Critical Issues Confronting China - Professor Yasheng Huang - November 29, 2023
What this covers
Critical Issues Confronting China series
China’s Long March: From Politics to Economics and from Economics to Politics
Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management at MIT Sloan School of Management
with
Yuhua Wang, Professor of Government, Harvard University
November 29, 2023
In a recent Critical Issues Confronting China talk, Yasheng Huang, Professor of Global Economics and Management at MIT Sloan School of Management, and discussant Yuhua Wang, Professor of Government at Harvard University, explored the roots of China’s present-day return to heightened political controls.
Professor Huang, author of The Rise and Fall of the EAST, How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to its Decline, argued that the crackdown on the democracy movement of 1989 sowed the seeds that eventually led to today’s rise in autocracy and the ultimate reversal of economic reforms. “Tiananmen was the turning point,” he said, while arguing that, in the early 1980s, divisions among state agencies and Politburo members formed a check-and-balance mechanism of sorts. Following the crackdown, the drive toward capitalist-style reforms paired with a ban on political reform led to unprecedented growth—but also rampant corruption and crony capitalism. Inevitably, Huang argued, Communist Party leaders, fearing the collapse of the Party itself, turned to recentralization and a reinstatement of strong political control. The end result: Reframing economist Adam Posen’s argument that China has "Economic Long Covid,” Huang asserted that China has "Political Long Covid," under which confidence wanes in three critical components of the economy: business, government, and households.
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Yasheng Huang argues that Chinese politics and economics have fundamentally shifted from a fragmented, reformist 1980s era toward extreme centralization and autocracy since 1989, driven by institutional collapse rather than inevitable historical forces, with the abolition of the Central Advisory Commission removing the primary mechanism for constraining concentrated power.
- Political fragmentation in the 1980s (five power centers) enabled bottom-up economic reforms and shared decision-making; centralization after 1989 reversed this, concentrating power in the General Secretary while eliminating institutional checks
- The Central Advisory Commission institutionalized elder constraint on incumbents; its abolition in the 1990s eliminated the only legitimate platform for exercising this check, leaving only individual capacity-dependent constraints
- The recent pivot from GDP targeting to political priorities has undercut the objective anchoring effect of economics, making state action more arbitrary and discretionary, demonstrated by zero-COVID lockdowns signaling to all economic sectors that growth is no longer the priority
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Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in 1984 were primarily private (10 million of 12 million), not government-run as Western scholars claimed; the Chinese definition of TVEs was 'Enterprises located in townships and villages' not 'owned by townships and villages'—Western scholars confused location with ownership.
“ship in Village Enterprises very famous uh phenomenon in rural China in 1984 there were some 12 million of TV 10 million of them were purely private it it just Scholars got it totally wrong when they said TVs were run by the local governments they are confusing two things one is ownership the other is location I checked the original definition published by the Chinese government of the TV the Chinese definition of tves is that these are Enterprises located in Township and villagers not owned by townships and villagers”
In the 1980s, China had five roughly equal centers of power (General Secretary, President, Premier, Chairman of Central Military Commission, and Chairman of Central Advisory Commission) with meaningful checks and balances between individual leaders, rather than institutional separation of powers.
“if you look at the division of labor in 1987 codified by the 13th party Congress you have five individuals occupying know more or less right so I I I want to emphasize that term more or less um equal uh positions of power right General Secretary Jang president of the country Le and chairman of the central military commissioning Premier Le chairman of the central advisory commission Chang”
Huang acknowledges that institutionalizing the Central Advisory Commission could have evolved differently over time; founding members' heavy-handedness was inevitable but would have diminished with new members and institutional norm-setting; institutions work out their problems when there is incentive to write rules of the game.
“but we we have to think about these things in evolutionary terms in Dynamic terms right so um you know PE people die right so so the those personalities would exit from history you can have new members right younger and new members their behavior could be different and also remember in the 1980s that was the funding of the institution when you are a founding member you always feel that you're are entitled to do more than you're sort of implicitly allowed right so I I'm not surprised by that at all but the thing is 30 years out right if essentially you have a situation where the politics is more contentious it could be personal interventions it could be you know personalities and things like that but but the things we have to look at institutional Evolution you always started with personal antagonism personal negotiation as long as the institution is there you have incentive to write rules of the game to write the uh the rules into the establish of norms maybe in the future they will say okay on these things we intervene on other things we don't intervene”
Economic reforms in the 1980s were bottom-up rather than top-down, with no centralized political decision to pursue reforms; People's Daily published competing editorials debating reforms, and intellectuals could criticize policies by name without immediate punishment for years.
“the economic reforms in the 1980s were much more bottom up rather than top down which means that when the reforms happened there was not yet a political decision to go with the reforms or not to go with the reforms so people's daily will publish two competing editorials side by side debating with each other you know whether or not they should do this and whether or not they shouldn't do it right”
China undertook substantial rural financial reforms in the 1980s, including officially sanctioned rural credit foundations that operated nationwide covering 40% of townships and villages, contradicting claims that China never pursued financial reform.
“rural Financial reforms again Western Scholars will tell you China never undertook Financial reform totally wrong China in the 1980s undertook substantial rural Financial reforms officially sanctioned rather than kind of a spontaneous informal Finance one very famous institution rural credit Foundation Nationwide in operation covering 40% of the townships and Villages right”
The Central Advisory Commission, created by Deng Xiaoping in 1982-1983, provided a formal institutionalized platform for retired elders to exercise constraint (participation power, not decision power) on the incumbent leadership, serving a similar function to the House of Lords in British politics.
“the central advisory committee provided a formal institutionalized legitimate platform to exercise that constraint right so for those of you who are not familiar with the central advisory committee uh actually it should be commission who who are not familiar with it it is institution created by J Shing in 1982 or maybe 83 to have the retired Elders to retire into this institution and then the institution gave them formal participation power not decision power but participation power they can sit at the polar buau meetings they can voice their opinions”
In the 1980s, personal income growth (rural and urban combined) outpaced GDP growth, meaning Chinese people captured a larger share of growth, and the Gini coefficient initially declined—the only period in the reform era with this outcome.
“but most importantly the personal income growth outpaced the GDP growth right so the essentially the household income rural household income Urban household income grew at lower rate as compared with rural household income but combined the two they grew faster than the GDP that means that for each one percentage point of GDP growth the Chinese people got a bigger share of the growth the Gen coefficient actually declined uh income uh inequality initially actually declined”
After 1989, power distribution collapsed from five centers to two centers; the Central Advisory Commission was abolished; party branches were reinserted into State-Owned Enterprises and government agencies; and all major political reforms of the 1980s were explicitly reversed.
“Political developments in the 1990s uh basically went from decentralization from fragmentation to centralization five centers of power collapse into two reverse explicitly all the political reforms of the 1980s the party Constitution was revised to put party back into the s soe to put party back into the government agencies junah was closed again”
The Central Advisory Commission's constraint power depended on the personal willingness and health of individuals like Jiang Zemin, not on institutionalized mechanisms; this personal basis was Huang's point about why abolishing the institution matters—it shifted from institutional to individual capacity-based constraint.
“that was because of the personal intervention of Jan zamin it is dependent on his health on his longevity right and on his personal willingness to intervene who for whatever reasons decided not to do that maybe the health was a issue or whatever I I I really don't know he decided not to do that but that's precisely my point if you have an institution there then the institutional intervention is not going to be dependent on the personal situations of one leader or two leaders right it's going to be more of a institutional uh intervention”
Huang acknowledges that his optimism about institutional evolution might be naive, but argues that institutions provide the opportunity for evolution while their absence precludes it.
“so you know maybe that will never happen but at least there's a opportunity for that happen when you still have that institution”
An estimated 400 million people were placed under lockdown at some point during COVID in China; no other country imposed lockdowns at this scale, and the US and India made different tradeoff choices between public health and economic development.
“estimated uh uh the estimation is some 400 million people were under some sort of lockdown uh at one point in time right in no other country would you do that right in the United States you know obviously we didn't do it very well right so we probably relax too much in India there's that debate about economics and public health but when you put 400 million people under some sort of lockdown you order every shop to be closed you order every business to be closed clearly there's not a discussion about the tradeoff between public health and economic development unprecedented human history I can't think of anything that that's on that scale”
Immediately after Tiananmen 1989, the elders decided to recentralize power and strengthen Jiang Zemin's position by giving the General Secretary increased decision-making authority because Jiang was weak and lacked a political base in Beijing.
“there was recentralization of power immediately after TMM the ERS got together and they decided to recentralize the power because they wanted to support Janam janami came in all of a sudden and he was relatively weak he didn't have political base in Beijing so the elders decided and they needed to do that to uh strengthen his power by giving lot of decision-making uh power to the general party secretary”
Yuan Foley argues that the 1980s and 1990s may have been exceptional rather than representative of normal Chinese political development; the last 10 years represent a return to the 2,000-year historical norm of unrestricted imperial/authoritarian rule where politics dominates economics.
“you know the last 40 years occupy a um a good share of our life and uh so we all tend to think you know that's that's the norm and then you know 1980s you know even 1990s uh you know there was some Kindle of leadership uh and then we all think that um the last last 10 years right is is is one exception and this is this is not right something is wrong something wrong is about China but then also thinking about yash's uh most recent book you know which goes back to 2,000 years and then that really let me think it's probably uh the norm you know we are living in you know the last 10 years it's probably going back to the norm uh where China has been in the last 2,000 years we have a you know in the past is an emperor now a president that is now conru by anything right there's no institutional constraints on the emperor's power in Imperial China now there's no no institutional constraints on sh P's power”
The 1980s were characterized by political rivalry rather than political struggle, meaning that political rivals could coexist without criminalization, and defeated politicians received soft landings (retaining Central Committee membership and privileges) rather than being imprisoned.
“the basic difference between political struggles and and political rivalries is that political rivalries um allow you to Live and Let Live right you don't pursue your political Rivals all the way to uh jail to criminalization and they were s Ling hun didn't last very longang was sacked for sure but they were soft Landing right both of them retained uh membership in the Central Committee retained privileges as um uh leaders of the country retained the polar buau seat right there was no criminalization of politics”
1989 (Tiananmen) was the true turning point in Chinese politics and economics, not the most commonly cited 1978 (reform beginning) or 1997-1998 (Asian financial crisis); after 1989, political centralization accelerated and economic reforms were reversed.
“the true turning point is 1989 the T right uh the rise of autocracy the reversal of economic reforms almost all of them can be tra through 1989”
By analogy to Taiwan's democratic evolution, institutions begin with personal antagonism but over time develop rules and norms about scope of intervention; the evolution of democracy in the West followed this pattern.
“this is if you look at the evolution of democracy on Taiwan sort of like that first within the party you know they didn't get along they hated each other but over time they negotiated rules of the game and um and scope of their uh interventions and interactions right so you know maybe that will never happen but at least there's a opportunity for that happen when you still have that institution”
The Chinese economy's failure to bounce back after COVID is rooted in 'long political COVID', not the disease itself; confidence has been sequentially undermined in three sectors—first government (2013-2018), then business (2019-2021), then households (2022)—through anti-corruption campaigns and regulatory crackdowns.
“a economy a society has three sectors government business and household right what has happened in the last 10 years is sequentially each one of these three sectors confidence has been undermined one by one first government then business and the covid has done this massive undermining of the confidence in the household sector right um from 2013 to 2018 the anti-corruption uh undermine the incentive and the confidence in the government sector”
If economic growth became unachievable (due to marginal decreasing returns), Xi's shift to alternative sources of legitimacy (anti-poverty, anti-corruption campaigns that people welcomed initially) would be a rational strategic choice, not a destructive error.
“what if right she was very smart actually he was you know he knew that he knew that he cannot uh have K girl anymore and then he knows that the legitimacy of the party really comes from something he has to do something else when GDP stopped growing and then he's he he was forced to PE PE it away from GDP growth to focus on those other things you know anti-poverty for example there's an anti-poverty campaign anti-corruption campaign although it's very distructive to the bureaucracy but people like it you know in the first several years of the campaigns you know people really welcome the anti-corruption campaign”
Huang agrees that diminishing marginal returns from growth constrain future performance but argues that accepting lower growth is different from actively suppressing growth through private sector crackdowns and FDI investigations; accepting constraints would predict more effort to maintain growth, not policies that reduce it.
“I think there's a difference between sort of accepting that you cannot grow GDP there's a difference between that and and then you actively doing things to reduce DDP growth right so you crack down the private sector you you you sort of um you know you investigate foreign firms to make sure that FDI is not going to come in right so so your uh Theory applies more to accepting lower GDP growth as a fact right because they're uh reduced marginal returns from GDP growth I totally agree no if if if you and I were in his position precisely because we cannot take it for granted that GDP growth is going to be 8% 9% every year we have to do really other things to make sure it is not going to be 0% right so so that will predict more active efforts to butress GDP growth rather than to suppress CDP growth”
Zero-COVID lockdowns represented a massive violation of property rights and basic security (shelter, access to necessities), with detention power exercised at will, and demolished the sense of economic security and confidence in the household sector.
“the state power was completely unconstrained basic security was shattered you lost shelter you lost access to basic necessities detention power was exercised at will right so if you think about this from a property rights perspective this was a massive violation of every kind of right you can think of”
Personal consumption as percentage of GDP in the 1980s was 50% (the highest in 40 years of reform), declining to 40% by recent years, with a low of 34% in 2010, indicating a fundamental shift away from consumption-driven growth.
“the personal consumption GDP ratio was 50% the highest uh ever in the uh 40 Years of Chinese reforms now it's about 40% the lowest point was 2010 34%”
Foley questions whether Xi Jinping's deprioritization of GDP was a deliberate choice or was forced by declining economic growth; after 40 years of rapid growth, marginal returns diminish and 10% growth becomes impossible, potentially forcing the regime to seek alternative sources of legitimacy.
“this recent uh pivot away from GB G GDP right we we know that you during covid uh you know shining certainly signals to the audience to the people that you know I don't care about GDP I care about party building I care about stability I care about anti-corruption I wonder whether you know so when you talk about it it seems that it's a choice right so she chose to P it away from GDP but I wonder whether uh it was a choice I wonder whether he was forced to P away from GDP because we all know that economic growth has marginal decreasing marginal returns that you after 40 Years of rapid growth it's impossible to grow at 10% anymore”
GDP targeting, despite its problems (pollution, evictions, corruption), made a larger contribution by pivoting the Communist Party from its traditional activities (power struggles, ideological extremism, paramount insecurity) toward pursuing economic development.
“ccp's first principle is development right development is the hard Truth uh GDP targeting has its problems in my book before I criticize CDP targeting but its biggest contribution is that it pivoted the CCP from its usual customary activities such as power struggles ideological extremism and Paramount insecurity right so the larger effect of the GD G so you criticize G GDP targeting because uh a permitted pollution uh a um uh allow the evictions of the rural uh peasants um a encourage corruption I think all these are legitimate but the larger benefit of the GD targeting is that CCP was going to pursue GDP rather than doing these other things right”
A retiree questioner argues that according to Maslow's theory of human needs, Chinese people who have food, shelter, and security might not care about autocratic rule; Huang counters that elite politics, not mass preferences, determine political outcomes, with 75% of 20th century autocracy collapses caused by elite rebellions, not mass movements.
“uh according to um Empirical research on 20th century 75% of the collapse of collapses of the autocracies are caused by Elite uh uh rebellions not by the not by the masses historically speaking um same thing it's it's really the the ver the the reason why the imperial system was so stable was because they were able to achieve Elite peace and stability if you look at the masses they Rebel all the time”
Politics and economics are complements rather than substitutes: liberal politics go with liberal economics, and vice versa; this directly contradicts the popular view that autocratic 'strong men' are needed to reform economies.
“politics and economics are compliments rather than substitutes um essentially the idea is liberal politics go with liberal economics and vice versa right so that's actually very different from a uh popular view which says that in order to uh reform Chinese economy you need a strong man you need an autocrat I go directly against that view um and I think facts and evidence actually point to exactly the opposite conclusion which is that when you have more fragmentation at the in the political system you actually have more economic reforms when you have concentration of power you have less economic reforms you can actually have uh reversals of the reforms”
Global connections, private sector development, technology, and foreign education in modern China differ from imperial history, potentially constraining the return to pure historical autocracy despite similar institutional structures.
“China today is not Chinese history right globalization private sector development technology foreign education you know you can think about all these other things and even those things didn't stop going back to the right”
Zero-COVID lockdowns are probably history's single biggest destructive act against economic growth, collective security, and sense of confidence about the future.
“zero zero Co the way I put it is zero covid lockdowns are probably history's single biggest destructive Act of economy collective security and a sense of confidence about the future”
GDP targeting anchors state actions to objective, quantifiable conditions (labor, capital ratio, foreign trade, FDI) that government cannot directly control, forcing observation of binding constraints; by contrast, abandoning GDP targeting makes the state more arbitrary and discretionary.
“GDP targeting also encourages experimentation and prag right you know I I still feel legitimate to criticize GDB targeting within a narrow uh framework but if you have a broader framework in terms of political and economic tradeoff then I think GDP targeting is actually a better uh goal for the uh Chinese government to pursue...GDB targeting also anchors the state actions on objective or qu side objective facts and conditions such as labor Capital ratio foreign trade relations foreign direct Investments so these are the things that the government doesn't really have direct control over you kind of have to observe these binding constraints”
Using mentions of Communist Party leaders in People's Daily editorials as a measure of political fragmentation: the General Secretary's name mentions rose from ~15 times/year in 1980s to 117 times in 2013-2017 under Xi Jinping, while other officials' mentions declined, showing extreme centralization.
“this is the mentions of the party secretary in the 1980s at this level average level about 15 it means that for each given year uh his name came up about 15 times the uh the solid line is the Premiere right the average uh mentioning of the premere and he got mentioned 22 times”
COVID lockdowns had a signaling effect, communicating to the public that the regime does not care about GDP; ordering firms and stores to shut down is the clearest possible message that economics is no longer a priority.
“essentially what the covid lockdowns it had it had a signal signaling effect it's basically saying economy doesn't matter right just think of it right so you put the entire country on lockdown firms were ordered to shut down stores were ordered to to shut down is there a better way to communicate to the public that you don't care about GDP right I don't I can't think of anything right”
The instability that could arise from current Chinese conditions comes not from mass discontent but from a mismatch between income and expenditure: China spends money on infrastructure, semiconductors, and common prosperity while simultaneously cracking down on its growth engine, an unstable equilibrium.
“the uh the instability I think will come from a mismatch the mismatch is that they're basically two equilibria one is that if you don't make money if you don't spend money you're okay you can be stable right no income no expenditure sort of like me now I'm sabatical so uh or you spend a lot of money but you make a lot of money so both are happy equilibrium the situation that is not stable is in between you spend a lot of money you don't make any money China China today is in that situation you spend money on buil and Road you spend money on semiconductors you spend money on urbanization you spend money on common Pro common Prosperity but you also crack down on the growth engine of the Chinese economy”
Funding families (founding elite families like the Deng, Ma, Chen Yun, Bo, and Chen families) agreed to power-sharing arrangements after the revolution to guarantee their descendants would also have a share of power; the Central Advisory Commission institutionalized this family-based power sharing.
“every dynasty in China that uh um because every dynasty in China was founded on some violent War right uh the Communist party you know uh took over China through a violent revolution and then through any Revolution there has to be a coalition of elite members they fall together and then when they fall together you know to win the revolution uh they have to make an agreement after they take the country and then the agreement you know I don't know I guess in the 1940s 1950s is all the funding family the ma family the D family you know and um uh they probably agree to something to share power right they agree that we you know uh there there should be some arrangement is institutional or informal that each family will have a share in the pie”
Once the Central Advisory Commission was abolished, the only constraint on the incumbent was informal check-and-balance by individual predecessors in their personal capacity, making such constraint dependent on their health and longevity rather than institutional design.
“in 2020 uh 2022 right so essentially what happened was that once you got rid of this institution the predecessors could still check and balance the current serving politicians but only in their individual capacity right so that means that it is a issue of biology if you are very robust uh if you're in good health you can exercise that power but if you're not then that power is weak”
The recent pivot from economics to politics as the priority has caused the state to lose objective anchoring; autocratic politics is highly subjective and discretionary with high variance and inconsistency, whereas GDP targeting provided consistency.
“There was this pivit from economics to politics in recent years uh economic growth was relegated to to maybe a secondary or even tertiary principle and by doing that you lose the objective anchoring effect of Economics right basically making the Chinese State more discretionary and more arbitrary so autocratic politics is highly subjective and discretionary subject to large degree of variances inconsistency so at least GDP targeting gives you some consistency”
Huang predicts that if China is to remain stable, there will be domestic relaxation of economic and perhaps social controls, followed by repair of US-China relations; alternatively, persistent imbalance will grow increasingly problematic.
“my own prediction you can be very naive can be very optimistic prediction my own prediction is that there will be some domestic relaxation of Economic and maybe even social controls uh followed by repairing the relationship between us and and and China if China is successful in going back to that say to the H not all the way to uh D shaing area you know I I think you know so this is going back to the the long-term tendency of China towards stability I think China can manage right so you can go back you get decent growth once again you could have some intellectual space you know I can can they can they can manage but if they persist then this imbalance is is going to grow and that's very very problematic”
Corruption cases reported in Chinese media rose from an average of 120,000 RMB in the 1980s to almost 4 million in 1990-2002 (post-Tiananmen), then to 30 million under Hu Jintao, showing that centralization of power correlates with increased corruption.
“this is uh uh referring to the monetary value of average and Medan corruption cases reported in the Chinese media um in the 1980s the average value is about 120 R&B immediately after tmn from 1990 to 2002 it shot up to almost 4 million right so from 120 shut up to 4 million and then there's another gigantic rise under H int that's 30 million”
The crony capitalism and corruption of the 1980s planted the seeds for the extreme autocracy that followed; this corruption was later used as justification for power grabs and anti-corruption campaigns.
“I think the politics and the economics of the 1980s incubated the Sease for Future Extreme autocracy there was crony capitalism of the 1980s that seated corruption right and and then the corruption was used as a uh justification for power grab”
Returns from politics (power struggles, ideological attacks, personality cults) are now high, and the CCP is losing the systematic, metric-based quality that was established during the Deng era.
“the returns from politics are going to be high right so people are engaged in power struggles ideological attacks personality C personal FY right all these things have returned right as many of you know um and the CCP is losing is systematic metric based quality that was established during the era”
Official sector 'lazy government' (政府懒政) began around 2014-2015 as officials lost confidence due to anti-corruption campaigns; this then spread to the business sector around 2019-2021 due to regulatory crackdowns.
“from 2013 to 2018 the anti-corruption uh undermine the incentive and the confidence in the government sector so some of you may have heard this term lazy government L right that was basically the official version and the early version of lying flag so it first happened in the official sector that began to happen around 2014 2015 right it first happened in the official sector and then it happened in the business sector right because of the anti-corruption campaign the regulatory crackdowns in 2020 and 2021 uh on the business sector right undermine the incentive and confidence of the business sector”
Funding families (red families) naturally die out after about three generations when younger members cease participating in politics and pursue other interests (art, fashion, design); the power of red families gradually declined through the 1990s-2000s as their members exited politics or died.
“the problem is those families don't last this is the true um Truth for every Dynasty in the past as well because those funding families they will die out right and then usually after three generations you know the children the grandchildren don't go into politics then they go into art fashion design they don't they don't care about politics and uh and gradually you know in the 1990s 200000 uh those families just you know those the younger members of the family just die out or they they stop entering politics”
Had the Central Advisory Commission still existed as an institution in 2018, it would have been more difficult for Xi Jinping to abolish constitutional term limits; the counterfactual question of whether the institution could have constrained this move cannot be definitively answered but is historically significant.
“had the central advisory uh commission still existed as a institution you know would it have been as easy as it was in in 2018 to abolish the Constitutional term limit I don't think we know the answer right I don't think we we will never know because the the the the central advisory commission was not there in 2018”
The Institute is extremely pleased to have Yasheng Huang as a visiting fellow at the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center and as an associate in research at the Fairbank Center.
“uh this year he's serving as a visiting fellow at the Kissinger Institute at the woodro Wilson Center in Washington DC”
Huang's book 'The Rise and Fall of the East' uses the acronym EAST (Examination, Autocracy, Stability, Technology) to identify four forces that shaped China's past and continue to shape it today, alternating between historical and contemporary analysis.
“so the East uh stands for examination autocracy stability and technology so there are many many really good books about the historic historical origins of the Chinese Communist Party of contemporary China um my book is not built on a chronological sequence uh rather a alternance between history and Trad today so the first chapter is about one chapter is about the exam system and then the next chapter is about the ccp's meritocracy it is very Broad in terms of the coverage and as I said before it alternates between history and the Contemporary period and so the four topics are exam kuu system uh autocracy stability and”
Huang's method in his books is deliberately based on history, facts, and data rather than values, and is descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive, with the final chapter offering a vision for reform if the country decides to revise its system.
“it is based on the book that just came out um the rise and the fall of the East but it's also based on the revision of my 2008 book um from the Cambridge University press I'm almost done with the revision so the talk is based on these two books but primarily on the Rison fall of the East...so I want to base my uh views of um of a future China based on history based on um facts and data rather than based on values right”