Will the U.S. Dollar Survive the Breakdown of the International System? | Paul Blustein
What this covers
In Episode 412 of Hidden Forces, Demetri Kofinas speaks with financial journalist and economic historian Paul Blustein about the U.S. Dollar’s historic resiliency in the face of international shocks and whether dollar hegemony can endure the ongoing breakdown of the global capital and trading system.
In the first hour, Kofinas and Blustein trace how the U.S. dollar became the de facto currency for global trade, savings, and investment and what recent policy shifts in Washington—and how they have been perceived abroad—may mean for the future value and status of the Greenback.
The second hour builds on this foundation as Paul and Demetri speculate about what the future holds for dollar hegemony in a world characterized by growing trade protectionism, a breakdown in international cooperation, and a potentially irreparable loss of confidence among foreign investors in U.S. leadership and in the strength and reliability of U.S. capital markets.
This could not be a timelier conversation about a subject whose ramifications will continue to play out over many years if not decades to come.
You can subscribe to our premium content and access our premium feed, episode transcripts, and Intelligence Reports at https://hiddenforces.io/subscribe.
If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, which includes Q&A calls with guests, access to special research and analysis, in-person events, and dinners, you can also do that on our subscriber page at HiddenForces.io/subscribe. 00:00 Introduction 02:53 Paul Blustein’s Background 08:06 Writing About Economic Crises 11:34 King Dollar: The New Book 14:42 The Dollar's Early Years 18:25 Creation of the Federal Reserve 24:38 US Dollar vs. British Pound 27:16 Importance of CHIPS 31:55 US Sanctions and Dollar Dominance 34:14 Stress Tests and Policy Responses 36:21 The Dollar's Unique Advantages 39:02 Maintaining Dollar Dominance 42:13 Topics for the Second Hour
If you enjoyed listening to today’s episode of Hidden Forces, you can help support the show by doing the following: Subscribe on Apple Podcasts | YouTube | Spotify | Stitcher | SoundCloud | CastBox | RSS Feed Write us a review on Apple Podcasts at https://apple.co/3fLSIgR Write us a review on Spotify at https://spoti.fi/3tv4zYr Subscribe to our mailing list at https://hiddenforces.io/newsletter/ Subscribe and Support the Podcast at https://hiddenforces.io Follow Hidden Forces on Twitter: https://twitter.com/hiddenforcespod Follow Demetri on Twitter: https://twitter.com/kofinas Producer & Host: Demetri Kofinas
Editor & Engineer: Stylianos Nicolaou Follow Demetri on Twitter at @Kofinas Episode Recorded on 04/23/2025
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The dollar's dominance as the global reserve currency rests on deep institutional foundations—Fed credibility, legal frameworks, and especially the Treasury market's unparalleled liquidity—that are robust against most challenges but vulnerable to catastrophic US policy missteps that undermine its role as guarantor of the international trading system.
- The dollar survived existential challenges (gold standard collapse, double-digit inflation, 2008 crisis) because the Treasury market's depth and breadth has no peer—it is the only safe asset foreign actors can reliably convert to cash in a crisis
- Dollar dominance depends not only on network effects and inertia but on active US policy: credible Fed independence, willingness to provide swap lines to all countries in crisis, and commitment to maintaining rather than weaponizing the dollar system
- Current US policy—trade protectionism, unilateral sanctions, and signals of withdrawal from the guarantor role—risks triggering a cascading loss of confidence among foreign investors in US leadership and capital markets, though the dollar's structural advantages make this a slow-moving catastrophe rather than imminent collapse
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CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System) is the least well-appreciated piece of dollar infrastructure despite being more critical than SWIFT because CHIPS actually clears and settles international dollar payments, whereas SWIFT is only a messaging system that confirms transactions but does not move funds.
“the aspect of the the hardware or of the institutions that are least well appreciated is chips. You know, I write a good biting house interbank payment system clearing house clearing house interbank payment system. Now, I'm not, you know, I'm not claiming any great revelations. It's not like I scooped, you know, did some great investigative reporting and and told people Sure. But most people don't even know what this is.”
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System), not SWIFT, is the most critical piece of dollar infrastructure because it handles more than 90% of all dollar payments across borders (~540,000 transactions per day, $1.8 trillion in value), and all CHIPS transactions are subject to US law and supervised by US regulators, giving the US government the power to enforce sanctions.
“I would say the aspect of the the hardware or of the institutions that are least well appreciated is chips. You know, I write a good biting house interbank payment system clearing house clearing house interbank payment system...most people don't even know what this is. They wouldn't even know the acronym.”
The dollar experienced multiple existential challenges in the post-WWII era—the end of Bretton Woods gold backing in 1971, double-digit inflation in the 1970s, the rise of the yen and euro as rival currencies—but at each juncture, predictions of dollar decline proved wrong because no alternative currency possessed the depth and liquidity of US Treasury markets.
“at each of those junctures that you okay the you know the Nixon taking the racing the last vestigages of the gold standard in 1971 and then the the inflation which you know was a really probably I you know maybe the most serious threat because when you have double digit inflation and it seems to be racing out of control why do people want to hold dollars and you know And of course the rise of the yen and and the rise of the euro which people there were lots of predictions that those would supplant or at least seriously rival the dollar and the global financial crisis I would say was the one you know there was just so much of a all right we're done with this system”
The US became the world's largest economy around 1870, but the dollar did not overtake the British pound as the dominant international currency until the 1920s because the US lacked a centralized financial system and central bank until the Federal Reserve was created in 1913.
“it's pretty clear that the US became the world's largest economy around 1870 but because the the US financial system and monetary system was so defederalized decentralized as you were just pointing out the period of wildcat banking was over by 1870 but but there was still no central bank and there was still no Federal Reserve and so it wasn't really until I mean it's hard to date exactly when the dollar overtook the pound.”
The creation of the Federal Reserve through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, signed by President Woodrow Wilson, was the crucial step that transformed the dollar from private bank obligations into a centralized, government-backed currency by establishing a central bank that could regulate bank solvency and guarantee deposits.
“the most important and pre-minent step was the creation of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Act signed into law in 1913 by President Woodrow Wilson. So it wasn't until then that America had a central bank.”
CHIPS is a private network owned by 40 of the world's biggest banks but is subject to US law and jurisdiction, and crucially, the US subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks are also subject to US law, making CHIPS the enforcement mechanism for US sanctions on international financial transactions.
“chips is a matching system, right? So the member banks are some you know the big there's something like 40 bank and it's a private it's a private network. It's not it's not uh run by the government, right? But it's based in New York. It's subject to US law and that's incredibly important and it's got all the biggest US banks in it, but it also has a lot of big foreign banks in it and this is a crucial qualifier here. It's the US subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks and they are also subject to US law.”
The unique structural foundation of the dollar's dominance is the depth, breadth, and liquidity of the market for US government obligations (Treasury bills, bonds, and notes)—no other currency or country has this feature, and this advantage is not competitive but absolute.
“no currency has ever been as dominant as the dollar is today. And no other currency on earth today has this feature of a you know one type of obligation that is so deep, so liquid and with such a broad market”
The Federal Reserve, rule of law and the court system, bank lending as an asset backed by enforcement of borrower obligations, and the Fed's commitment to maintain stable purchasing power are all components of the institutional edifice that sustains confidence in the dollar.
“I argue in my book that it's a whole series of steps and a whole edifice and series of arrangements all backed by laws, regulations in which we depend on the state to partly it's the Federal Reserve, partly it's rule of law and the court system which adjudicates disputes. When banks make loans, they know that the loans they hold are assets and if the borrower doesn't repay, they, you know, could be forced into bankruptcy. That's all part of it. Uh the Federal Reserve's commitment to maintain the more or less stable purchasing power of dollars.”
The creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 was the critical institutional step that transformed the dollar from a collection of private bank obligations into a unified national currency, because a central bank can enforce uniformity of value and redemption across the system through law and regulation, rather than relying on individual bank reputation.
“It's such a fascinating process and and it's something I really learned in the course of doing the book. It's not something I intuitively understood and the import really hugely important step was the creation of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Act signed into law in 1913 by President Woodrow Wilson. So it wasn't until then that America had a central bank.”
The 2008 financial crisis represented a legitimate crisis of confidence in the dollar system because the crisis was caused by dollar dominance and exposed the dangers of depending on a single currency, leading to justified international complaints about the dollar's hegemonic role.
“the global financial crisis I would say was the one you know there was just so much of a all right we're done with this system and there was quite legitimate the complaints about the dollar dominance at that point because it had contributed to the crisis and the world had seen how dangerous it is to depend on you know on a system in which one currency is dominant.”
Foreign banks must worry about being cut off from CHIPS if they transact with US-designated targets, creating a chilling effect where they preemptively sever ties with any entity remotely associated with potential US sanctions, a dynamic that was particularly evident in the Russian sanctions following the Ukraine invasion.
“I think even before the private sector was way ahead of the government in applying those secondary sanctions to entities doing business with Russia because they were worried that if they it wasn't worth their time. It wasn't worth their their their um it was from a risk awards standpoint. It wasn't worth it. Just get out of Russia, get out of dealing with these companies because what if the US government decides to sanction them, etc. That's going to impact our business. So it's there's a private logic of its own that makes these sanctions and the fear of sanctions just really devastating for private entities and countries that are remotely impacted by them.”
If disconnected from SWIFT, a country would face severe inconvenience in conducting international payments, but this would be manageable because SWIFT is only a messaging system and alternative messaging methods could substitute for it.
“if a country or is disconnected from Swift that it'll have difficulty doing international payments. Well, that's true. It'll be really inconvenient. But Swift is just a messaging system. It's important but it but all it what it does is it when one bank transmits money you know across borders to another it sends a message saying you know to confirm that this is what is happening but you can do that in all kinds of ways it used to be done by tux machine it used to be done and it can be done by email if necessary”
Bank membership in the Federal Reserve system was technically voluntary, but once the system became large enough, banks had little practical choice but to join due to collective pressure and the inability to function outside the system.
“It was a voluntary thing. I mean, again, there was a a supposedly, you know, obviously a level of coercion as well in the sense that once the the collective became large enough, you know, it's just you can't really you don't want to not be part of it. But it wasn't. It was a voluntary action.”
In the late 1700s, what people called a 'dollar' was ambiguous—they could be referring to US dollars or Spanish dollars, and the term was primarily a unit of account and denomination backed by the promise of redemption in precious metal by private banks.
“at that time it was a pretty decentralized system. First, he'd probably ask you if you were talking about US dollars or Spanish dollars. Well, yes. I'm not sure, but I guess what you're getting at is the fact that dollars were then just things that were issued by banks.”
The Federal Reserve Act gave US banks much greater liberty to establish branches and subsidiaries not only within their own states but outside of their own states and abroad, which enabled American banks to aggressively expand into Europe and other markets in the 1920s onward.
“the Federal Reserve Act gave US banks much greater liberty to have branches and subsidiaries and whatnot, not only within their own states, but outside of their own states and abroad as well. So the dollar was the American banks were really barging into Europe by that point.”
In a financial crisis, participants need access to assets that can be converted to cash quickly without fire-sale losses, and Treasury obligations uniquely provide this because of their deep and broad market, which no other currency's obligations can match.
“that's so crucial in a crisis because everyone wants to be able to they want to have an asset that they can convert to cash in a hurry. if they can't get cash in a hurry, can't pay their obligations, they're the next Leman Brothers, and they also want to have an asset that they don't have to sell at fire sale prices and treasury obligations because the market is so deep and broad.”
Legal tender laws—which state that 'this note is legal tender for all obligations public and private'—mean that if you pay a debt using dollars, courts will deem the contract fulfilled, which is not true for payments in gold, Bitcoin, or other non-legal-tender assets.
“And another thing that it says on it is this note is legal tender for all obligations public and private. That's the government saying if you pay a debt whether it's taxes or a debt owed under a contract using dollars and you satisfy the con the terms of the contract by paying in dollars. Well, then a court of law will deem that contract to have been fulfilled, which is not true. If you say, well, I'll tell you what, I'll pay you in gold or Bitcoin or something else. That's not legal tender.”
The US became the world's largest economy around 1870, but because it lacked a central bank and federal monetary authority until 1913, the dollar did not become the dominant international currency until the 1920s after World War I, when US banks began expanding into Europe and the Fed gave them new powers to establish branches and subsidiaries abroad.
“It's pretty clear that the US became the world's largest economy around 1870 but because the the US financial system and monetary system was so defederalized decentralized as you were just pointing out the period of wildcat banking was over by 1870 but but there was still no central bank and there was still no Federal Reserve and so it wasn't really until I mean it's hard to date exactly when the dollar overtook the pound.”
Federal Reserve notes bear the text 'This note is legal tender for all obligations public and private,' which is the government's declaration that payment in dollars satisfies any contractual obligation.
“another thing that it says on it is this note is legal tender for all obligations public and private. That's the government saying if you pay a debt whether it's taxes or a debt owed under a contract using dollars and you satisfy the con the terms of the contract by paying in dollars. Well, then a court of law will deem that contract to have been fulfilled”
The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s brought the world close to the precipice and demonstrated the catastrophic spillover effects of currency crises when a major economy like South Korea (the 11th largest economy at the time) ran out of hard currency reserves.
“particularly when I did my first book, my first book was about the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. the crisis that hit you know Korea, Thailand first well first Thailand then Indonesia, Korea and then later Russia and Brazil and looking back on that now from the perspective that we have today...that crisis really brought the world pretty close to the precipice.”
After the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913 and became operational in 1914, a process began of selling regional banks on joining the system, and this process was led by figures like Paul Warburg who gave talks to convince banks to participate voluntarily.
“after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and it was passed in 1913 and the bank became operational in 1914. There was a process of selling regional banks into the system. I remember reading lectures that Paul Walberg was giving talks. He was going out to the country and trying to convince banks to join the system.”
The US dollar was not a unique invention but rather a unit of account—a denomination borrowed from Spanish dollars, which were the most widely circulating currency in the Western Hemisphere through the 18th century, and it was issued by both private banks and the US Mint as competing forms of bank notes backed by specie.
“At that time it was a pretty decentralized system. First, he'd probably ask you if you were talking about US dollars or Spanish dollars...dollars were then just things that were issued by banks. And uh of course there were coins of gold and silver that were issued by the government. There were continentals that were issued by the revolutionary government where we got the phrase not worth a continental.”
No currency in history has ever been as dominant as the dollar is today, which means historical precedent offers limited guidance for predicting dollar decline.
“but no currency has ever been as dominant as the dollar is today. And no other currency on earth today has this feature of a you know one type of obligation that is so deep, so liquid and with such a broad market”
SWIFT is only a messaging system for confirming that international payments are happening; it does not transmit or settle funds and can be replaced by other secure communication methods if necessary, making it less critical to the dollar system than commonly assumed.
“Swift is just a messaging system. It's important but it but all it what it does is it when one bank transmits money you know across borders to another it sends a message saying you know to confirm that this is what is happening but you can do that in all kinds of ways it used to be done by tux machine it used to be done and it can be done by email if necessary I mean I guess you want to make sure you use a very secure email system but swift doesn't actually transmit funds and it doesn't clear and settle funds”
Reserve currency status refers specifically to the dollar's special role as the currency held by central banks in their foreign currency reserves (about 60% of all foreign currency reserves), but this is only the beginning of the dollar's dominance—its broader role spans international trade, finance, borrowing, and hedging.
“when you say reserve currency of course as you know from reading the book I I try to be careful in in saying that that's the reserve currency that terminology really only refers to the dollar's special status as the currency that's held by central banks around the world in their foreign currency reserves. It has about 60% of those dollar denominated securities account for about 60. But that's just the beginning of it. Its special status is the currency that is used in international commerce of all kinds. Trade, finance, borrowing, hedging, all these ways”
The federalization of the dollar (centralization of currency control under the Federal Reserve) is a separate and earlier process than the internationalization of the dollar (its adoption for global trade).
“you know, so there are two competing histories here. One is the history of the dollar's internationalization, which we're going to talk about. But what we've been talking about so far is the history of the federalization of the dollar”
The 2008 global financial crisis was a legitimate test of dollar dominance because the crisis was partly caused by dollar dominance (the ability to issue unlimited debt in the reserve currency encouraged excess borrowing), and the world saw how dangerous it is to depend on a system where one currency is dominant.
“the global financial crisis I would say was the one you know there was just so much of a all right we're done with this system and there was quite legitimate the complaints about the dollar dominance at that point because it had contributed to the crisis and the world had seen how dangerous it is to depend on you know on a system in which one currency is dominant.”
All data processing and backup sites for CHIPS and Federal Reserve Wire are located in the United States, which grants the US jurisdictional authority over these critical payment systems.
“all data processing and backup sites for chips and fed wire are located in the US which is what gives the US jurisdictional authority”
The US government weaponizes the dollar by threatening or actually cutting off targets from access to the dollar system, and this practice, combined with cryptocurrency concerns and worries about mounting national debt, has triggered speculation that the dollar might lose its reserve currency status.
“There was an awful lot of talk partly because of the rise of cryptocurrency, partly because the US government was weaponizing the dollar, meaning by by which I mean it was, you know, either threatening or actually cutting off targets from access to the dollar system.”
Treasury market illiquidity or dysfunction represents a vulnerability to dollar dominance, as evidenced by disruptions that occurred in recent history ('just a few days ago').
“And you know, we can talk about the exceptions. You know, there have been periods of time when the Treasury market hasn't functioned so well and we had that just a few days ago, but put that aside for a minute.”
In a financial crisis, the liquidity and depth of treasury markets is crucial because participants need to quickly convert assets to cash without incurring severe losses; if that is not possible, they become insolvent like Lehman Brothers, making treasury market depth a systemic safety feature.
“that's so crucial in a crisis because everyone wants to be able to they want to have an asset that they can convert to cash in a hurry. if they can't get cash in a hurry, can't pay their obligations, they're the next Leman Brothers, and they also want to have an asset that they don't have to sell at fire sale prices and treasury obligations because the market is so deep and broad.”
Double-digit inflation in the 1970s was probably the most serious threat to dollar dominance because it raised the fundamental question of why people would want to hold an asset (dollars) whose purchasing power was collapsing.
“the inflation which you know was a really probably I you know maybe the most serious threat because when you have double digit inflation and it seems to be racing out of control why do people want to hold dollars”
The Bretton Woods conference in 1944 marks the point at which the dollar formally became the dominant global currency by international agreement, after which it was later dismantled.
“it was, you know, I think the point at which we can really say the dollar became the dominant global currency by international agreement was in 1944 at the Bretonwoods conference. You know, that agreement doesn't is null and void today. No, it it was dismantled later.”
The US does not have unique advantages in rule of law compared to other major economies like Europe, Japan, and China, meaning the dollar's dominance cannot be explained by superior governance alone—it requires a specific institutional advantage.
“The US doesn't have any unique advantages in terms of of rule of law. I mean, Europe has that. Japan has that. It's not the only big economy in the world. Europe is a big economy. China is a big economy. Japan is still kind of a big economy.”
The term 'reserve currency' technically refers only to the dollar's status as the currency held by central banks in their foreign currency reserves, where dollar-denominated securities account for about 60% of those reserves, but this is just the beginning of the dollar's special status.
“when you say reserve currency of course as you know from reading the book I I try to be careful in in saying that that's the reserve currency that terminology really only refers to the dollar's special status as the currency that's held by central banks around the world in their foreign currency reserves. It has about 60% of those dollar denominated securities account for about 60. But that's just the beginning of it.”
Unlike legal tender currency (dollars), alternative payment media like gold or Bitcoin are not legal tender and therefore cannot be used to satisfy legal obligations even if both parties agree.
“Which is not true. If you say, well, I'll tell you what, I'll pay you in gold or Bitcoin or something else. That's not legal tender. So, this whole edifice of laws and commitments that the state makes that give us as individuals or companies or lenders or borrowers or whatever that the money that we are transacting in is is good.”
Private banks in early US history would print their promises to redeem banknotes in specie (precious metal) on the notes themselves, stating the name of the specific bank.
“the bills you know in such a bank the classic bank of Newberg New York I've spen bank of Michigan I found a bunch of names you know for my book Alagany Bank in Maryland. they would put print on their bills, you know, that they promised to redeem in in specy in precious metal if that bill was presented to them.”
Double-digit inflation in the 1970s-80s was perhaps the most serious structural threat to the dollar's dominance because it is fundamentally irrational for foreign actors to hold or accept dollars if their purchasing power is eroding rapidly.
“and then the the inflation which you know was a really probably I you know maybe the most serious threat because when you have double digit inflation and it seems to be racing out of control why do people want to hold dollars”
Losing dollar dominance would be less important than avoiding catastrophic events like a full-scale war with China, and policy makers should not prioritize dollar dominance over preventing such catastrophes.
“for all of these kinds of dire scenarios that people can come up with of the US government really stepping away from its commitments and from providing the foundations and underpinnings of dollar dominance. My answer always is well dollar dominance is important but it's not nearly as important as avoiding these dire scenarios. I mean just the other day in one of my presentations someone said well what would it take? I mean suppose we had an allout war with China. I mean after all it was the you know first and second world wars that brought down the pound and I mean my you know my view is well you know the first and second world wars were a lot more important and horrible than losing the dominance of the pound to Britain and you know if we have a war that's going to be a lot more important than losing dollar dominance.”
The dollar's dominance is almost impregnable absent catastrophic missteps by the US government, but many such catastrophic missteps are currently being made by Washington.
“the underlying premise of my book is that the dollar's dominance, the special unique quality that it has in international commerce is almost impregnable, barring catastrophic missteps by the US government. And I'm of the view I mean you say okay we'll come to the present day later in this discussion but I'm of the view there many catastrophic missteps are being made but are they catastrophic enough that the US is really stepping away so badly from the pillars and the foundations of dollar dominance that it really is at risk? I don't think so.”
At each major juncture threatening the dollar (end of gold standard in 1971, double-digit inflation in the 1970s-80s, rise of the yen and euro, and the 2008 financial crisis), distinguished economists made legitimate predictions that the dollar would lose its dominance, yet at each point the dollar proved resilient.
“I think at each of those junctures there were all these predictions that you know, okay, the dollar is doomed. And you know, one of the I hate to say one of the delights, I guess, but I have to admit as a writer, you you have to take some delight in finding fodder that will be, you know, useful in your writing. I kept coming across these predictions that people had made and often quite distinguished economists and, you know, people who were, you know, they weren't just cooks. They were quite legitimate scholars”
Jack Borman, the top civil servant at the IMF, learned during Thanksgiving that Korea was almost bankrupt and almost out of hard currency, requiring him to spend all day on a conference call deciding how to rescue the 11th largest economy in the world from potential default.
“I was at my house, our beach house in Rahobit Beach at Delaware, and we were expecting 24 people for Thanksgiving dinner. And this phone call came from our mission in Seoul, saying, you know, the Koreans are almost they're almost bankrupt. They're almost out of money, out of hard currency. Now, you know, we can get into the definition explanation of what that is. And I had to spend all day, this guy was telling me he had to spend all day on a conference call trying to figure out what the heck the IMF ought to do to rescue this what was then the 11th largest economy in the world from a default which could have sent, you know, could really have sent the world into a quite dire situation.”
CHIPS processes more than 90% of all dollar payments made across borders, averaging 540,000 transactions per day with a total daily value of $1.8 trillion (according to its last public disclosures).
“chips runs and it handles more than 90% of the dollar payments that are made across borders. These are, you know, stupendously large amounts. Their last public disclosures are 540,000 transactions per day on average, $1.8 trillion in value.”
The modern dollar's stability and trustworthiness depends on an entire institutional edifice including the Federal Reserve's commitment to maintain stable purchasing power, the rule of law and court system that enforces contracts, FDIC deposit insurance, and the legal designation of dollar bills as 'legal tender for all obligations public and private'.
“I argue in my book that it's a whole series of steps and a whole edifice and series of arrangements all backed by laws, regulations in which we depend on the state to partly it's the Federal Reserve, partly it's rule of law and the court system which adjudicates disputes. When banks make loans, they know that the loans they hold are assets and if the borrower doesn't repay, they, you know, could be forced into bankruptcy. That's all part of it. Uh the Federal Reserve's commitment to maintain the more or less stable purchasing power of dollars.”
If the Federal Reserve were to announce it would only provide currency swap lines to countries that 'play ball' with US policy rather than providing them universally in crises, this would severely undermine confidence in the dollar's role as an international currency.
“if the Federal Reserve were to announce, you know, well, or if the US government were to announce, well, the Federal Reserve is not going to play the role in a global crisis that it has in the past, we're only going to provide swap lines to countries that we like and who play ball with us and who do what the president of the United States wants. I think that would seriously undermine confidence in the dollar, no question, in its international role.”
Today we conflate and synonymize the dollar with banknotes, assuming they are the same thing, but technically they are not—Federal Reserve notes are specifically the obligations of the Federal Reserve, not a universal dollar.
“today we conflate, we synonymize the dollar with banknotes. We assume those two things are the same thing, but they're really not. Technically, they're not. I mean, when when you pull dollars out of JP Morgan, you're actually taking JP Morgan bucks, but because of the way that the system has been centralized over the years, we've come to conflate those two.”
Secondary sanctions create 'ethereal' deterrence that makes banks hypersensitive to any hint of US displeasure; banks would rather exit an entire market than risk inadvertently transacting with a sanctioned entity, as evidenced by banks voluntarily cutting ties with Russia before official sanctions were fully implemented.
“there's something about the way the power of secondary sanctions. It's kind of like it's almost like ethereal, like you don't want to be tainted with anything that could be remotely seen as going against US government policy. And banks are so allergic to that possibility and so riskaverse that they end up just cutting off entities or cutting off countries at the meest hint.”
Oxford University's economics education is contrasted with contemporary Samuelson-style neoclassical economics education, which relies on Newtonian-type mechanical models and does not teach political economy or historical context.
“I know that you were interested in in journalism primarily and so you kind of conveniently went into money and finance because you had this degree from Oxford in philosophy, politics and economy which by the way sounds super fascinating. I mean you know like so much of the way that we think about economics today has been built around these almost like you know Newtonian models or at least that's how I learned it. Samsonian economics we didn't really learn political economy. We didn't study history in school at least I didn't. So that that sounds very fascinating.”
The history of the dollar involves both a 'federalization' process (consolidation of private bank currencies into a central currency) and an 'internationalization' process (expansion of the dollar's role in global trade), and these are distinct historical movements that should not be conflated.
“there are two competing histories here. One is the history of the dollar's internationalization, which we're going to talk about. But what we've been talking about so far is the history of the federalization of the dollar, which if it's not already obvious to people, this is a process that uh was not linear.”
The dollar's dominance is 'almost impregnable' unless the US government makes catastrophic missteps in abandoning the institutional pillars of dollar dominance, but Bluestein observes that 'many catastrophic missteps are being made' in current US policy.
“the underlying premise of my book is that the dollar's dominance, the special unique quality that it has in international commerce is almost impregnable, barring catastrophic missteps by the US government. And I'm of the view I mean you say okay we'll come to the present day later in this discussion but I'm of the view there many catastrophic missteps are being made but are they catastrophic enough that the US is really stepping away so badly from the pillars and the foundations of dollar dominance that it really is at risk?”
The US government has been 'weaponizing the dollar' by threatening or actually cutting off targets from access to the dollar system, such as through sanctions against hostile nations and specially designated entities.
“There was an awful lot of talk partly because of the rise of cryptocurrency, partly because the US government was weaponizing the dollar, meaning by by which I mean it was, you know, either threatening or actually cutting off targets from access to the dollar system.”
Bluestein's motivation for writing about crises stems partly from genuine concern that analysis and public debate might reduce future crises, but also from the fact that crises provide compelling subject matter for books and journalism, creating a complex ethical situation that requires walking a difficult line.
“I just found it endlessly I hate to say that I you know I I I clap my hands and yeah I I you know it's you feel sorry for the people who suffer and people really do suffer and but you just have to hope that by writing about it and informing the public debate about these things that those things won't happen quite as often. That's kind of the um the difficult line we walk, right? I mean we live in this world. We don't want things to go haywire. At the same time, when things go haywire, it gives us something to write about, to think about, to talk about and that's sort of our jobs.”
The role of the US dollar is inseparable from the broader role of the United States as guarantor of the international commercial and trading system, a role that became especially pronounced after the Cold War's end and the rise of neoliberal globalization.
“when we're talking about the role of the dollar we're also it's really about the role of the United States. I mean the role of the United States certainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and then the rise of neoliberalism and the broadening of globalization has been to play the role of guarantor of the international commercial and trading system.”
Bluestein's book 'King Dollar' was motivated by speculation in 2019-2020 about the dollar losing its reserve currency status due to three factors: (1) the rise of cryptocurrency, (2) the US government 'weaponizing' the dollar through sanctions, and (3) concerns about the US national debt limiting the money supply and causing debasement.
“I got into it in I think it was 2019 2020. There was an awful lot of talk partly because of the rise of cryptocurrency, partly because the US government was weaponizing the dollar, meaning by by which I mean it was, you know, either threatening or actually cutting off targets from access to the dollar system. And there was a lot of talk that the dollar might be other actors would find all kinds of new currencies to replace the dollar. And also there was a lot of uh I suppose what you'd call the usual concern that you know because the national debt was mounting and you know it was hard to see how the money supply could be kept under control that you know that the dollar would somehow reserve status. Yeah. Would be debased.”
After the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913 and the Federal Reserve became operational in 1914, Paul Warburg and other Fed officials had to persuade regional banks to voluntarily join the Federal Reserve system through a process of advocacy and persuasion.
“after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and it was passed in 1913 and the bank became operational in 1914. There was a process of selling regional banks into the system. I remember reading lectures that Paul Walberg was giving talks. He was going out to the country and trying to convince banks to join the system.”
The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, which hit Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, nearly precipitated a global catastrophe and brought the world 'pretty close to the precipice,' illustrating the systemic risk embedded in the international financial system.
“My first book was about the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. the crisis that hit you know Korea, Thailand first well first Thailand then Indonesia, Korea and then later Russia and Brazil and looking back on that now from the perspective that we have today where you know we've already been through the the global financial crisis of 2008 and and COVID and other all these other things that have happened but that crisis really brought the world pretty close to the precipice.”
The period of wildcat banking occurred after the expiration of the Second Bank of the United States' charter under Andrew Jackson, representing a step backward from centralization of the dollar.
“This is a process that uh was not linear. You know, it went through, of course, the period of wildcat banking, which was a kind of step back from centralization after the second bank of the United States's charter expired. It wasn't renewed by Andrew Jackson.”
The period of wildcat banking in the US (post-Second Bank of the United States charter expiration under Andrew Jackson) represents a setback from centralization and created monetary chaos that the Federal Reserve was later created to prevent.
“the period of wildcat banking, which was a kind of step back from centralization after the second bank of the United States's charter expired. It wasn't renewed by Andrew Jackson.”
American lawmakers traveled to Europe to ask for advice on creating a central bank, and Europeans responded that it was stupid that the world's largest economy didn't have one.
“there was a process of creating this central bank. American lawmakers went over to Europe to ask for advice about how to create one. And the Europeans said, you know, just do it. I mean, it's so stupid that you, you know, you're the world's now the world's biggest economy. Why don't you have it?”
CHIPS operates a sophisticated algorithm that nets out payments between banks, matching what one bank owes another against what the second bank owes to the first and third parties, to minimize settlement obligations and maximize system efficiency.
“we'll match these payments so that if Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi is an equivalent amount to Pariba and France well then we'll cancel those two... we'll we'll match the payments from that's left over from Banku Bank of Tokyo and we'll match that against the amounts that Bank Brazil owes to JP Morgan... there's a whole process of reconciliation... Right. That's what the algorithm does. It's very sophisticated and what it does is it's basically cancelling what one bank owes another against what the other bank owes to it.”
American lawmakers initially had to travel to Europe to ask European central bankers for advice on how to create the Federal Reserve, with Europeans essentially telling them it was obvious the world's largest economy should have a central bank.
“some great stories about how in the process of creating this central bank. American lawmakers went over to Europe to ask for advice about how to create one. And the Europeans said, you know, just do it. I mean, it's so stupid that you, you know, you're the world's now the world's biggest economy. Why don't you have it?”
Paul Warburg was the most crucial figure in leading the project to create the Federal Reserve, along with Senator Aldrich and other members of Congress.
“Paul Warburg, who was really in some ways the most crucial figure, but you know, Senator Aldrich and and the other members of Congress who who were eventually responsible for for the legislation.”
The 1920s Great Depression and subsequent decade of depressed international commerce meant that regardless of which currency had structural advantages, it 'didn't matter whose currency was on top' because so little international trade was occurring.
“that period of the 20s was followed by a not so good decade in which it really didn't matter whose currency was on top because so little international commerce was going on.”
Paul Volcker, who was 6'7" tall, served as Federal Reserve chairman and crushed inflation by putting the US economy 'through the ringer' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
“I covered the Federal Reserve in the late 1970s, early 80s when Paul Volcker, the towering literally because he was 6'7, was chairman of the Fed and crushed inflation by really just putting the US economy through the ringer.”
When South Korean officials told the IMF during the Asian financial crisis that they were 'almost out of hard currency,' they meant they were running out of dollars, since dollars are the primary hard currency in international commerce.
“the South Koreans, who were at the time the 11th largest economy in the world, were out of hard currency. Of course, when we're talking about hard currency, we're really talking about primarily is dollars, right?”
The host recently completed a few episodes of Hidden Forces focused on Argentina.
“we recently did a few episodes in Argentina.”
Banks in the early US were not uniformly regulated, and merchants faced uncertainty about whether banks actually held the specie they claimed to hold.
“As time went on, then we're talking about, you know, the 19th century now. As time went on, there were questions that were logically arose, quite reasonably arose in people's minds about whether some of these banks really had the specy that they claimed they had. And in any event, you didn't know how good the regulation was of those banks and whether they would be, you know, solvent enough to be able to pay their liabilities.”
Bluestein's books are used in university courses and he has found syllabi mentioning them on the internet; he finds it gratifying when professors or students say his books helped them understand economics better than textbooks did.
“I there's nothing I like better than hearing from professors or students cuz my my books are used in a number of university courses. I've been able to go on the internet and find them, you know, the syllabi on on the internet. And there's nothing I like better than hearing from professors or students that, oh, you know, Bluestin's books were were really uh popular with the stu. They hated the textbook. But you know those books brought these subjects alive”
Bluestein studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Oxford University, and described the economics training there as extremely theoretical and highfalutin, focused on abstract concepts like equity and debt rather than stocks and bonds.
“I went to the University of Wisconsin. I was uh I'm not from Wisconsin, but uh was a pretty decent student there and then went off to Oxford University where I did a degree called philosophy, politics, and economics. And you know, the way they teach economics at Oxford, it's extremely theoretical and highful and they don't really talk about stocks and bonds. They talk about, you know, equity and debt.”
Desmond Lackman was deputy director at the IMF during the Argentine crisis and later worked at Salomon Smith Barney, and he helped the host understand the crisis when Bluestein introduced them.
“you thought it'd be better to introduce me to Desmond Lackman who was deputy director at the IMF and later at Salomon Smith Barney during the time of the the collapse of the Argentine economy and the default on its sovereign debt”
The Argentine debt default of 2001 was approximately $100 billion and was at the time the largest debt default in history.
“about the Argentine debt crisis in 2001 which was at the time and may still be the largest debt default in history. I don't know. And you had told me, you know, you hadn't written anything on Argentina in a long time. And so you thought it'd be better to introduce me to Desmond Lackman who was deputy director at the IMF and later at Salomon Smith Barney during the time of the the collapse of the Argentine economy and the default on its sovereign debt which was I believe was about hundred billion dollars or so or just under at the time.”
Bluestein chose journalism as a career partly because his friends were going to law school, and he reasoned there would be a glut of lawyers, so studying economics gave him a competitive advantage in getting hired as a journalist.
“when I finished there, I was thinking, you know, what do I want to do? Well, all my friends were going to to law school and I thought, well, I probably shouldn't do that. If everybody else is doing it, there might be a glut in the in the law business and and so I decided to try my hand at at journalism. And my dreams of being the, you know, the next Woodward and Bernstein were kind of thwarted because everyone wanted to do that at this was in the mid70s. But because I studied economics, I was able to get a job at Forbes magazine.”
Bluestein's first book was about the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, covering Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, and Brazil.
“particularly when I did my first book, my first book was about the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. the crisis that hit you know Korea, Thailand first well first Thailand then Indonesia, Korea and then later Russia and Brazil”
Hidden Forces is a podcast that does not accept advertisers or commercial sponsors, and is entirely listener-funded through subscription tiers.
“Hidden Forces is listener supported. We don't accept advertisers or commercial sponsors. The entire show is funded from top to bottom by listeners like you.”
The second hour of the Hidden Forces episode with Paul Bluestein explores crypto, CBDCs, and the risk of a cascading loss of confidence in US leadership and capital markets by foreign investors.
“Paul, I'm going to move us to the second hour where I want to wrap up this part of the conversation. I also want to talk about some other things and we talked a little bit about crypto. I want to get a little bit more specific here. Also, there's some conversations about CBDC's and things like this. And then I really want to talk about this fear or this risk of a cascading loss of confidence in Washington and the effect that that could have on the dollar on US treasuries and potentially a secular move out of US capital markets by investors.”
Paul Warburg was the most crucial figure in the creation of the Federal Reserve, along with Senator Aldrich and other members of Congress who were responsible for the legislation.
“Yes, absolutely. Paul Warberg, who was really in some ways the most crucial figure, but you know, Senator Aldrich and and the other members of Congress who who were eventually responsible for for the legislation.”
The 1920s saw little international commerce because the period was followed by a 'not so good decade' (the 1930s/Great Depression) when it didn't matter whose currency was dominant because there was so little international trade.
“But really it wasn't. Of course, as we all know, that that period of the 20s was followed by a not so good decade in which it really didn't matter whose currency was on top because so little international commerce was going on.”
Paul Volcker, as Fed chairman in the late 1970s and early 1980s, crushed inflation by putting the US economy through severe contraction, and Bluestein covered this transformation as it happened.
“I covered the Federal Reserve in the late 1970s, early 80s when Paul Vulker, the towering literally because he was 6'7, was chairman of the Fed and crushed inflation by really just putting the US economy through the ringer.”
Bluestein's book 'The Money Kept Rolling In (and Out)' about the Argentine debt crisis has been influential on the host's understanding of Argentine economic history.
“I had read and the money kept rolling in and out years earlier. This is of course a famous book you've written about the Argentine debt crisis in 2001 which was at the time and may still be the largest debt default in history.”
Bluestein worked at Forbes magazine initially, then moved to the Wall Street Journal where he covered the Federal Reserve and Federal Budget, and later moved to the Washington Post (his hometown paper) where he continued covering economics.
“they hired me under the illusion that having studied economics at Oxford, I I I might know something about how the economy and companies actually worked. And anyway, from there, I went to the Wall Street Journal and began to put some of my economics training to some practice because I was covering the the Federal Reserve and the Federal Budget and and then moved from there to the Washington Post in the late 80s. That's my hometown paper. And just continued covering economics.”
Bluestein did a podcast with David Beckworth from the Mercus Institute, and Beckworth mentioned that Bluestein's work had impacted him years ago.
“I heard another podcast recently you did with the Mercus Institute, David Beckworth, and he said the same thing and I was like, "Wow, man. That's wild." Like David and I had the same experience where you had this, you know, impact on us years ago.”
The host (Demetri Cafenas) has been corresponding with Bluestein for about 14 years, initially reaching out to him during the Fukushima nuclear facility disaster when Bluestein was living in Japan.
“This uh conversation is 14 years in the making because that's about the amount of time just short by a few days I think that you and I have been corresponding. I initially reached out to you during the uh Fukushima Dichi nuclear facility disaster and I didn't know you were living in Japan at the time”
Redemption of private bank notes required traveling to the issuing bank, which was no small matter in the 18th and 19th centuries due to transportation difficulty.
“in such a bank the classic bank of Newberg New York...So, in a sense, the bill was as good as gold. But, you know, traveling to those banks to redeem those notes was no small matter in those days.”
Paul Bluestein has been influenced by academic and journalistic coverage of Paul Volcker's role in crushing inflation in the late 1970s/early 1980s, though some of the mythology around Volcker may have been manufactured retrospectively.
“I covered the Federal Reserve in the late 1970s, early 80s when Paul Vulker, the towering literally because he was 6'7, was chairman of the Fed and crushed inflation by really just putting the US economy through the ringer.”
While people suffer in financial crises, Bluestein justifies writing about them on the grounds that informing public debate about such crises may help prevent them from happening 'quite as often,' reflecting a moral tension in crisis journalism.
“you feel sorry for the people who suffer and people really do suffer and but you just have to hope that by writing about it and informing the public debate about these things that those things won't happen quite as often. That's kind of the um the difficult line we walk, right?”
Bluestein's first book was about the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (affecting Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, and Brazil), which he now views in context of having also lived through the 2008 global financial crisis, COVID, and other subsequent crises.
“my first book was about the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. the crisis that hit you know Korea, Thailand first well first Thailand then Indonesia, Korea and then later Russia and Brazil and looking back on that now from the perspective that we have today where you know we've already been through the the global financial crisis of 2008 and and COVID and other all these other things that have happened”
Jack Berman recommended that Bluestein interview other IMF staff members including Wanda Sen and Hubert Nice to gather stories about the Asian financial crisis, helping Bluestein discover the potential for a compelling book.
“he said, "Wow." So, Mr. Borman, I mean, are there like a whole bunch of other stories like that? And he said, "Oh, yeah, let me tell you. Oh, you got to interview Wanda Sen. You got to go interview Hubert nice."”
The rise of cryptocurrency in 2019-2020 was a trigger for Bluestein's interest in writing King Dollar because it raised questions about whether alternative currencies might replace the dollar.
“because that was really when Bitcoin and the other cryptos were were having their starting to have one of their many heydays which have you know come and gone and come back now. So I thought you know this is a subject I know something about”
Bluestein found economic journalism rewarding because he enjoyed 'writing about stuff that people know is important but don't quite grasp intuitively,' and his books are used in university courses where students often preferred them to textbooks.
“I found it to be really rewarding. It's, you know, I didn't have quite the glamorous image that the White House reporters or the style section party reporters had, but um but I uh I enjoyed doing it. I enjoyed writing about stuff that people know is important but don't quite grasp intuitively. And so I was very gratified to hear what you said about how my books influenced you. I there's nothing I like better than hearing from professors or students cuz my my books are used in a number of university courses.”
Dollar dominance is important but less important than avoiding catastrophic outcomes like full-scale war with China, which would be far more consequential than losing reserve currency status.
“for all of these kinds of dire scenarios that people can come up with of the US government really stepping away from its commitments and from providing the foundations and underpinnings of dollar dominance. My answer always is well dollar dominance is important but it's not nearly as important as avoiding these dire scenarios. I mean just the other day in one of my presentations someone said well what would it take? I mean suppose we had an allout war with China. I mean after all it was the you know first and second world wars that brought down the pound and I mean my you know my view is well you know the first and second world wars were a lot more important and horrible than losing the dominance of the pound to Britain”
Demetri Cafenas has been corresponding with Paul Bluestein for approximately 14 years, beginning after the Fukushima nuclear disaster when Cafenas did not initially realize Bluestein was living in Japan.
“this conversation is 14 years in the making because that's about the amount of time just short by a few days I think that you and I have been corresponding. I initially reached out to you during the uh Fukushima Dichi nuclear facility disaster and I didn't know you were living in Japan at the time”
Bluestein chose journalism over law school in the mid-1970s because he reasoned that if everyone else was going to law school, there might be a 'glut in the law business' and he wanted to differentiate himself.
“when I finished there, I was thinking, you know, what do I want to do? Well, all my friends were going to to law school and I thought, well, I probably shouldn't do that. If everybody else is doing it, there might be a glut in the in the law business and and so I decided to try my hand at at journalism.”
Paul Bluestein became fascinated with money and finance because increasingly 'crazy stuff was happening'—particularly during the Asian financial crisis, which brought the world close to the precipice and served as a transformative moment in his career.
“the more I got into it, the more crazy stuff was happening. I think, you know, particularly when I did my first book, my first book was about the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. the crisis that hit you know Korea, Thailand first well first Thailand then Indonesia, Korea and then later Russia and Brazil and looking back on that now from the perspective that we have today where you know we've already been through the the global financial crisis of 2008 and and COVID and other all these other things that have happened but that crisis really brought the world pretty close to the precipice.”
Paul Bluestein's 2001 book 'The Money Kept Rolling In (and Out)' about the Argentine debt crisis is frequently referenced as a foundational source for understanding modern sovereign debt defaults and financial crises.
“I had read and the money kept rolling in and out years earlier. This is of course a famous book you've written about the Argentine debt crisis in 2001 which was at the time and may still be the largest debt default in history.”
Desmond Lackman served as deputy director of the IMF during the Argentine debt crisis and later worked at Salomon Smith Barney, making him a key figure for understanding the $100 billion+ default on Argentine sovereign debt.
“you hadn't written anything on Argentina in a long time. And so you thought it'd be better to introduce me to Desmond Lackman who was deputy director at the IMF and later at Salomon Smith Barney during the time of the the collapse of the Argentine economy and the default on its sovereign debt which was I believe was about hundred billion dollars or so or just under at the time.”
Bluestein worked at Forbes magazine in a role where they hired him based on his Oxford economics degree, believing he would know something about how the economy and companies actually worked.
“I was able to get a job at Forbes magazine. They they hired me under the illusion that having studied economics at Oxford, I I I might know something about how the economy and companies actually worked.”
Jack Borman, the top civil servant at the IMF (not the managing director or deputy managing director), was called away from Thanksgiving dinner on November 1997 to deal with a crisis call from the IMF mission in Seoul indicating that Korea was nearly bankrupt and out of hard currency, which catalyzed Bluestein's interest in writing about IMF crises.
“I remember going to interview a guy at the IMF. His name is Jack Borman. He's sadly no longer with us. He was sort of the top top ranking might call civil servant at the IMF. Not not the managing director and deputy managing director, but the really top guy on the staff. Uh and um he had never been very forthcoming in interviews. He was very I mean as people at the IMF are very guarded. and and uh I asked him, 'How did you know that Korea was really in trouble?' And he said, 'Oh my god, let me tell you. I was at my house, our beach house in Rahobit Beach at Delaware, and we were expecting 24 people for Thanksgiving dinner.' And this phone call came from our mission in Seoul, saying, you know, the Koreans are almost they're almost bankrupt. They're almost out of money, out of hard currency.'”
Bluestein studied philosophy, politics, and economics at Oxford University, where economics was taught theoretically and fundamentally, focusing on abstract concepts like 'equity' and 'debt' rather than practical knowledge about stocks and bonds.
“I went to the University of Wisconsin. I was uh I'm not from Wisconsin, but uh was a pretty decent student there and then went off to Oxford University where I did a degree called philosophy, politics, and economics. And you know, the way they teach economics at Oxford, it's extremely theoretical and highful and they don't really talk about stocks and bonds. They talk about, you know, equity and debt.”
Bluestein progressed from Forbes magazine to the Wall Street Journal where he covered the Federal Reserve and Federal Budget, and then to the Washington Post in the late 1980s where he continued covering economics.
“from there, I went to the Wall Street Journal and began to put some of my economics training to some practice because I was covering the the Federal Reserve and the Federal Budget and and then moved from there to the Washington Post in the late 80s. That's my hometown paper. And just continued covering economics.”
Bluestein found journalism about economics rewarding because it involved writing about subjects that people know are important but don't intuitively grasp, which is less glamorous than White House or style section reporting but more meaningful.
“I found it to be really rewarding. It's, you know, I didn't have quite the glamorous image that the White House reporters or the style section party reporters had, but um but I uh I enjoyed doing it. I enjoyed writing about stuff that people know is important but don't quite grasp intuitively.”
Cryptocurrency was the trigger for the 2019-2020 speculation about the dollar's decline because crypto was having one of its 'many heydays, which have you know come and gone and come back now'—suggesting a cyclical pattern of hype and disappointment.
“because that was really when Bitcoin and the other cryptos were were having their starting to have one of their many heydays which have you know come and gone and come back now.”
Bluestein studied at the University of Wisconsin before Oxford University, where he was 'a pretty decent student,' suggesting a solid academic foundation prior to his advanced studies at Oxford.
“I went to the University of Wisconsin. I was uh I'm not from Wisconsin, but uh was a pretty decent student there”
David Beckworth, from the Mercatus Institute, interviewed Bluestein and mentioned that his work had impacted him years ago, similar to how Bluestein's work had impacted Demetri early in his career.
“I heard another podcast recently you did with the Mercus Institute, David Beckworth, and he said the same thing and I was like, 'Wow, man. That's wild.' Like David and I had the same experience where you had this, you know, impact on us years ago.”