that China lacks: a global system of alliances, deep financial markets, the dollar as reserve currency, the English language as a global lingua franca, and command of the commons.
“the US also has the global system of alliances the Deep financial markets the dollar Reserve currency the English language right the Chinese don't have any of this okay”
All war is miscalculation by decision makers; wars do not happen without orders being given and buttons being pushed, but miscalculation is often present at the point of decision.
“all war is miscalculation by decision makers Wars don't happen unless an order is given buttons are pushed right World War I Sleepwalk into war there were a thousand orders just to move the horses and the fodder for the horses you can't fight a war right without orders a thousand orders alone just to move the horses and the fodder you can't Sleepwalk into to war you got to give orders to have War happen right but it's often miscalculation”
The underlying story of global development is one of success—non-G7 countries have risen economically—but the West was unprepared for this success.
“there is an underlying story which is one of success the problem is we weren't ready for success”
Russia has unique military and geopolitical capabilities but does not have its own sphere of influence and handicaps itself in many ways.
“we're in a situation where Russia has unique capabilities but doesn't even have its own sphere of influence it handicaps itself in many ways as you'll hear in upcoming lectures”
China's per capita income in 1979 was $270 per year; nominally today it is $7,500, and using purchasing power parity it is $14,000.
“China per capita income in 1979 $270 a year average income for someone an inhabitant of China in 1979 nominally today it's 7,500 purchasing power priority it's 14,000”
China's GDP in 1979 was 261 million dollars; today it is about 12 trillion dollars, representing roughly a 46,000-fold increase over approximately 40 years.
“China's GDP in 1979 261 million China's GDP today about 12 trillion”
China's total economy in nominal dollar terms is now 60% of the US economy; in 1992 China was 6% of the US economy; in 2007 China was 25% of the US economy—demonstrating accelerating convergence.
“China's income overall national income it's total economy in nominal dollar terms is now 60% of the US in 1992 China was 6% of the US economy in 2007 China was 25% of the US economy”
China has 200,000 merchant ships in its fleet and is the number one trading partner of about 43 countries, whereas the US is the number one trading partner of about 32 countries, giving China greater international leverage.
“China has a greater leverage greater International leverage because as I said they're the number one trading partner of about 43 countries and the US is the number one trading partner of about 32 countries”
China lacks a California-like geography—a large, fertile, defensible coastal region—which is identified as its principal geopolitical lack.
“China has no California which is its principal geopolitical lack”
The US faces a combination of 'Chinese opacity' (lack of transparency in Chinese decision-making) and 'American ignorance and incompetence' (lack of understanding and capability), which is the world we live in now.
“we have Chinese opacity we have American whatever you want to call it ignorance andc competence that's the world we're in right now”
The rise of US power globally differs from Germany and Japan because the British yielded to US power through the 'special relationship' rather than through war, making this a different type of power transition.
“remember the rise of us power globally slightly different because the British yielded as it were they surrendered to the rise of us power with that phony nonsense about the special relationship”
The US has failed to figure out how to provide economic and social opportunity for the lower middle class and middle class, and has failed to defend democracy.
“meanwhile we can't figure out how to provide economic and social opportunity for the lower middle class and the middle class anymore we can't figure out how to defend democracy we have a problem”
China has built a global network of ports where it has significant ownership stake, and these ports form the same geographic pattern as US military bases; some ports are private companies, some are Hong Kong-based, but the overall capacity is already substantially in place.
“this is a map you saw this in the financial times right these are China's ports where they have a significant ownership stake globally right in other words you saw the US military bases and you see the Chinese ports and lo and behold they're the same map the difference is is that the Chinese right have trading ports now some are still projected right right some are Hong Kong companies many of them are private companies but nonetheless this is the capacity that is already in place for the most part that the Chinese have built globally”
China's ports are dual-use infrastructure—built as commercial shipping ports but convertible to military ports capable of handling large warships like destroyers and cruisers.
“there's a piece of this which are what we call dual use dual use means you build a shipping Port that can handle trade and then it becomes a military Port that can handle big ships for example destroyers Cruisers”
The map of China's trading ports where it has controlling stake is becoming a map of potential military bases—China's port network is transitioning from purely commercial to military-capable infrastructure.
“the map of trading ports where they have a controlling stake is now becoming a map of of potential military bases”
Even business as usual—routine international relations without major policy changes—can trigger large-scale conflict during power transitions, as history demonstrates.
“and even business as usual triggers large scale conflict that's what history shows”
Can the US find a strategy combining containment and cooperation, while applying calibrated strength and diplomacy, and respecting others' interests and values while upholding its own?
“can we find containment and cooperation and delicate caliberation strength and diplomacy can we respect others interests and values while we uphold our own”
For a non-dominant state to avoid being bossed around by a powerful country, it must possess attributes as good as that powerful country's attributes, unless the powerful country is disciplined through mechanisms, institutions, and a constraining narrative or story (like 'the West').
“the combination of attributes you would have have to be as good as the most powerful country's attributes otherwise that most powerful country could have the ability to boss you around unless that most powerful country is somehow disciplined is somehow set in mechanisms institutions in a story called the West in which case they can do harm to the less powerful but not on the scale they could do given their power if they were undisciplined”
China's sphere of influence in East Asia is 'a serious one' and 'they're Playing for Keeps'—China is making major moves that signal commitment to regional dominance.
“that's where we are that's the world we live in today the Chinese sphere of influence in East Asia is a serious one They're Playing for Keeps”
China has a great civilization and the Chinese are great people, but they do not have a transparent political system.
“the Chinese are a great people they have an incredible civilization I would agree with all that they are a great people they do have an incredible civilization it's just they don't really have a transparent political system”
The US faces a set of faithful choices about its geopolitical strategy: whether to preserve or restore American primacy, whether to maintain current alliances or develop new structures, and whether to accommodate China's sphere of influence or contain it.
“we have faithful choices for Washington can American Primacy be preserved or restored should it even be preserved maybe enough is enough should we keep the current alliances should we let them go should there be new structures right should we just accommodate China and East Asia Russia in EUR Asia and Iran in the Gulf by granting the spheres of influence that's what they want that's what they're pushing for or should we try to contain them”
China's rise differs from all historical precedents—it doesn't resemble the German, Japanese, or US rises—and depends not just on China alone but critically on US choices and behavior.
“China we don't know like none of the above it doesn't depend on China alone right okay China is rising in a US dominated world that we do know okay so us Remains the key variable”
The US faces a choice between pursuing confrontation with China in each region (South China Sea, East Asia, etc.) or finding a new equilibrium in each region through negotiation and calibrated strength.
“is there maybe a new equilibrium in each region or are we actually headed for confrontation in each region”
The vocabulary available in English to describe the combination of attributes of ancient civilizations with historical grievances and desire for recognition is poor, requiring better conceptual tools.
“our vocabulary is um poor to describe this uh the combination of attributes you would have have to be as good as the most powerful country's attributes”