Why America Shouldn’t Underestimate Chinese Power | Foreign Affairs Interview
What this covers
For years in U.S. foreign policy circles, discussions of China focused on its growing wealth, power, and ambition, and the fear that it would supplant the United States.
But a few years ago, the conversation took a sharp turn. Rather than fixating on China’s rise, most analysis began to focus on the country’s stagnation and even decline. There were good reasons for this: disappointing post-COVID economic growth, dire demographics, and a foreign policy alienating much of the world. And so a new consensus took hold—that a weakened China might not overtake the United States after all.
In a new essay for Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi argue that this new consensus dangerously underestimates Chinese power and the challenge it represents for U.S. foreign policy. Washington, they warn, is missing Beijing’s key strategic advantage—an advantage that only a new approach to alliances will offset. As they write, if America goes it alone, “the contest for the next century will be China’s to lose.”
Campbell is the chairman and a co-founder of The Asia Group and served as deputy secretary of state and Indo-Pacific coordinator at the National Security Council during the Biden administration. Doshi is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations, and served as deputy senior director for China and Taiwan affairs at the National Security Council during the Biden administration. They joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan on April 14 to discuss the sources of Chinese power, what U.S. observers of China get wrong, and whether the Trump administration has an endgame in its confrontation with Beijing.
You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.
Subscribe to our free newsletters here: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/newsletter?utm_medium=social&utm_source=youtube_posts&utm_campaign=podcast_notes
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Campbell and Doshi argue that recent consensus on Chinese decline dangerously underestimates Beijing's structural power advantages in manufacturing and technology, and that the US can only compete effectively through a radical upgrade of alliance structures that achieves scale comparable to China's.
- China maintains two-to-one manufacturing dominance and is investing heavily in future industries despite economic headwinds, making it simultaneously economically challenged and strategically formidable
- The US and its allies combined have twice China's GDP but cannot realize this advantage without breaking down barriers between allies to create integrated defense, economic, and technology capabilities
- Without genuine alliance scale, a US 'go it alone' approach cedes the competition to China, but the Trump administration's current tariff-first strategy risks alienating allies and lacks a coherent end-state
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
The determination that the U.S. was in decline originated not with Xi Jinping but with Hu Jintao, who convened an ambassadorial conference in 2009 following the global financial crisis and shifted Chinese strategy from hiding capabilities and biding time to actively accomplishing strategic objectives.
“Xiinping was not the person to decide or to make the determination that the US was in decline. That determination began with the global financial crisis in Hujintowo when he convened the ambassadorial conference in 2009 and said essentially that they needed to shift their strategy from hiding capabilities and biting time to actively accomplishing something.”
Sophisticated great power diplomacy necessarily involves both competitive pressure and diplomatic engagement simultaneously; the false choice between 'talking to them' or 'beating them up' misses the reality that effective strategy combines both elements.
“any kind of sophisticated great power diplomacy involves a bit of both. acknowledgement that both great powers are going to do stuff the other great power won't like, but also recognizing the necessity of diplomacy.”
This is the first time the United States has faced a competitor of China's size and scale; the US had these advantages during the Cold War and during World War I and II, making the current challenge unprecedented.
“it's to recognize Dan that this is the first time that the United States has faced a competitor of this size and scale and that we had those advantages during the Cold War and during World War I and two.”
There was a brief period of stability during the Biden administration where the PRC stayed within certain military lines and Taiwan stayed within certain political lines, but this period didn't hold and now there's a cycle of vicious escalation because neither side believes the other will reciprocate restraint.
“There was a brief period of stability uh in part of the Biden administration where I think you saw the PRC essentially stay within certain military lines in exchange for Taiwan and the United States staying within certain political lines. But ultimately that didn't hold up for too long. It was very hard to sustain and now we're sort of in a cycle of vicious escalation. I think the PRC does not trust the political leadership in Taiwan. They don't believe that if they are restrained or that they make certain kinds of symbolic efforts to stay within certain lines that the PRC will reciprocate with military restraint. And if neither side believes their action, their restraint will elicit restraint from the other side, then you have no condition for stability. You have instead a condition for escalation.”
For 25 years, China shifted from 6% of global manufacturing to 25%, and we haven't fully internalized what that means for the distribution of economic power and strategic capability.
“first off, China's two uh times our manufacturing share, but just 25 years ago, it was 6% of global manufacturing and we were like 30%. What a huge shift has occurred in just 20 25 years. And we haven't fully internalized what that means.”
The principle that scale matters in great power rise and decline is an old historical pattern, as evidenced by Britain's loss of dominance as capability diffused to larger continental powers like Germany, Russia, and the United States, and Florence's domination being superseded by larger 16th-century powers.
“You you go back and you look at the British Empire, right? this tiny island right in the northwest corner of Europe that dominated the globe largely because it had a first mover advantage in the industrial revolution. Well, what happened next? that capability diffused to Germany, Russia, United States and even in that era you heard British leaders say, you know, this guy Lord Cely who wrote a bestseller in that period that essentially he was afraid that Great Britain would sort of be outscaled by these larger countries in the same way Florence was outscaled by the 16th century great powers.”
Many of the biggest structural impediments to US-China trade negotiations are systemic and structural rather than merely tariff-based, making 90-day fast-track negotiations unrealistic for resolving substantive trade issues.
“if we look back on some of the most difficult negotiations that the United States has ever entertained with respect to economic and trade relations we all understand that some of the biggest impediments are structural and systemic. They're not just tariffs.”
In the rise and fall of great powers, size and scale is one of the most important variables—examples include the British Empire's dominance from a small island due to industrial revolution first-mover advantage, and subsequent diffusion of that capability to Germany, Russia, and the United States.
“in the rise and fall of great powers, one of the variables that matters most really is this size and scale question. You you go back and you look at the British Empire, right? this tiny island right in the northwest corner of Europe that dominated the globe largely because it had a first mover advantage in the industrial revolution. Well, what happened next? that capability diffused to Germany, Russia, United States”
One of the great successes of American foreign policy is maintaining extended nuclear deterrence over the Indo-Pacific such that dozens of countries that could have developed nuclear weapons have chosen not to because of strength of American guarantees.
“One of the great successes of American foreign policy is the fact that there are dozens of countries in the Indo-acific that could have built nuclear weapons that have chosen not to because of a variety of things but most importantly the strength of American extended deterrence the umbrella over Asia.”
It is possible for China to be slowing economically but also more formidable technologically and strategically, and these technological and strategic advantages may matter more in the relevant timeframes for great power competition.
“China has problems. But it is possible for two things to be true. It is possible for China to be slowing economically but also more formidable technologically and strategically. It is possible that those advantages matter more in the time frames most relevant for great power competition, whether in the Taiwan Strait or in whose industry is going to hold out over the next 5 years.”
There is no path to American manufacturing in semiconductors without Taiwan, making Taiwan security critical to US re-industrialization strategy.
“There is no path to American manufacturing in semiconductors without Taiwan.”
For several decades, US strategy toward China was based on the flawed assumption that diplomatic and commercial engagement would cause China to become more like the United States politically and geopolitically, thereby mitigating the challenge it presents.
“You argued in that piece that for several decades, US strategy had been based on flawed assumptions about China. You know, particularly the idea that with diplomatic and commercial engagement, China would economically and politically and even geopolitically begin to look more like the United States in a way that would somewhat mitigate the challenge it presented.”
Critics often claim that the 'Competition Without Catastrophe' framework lacks a clear end-game, but this criticism wrongly applies Cold War historical expectations; the US did not actually have a clear plan for Soviet decline for much of the Cold War, with even premier strategist Kissinger believing the US was in relative decline.
“Critics will often say, 'Look, this is not how we planned the Cold War. we had a very clear outcome in mind. The only thing I would say about that Dan is that I think that historical backlooking is wrong. I I do not believe for much of the cold war we had a particular game plan. Those who would say look we were always expecting Soviet decline are wrong. I mean the premier strategists of the cold war many would argue would be Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger believed through much of that period that the United States was the one in decline and that it was incumbent on excellent American diplomats to get the best deal in a world in which the Soviets would be searching forward.”
South Korea and Japan developing independent nuclear weapons would be a negative step because it would likely trigger nuclear reconsideration throughout Asia in destabilizing ways contrary to US strategic interests.
“I I do not believe it would be, Dan, for the simple reason that it would most likely trigger a kind of nuclear reconsideration throughout Asia that would likely be destabilizing and not in our strategic interests.”
For decades, U.S. strategy toward China was based on the flawed assumption that diplomatic and commercial engagement would cause China to economically, politically, and geopolitically converge toward U.S. values and interests, a assumption that by 2018 had proven clearly wrong.
“for several decades, US strategy had been based on flawed assumptions about China. You know, particularly the idea that with diplomatic and commercial engagement, China would economically and politically and even geopolitically begin to look more like the United States”
One major U.S. foreign policy success is the fact that dozens of Indo-Pacific countries could have developed nuclear weapons but chose not to, primarily because of the credibility of American extended deterrence—an umbrella that would be undermined if those countries lost confidence in U.S. commitment.
“One of the great successes of American foreign policy is the fact that there are dozens of countries in the Indo-acific that could have built nuclear weapons that have chosen not to because of a variety of things but most importantly the strength of American extended deterrence the umbrella over Asia.”
After four years in the Biden administration interacting with top Chinese officials and President Xi, Campbell's assessment of the determination of the Chinese elite to challenge the United States across every vector has been reinforced, and he has been struck by how deep their sense of American decline runs in their strategic assessment.
“I think if anything, my assessment of the determination on the part of the Chinese elite to challenge the United States across every vector probably has been reinforced. I've also been struck at how deep their sense of American decline is. It pervades a lot of their strategic assessment.”
Xi Jinping's acceleration of China's strategic approach—including military modernization, globalization, power projection, new international institutions, and Belt and Road initiatives—builds on foundations laid by his predecessor Hu Jintao rather than representing a fundamental break from previous strategy.
“Xiinping invested heavily in China's military modernization, globalization, power projection. That all begins under his predecessor. He tries to build new international institutions. That begins under his predecessor. The idea for the belt and road for the AIIV, that big Chinese bank that came out a decade ago, began under his predecessor.”
On purchasing power parity measures (better for capturing local strategic capabilities), China's economy surpassed the U.S. economy in 2014, whereas on nominal dollar-denominated measures it has not—this distinction is crucial for understanding strategic capacity.
“if you stop focusing on the dollar and you look at purchasing power which isn't perfect but for the generation of certain strategic capabilities better captures local prices well in that case their economy passed ours in 2014”
Pressures on nuclear reconsideration in Asia are increasing due to: (1) Russia under Putin crossing the nuclear threshold into actual use scenarios in Ukraine; (2) North Korea's continued nuclear arsenal expansion and long-range system perfection; and (3) China undertaking one of the largest nuclear builds in modern history, planning up to 1,000 new systems over the next decade.
“The first is the fact that Putin has walked so closely to the edge and has basically entered nuclear use into the potential response scenarios in Ukraine in ways that are deeply worrisome. North Korea has continued to build its nuclear arsenal and to do a number of things in terms of testing its long range systems and perfecting elements that could lead to an effective delivery system. And perhaps most importantly, China is embarking on one of the largest nuclear builds in modern times, probably up to a thousand new systems over the course of the next 10 years.”
To penetrate global markets and bring back manufacturing scale against the world's most formidable manufacturing power (China) requires careful planning, industrial policy, and careful sequencing of tariffs and other tools—a blunt approach is insufficient.
“You have real successful efforts to build back manufacturing in America against the most formidable manufacturing power the world has ever seen. That's going to take conscious planning. industrial policy, careful sequencing of tariffs and other tools. And I understand the need for a blunt approach, which is the approach that the Trump administration has opted for. But the truth is a more tailored approach is really critical if you want to penetrate these global markets and bring back scale.”
The United States and China are probably the two most interdependent economies in the world, yet simultaneously the two countries most uncomfortable with that interdependence.
“I think there are probably no two economies that are more interdependent than the United States and China even now. And that it is also true that no two countries in the world are more uncomfortable with that interdependence.”
The current US-allied coalition has approximately twice the GDP of China, but cannot realize this advantage without breaking down barriers between allies to build integrated defense, economic, and technology capabilities at scale.
“The basic point is this. If you add up the US and its allies and partners, we are more than China in terms of GDP. Far more, right? It's like twice as much. The question for the US is can we achieve scale with others?”
The recent narrative shift from 'China rising' (2020-2021) to 'China declining' (2022-2024) was driven by specific events: Russia's military underperformance in Ukraine, ChatGPT demonstrating continued American innovation, China's failure to recover post-COVID, acute demographic problems, debt problems, and youth unemployment.
“Beginning in 2022 a few things happened right? the Russians invade Ukraine and at that moment in time there was thought that the Russian military was vastly underperforming and maybe autocracies can't do this kind of stuff that well then there was a sense that Chad GPT later in the year uh proved that America could still pull rabbits out of its hat new innovations from the black box of American dynamism there was also a sense that China was stalling out right they had gotten rid of their zero-co policy but growth hadn't picked up there was widespread discontent and also the demographic problems were becoming more acute the financial problems were becoming more acute. They were trying to rebalance from the housing sector. It wasn't happening fast enough and debt was at record high while unemployment was also at record high among youth.”
Global trading system credibility, American alliances and partnerships, dollar credibility as a reserve currency (seen in bond market reactions), and US ability to finance itself are all now in question due to tariff policy; this requires clarity about endgame objectives.
“This is extraordinarily high stakes. It calls into a question the entire global trading system, all American alliances and partnerships, the credibility even of the dollar as we're seeing in the bond markets, uh, and and fundamentally our ability to finance ourselves. If we're going to take all that and call it into question, we have to have a clear plan to get from here to there.”
The Campbell-Doshi essay argues against both the view that the US can go it alone against China and the view that business-as-usual alliance work is sufficient; instead, it calls for a qualitative step change in how the US approaches alliances in Asia.
“I think what Rush and I are trying to do in this piece is basically challenge conventional wisdom. Both the conventional wisdom that we can go it alone, which I'm afraid is too prevalent in Trump circles and the idea that a business as usual set of interactions with allies and partners is going to be enough. I think what we try to argue in the piece is that even though Rush and I are proud of the work that we did in, you know, strengthening allies and partners, not nearly far enough”
China believes that America's greatest asymmetric advantage is its alliance system; if China thinks this, the US should seriously consider whether it is America's greatest advantage and what can be done to steward it.
“We know that China believes that America's greatest asymmetric advantage is its alliance system. And in the first term, they thought we were squandering that. They tried to wedge it where they could. Now they have even more ways in which they can play that game. And uh if China thinks it's our biggest advantage, it stands to reason maybe we should consider whether it is in fact our biggest advantage and what we can do to steward it.”
Structurally, most countries in Asia understand that their best chance to secure peace and stability is through a stronger partnership with the United States, and this can be achieved under Republican, Democratic, or new leadership in the US, depending on the right circumstances.
“Structurally most of these countries appreciate that their best challenge to secure peace and stability is a stronger partnership with the United States. And under the right circumstances, I think that can be achieved under a Republican, a democratic or frankly a new kind of leader in the United States.”
The French-German independent brigade during the Cold War is a model showing that allies can create deep military integration even against initial institutional resistance and skepticism.
“you'd love to see a situation where you had more interoperability between the United States and its key allies in the Indo-Pacific almost in the way that the French and the Germans created their own brigade during parts of the Cold War against everyone's expectations and odds.”
Chinese export capacity is de-industrializing countries around the world, especially in the West, creating a real and ongoing challenge that flows from the same sources as China's apparent economic weaknesses.
“uh Chinese ex's capacity is de-industrializing countries around the world especially countries in the west and so there is a real challenge here and in some ways their strengths and weaknesses flow from the same wells”
The pressures on nuclear reconsideration in Asia are real and growing due to three factors: (1) Putin walking close to nuclear use edge in Ukraine, (2) North Korea continuing nuclear arsenal buildup and long-range system testing, and (3) China embarking on one of the largest nuclear builds in modern times, with up to 1,000 new systems over the next decade.
“The first is the fact that Putin has walked so closely to the edge and has basically entered nuclear use into the potential response scenarios in Ukraine in ways that are deeply worrisome. North Korea has continued to build its nuclear arsenal and to do a number of things in terms of testing its long range systems and perfecting elements that could lead to an effective delivery system. And perhaps most importantly, China is embarking on one of the largest nuclear builds in modern times, probably up to a thousand new systems over the course of the next 10 years.”
Trump administration granted sudden, unexpected carveouts to US tariffs (exempting iPhones and other electronics from tariffs) after initially imposing broad 145% bilateral tariffs on most products, raising questions about whether China needs to negotiate or if the US will 'negotiate against itself'.
“You know, I think one factor that uh was a little unexpected was the sudden carveouts in the US tariff posture, right? That's pretty significant. iPhones, for example, will now be exempted from the tariffs along with other goods. It it raises a question whether or not if you're China, you feel like you still have to negotiate or the US will negotiate against itself.”
China has 65 naval vessels it plans to build over the next 5 years, bringing it to 435-R300, establishing maritime dominance that tariffs and trade wars cannot quickly reverse.
“They have 65 naval vessels that they're going to build in the next 5 years. That takes them to 435 to R300.”
Countries appreciate that their best chance to secure peace and stability is a stronger partnership with the United States, and this can be achieved under Republican, Democratic, or new kinds of leadership in the United States.
“Structurally most of these countries appreciate that their best challenge to secure peace and stability is a stronger partnership with the United States. And under the right circumstances, I think that can be achieved under a Republican, a democratic or frankly a new kind of leader in the United States.”
Chinese exports capacity is de-industrializing countries around the world, especially in the West, creating a real challenge for Western competitiveness.
“uh Chinese ex's capacity is de-industrializing countries around the world especially countries in the west and so there is a real challenge here”
Much of China's manufacturing advantages are 'poured concrete'—already baked in—such as 65 naval vessels they are going to build in the next 5 years taking them to 435, maintaining approximately 2x U.S. manufacturing share, 3x car production, 2x energy production, 11x steel, and 20x concrete production, and dominating chemicals, batteries, EVs, and drones production globally.
“A lot of China's advantages are already baked in. They have 65 naval vessels that they're going to build in the next 5 years. That takes them to 435 to R300. They're already two times the US in manufacturing. That's still likely going to be the case. They're three times in car production, two times in energy production, 11 times in steel, and 20 times in concrete. And you know, they dominate chemicals and batteries and EVs and drones and make more than half of all that for the world.”
Is China's production dominance in strategic sectors like shipbuilding, energy, steel, and rare earth elements going to stop overnight, or will production magically reappear in allied countries or the United States, which is unlikely without sustained strategic planning.
“Is that going to just stop overnight? Is that production going to magically reappear in allied countries or in the United States? I think the Trump administration is right to focus on reducing that reliance on China's capacity. I don't think that's sustainable over the long run. It's not in American interests either. But you can't just put up a tariff and expect that suddenly the factories will set up in the United States.”
It is not enough to protect the American market from Chinese EVs; America can only get scale if American companies can sell to other allied markets, requiring internal market access while maintaining external protection.
“It's not enough to protect the American market from Chinese EVs. say America's only going to get scale if our companies can sell to other markets. The basic point is this. If you add up the US and its allies and partners, we are more than China in terms of GDP. Far more, right? It's like twice as much. The question for the US is can we achieve scale with others?”
In the 2020-2021 period, there was a sharp shift in Western assessments of Chinese power: whereas early COVID period analysis warned of China gaining global advantage, by 2022 a consensus formed that China's rise was over due to economic slowdown, demographic decline, and foreign policy alienation.
“I think that ultimately, you know, in 20 everybody thought China was taking over because the US was you know dealing with the fallout from January 6th. Manufacturing was challenged. COVID response seemed uneven and uneasy. Uh we had alienated some allies and China was firing on all cylinders. Then two years later I think everything changes. Beginning in 2022 a few things happened”
Xi Jinping invested heavily in military modernization, globalization, power projection, international institutions, and Belt and Road Initiative, but all of these programs began under his predecessor Hu Jintao.
“Xiinping invested heavily in China's military modernization, globalization, power projection. That all begins under his predecessor. He tries to build new international institutions. That begins under his predecessor. The idea for the belt and road for the AIIV, that big Chinese bank that came out a decade ago, began under his predecessor.”
By purchasing power parity metrics (which better capture local prices relevant to strategic capability generation), China's economy passed the United States in 2014, making it larger than is commonly recognized in nominal dollar-based GDP comparisons.
“if you stop focusing on the dollar and you look at purchasing power which isn't perfect but for the generation of certain strategic capabilities better captures local prices well in that case their economy passed ours in 2014”
While China faces severe demographic challenges (population potentially halving by 2100), the strategic implications of these problems are probably 20-25 years away; additionally, the population below age 14 recently increased due to an echo boom of children of Cultural Revolution-era baby boomers.
“If you look at the question of demographics, China has enormous problems, right? By 2100, their population might be half what it is today. But the reality is that the strategic implications of those demographic problems are probably 20 maybe 25 years away. The population below the age of 14 actually increased because it's a it's an echo boom of the MOA era baby boomers, their kids. And so demographics is lumpy.”
It is possible for China to be slowing economically but simultaneously more formidable technologically and strategically, and those technological and strategic advantages may matter more in the timeframes relevant for great power competition (such as Taiwan Strait scenarios or industrial leadership over 5 years).
“China has problems. But it is possible for two things to be true. It is possible for China to be slowing economically, but also more formidable technologically and strategically. It is possible that those advantages matter more in the time frames most relevant for great power competition, whether in the Taiwan Strait or in whose industry is going to hold out over the next 5 years.”
If the United States attempts to compete alone against China without allies, 'the contest for the next century will be China's to lose,' as Campbell and Doshi write, because scale matters in great power competition and the U.S. lacks sufficient scale without allies.
“If America goes it alone, the contest for the next century will be China's to lose.”
The only realistic endgame for U.S.-China competition is managed competition and uneasy equilibrium, because the alternatives—China's collapse, systemic change in China, military conflict, or a grand bargain—are all unrealistic.
“What are the endg ames that you could imagine, right? If we just put our imagination caps on, there's only a handful you could imagine, right? One is China collapses. The second is China's system changes. The third is essentially there's conflict that resolves one way or another way. The fourth is maybe you just shake hands and agree to disagree and have a grand bargain. And none of these four end games are very realistic. The only realistic situation that we can expect is kind of managed competition and uneasy equilibrium or a steady state.”
Sophisticated great power diplomacy requires both intense competition and intense diplomacy simultaneously, not a choice between the two; diplomacy allows powers to communicate intentions, shape perceptions, clear misunderstandings, find offramps during crises, and demonstrate face at critical moments.
“often the critique is you got to pick one, right? You either talk to them or you beat them up. But the truth is any kind of sophisticated great power diplomacy involves a bit of both. acknowledgement that both great powers are going to do stuff the other great power won't like, but also recognizing the necessity of diplomacy. And very quickly to end it, I'll say why does that kind of work? Diplomacy lets you tell them what you're doing, but just as critically what you're not doing. Let you kind of shape perception. It helps clear up misperception and miscommunication. It helps find offramps when there's a big problem.”
The Biden administration's 'Competition Without Catastrophe' approach was critiqued as lacking a clear endgame, but this critique misunderstands how great power competition actually works; nuance and pragmatism in managing relationships while advancing interests is sophisticated statecraft, not failure.
“the one that I think I hear most often cited is that we don't offer an ingame. We basically depict a process that we're in the early stages that we have to accept and maneuver accordingly.”
The 'Competition Without Catastrophe' framework does not offer a specific endgame or victor's conclusion because the Cold War precedent is misread: even during the Cold War, U.S. strategists like Kissinger believed the Soviet Union would outlast American decline and aimed to achieve the best deal possible in a world of Soviet advantage, not to achieve Soviet collapse.
“Those who would say look we were always expecting Soviet decline are wrong. I mean the premier strategists of the cold war many would argue would be Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger believed through much of that period that the United States was the one in decline and that it was incumbent on excellent American diplomats to get the best deal in a world in which the Soviets would be searching forward.”
Many Western observers wrongly believe that if Xi Jinping fails, China will return to a course of coexistence with the United States, but this Chinese assertiveness is actually a structural feature of the CCP system, not dependent on Xi's personal preferences.
“For many they are in some ways comforted or they are convinced that this is really about Xiinping that the Chinese system essentially accepted a kind of coexistence with the United States but he took China on a different path away from that coexistence. But much of Russia's early part of the book makes quite clear that yes, this in many respects is structural. It is part and parcel of the Chinese system. I don't think that is as well received and as bought into even now than one might accept. We find ourselves often in situations where people think well if Xiinping fails that you will see China coming back on a different course that again is about more coexistent engagement with the United States and I think we probably both would argue that this is probably an inescapable feature of the system.”
The recommendations in Campbell and Doshi's essay are 'capacity-centric statecraft' aimed at breaking down barriers between allies to build up defense and economic capacity very quickly, requiring integrated flows of military production (Japan and Korea helping build ships in the US) and advanced weapons technology.
“These are capacity ccentric kinds of statecraftraft where the goal is to break down barriers between allies to build up capacity very quickly. Right? On the defense side, we want flows in both directions. We want Japan and Korea maybe to help us build ships in the United States because they're three to five times more productive than we are.”
China's current manufacturing dominance includes 2x U.S. production in energy, 3x in car production, 11x in steel, and 20x in concrete, and China dominates global markets in chemicals, batteries, EVs, and drones (producing more than half of global supply in many categories).
“They're already two times the US in manufacturing. That's still likely going to be the case. They're three times in car production, two times in energy production, 11 times in steel, and 20 times in concrete. And you know, they dominate chemicals and batteries and EVs and drones and make more than half of all that for the world.”
High-level US-China diplomatic engagement puts a huge burden and risk on the relationship by making it dependent on occasional calls between the two leaders and a fragile set of interactions, requiring extraordinary preparation for success.
“for substantial periods before the really strong dialogue emerged between Wangi and Jake Sullivan. It was almost as if the relationship was built on occasional calls between the two leaders and they were extremely important but it put huge burdens and frankly risks on a relatively fragile set of interactions.”
Economic and technology competition, which is necessary, risks foreclosing the ability to manage security competition through diplomacy, creating the danger that both dimensions escalate simultaneously.
“I worry that we're entering a place where the economic and tech uh competition which in some ways is necessary uh ends up foreclosing uh our ability to manage the security competition and that itself is quite dangerous.”
China is not going anywhere and will be present for a very long time, meaning realistic end-game scenarios are limited: only managed competition and uneasy equilibrium are realistic, rather than Chinese collapse, regime change, military victory, or grand bargain.
“China's not going anywhere. Ultimately, they're going to be here for some time to come. And this gets to the endgame debate as well. I mean, what are the endg games that you could imagine, right? If we just put our imagination caps on, there's only a handful you could imagine, right? One is China collapses. The second is China's system changes. The third is essentially there's conflict that resolves one way or another way. The fourth is maybe you just shake hands and agree to disagree and have a grand bargain. And none of these four end games are very realistic. The only realistic situation that we can expect is kind of managed competition and uneasy equilibrium or a steady state.”
An alternative approach to Liberty Day tariff announcement would have been to announce reorientation of global trade and manufacturing toward US and allies due to overconcentration in China, with conditional tariffs only if allies don't participate in the plan; this would have signaled strategic vision rather than pure protectionism.
“Imagine a world where instead of on Liberty Day, that chart was unveiled in all those countries and that island of penguins. Instead of that, imagine if you know that day the announcement had been we want to reorient global trade and manufacturing to the United States and to our allies and partners because it's too concentrated in one country and that's bad for the world and here's our plan to get there. You know, we might raise tariffs on our allies if they don't come in with us on this plan, but we're not immediately going to do it out of the gate.”
Interestingly, just as Chinese leaders overestimate their own power in certain circumstances, they have also underestimated the American ability to maneuver internationally with allies and partners and to invest substantially in domestic capacities.
“a similar process in many respects is underway in China in which they often overestimate their own power in certain circumstances. And frankly, I think over the course of the last several years have underestimated the American ability to maneuver internationally with allies and partners”
The current U.S.-China relationship structure lacks sufficient formal alliance coordination in Asia; the Biden administration's work on alliances and partners, while significant, was not nearly sufficient and needs a qualitative step-change in depth and formality.
“even though Rush and I are proud of the work that we did in, you know, strengthening allies and partners, not nearly far enough and that many of those relationships are based on historical dimensions, paternalistic views, and frankly structural barriers in our bureaucracies that make it challenging to build deeper, more sustaining relationships”
The United States and China are more interdependent than any two economies in the world, even now; and yet no two countries are more uncomfortable with that interdependence.
“I think there are probably no two economies that are more interdependent than the United States and China even now. And that it is also true that no two countries in the world are more uncomfortable with that interdependence.”
During the Biden administration, there was a period of prolonged and substantive high-level diplomatic conversations between Jake Sullivan (U.S. National Security Adviser) and Wang Yi (top CCP foreign policy official) that were instrumental to managing U.S.-China competition, but the Trump administration has not yet established a similarly clear leadership structure for its own negotiations.
“for substantial periods before the really strong dialogue emerged between Wangi and Jake Sullivan. It was almost as if the relationship was built on occasional calls between the two leaders and they were extremely important but it put huge burdens and frankly risks on a relatively fragile set of interactions.”
The United States and its allies together represent more than 2x China's GDP, making allied scale the essential lever for managing competition; the question is whether the U.S. can achieve that scale through persuasion-based coalition building (Biden approach) or through coercive tools (Trump approach), but both paths can theoretically succeed if focused on maintaining allied coherence.
“If you add up the US and its allies and partners, we are more than China in terms of GDP. Far more, right? It's like twice as much. The question for the US is can we achieve scale with others? And I'll end with this. I don't think it's a partisan question. I don't think our piece is particularly partisan. There's a one path to achieving scale more focused on persuasion and consent. There's another path maybe with Trumpian characteristics, Dan, that could also end up achieving scale.”
Xi Jinping cannot politically back down from the Trump administration's direct challenge to Chinese power, because such backing down would damage his political standing within China and across Asia.
“the way that President Trump has posited this as such a direct challenge to China, just absolutely obvious power play for a country that has invested so much in national power. It is the watchword and the namesake of President Xi. I do not think politically that he can back down. I think it will do him damage politically in China and frankly in other parts of Asia.”
China is not planning a 'bolt from the blue' invasion of Taiwan in the near term, but is gradually ramping up military and political tensions in the Taiwan Strait, hoping that a combination of military pressure, deep engagement in Taiwanese life, and U.S. unpredictability will cause Taiwan to reconsider its future.
“my own sense is that I think the Chinese are not interested right now in a bold from the blue um invasion of Taiwan. But I believe that they are going to gradually and in some cases dramatically ramp up certain kinds of tensions on Taiwan. And they're hoping that the combination of those tensions, the deep pervasive Chinese engagement in every element of Taiwanese life, plus some unpredictability with the United States and perhaps a few statements from President Trump that cause anxiety among leaders in Taiwan would cause them to think differently about the future.”
The U.S. may need to think about joint nuclear command and control with allies in ways that signal shared nuclear decision-making during peacetime, similar to Cold War arrangements between the U.S., Germany, and Britain.
“We will probably have to think about certain kinds of nuclear command and control in which we are signaling that these are in many respects almost joint decisions like during the height of the cold war between the United States and Germany and Great Britain.”
A formal NATO-like alliance structure in Asia would be overly provocative and trigger negative views about NATO across Southeast Asia that China has successfully seeded, so the better approach is to innovate bilateral, multilateral, and trilateral arrangements that create capacity for changes in the future.
“The truth is we're talking about a perception game as well, Dan. Few things that China has been more successful in is seeding negative views about NATO across primarily Southeast Asia. And so often times when this topic comes up, it triggers foroding even among some of your closest partners and allies. So I would simply say that probably the better part of valor here is to seek to innovate bilateral, milateral and multilateral creating the capacities for certain kinds of changes in the future.”
Biden's industrial policy approach to manufacturing, which created subsidies and incentives for manufacturing investment, was more effective in generating manufacturing investment than Trump's approach of focusing on tariffs and deregulation without industrial policy, which the Trump administration is planning to cut.
“Biden approaches to manufacturing focused on industrial policy in particular uh creating subsidies incentives for manufacturing and the record reflects that that approach worked and we had a massive increase in manufacturing investment in this country. Maybe you could argue in response there wasn't enough done on permitting reform or on perhaps even tariffs to create more incentive to invest. The Trump approach is to focus on the tariffs and the deregulation but not on the industrial policy which they're planning to cut.”
Many countries quietly are probably inspired by someone (Xi) who will stand up to what they perceive to be the bully (Trump).
“frankly I think many countries quietly are probably inspired by someone who will stand up to what they perceive to be the bully.”
The trilateral engagement between China, Japan, and South Korea—despite reassurances from both countries—contains strategic elements that should concern the U.S., suggesting potential alignment against U.S. interests.
“the trilateral engagement between China, Japan and South Korea despite reassurances from both South Korea and Japan has some strategic um elements to it that should worry us”
The Biden administration pursued a strategy with three distinct phases: first, showing the US was not in hurling decline through Russian invasion of Ukraine; second, a tougher phase of competition through Taiwan and balloon incidents; and third, a two-year phase of more intense competition combined with more intense diplomacy aimed at stabilizing the relationship at a higher competitive equilibrium.
“I would divide it into three phases, right? Not always consciously designed, sometimes a product of events. The first phase, I think, is from inauguration, you know, everyone thought we were in hurdling decline. We had to show we weren't all the way through the Russian invasion of Ukraine...The second period was from the Russian invasion of Ukraine through the Pelosi visit to Taiwan all the way to the balloon, which was even worse than the first phase. But there was a third phase and I think the logic of the third phase which lasted two years is worth taking a second to talk about because ultimately what you had in that third phase was more intense competition but also more intense diplomacy.”
Chinese elite have a deep sense of American decline that pervades their strategic assessment, and they often simultaneously overestimate their own power in certain circumstances.
“I've also been struck at how deep their sense of American decline is. It pervades a lot of their strategic assessment. In fact, I think one of the interesting things about our peace is that a similar process in many respects is underway in China in which they often overestimate their own power in certain circumstances.”
American companies dominate in profit share and market capitalization globally, but some of this reflects the strength of the dollar and the fact that American companies optimize for profit while Chinese companies optimize for market share and long-term competitive positioning.
“You look at the question of American competitiveness. Our companies, it's true, they dominate profit share, they dominate in market cap, but some of that is a reflection of the dollar and some of that is a reflection of the fact that our companies focus on profit and their companies focus on market share winning the long game.”
To counter nuclear proliferation pressures, the US will probably need stronger conventional military engagement and technological cooperation with allies, plus consideration of certain kinds of joint nuclear command and control arrangements similar to US-Germany and US-Britain arrangements during the Cold War.
“What I think that argues for not only stronger engagement on conventional military and on issues associated with technology and economics. We will probably have to think about certain kinds of nuclear command and control in which we are signaling that these are in many respects almost joint decisions like during the height of the cold war between the United States and Germany and Great Britain.”
The US should have modest and humility about its capability to change China, and if you begin with that assumption, it leads to slightly different emphasis in endgame goals but not necessarily very different policy prescriptions compared to more hawkish approaches.
“I don't have a lot of confidence that we can actually engineer or tinker with China system of government. And I'm reminded of a debate that we used to have with people who who proposed engagement as the beall endall. Right? The engager logic was essentially if we engage China will change and things will be good. this more hardline logic is if we beat them up they'll change and then things will be good but both of them have a middle step right that China changes and I think we have to have a lot more modesty and humility about the capability of the United States to change China and if you begin with that set of assumptions it takes you to I think slightly different emphasis in your end goal but not necessarily very different prescription”
China's current manufacturing share (2%) is striking given it was only 6% of global manufacturing 25 years ago when the US was 30%, representing a massive structural shift in global economic capacity.
“China's two uh times our manufacturing share, but just 25 years ago, it was 6% of global manufacturing and we were like 30%. What a huge shift has occurred in just 20 25 years. And we haven't fully internalized what that means.”
While China faces severe demographic challenges (population could be half current size by 2100), the strategic implications of those challenges are likely 20-25 years away, and China's current youth population is actually growing due to echo effects from the one-child policy generation, creating lumpy demographic dynamics.
“If you look at the question of demographics, China has enormous problems, right? By 2100, their population might be half what it is today. But the reality is that the strategic implications of those demographic problems are probably 20 maybe 25 years away. The population below the age of 14 actually increased because it's a it's an echo boom of the MOA era baby boomers, their kids. And so demographics is lumpy.”
Xi Jinping is a commanding and confident leader who does not rely heavily on talking points, occasionally departs from them confidently, and demonstrates confidence by turning to members of his team to contribute to conversations, unlike some past Chinese leaders.
“in the room he's very commanding and very confident and he doesn't rely as past Chinese leaders might have on talking points. He has them. He uses them. He departs from them as needed confidently. And I was also fascinated by the way in which he'd occasionally turn to members of his team to chime in which is again another sign of of confidence.”
American competition should focus on specific strategic interests—ensuring the region doesn't fall under hegemony of a foreign great power, maintaining American prosperity and leadership in the economy, leading in advanced technology, and ensuring the world is safe for democracy—not on changing China's system of government.
“competition isn't about changing China's system of government. It isn't even about the kind of relationship we have with China. What is it that the US cares about achieving and as Kurt and others have written about for decades, you know, one long-standing American interest is ensuring the region does not fall under the hegemony of a foreign great power. Another is we want to make sure America remains prosperous, a leading economy, that foreign policy generally benefits the average American. We want to make sure we lead in advanced technology because our power flows in part from our technological prowess. We want to make sure the world is basically safe for the system of government we have and that others have democracy.”
The purge of General Ho Dong, vice chair of China's Central Military Commission, is significant because it may indicate Xi Jinping is prioritizing war-fighting capability (FDR model) rather than loyalty (Stalin model), suggesting Xi may be preparing for conflict rather than consolidating power.
“You could argue that President Xi's purges within the military might have been oriented towards war fighting, right? sort of you could call it the FDR model that he was seeing a conflict over the horizon and wanted to get folks out and get folks in who were better capable for implementing um you know his vision in a condition of conflict. Then there's the Stalin model that he's purging for loyalty and he's going to end up degrading the quality of his military.”
Many countries may be quietly inspired by Xi Jinping standing up to what they perceive as American bullying, which could increase Xi's regional credibility and influence despite the economic costs of tariff conflict.
“And frankly I think many countries quietly are probably inspired by someone who will stand up to what they perceive to be the bully.”
Attempting to use U.S. influence to change the nature of Chinese governance is extremely escalatory without offering strategic benefit, because it would undermine domestic and allied buy-in, potentially giving China legitimacy to claim it is being targeted for regime change.
“I think ultimately it's extremely escalatory without necessarily offering strategic benefit because the most important thing is to get buy in at home and with allies and they probably don't want to see a kind of gloves off unmititigated fight between the two superpowers or if there is such a fight they want to believe that China is to blame for escalation not the United States.”
The Trump administration's tariff policy, if executed without consideration of structural trade issues and industrial policy, risks the economic equivalent of the 2003 Iraq War invasion—an action with far-sweeping unforeseen consequences that linger for decades.
“one of the things that you'll be asking the question about is this the economic equivalent of the Gulf War. Does it have far sweeping unforeseen consequences that linger for decades thereafter? And I think that's a real worry.”
Structural and systemic impediments—not just tariffs—are the primary barriers to resolving U.S.-China trade and economic disputes, making the Trump administration's expectation that negotiations can resolve these issues within 90 days 'pretty much foolhardy'.
“some of the most difficult negotiations that the United States has ever entertained with respect to economic and trade relations we all understand that some of the biggest impediments are structural and systemic. They're not just tariffs. The idea that we're going to resolve all of these issues in 90 states through fast-track negotiations in a couple of weeks is is pretty much foolhardy.”
There is already evidence of Chinese engagement in Europe that has 'some traction,' suggesting China is successfully diversifying its alliance-building efforts beyond Asia.
“you're seeing some signs of Chinese engagement in Europe that's you know has some traction associated with it”
China is betting that it can weather the trade war pain better than the United States, but if the US negotiates with itself (making carveouts and concessions unilaterally), then China's advantages will remain formidable and it will prove right in its bet.
“If we're going to negotiate against ourselves, China's advantages are going to remain pretty formidable. It remains to be seen whether they'll take more pain or will take more pain. That's the big question. They're betting that they can handle it better. They may be wrong about that.”
There are significant submarine production slowness and lack of interoperability between the US and key Indo-Pacific allies, and building Deep French-German-style integrated military brigades or similar structures would be valuable but faces resistance from military organizations and bureaucracies.
“There are lots of things that continue to concern the slowness of our submarine production. the fact that we still lack substantially in terms of the ability to procure critical and needed defense technologies and the fact that you'd love to see a situation where you had more interoperability between the United States and its key allies in the Indo-Pacific almost in the way that the French and the Germans created their own brigade during parts of the Cold War against everyone's expectations and odds. Still, there are uh areas of resistance in our military organizations, in our bureaucracies that have resisted the kind of deep engagement that we are recommending in this piece.”
The Biden administration's 'Competition Without Catastrophe' framework, which sought long-term coexistence with China while accepting ongoing competition without a definitive end-state, was partially realized through substantial improvements in allied partnerships and regional strategic alignment.
“the change in those four years across many vectors is a a substantial sort of arc more in our favor. Uh again the allied and partner piece I don't think anyone would have anticipated our ability to link the Indo-Pacific and Europe in more fundamental ways understanding that both regions have strategic interests in the other the role of the Quad AUS.”
China has successfully seeded negative views about NATO across Southeast Asia, making an explicit 'Asian NATO' framework politically impossible because it would trigger fears and resentment even among close US partners.
“Few things that China has been more successful in is seeding negative views about NATO across primarily Southeast Asia. And so often times when this topic comes up, it triggers foroding even among some of your closest partners and allies.”
Tariffs alone cannot restore US manufacturing capacity against China—factories won't simply appear overnight. Success requires conscious planning, industrial policy, careful sequencing of tariffs, and allied cooperation.
“You have real successful efforts to build back manufacturing in America against the most formidable manufacturing power the world has ever seen. That's going to take conscious planning. industrial policy, careful sequencing of tariffs and other tools.”
Every day that countries perceive the U.S. lacks a plan or is risking inflation, bond collapse, and economic chaos, they re-evaluate their long-term strategic interests and become more likely to hedge toward China or reduce commitment to the U.S.
“With every day it looks like we don't have a plan or that we are risking, inflation, bond collapse in the markets, questions about every element of our economic and strategic approach. It causes countries to re-evaluate their long-term interests.”
Much of the current US-allied relationship structure is based on historical dimensions, paternalistic views, and structural bureaucratic barriers that prevent deeper and more sustaining relationships, requiring fundamental changes beyond business-as-usual engagement.
“not nearly far enough and that many of those relationships are based on historical dimensions, paternalistic views, and frankly structural barriers in our bureaucracies that make it challenging to build deeper, more sustaining relationships.”
The essay argues for something more than just strengthening allies and partners and also challenges the idea that going it alone is sufficient; instead, they advocate for a third path that requires much deeper, more sustaining relationships than currently exist.
“I think what we try to argue in the piece is that even though Rush and I are proud of the work that we did in, you know, strengthening allies and partners, not nearly far enough and that many of those relationships are based on historical dimensions, paternalistic views, and frankly structural barriers in our bureaucracies that make it challenging to build deeper, more sustaining relationships. And so I think what we're arguing for is something that challenges not just the emerging views among some that are basically arguing for American alone or American unilaterally, but also those who said that what we did was enough with allies and partners. No, we need to go much further, much further.”
Chinese companies focus on market share and winning the long game, while American companies focus on profit and market cap, leading to different competitive dynamics where nominal profit dominance may obscure underlying market structure changes.
“Our companies, it's true, they dominate profit share, they dominate in market cap, but some of that is a reflection of the dollar and some of that is a reflection of the fact that our companies focus on profit and their companies focus on market share winning the long game.”
The recommendations in Campbell and Doshi's essay call for capacity-centric statecraft that breaks down barriers between allies to build capacity quickly, including two-way defense production flows where Japan and Korea help build ships in the United States and the U.S. provides advanced weapons capabilities.
“These are capacity ccentric kinds of statecraftraft where the goal is to break down barriers between allies to build up capacity very quickly. Right? On the defense side, we want flows in both directions. We want Japan and Korea maybe to help us build ships in the United States because they're three to five times more productive than we are.”
Economic and tech competition, while necessary, might end up foreclosing the ability to manage security competition, which is quite dangerous.
“I worry that we're entering a place where the economic and tech uh competition which in some ways is necessary uh ends up foreclosing uh our ability to manage the security competition and that itself is quite dangerous.”
In 2009, Hu Jintao convened an ambassadorial conference and signaled that China needed to shift from 'hiding capabilities and biting time' to 'actively accomplishing something,' marking the beginning of the belief that China's moment had arrived.
“Xiinping was not the person to decide or to make the determination that the US was in decline. That determination began with the global financial crisis in Hujintowo when he convened the ambassadorial conference in 2009 and said essentially that they needed to shift their strategy from hiding capabilities and biting time to actively accomplishing something.”
The Biden administration's policy toward China achieved substantial progress across multiple vectors from its start to end, including linking the Indo-Pacific and Europe in more fundamental ways and establishing the role of the Quad and AUKUS as mechanisms for allied coordination.
“If you look at the beginning of the Biden administration and then the end, the change in those four years across many vectors is a a substantial sort of arc more in our favor. Uh again the allied and partner piece I don't think anyone would have anticipated our ability to link the Indo-Pacific and Europe in more fundamental ways understanding that both regions have strategic interests in the other the role of the Quad AUS.”
Every day that it looks like the US doesn't have a plan or is risking inflation and bond collapse questions about every element of economic and strategic approach, it causes countries to re-evaluate their long-term interests and credibility of the US.
“With every day it looks like we don't have a plan or that we are risking, inflation, bond collapse in the markets, questions about every element of our economic and strategic approach. It causes countries to re-evaluate their long-term interests.”
Xi Jinping is not interested in a bold, from-the-blue invasion of Taiwan but is gradually and dramatically ramping up tensions in hopes that cumulative pressure, deep Chinese engagement in Taiwan, and US unpredictability will cause Taiwan to reconsider its future.
“My own sense is that I think the Chinese are not interested right now in a bold from the blue um invasion of Taiwan. But I believe that they are going to gradually and in some cases dramatically ramp up certain kinds of tensions on Taiwan. And they're hoping that the combination of those tensions, the deep pervasive Chinese engagement in every element of Taiwanese life, plus some unpredictability with the United States and perhaps a few statements from President Trump that cause anxiety among leaders in Taiwan would cause them to think differently about the future.”
The Trump administration's tariff rollout was haphazard, poorly planned, and heavily dependent on Trump's final approval, requiring constant revision, which creates uncertainty and predictability problems that undermine the industrial coordination necessary for achieving allied scale.
“the roll out of this global tariff was haphazard, poorly planned, very much waiting for the final say of President Trump and is in need of almost constant revision. I I think the fact remains that for most of the key industries that we are working with a degree of predictability is essential and that is the furthest thing that you get right now”
The Trump administration has not yet turned its strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific; most focus remains on Europe and Iran, and such Indo-Pacific focus as exists is primarily through a commercial lens rather than strategic military lens.
“The Trump team has really not in a fundamental way turned its strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific. Most of that still is on Europe and on uh Iran and to the extent that people are focused uh on the Indo-Pacific, it is almost exclusively through the commercial lens.”
There are risks that Trump's tariff approach could have far-reaching unforeseen consequences that linger for decades, comparable to the unintended consequences of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
“this the economic equivalent of the Gulf War. Does it have far sweeping unforeseen consequences that linger for decades thereafter? And I think that's a real worry.”
Biden's manufacturing approach combined industrial policy (subsidies and incentives) with regulatory support and achieved massive increases in manufacturing investment, whereas Trump's approach emphasizes tariffs and deregulation but cuts industrial policy, requiring both components to succeed.
“Maybe Biden approaches to manufacturing focused on industrial policy in particular uh creating subsidies incentives for manufacturing and the record reflects that that approach worked and we had a massive increase in manufacturing investment in this country. Maybe you could argue in response there wasn't enough done on permitting reform or on perhaps even tariffs to create more incentive to invest. The Trump approach is to focus on the tariffs and the deregulation but not on the industrial policy which they're planning to cut.”
Xi Jinping cannot back down from Trump's challenge politically because of the way Trump has framed it as a direct power play, and Xi views national power as his watchword and namesake, so he will likely maintain his position.
“I think the way that President Trump has posited this as such a direct challenge to China, just absolutely obvious power play for a country that has invested so much in national power. It is the watchword and the namesake of President Xi. I do not think politically that he can back down. I think it will do him damage politically in China and frankly in other parts of Asia.”
China is unlikely to link military activity in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea directly to trade tensions, but may use cyber activity, bond market disruption, rare earths export controls, and supply chain warfare as response tools.
“I would just say that I think China's already pulled some fentanyl cooperation. I'm not sure how they'll link or whether they'll link activity in the Indoacific, you know, military activity in the straight or in the South China Sea to these tensions. They may or they may not. Same with cyber activity. I think if they want to get our attention, they'll do it in the bond markets. Uh, as we saw recently when the yield went up, President Trump may have been incentivized to pursue a truce with most allies and partners. But I think that'll be one place they might look. They'll also look, of course, at rare earths and, you know, critical inputs we rely on certain electronics and export control, supply chain warfare will be a big part of the toolkit.”
China is also pursuing more sophisticated engagement with European countries and trilateral China-Japan-Korea engagement, both of which should worry the US about alliance structure despite reassurances from those countries.
“already you're seeing some signs of Chinese engagement in Europe that's you know has some traction associated with it and the trilateral engagement between China, Japan and South Korea despite reassurances from both South Korea and Japan has some strategic um elements to it that should worry us”
The Trump administration structure favors loyalty and reinforces the president's views and biases over allowing dissenting voices to 'speak truth to power,' making it harder to correct mistakes or incorporate contrary evidence.
“I worry that the incentive structure and that the way that the Trump administration is organized is that it favors over anything else the just absolute loyalty and reinforcing his views and his biases and it's harder to speak truth to power. some outsiders do it. Um, but even then it's often, you know, shrouded in just the most unusual praise of the kind that, you know, is more common in authoritarian circumstances than what we've seen in democracies.”
The Trump administration will probably face some kind of Taiwan-like crisis in the period ahead, and managing it will be very difficult because the channels of communication between US and China established during Biden administration no longer exist.
“I think the Trump administration will have probably some kind of Taiwanlike crisis in the period ahead. And I think that they will have to find a way to manage it and address it. And that will be very hard to do right now because the channels of communication that we talked about in the first half of this conversation to manage competition. Well, that's when they show their value and right now they don't exist.”
In the Biden administration, Jake Sullivan and later Tony Blinken played clear, understood roles in U.S.-China diplomacy that provided consistent structure to the relationship, and every other encounter flowed from understanding their roles; the Trump team has not arrived at any comparable understanding.
“in the way that frankly Jake Sullivan and then also Tony Blink and it was very clear that the roles that they played in our administration we understood that and every other encounter basically flowed from that. I don't think we've arrived at any such understanding among the Trump team.”
The purge of He Dongming, vice chair of the Central Military Commission, suggests Xi may have been selecting for war-fighting capability (FDR model) rather than just purging for loyalty (Stalin model), which has implications for military preparedness against Taiwan.
“You could argue that President Xi's purges within the military might have been oriented towards war fighting, right? sort of you could call it the FDR model that he was seeing a conflict over the horizon and wanted to get folks out and get folks in who were better capable for implementing um you know his vision in a condition of conflict. Then there's the Stalin model that he's purging for loyalty and he's going to end up degrading the quality of his military.”
Campbell's assessment of Chinese elite determination to challenge the United States across every vector has been reinforced by his direct interactions with Chinese officials and Xi Jinping during his time in the Biden administration.
“I think if anything, my assessment of the determination on the part of the Chinese elite to challenge the United States across every vector probably has been reinforced.”
China's strengths and weaknesses flow from the same wells, and both create strategic advantages and disadvantages that must be understood together rather than separately.
“in some ways their strengths and weaknesses flow from the same wells”
There are two potential paths to achieving allied scale: one focused on persuasion and consent, and another with 'Trumpian characteristics' based on coercion, but both could achieve the same strategic outcome if properly sequenced.
“There's a one path to achieving scale more focused on persuasion and consent. There's another path maybe with Trumpian characteristics, Dan, that could also end up achieving scale. But the key thing is to keep scale in mind”
The Trump administration has inadvertently signaled it expects to accomplish large strategic purposes in very short timeframes, both on Ukraine and on trade, which differs from how major strategic outcomes actually develop.
“the Trump team has perhaps inadvertently signaled is the idea that they're going to be able to accomplish large strategic purposes either in Ukraine or in trade in very short periods of time.”
There was a brief period during the Biden administration where China and the US maintained military restraint in exchange for political restraint on Taiwan, but this stability did not hold and has given way to escalatory cycles.
“There was a brief period of stability uh in part of the Biden administration where I think you saw the PRC essentially stay within certain military lines in exchange for Taiwan and the United States staying within certain political lines. But ultimately that didn't hold up for too long. It was very hard to sustain and now we're sort of in a cycle of vicious escalation.”
China has created a 'leading group' to design a playbook targeting US vulnerabilities while avoiding complete rupture of US-China relations, likely involving targeted pain on specific companies or sectors as reminders of latent Chinese power.
“the president has constituted a leading group, a small cohort who is actively seeking to design a playbook that signals clearly areas where the the United States is vulnerable and uh is at risk without completely either hurting China or tearing down the USChina relations.”
Chinese leaders are signaling directly and clearly to the Trump team that they will not engage in high-level encounters between Presidents Trump and Xi without substantial preparation, which contrasts with Trump's apparent preference for unprepared engagement.
“the Chinese are are signaling quite directly and clearly to the Trump team that they're not about to have a high level encounter between President Trump and President Xi without some degree of preparation. I don't think that's the way the Trump team necessarily is inclined to proceed”
China is not prepared to give in to US trade pressure and is betting that pain will hit the United States first, particularly through immediate consumer impacts from increased tariffs on goods that make up daily life.
“I do not believe that China's prepared to give in right now. and they are betting that the pain will hit the United States first. Recognize how much damage politically was done by just a cardon of bags going up a little bit in costs. Now we're going to find ourselves in a set of circumstances that you can no longer get bike parts. You cannot get some of the medicines that older people rely upon.”
As of April 14, 2025, China has signaled it does not intend to escalate further in the tariff conflict, suggesting it would welcome if the Trump administration would reciprocate with commitment not to escalate further.
“I'll just say I think it's notable that China, you know, this is uh of course April 14th, so the situation will almost certainly change, but has been essentially signaling it doesn't intend to escalate further. So my guess is that that's a sign that they would hope that the Trump administration would return that gesture with the commitment also perhaps not to escalate further.”
China may use fentanyl cooperation, supply chain controls (rare earths, critical minerals), regulatory actions against U.S. companies, military exercises in the Indo-Pacific, bond market pressure, or cyber actions to signal power and cause pain in response to Trump administration tariffs.
“if they want to get our attention, they'll do it in the bond markets...China's already pulled some fentanyl cooperation...supply chain warfare will be a big part of the toolkit...regulatory action against US companies operating in China. But by and large, I would say that right now, it seems their response is largely in two areas. Econ tech or in the bilateral space like on fentanyl.”
Looking carefully at products coming from China that matter to American daily lives will be shocking in the next couple of weeks, indicating broad exposure of US consumer and industrial supply chains to Chinese product reliance.
“I mean, I just I can't tell you if you go and look carefully at the things that are coming in from China that matter to our daily lives, it's going to be a bit of a shock in the next couple of weeks.”
Some critics argue the Campbell-Doshi allied scale vision is too late and the ship has sailed, but the authors believe this approach could succeed in the near future if the Trump administration has the discipline and vision to implement it.
“one critique of the piece that a lot of folks have made in the last few days is well, it's a great beautiful vision of allied scale you've laid out, but it's too late. That ship has sailed. I think it's true that this approach is imperiled, but I also think it's true that this approach could succeed in the near future if the Trump administration had the discipline and vision to kind of implement that set of deals with allies.”
If China seeks a deal with Trump, it will want more than just economic/tech concessions—it will want to include non-economic items like fentanyl to gain additional leverage for later use.
“if China looks for a deal, they'll want to go bigger. They won't just want an economic and tech deal. They'll want to throw a few other things in there like fentanyl to get more leverage. And so that's the challenge that that we face that they'll have incentive to take away some of that stuff in the near term so they can turn it back on a little bit later.”
China is investing in capabilities that will help it weather demographic challenges, suggesting it is not passively accepting demographic decline but actively preparing to manage it.
“and they're investing in the kinds of capabilities that will help them weather the demographic challenges.”
Taiwan is one of the hardest questions in U.S.-China relations and U.S. Asia policy, and Campbell and Doshi tread carefully around it, but there are people in the Trump administration who openly question why the U.S. is standing in the way of China on Taiwan when Taiwan is so close to China.
“it's one of the hardest questions and one of the things they teach you in diplomacy um when you're in government is that you don't speculate idly about these issues [50:26] that have such magnitude and the strategic struggle in the Indopacific. Nevertheless, we'll try to, you know, sort of brave forward. You're you're out of government and out of government, all we do is speculate. So, I I know. I guess the reason I mention it is I find myself even now after decades of this that I find I I sort of tread carefully around these questions. My own sense is that just as we described a very wide set of views on China. I think you see those also with respect to the American commitment to Taiwan. There are people in the administration that openly ask the question, why are we doing this? You know, it's so close to China, like why are we standing in the way?”
Trump administration tariff rollout was haphazard, poorly planned, highly dependent on Trump's final say, and in constant need of revision, making it extremely difficult for key industries to operate with the predictability they need.
“the roll out of this global tariff was haphazard, poorly planned, very much waiting for the final say of President Trump and is in need of almost constant revision. I I think the fact remains that for most of the key industries that we are working with a degree of predictability is essential and that is the furthest thing that you get right now”
The Trump administration has not turned its strategic attention fundamentally to the Indo-Pacific; most focus remains on Europe and Iran, and the little Indo-Pacific attention exists is primarily through a commercial lens rather than strategic one.
“The Trump team has really not in a fundamental way turned its strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific. Most of that still is on Europe and on uh Iran and to the extent that people are focused uh on the Indo-Pacific, it is almost exclusively through the commercial lens.”
The Trump administration's post-hoc justification that the tariffs were always about China (after dropping tariffs on most countries but China) contradicts the initial broad rollout and raises questions about what the real goal is.
“We saw a few days after the Liberty Day tariffs a kind of expost justification. This was always about China and that's why they dropped the tariffs on everybody but China. But if that were really the case, why not start there?”
Trump's willingness to maneuver and not be bound by precedent or past position means there is a path for deal-making with China if the foundations are right, though this path is uncertain.
“if there's one thing we know about President Trump, it's that he's not bound by any sense of precedent or past position. he's willing to kind of maneuver to find that space if it's there. So, there's a path.”
One critique of the Campbell-Doshi essay is that the approach is too late and 'the ship has sailed,' but Doshi argues this approach could still succeed if the Trump administration had the discipline and vision to implement deals with allies.
“one critique of the piece that a lot of folks have made in the last few days is well, it's a great beautiful vision of allied scale you've laid out, but it's too late. That ship has sailed. I think it's true that this approach is imperiled, but I also think it's true that this approach could succeed in the near future if the Trump administration had the discipline and vision to kind of implement that set of deals with allies.”
Xi Jinping is commanding, confident, does not rely on talking points in the way past Chinese leaders did, and confidently departs from prepared remarks as needed, showing signs of political confidence.
“he's very commanding and very confident and he doesn't rely as past Chinese leaders might have on talking points. He has them. He uses them. He departs from them as needed confidently. And I was also fascinated by the way in which he'd occasionally turn to members of his team to chime in which is again another sign of of confidence.”
China has been essentially signaling it doesn't intend to escalate further (as of April 14), suggesting they would hope the Trump administration would return that gesture with a commitment not to escalate further.
“China, you know, this is uh of course April 14th, so the situation will almost certainly change, but has been essentially signaling it doesn't intend to escalate further.”
There is a massive escalation in trade tensions with bilateral tariffs at 145% or so on most products, though Trump did walk back some tariffs on electronics over the weekend.
“we have seen this massive escalation in in trade tensions between the US and China. Bilateral tariffs are at, you know, 145% or so on most products, though Trump did walk back some of those over the weekend on on electronics.”