The Old World Order is Dead. What Comes Next? Ian Bremmer and Anirudh Suri | The Great Tech Game
What this covers
In this episode of The Great Tech Game Podcast, Anirudh Suri, Author and Host of The Great Tech Game Podcast, sits down with Ian Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media. Bremmer has spent his career helping business leaders, policymakers and the public make sense of global power shifts, and in this conversation he makes the case that tech companies, and the people running them, are evolving into a new category of geopolitical actors, one that didn't really exist before.
We start with the Starlink decision during the Russia-Ukraine war as a case study in what this kind of power actually looks like in practice. From there, we dig into the structural forces driving today's geopolitics, the competing models of the US, China and Europe, the push for ""sovereign AI,"" and where India stands in the global AI race.
We explore: How are tech companies and their founders starting to function as sovereigns in the geopolitical space? What kind of social backlash could this shift in power trigger, and could it change how governments and tech companies work together? What are the structural forces reshaping the balance of power in the world today, but especially between the US, Russia and China? Is the ""Thucydides Trap"" the right historical analogy for the US-China relationship? What do the US, Chinese and European models of capitalism reveal about where each system is headed? Is ""sovereign AI"" a viable strategy for middle powers, or should countries think about it differently? Where does India genuinely stand in the AI race, and what's the risk most people aren't talking about?
▶️ Watch the full conversation now, and subscribe to The Great Tech Game Podcast!
About the guest, Dr. Ian Bremmer:
Dr. Ian Bremmer is the founder and president of Eurasia Group, one of the world's leading global research and advisory firms, and GZERO Media, a digital media company providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs. He helps business leaders, policymakers and the general public make sense of global events through speeches, commentary, and media formats reaching a wide public audience.
This series is a collaboration between AI Futures Podcast & Hindustan Times.
#thegreattechgame #tgtgpodcast #anirudhsuri #ianbremmer #eurasiagroup #gzero #geopolitics #AI #artificialintelligence #globalaffairs #techpolicy #sovereignAI #indiaAI #usa #china #middlepowers
Download the Hindustan Times App from Playstore/App Store for all the latest news & updates. google app store : https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.ht.news&hl=en_IN&pli=1
Apple Store : https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.ht.news&hl=en_IN&pli=1
Add Hindustan Times as your preferred source on Google. Click here: https://www.google.com/preferences/source?q=hindustan%20times
Hindustan Times Videos brings all the News for the Global Indian under one umbrella. We break down news from across the globe from the unique lens of a Rising India. Tune in for Explainers, Opinions, Analysis and a 360 degree view of big events in India and the World which impact your present and future.
Follow the Hindustan Times Channel on WhatsApp for News Alerts, Top Stories and Editor picks. Join Us Today - https://www.bit.ly/3PQ4kSv
Subscribe to the Hindustan Times YT channel and press the bell icon to get notified when we go live.
Visit our website https://www.hindustantimes.com/ Follow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/htTweets Follow us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/hindustantimes
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
The world is entering a technopolar order where technology companies and AI systems are becoming geopolitical actors rivaling and sometimes superseding nation-states, fundamentally reshaping the global balance of power away from traditional great power competition toward a new era where digital infrastructure and AI capabilities determine geopolitical influence.
- Tech companies like Elon Musk's Starlink can unilaterally make decisions (cutting Russian access) with geopolitical consequences that governments cannot override, demonstrating de facto sovereignty
- The global order is fragmenting into three competing systems: a security order still dominated by the US, an economic order becoming multipolar, and a digital order increasingly dominated by tech companies—with the digital order moving fastest and becoming most powerful
- Middle powers and nations cannot compete by building independent AI stacks but must negotiate with tech giants as geopolitical allies, using leverage like energy or data to shape how AI operates within their borders
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Elon Musk decided to cut the Russians off from Starlink literally with the snap of his fingers, and no government made the decision; he made this decision with no oversight, fundamentally changing the Ukraine war—the Russians went from being able to effectively fight a drone war to losing it and falling a year behind in unmanned vehicles and drones.
“Elon Musk decided to cut the Russians off from Starlink. And so literally with the snap of his fingers, and this was him that made this decision, not the US government. No government made the decision. He made this decision with no oversight... Suddenly, the Russians went from being able to effectively fight a drone war against the Ukrainians to lose it um to no longer being able um to functionally um to they're a year behind.”
Cutting through information overload requires curiosity, recognition of your own biases, humility about the fact that what you want has nothing to do with analysis of the world around you, and if those things feel uncomfortable, you shouldn't be in this field.
“cutting through the noise is something that you do uh in every one of those aspects. It's a curiosity. Um it's a recognition of your own biases. Um it's a humility about the fact that what you want has nothing to do with analysis and the world around you. And if those things feel uncomfortable to you, you shouldn't be in this field. You should do something else.”
A majority of Americans increasingly do not support the global leadership role that America fashioned for itself after World War II, opposing the US as global sheriff, global free trade architecture promoter, and promoter of democracy and rule of law abroad, and are instead demanding other countries pay for their own defense, industrial policy, subsidies, and closed borders.
“a majority of Americans increasingly do not support um the leadership role that America had fashioned for itself after World War II... What do they oppose? Well, they oppose the US as the global sheriff. They want other countries to pay for their own defense. They oppose the US as uh promoting global free trade architecture. They want more industrial policy. They want subsidies. They oppose comparatively open borders.”
Russia was not brought into the West after the Soviet Union collapsed; NATO did not include Russia, the EU did not expand to include Russia, and Russia was excluded from important G8 meetings, leaving them angry and acting as a revisionist rogue state allied with North Korea and countries like China and Iran.
“back when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was not brought into the west. Uh NATO did not include Russia. The EU did not expand to include Russia. The G7 had a became a G8, but the Russians were excluded from all the important meetings. and and they're angry about that.”
China was integrated into the global economy and WTO with the Western presumption that as China became more powerful and wealthier, their political and economic system would align with Western advanced democracies, but instead China remains state capitalist, authoritarian, and is seen by most Western nations as a competitor and adversary rather than having become Western.
“China uh was brought into uh the global system particularly the global economy when the Americans welcomed their integration into the WTO. Um and and the presumption on the part of the West was that as China became more powerful and wealthier their political and economic system would align more with the western advanced democracies. they would become western. And China is today much more powerful... And yet they're not remotely western. They're they're still state capitalist. They're still authoritarian.”
The US government is not rapidly adopting the Chinese state capitalism model; instead, US tariffs and subsidies remain dimminimous compared to regulatory capture where private companies still drive most outcomes, suggesting the US system remains corporate-dominated rather than state-directed.
“It is certainly true that the United States government is leaning into tariffs, which means less free market. But is that really all that different from the way the US system worked before, or is it still the private sector that's calling most of the shots?”
Five years ago, the relationship between governments and tech firms was characterized by a real battle and tug of war for control, with governments using antitrust and other tools to constrain tech firms; today, the relationship has shifted to hand-in-glove alliance between the two.
“Five years ago there was a real battle between the two between governments and tech firms for control and influence where states were trying to exert their influence through antitrust and other such tools... today... they are much more handin glove for various reasons”
Companies fundamentally are not thinking first and foremost about long-term population acceptance; that's what governments are supposed to do, which is why when the regulatory aspect falls apart, the companies don't step in—and that's a problem.
“companies fundamentally are not thinking first and foremost about uh long-term how do we make sure um that um the population at large likes us. Um that's that's what the governments are supposed to do which is why when the regulation when the regulatory aspect falls apart you have a problem. That's right. The the companies don't suddenly just step in.”
Younger people interested in political risk careers should focus first on understanding content (read, digest, meet people, engage with issues), second on communicating effectively across formats (long-form, short-form, video, writing, in-person), and third on understanding how organizations work and reverse-engineering institutional architecture.
“three things you need um you need to first focus on content. You can't be in this field unless you actually care first and foremost about understanding of the issues. You got to read a lot. You got to digest a lot. You got to meet a lot of people. You got to engage. But it's about understanding, challenging yourself. Uh recognizing that you know the world changes fast. Your your thoughts will change as accordingly. Secondly, got to learn how to communicate that effectively um in different formats in long form, short form, video, writing, in person, on a stage, oneonone. It's really important. And third, you have to have an understanding and a willingness to learn how organizations work.”
If France acts alone on its nuclear data center deal without European coordination, it leaves other EU members in a much weaker position to negotiate similar deals with AI companies, creating fragmentation in Gzero that strengthens tech companies' position.
“But if France is doing that by itself and not with the Europeans, then where does that leave other EU members in trying to negotiate similar deals with AI companies? And the answer is of course in a much weaker position. So that's the that's the challenge here is that we are just nowhere close to having the kind of governance that we need geopolitically to make these alliances work effectively. And as long as that we have fragmentation in Gzero, the technology companies will end up in a stronger position.”
India has done some of the most impressive things on AI at scale; the fact that it has a huge population with an extraordinary amount of data provides leverage in attracting AI companies, and India's scale makes it matter geopolitically.
“I I I do think that after the US and China, India has done some of the most impressive things on AI. Um and uh the fact that it's a huge population with an extraordinary amount of data like that by itself is a piece of leverage um in attracting an AI company. There is scale just in India that makes India matter.”
China is facing very serious economic problems despite rising in absolute power and making investments in many technologies: their economy is not growing very fast, unemployment is way too high, many sectors are wildly unproductive and indebted with bad debt they're not addressing, and demographics are disastrous.
“China in my view uh I think is uh is facing some very serious problems that they are rising in absolute power... but their economy is in trouble and their demog it's not growing very fast. Uh unemployment is way too high. they have many sectors of their economy that are wildly unproductive and indebted with bad debt uh that they're not addressing.”
We are in uncharted territory because we are about to see an entire new group of geopolitical actors—non-state actors that are technology companies and AI companies—which has not happened since the beginning of the Westphalian system, and these actors will transform not just geopolitics but society and humanity as a whole.
“we are in uncharted territory. And and I suspect you know this because and and this is part of why you wanted to talk to me is because we are about to see an entire new group of geopolitical actors which has not happened since the beginning um of the West Failian system which are non-state actors that act geopolitically. They're technology companies. They're AI companies.”
In China, the state really captures the corporations and determines what is and what is not patriotic behavior, where money should be invested, and what sorts of things are out of bounds.
“where in China uh the state really captures the corporations and determines uh what is and what is not patriotic behavior, where money should be invested, uh what sorts of things are out of bounds, all of that.”
Sovereign AI is not a lost cause if middle powers think about it differently: identify components of AI they can compete with (e.g., energy for Gulf states, nuclear power for France) and build alliances with tech companies as strategic partnerships with leverage over business models and operations in their territory.
“that doesn't mean that sovereign AI is a lost cause. It just means you can't think about it holistically. You have to think about what are the components of sovereign AI that an individual country can compete with. So for example, if you're in the Gulf, a really big component of sovereign AI is you have incredibly cheap energy.”
Taiwan is wildly overhyped as a near to medium-term geopolitical problem, not actually a major risk in the near future.
“Taiwan uh wildly overhyped uh not not a near to medium-term problem in my view at all.”
We are in a geopolitical recession, defined as a period where the underlying balance of power no longer fits with the rules of the road, institutions, architecture, priorities, and policies that governed the previous order.
“we're in a geopolitical recession where the underlying balance of power really no longer fits with the rules of the road with the institutions, the architecture, the priorities, the policies.”
In the US-China AI competition, America's biggest asset is creative destruction and the opportunities and innovation that come from it; China's biggest asset is the longer-term strategic orientation of the system.
“American biggest asset um is uh creative destruction um and uh and the the opportunities and innovation that come from that. China's biggest asset is the long-term or longer term strategic orientation of the system.”
Technology dominance by a small number of people with access to LLMs and the ability to program them with data will not necessarily continue indefinitely; alternative possibilities include backlash from individuals or states, changes in technology development trajectories, or collapse of the model.
“it doesn't mean that the technology companies will remain dominant forever. It doesn't mean that we won't see different kinds of backlash bottom up from individuals top down from states. uh also doesn't mean the technology will continue to develop in the way that it's presently developing that allows small number of people um that have access to those LLMs”
New technologies disrupting not just drones but financial markets are underappreciated risks; cyber risk from mythosis becoming more available is underestimated.
“underhyped is uh you know everything about uh new technologies disrupting not just drones but financial markets. um the the cyber risk that comes from um what happens when mythos uh suddenly becomes more available, other people developing it, all these things uh are underappreciated.”
People are angry and scared about AI because they're also wildly anti-corruption and anti-privilege, and they don't differentiate between Trump's crypto interests, Elon's AI interests, and traditional tech companies like Google and Microsoft.
“people are scared. Um they're angry. Um they're also wildly anti-corruption and privilege and the connection of the two. And even though um Trump is much more about, you know, World Liberty Financial and his family on crypto and less about AI, um they're they're not going to uh differentiate between that and Elon and then and the and the the longer term C companies”
The digital order is set to become the dominant geopolitical order in a comparatively short period of time, and this transformation will be experienced within our lifetimes.
“the digital order is set to become the dominant order geopolitically in a comparatively short period of time. In other words, God willing, short of like, you know, getting hit by a bus. You and I will experience this uh as will pretty much everybody watching.”
It's plausible that tech companies could have the same advantages as China's surveillance state in containing social backlash through repressive measures and coercive control, allowing them to grab more attention, eyeballs, and data without facing consequences.
“it's quite plausible that uh tech companies um who are who need to continue to raise money um in order to be successful uh could have some of those same advantages. In in being able um to grab more and more of the attention, the eyeballs, the data of the individuals that are actually on um their platform.”
Tech CEOs and their business decisions provide more geopolitical insight on where the world is going than talking to heads of state of major countries, based on what they're doing, who they're talking to, how they're deploying capital, and what their business model is.
“I'll go and meet with um a CEO of a major AI or tech firm and and I will get more geopolitical insight on where the world is going from what they're doing, who they're talking to, how they're deploying capital, what their business model is than I will from talking to the head of state of a pretty major country.”
Middle powers trying to create a competing tech stack with the US and China is a lost cause because they will never be able to compete or catch up; if it turns out US/China are creating expensive models, fast followers will commoditize it, and middle powers will waste money on things that become nearly free in 3-5 years.
“if if what these countries are trying to do is to create a competing tech stack um with what you see in the US and China, it's a lost cause. And it's a lost cause because they will never be able to compete or catch up with what the Americans and the Chinese are doing. And if it turns out that actually what the US and the Chinese are doing is creating really expensive models so that fast followers can take advantage and it becomes commoditized then the middle powers waste a lot of money”
India faces potential displacement risk from AI: American banks are quietly shutting down their Indian offshoring operations because AI can replace those workers; Indian labor is extremely mobile and competitive, requiring constant churning to attract new workers, and data security concerns make companies prefer onshore operations near headquarters.
“I worry about a lot of displacement I I already see American banks that are quietly talking about shutting down their offshoring in India. Um because AI can displace those people. Um also because those that labor in India is extremely mobile and competitive. So you're constantly churning and you're fighting to bring in more of them and there's issues of data security and wouldn't you rather have all of that in the United States or with your headquarters?”
UAE and Singapore are wildly impressive in terms of AI diffusion for their populations and utility by their governments, while the US government is not, most people don't use AI effectively, which is really bad because it will undermine efficient decision-making in government.
“You know, the UAE and Singapore are wildly impressive in terms of AI diffusion for their populations and utility by their governments. The US government is not. Most people in the US government don't use AI effectively. That's really bad. Yeah. Because that's going to undermine efficient decision-m in the government.”
The government-tech alliance is unlikely to last more than 5-10 years as a maximum, and social backlash driven by fear, anger, and anti-corruption sentiment among voters will force a reckoning with tech firm power.
“it's amazing because 5 10 years feels like the absolute maximum that we can even think about in this. I'm stretching it. I think we should be asking for a year or two until the Trump”
In the US and allied governments, it is the companies and individuals running tech and AI companies that act functionally as sovereigns in the geopolitical space, rather than the state acting as principal AI actor as it does in China.
“it is actually the companies and the individuals that are running the companies that are acting as functionally as sovereigns in the geopolitical space...for the US and for any governments that are working with the US”
There is a disconnect where people evaluate tech companies as they would governments but evaluate governments as they would companies, when in fact governments should be judged by social welfare and legitimacy while companies should be judged by innovation and efficiency, creating misaligned metrics.
“we need to think about governments more like the way we've traditionally thought about companies and we need to think about companies in the tech space and the AI space more like the way we've traditionally thought about governments and that is not happening”
By 2028, at least one major US presidential candidate will be heavily driven by populist backlash to AI, assuming traditional party structures hold, likely the Democratic candidate.
“I do think that in 2028 there's going to be at least one major candidate, assuming that, you know, there are two and it's both traditional parties and one of them doesn't blow apart and who knows, right? But assuming it's that way, I expect that at least the Democratic candidate will be heavily driven uh by a populist response to AI.”
Tech firms may be adopting a 'welfarist' positioning toward consumers to avoid backlash, with firms like Anthropic taking more pro-consumer stances than competitors like Open AI, potentially allowing some firms to emerge as consumer-focused leaders.
“between the different tech firms that are at the helm of the AI wave you might see and you're already seeing this between open and anthropic a little bit that some firms will take a very very proconsumer positioning to avoid that backlash against them and hence might emerge as much more let's say welferist AI firms than others right”
Trump is a symptom of the geopolitical recession, not the cause of it, but he is a beneficiary and accelerant of it while also having unique qualities of unfitness that cause additional uncertainty.
“President Trump is a symptom of those developments. He is not the cause, but he is certainly a beneficiary. He is an accelerant and and also he has some unique qualities in terms of his unfitness for the role.”
The US operates on a model where the private sector captures the regulatory environment through a 'coin operated democracy' where two tiers of power exist: one for those that can lobby and pay for policy outcomes, and one for everybody else, with the current US president able to do this for himself and his family in unprecedented ways.
“the United States with the private sector capturing the regulatory environment uh through a a coin operated democracy. I mean the most most Americans that think the US is not a representative system believe that there's two two tiers of justice, two tiers of law, two tiers of power. one for those that are able to lobby and pay for um the the policy outcomes that they wish. And it turns out that the president of the United States today can do that himself for himself and his family in ways that are unprecedented.”
The technology companies are currently only dominant in a 'little sandbox' of the digital realm, but that sandbox will expand to subsume other orders if current trends continue.
“these technology actors which right now are only you know sort of dominant in the little sandbox that they're playing in the world becomes sand”
Bremer's base case bet is that benefits of scale, information advantages, and ability to acquire/squeeze competitors will allow a few tech hyperscalers in the US and China to maintain dominance, with everyone else as takers rather than makers.
“my bet would be for the next 5 years that actually the benefits of scale, the information advantages of scale that you can identify what is coming faster than anyone else and either buy it or squeeze it and starve it that that plus the ability to collect extraordinary data and use it effectively will be a huge advantage for China and will make their government much more efficient... and will be a huge advantage for a few of the tech giants the hyperscalers in the US... everyone else will be a taker, not a maker”
The DoD should be making decisions about where Starlink is shut on and off, not SpaceX; the company should provide the technology, the government buys it, and government should make the decision about deployment.
“My my view at the time was that the right thing to do would be don't take that risk on yourself um for for SpaceX. Um the you should it's the the DoD should be making those decisions. Like you provide the technology, they buy it, but the decision of where it is and isn't shut on and off that should be a decision made by states. I lost that argument.”
In the Gzero world, scale is important for influence not just against Trump but also with tech companies, which is why countries like Norway are thinking about EU and UK reversal of Brexit—because coordination provides leverage.
“the Norwegians are now thinking about the EU and the UK Ministry of Treasury saying reversing Brexit is an inevitability because they understand that in the Gzero world scale is important for influence, right? And not just against Trump, also with the tech companies.”
The Gulf is not flying under the radar but will have the most trajectory change of any region in both positive and negative dimensions over the next few years.
“Uh I mean the Gulf's not flying under the radar, but it's becoming both that's the one where the trajectory is going to change the most on both sides.”
Xi Jinping and the current generation of world leaders—Trump, Putin, Xi, and others in their 70s and 80s—are arrogant, out of touch with young people, have no interest in giving up power, and people would not want them responsible for the future of society and global order, yet the fact that this will change and people want something different is a promising development.
“when when the most powerful leaders in the planet today are are Xihinping Trump and Putin like in their 70s or Trump basically 80 and and in you know men incredibly arrogant don't think they're right about everything um really out of touch... You wouldn't want your kids to be raised in a society where those are the people calling the shots. That's insane.”
The European model of regulation with government acting independently from the private sector to ensure a social contract is met comes at the expense of growth and entrepreneurship, and it's hard to provide for the social contract if you don't have the growth to fund it—people will get angry because there's no money to spend.
“the European model is the one where the the government acts independently um from uh the private sector as a regulator um that is meant to try to ensure a social contract uh is met for its people. And the problem is while it it has a regulatory superpower that that it comes at the expense of growth and entrepreneurship and it's very hard to provide for the social contract even if you are aligned and capable of doing it if you don't have the growth. People will get angry because you won't just won't have the money to spend.”
Bremmer's baseline bet for the next five years is that the Open AI model will win (against other approaches like the Chinese developing a separate model), though there is substantial uncertainty around this forecast.
“I'm sure you read AI 2027 um which you know implies that the the open AI model is the one that is going to win and the Chinese will have a a separate one. I I think there's a lot of uncertainty around that, but as of 2026, I still think that's probably the right baseline bet if you're forced to make a baseline bet.”
Key books to understand how AI is transforming society include: Mustafa Suleiman's 'The Coming Wave'; Nick Bostrom's 'Superintelligence'; and the 'AI 2027' analysis piece from a year and a half ago.
“I would say that uh right now so much um that's like Mustafa Sulleman's the coming wave in AI um which is about two years old now but is utterly essential. Um I mean super intelligence by Nick Bostonramm. I mean all the foundational stuff first the AI 2027 piece that I tal told mentioned that came out um a year and a half ago um I mean as much as you can read about how AI is transforming society that's the place that people are it's going to move everything”
Bremer is working on a book coming out next year about geopolitical cycles, long-term patterns, and what comes next, which is almost done and has been in development for three years while he's been thinking about it his entire career.
“You're going to love my next one. It's coming out next year. It's almost done. It's about a lot of the topics we're discussing here. It's about geopolitical cycles, long firm, and what to come next, how we think about that. So, people I think will really enjoy what's done. I've been working on it for three years now, but in some ways, I've been thinking about it for my entire career.”
Recommended podcast guests who are knowledgeable on these topics include: Uval (described as amazing); Jeremy Alair from Circle (CEO, extremely thoughtful on tech/geopolitics); and Amy Webb (excellent on different models of AI development).
“Uh if you haven't had Uval on yet, you should because he's amazing. I think he's wonderful and thoughtful. Um, I I really I think Jeremy Alair from Circle, the CEO of Circle, is extremely thoughtful on this stuff. He'd be wonderful if um you know... Amy Webb uh I thought was really good on her different models. I I I love her stuff.”