What this covers
Glenn Carle, a former CIA officer who spent twenty years in clandestine operations before retiring as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, examines whether the framing of Trump as a Russian asset misses the deeper strategic picture. Rather than debating Trump's formal status, Carle argues that Russia's central project—refined by Vladislav Surkov from Soviet disinformation traditions—is to dissolve Western perceptions of truth and erode social cohesion. He traces this logic through Operation RYAN, a 1983 KGB operation that produced a fictional but dangerously consequential crisis when paranoid Soviet leadership demanded confirming reports of an imminent U.S. first strike, demonstrating how authoritarian systems generate self-fulfilling delusions. The conversation moves from the mechanics of Russian active measures to America's own authoritarian drift, examining how that drift has independent domestic roots and what it means to operate as an intelligence asset across multiple simultaneous levels of conviction.
Carle distinguishes between Russia's strategy (supporting opposing factions to sow distrust rather than advance any single cause) and America's homegrown ideological movements that Russia merely exploits. He identifies two primary drivers of American authoritarianism: Grover Norquist's project to drastically shrink federal government, and the unitary executive theory enshrined in Project 2025, which traces philosophically to Carl Schmitt, the Weimar jurist who became Hitler's personal lawyer. On Russia itself, Carle examines Putin's significance not as a low-level KGB functionary but as a Russian nationalist operating from a zero-sum view of international power, and discusses the deep traditionalist opposition to democratic norms articulated by Aleksandr Dugin. The conversation encompasses European vulnerabilities, the collapse of Soviet collectivization's brutality, and the marriage of Russian intelligence services with oligarchs and organized crime. Throughout, Carle argues that whether Trump is literally a Russian asset is less important than the practical reality that he consistently acts to Russia's benefit, making the distinction between asset, fellow traveler, and manipulated individual largely immaterial.
Glenn Carle argues that Russia, guided by KGB officer Putin and strategist Vladislav Surkov, has waged a decades-long information warfare campaign to undermine Western democracy and rule of law through disinformation, exploiting existing social divisions, and that this threat has been dangerously deprioritized in U.S. policy despite being an existential challenge to American institutions.
- Russian intelligence services have more active officers in the U.S. than the CIA has worldwide, and Putin's worldview is fundamentally shaped by KGB training and zero-sum geopolitical thinking
- Surkov has systematized propaganda and postmodern disinformation into state policy, deliberately distorting perception of truth itself to paralyze Western societies
- Trump's authoritarian instincts and zero-sum worldview align with and are exploited by Russian strategic interests, whether or not he is a formal asset
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Operation RYAN illustrates how an authoritarian intelligence system that only accepts confirmation of leadership's presuppositions produces circular reporting and genuine mass delusion: in 1983 the paranoid Soviet leadership tasked the KGB to warn of an imminent US first strike, field officers fabricated confirming reports to please their masters, the leadership then took real preparatory measures, the US detected those and escalated—an entirely fictional yet dangerously real crisis.
“operation Ryan was to provide advanced warning of when America was going to launch its uh first strike nuclear attack which they believed was uh if not imminent sincerely being planned”
A falsehood repeated sufficiently becomes perceived as truth in the mind; this has been empirically shown and is the mechanism by which religious catechisms and state propaganda work, because no human has time to examine every question empirically and so accepts paradigms.
“if you hear a falsehood enough it becomes the truth in your mind... that's how religious catechisms work through uh endless repetition of phrases”
A statement repeated sufficiently becomes one's perceived reality and therefore the truth, which is empirically established and allows authoritarian states to shape perceptions even in the face of contradictory evidence like starvation or material deprivation.
“it has been empirically shown that a statement repeated sufficiently becomes one's perceived reality therefore the truth uh and that allows the state to say well if you know even though let's say Ukrainians are starving because of of collectivization I can say we're all marching towards a happier future look the sun is rising and if you repeat this endlessly you many people will believe it until the moment they expire from starvation”
British intelligence ran one of history's great operations from roughly 1936 to December 1941, manipulating the American political system to support Britain and enter WWII—including strong evidence they selected the 1940 Republican presidential candidate and fabricated the Panama map scare presented by Roosevelt—demonstrating how layered, seemingly contradictory manipulation serves a larger strategic operation.
“there's strong evidence that no one ever talks about that the British Intelligence Service selected the Republican candidate for president in 1940”
Vladislav Surkov is an overlooked seminal figure who took age-old marketing and propaganda techniques plus postmodern theater and distilled them into Russian state policy whose objective is to so distort people's perceptions that truth becomes impossible to identify, thereby empowering the state—a strategy that has reaped dramatic success over 25 years.
“Cir's uh objective is to so uh distort people's perceptions that truth becomes impossible to uh identify... and that empowers the state”
Intelligence assets should not be understood in a binary spy/not-spy way; people operate at multiple simultaneous levels of conviction, so one can sincerely be an American patriot while working to undermine the country, and intelligence services exploit a person for some purposes while undermining them for others at the same time.
“all of us operate at multiple levels of conviction and sincerity with respect to the infinite number of issues to which we react in our our lives. And so I can simultaneously be an American patriot and work to undermine my country.”
Any traditional culture confronted by a more dynamic and powerful culture faces a binary: embrace and reform, thereby losing its essence/identity, or oppose and be destroyed while remaining true to itself—and cultures that define themselves by their essence (Russia, certain readings of Islam, the American Indian against gunpowder) tend to choose opposition, preferring to lose existence rather than essence.
“the choice is I I um evolve and I I embrace uh or I oppose. If I uh reform and embrace, then I no longer am who I am.”
America's authoritarian drift is driven primarily by two domestic intellectual strains independent of Russia (which merely exploits them): Grover Norquist's project to cut the federal government by 50% and restrict it to defense and border control, and the unitary executive theory (incarnated in Project 2025) that centralizes power to overcome the inefficiency of separated powers.
“his objective is to reduce the size in absolute terms of personnel and budget of the central government, the federal government of the United States by 50%. That's the basis of the now dominant wing of the Republican party that leads to that gives us Doge.”
The flaws of Marxism, specifically centralizing economic decision-making and control, were apparent within moments of the Communist Manifesto's publication, and Russia's New Economic Policy under Lenin—reintroducing capitalist features—almost instantly reversed WWI economic losses, demonstrating the superiority of rule-of-law/market mechanisms over command economies.
“as Russia liberalized and established, you put your your finger on the central single point which is the rule of law uh rather than the rule of men or decree uh then uh efficiency will go up”
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was the greatest disinformation campaign in history and was written by the Russian intelligence service, exemplifying Russia's enduring superiority at disinformation since before the Soviet revolution.
“the protocols the electors of Zion the greatest disinformation campaign in history was the Russian intelligence service that wrote it”
Putin's significance lies not in having been a low-level KGB functionary but in being a highly intelligent Russian nationalist trained in a distinctly Russian (not uniquely KGB) view of international relations as a zero-sum game of pure power, fundamentally different from the Western norm that both sides can benefit from agreement.
“his view of international relations is the zero sum and he wants to uh retain and extend the Russian influence”
Europe—France, Britain, Germany—has been targeted by the same Russian strategy for decades, ranging from kinetic operations (multiple assassination attempts on Montenegro's prime minister, severing North Sea cables) to softer shaping of acceptable discourse via think tanks, friendship societies, and journalist associations that subtly loosen the threads binding Europe to the United States as a long-term project.
“Europe is is directly uh has been targeted for for decades in the same ways in absolutely the same ways.”
The philosophical lineage of the unitary executive theory traces to Carl Schmitt, an eminent Weimar jurist who became Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer; basing the American system of government on one of the chief thinkers of Nazism is something Carl would be wary of even if Schmitt's structural arguments were coherent.
“the the philosopher of this unitary theory of executive power... is a man named Carl Schmidt who was an eminent jurist... He was Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer.”
Whether Trump is literally a Russian asset is irrelevant—a red herring—because if he consistently acts to Russia's benefit it makes no practical difference whether he is a direct asset, a fellow traveler, or an individual being manipulated; the certain part is that he is at minimum being manipulated.
“It's irrelevant whether he is actually a a uh direct um Russian asset or if he's a fellow traveler uh or or simply an individual being manipulated. And certainly the latter is the case.”
Totalitarians have for 250 years underestimated democracies because they appear incoherent, yet democracies can marshal greater force than authoritarian states when they manage to—a pattern true until now, with China being the open question.
“totalitarians have for 250 years underestimated democracies because they're they seem incoherent. Um, and yet they can marshall when they manage to greater force uh than uh an authoritarian state.”
Russia's deeper motivation is traditionalism (articulated by Dugin): the conviction that the destabilizing rise of individual rights and democratic norms undermines authority and capital-R Rightness and must be opposed—a worldview deeply laced into deep-conservative movements across Europe and the US, and shared structurally with Islamic jihadists who likewise reject decadent Western norms.
“it gets gets us back to the roots of Vladimir Putin's thought which is frankly traditionalism which is this change destabilizes uh rise of individual rights ergo of democratic norms... undermine authority and power”
The United States faces the greatest crisis to its democracy, culture, and institutions since at least 1861—arguably the greatest in its history—because unlike the Civil War, when both sides largely affirmed the government's norms and ideals, a significant portion now explicitly and viscerally rejects those norms out of grievance, resentment, and hope.
“the United States faces the greatest crisis to our culture, society, and institutions to our democracy uh since at least 1861”
Ukraine faced 8 million deaths from Soviet collectivization policies (intentional starvation), which was so traumatic that Ukrainians were reduced to desperation and welcomed Nazi occupation as liberation—illustrating the extreme brutality of communist centralization.
“the communism did through collectivization to Ukraine was so grotesque that the Ukrainians were reduced in desperation to welcoming effing Nazis as liberators. I mean, what a choice. What a choice. Uh because 30 million of them, I think it was, uh or no, no, no, it's 8 million Ukrainians, um were were killed from uh communist policies intentionally starved to death.”
Soviet collectivization intentionally starved roughly 8 million Ukrainians to death, an atrocity so grotesque that Ukrainians were reduced to welcoming Nazis as liberators.
“8 million Ukrainians, um were were killed from uh communist policies intentionally starved to death... And intentionally so.”
Covert action and destabilization operations are profoundly sensitive and almost without exception have unintended consequences harmful to the country conducting them—destabilization should not be undertaken lightly.
“But that's a you know destabilization covert action operations are profoundly uh sensitive and problematic. Um, and almost without exception, they have unintended consequences that that are harmful to the uh country that that does them. Not not always, but almost always.”
Dividing Russia and China as separate geopolitical problems misunderstands the nature of the threat, as they leverage each other's actions—China is happy to have Russia creating headaches for the West in Central Europe and elsewhere as a way to pursue its own national interests.
“China will is quite happy to have Russia um creating headaches for the west in central Europe as one specific example. Uh and in any other way that uh they may leverage another state's interests for their own purposes, they will do so.”
Russia's turn from hybrid authoritarianism with market features (1990s-early 2000s) toward full-scale imperialist authoritarianism is accompanied by collapse in indices of personal wealth, security, and longevity, demonstrating that rule of law and market features bring concrete benefits.
“the '9s you had essentially an absence of rule of law but an absence of tyranny in Russia um and various indices such as longevity collapsed uh as the sort of you know the infrastructure of the Soviet Union collapsed. The early period of of Putin's regime could be described as hybrid authoritarianism but with strong features of a market economy and you saw indices of uh you know personal wealth and comfort rising dramatically. You saw longevity rising dramatically. It's when Russia has turned to far more I would say sort of old uh Soviet and Tsarist imperialist uh sort of policies and allout authoritarianism. you're starting to see those indices collapse again.”
The flaws of Marxist economics and centralized decision-making were apparent immediately after the Communist Manifesto was published in 1848, yet Stalin refused to liberalize despite knowing better because he prioritized personal control over human welfare—a pattern repeated in Russian history.
“the answer to Marxism was given this within moments of the publication of the communist manifesto. I mean the the the flaws of Marxism and specifically the economic model of centralizing decisionm and control are patent.”
Under Lenin's New Economic Policy, which reintroduced capitalist features alongside command economy elements, the Soviet economy reversed economic losses from WWI very rapidly, demonstrating that mixed systems can work better than pure command economies.
“under the period of NEP or new economic policy under Lenin where they reintroduced features of a capitalist system and features of a command economy, the economy almost reversed uh you know the economic losses of the first world war in a very short period instantaneous huge dynamo of uh wealth creation.”
Putin has accepted that a million casualties (2.5% of eligible male population) in Ukraine may rise to 3 million if his economy is not choked off, suggesting he has no threshold number of acceptable losses—he prioritizes holding territory and Russian influence over human welfare.
“there have been a million casualties in a population of 140 million that's 70 million males of whom probably let's say 40 million of them are eligible uh in age and conditioning and so on to serve in the military. So that's that's 2 and a half% of the the uh relevant male population of all Russia has now been destroyed killed or destroyed uh in this effort to hold on to the uh ancient Russian way in central Europe...And of course, you know, Putin probably doesn't have a threshold number uh in his mind, uh which he's prepared to waste. This could easily rise to 3 million if um if his economy is not sort of choked off”
Russia has simultaneously fostered social tensions regarding race relations in the United States while supporting both white supremacists and black civil rights leaders—the objective is not to advance either cause but to put people at odds with each other, creating distrust and grievance that makes them manipulable.
“the Russians have simultaneously u fostered um social tensions with regard to race relations in the United States. at the same time that they are supporting um white supremacists and black civil rights leaders. Well, that doesn't make any sense. Of course, it makes perfect sense because the point is not to advance black rights or white supremacy. The point is to put people at odds of each with each other to make them not understand what's happening to for them to feel tension uh distrust, grievance, uh and to be potentially more manipulatable, manipulable, whatever the word is.”
Russia has an inferiority complex alongside its civilizational opposition to the West—it envies Western technology, luxuries, and machinery while creating a narrative that it actually loathes the Western systems that produced those things, and must acquire superficial Western features while maintaining ideological opposition.
“And again they they have an inferiority complex at the same time which means that they must acquire the superficial features of those societies they envy while creating a narrative that actually they they loathe the societies that that gave rise to those things they prized the luxuries the technology the machinery”
America is profoundly democratic in nature, which frustrates Europeans who see American disorganization and contradictions as weaknesses—yet this cacophony of debate and dissent is the essence of American strength and genius.
“America's a profoundly democratic society. Um, this is the frustration of for Europeans is how can such a disorganized uh cacony uh make any sense or have any pretense to to leadership when you you know you don't dress right, you don't eat right, and you contradict authority figures and don't know what you're talking about. Um, all of which is true, but all of which is the the essence of uh the American genius and success simultaneously.”
Operation Ryan (1983) was a KGB operation based on paranoid Soviet leadership conviction that the U.S. was preparing a first-strike nuclear attack; field officers, fearing purges for contradicting the premise, sent back confirming reports rather than objective assessments, creating circular confirmation bias that terrified Soviet leadership and nearly escalated U.S.-Soviet tensions.
“in uh 1983, it was during Reagan's first uh administration, the KGB initiated and [27:27] and Reagan's talking about I forget the exact terminology. Star Wars was an issue. We're going to, you know, protect ourselves with this, you know, missile defense system and we're going to destroy the Soviet Empire there...and they initiated a uh a large operation within the KGB to understand what was going on. It's called Operation Brian...to provide advanced warning of when America was going to launch its uh first strike nuclear attack which they believed was uh if not imminent sincerely being planned.”
Russian intelligence operations target not only the United States but Europe directly and equally, including assassination attempts (e.g., Montenegrin prime minister), cable-cutting in the North Sea, and penetration of think tanks, friendship societies, and journalist associations—primarily in France but equally true for Britain and Germany.
“Europe is is directly uh has been targeted for for decades in the same ways in absolutely the same ways. Now this extends or encompasses uh the kind of operation that people would understand if they heard of it such as the the at minimum two attempts by the Russian intelligence services to assassinate the prime minister of Montenegro. to um the Russian uh operations conceivably Ukrainian but I really believe it's Russian uh to severing cables in the North Sea”
Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting US and Western interests than the CIA employed in the entire world, and this did not change after the Soviet Union collapsed.
“the Russians Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting the United States and Western interests than the CIA employed in the world”
As Russia turned away from market-economy features and rule of law toward old Soviet/Tsarist imperialist policies and all-out authoritarianism, social indices like personal wealth, security, and longevity—which had risen during the earlier liberalizing period—began to collapse again, demonstrating that approaching rule of law brings tangible benefits.
“It's when Russia has turned to far more I would say sort of old uh Soviet and Tsarist imperialist uh sort of policies and allout authoritarianism. you're starting to see those indices collapse again. Personal wealth, security, longevity.”
The Russian oligarchs, the 'Russian mafia,' and the Russian intelligence services cannot be separated: after the Soviet collapse the security state (KGB/FSB/GRU) retained the levers of power and the ruthless people willing to kill took advantage of poorly executed privatization, producing a marriage of overlapping criminal and intelligence sets that defines the Russian state, with Putin at the top of that heap.
“You one can't separate the Russian uh oligarchs, the Russian quote mafia unquote and the Russian intelligence services.”
Russia exhibits a cultural inferiority complex: it must acquire the superficial features—luxuries, technology, machinery—of the societies it envies while constructing a narrative that it loathes the very societies that produced those prized things, captured in the joke of Khrushchev ordering 'the eastern half of the western sandwich.'
“they have an inferiority complex at the same time which means that they must acquire the superficial features of those societies they envy while creating a narrative that actually they they loathe the societies”
Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting U.S. and Western interests than the CIA employed in the world, and this did not change after the Soviet Union collapsed.
“it's an easy thing to say and not revealing something that I shouldn't that the Russians Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting the United States and Western interests than the CIA employed in the world. Uh, think of that. Uh, and that didn't change when the Soviet Union collapsed”
The cheaper and more effective way to challenge the United States than building military equals (e.g., MiGs matching F-22s) is to undermine the foundations of American coherency: social cohesion, belief in democracy, belief in the rule of law, and faith in institutions—achieved by supporting opposing factions and seeding cross-purpose messaging—and this is the explicit strategy of Russian intelligence.
“better is to undermine the foundations of American coherency and and power. And that is social cohesion, belief in democracy, belief in the rule of law, faith in institutions.”
The cynicism that the international 'normative system' or rules-based order was never real is itself a triumph of Soviet and Marxist propaganda; the rules-based order is grossly imperfect but objectively real and the US has genuinely constrained itself and lost arguments by playing by rules it created.
“the normative system much derided by um the third world... is is frankly a legacy uh and triumph of Soviet and and Marxist propaganda”
Putin chose to oppose and destroy rather than reform because reform would have meant dismantling Russia's vertical of power and economic model and thereby betraying the cultural narrative that justifies that control—he had effectively lost the contest in central Europe because nothing is more powerful than an individual's desire to make his own decisions.
“the the alternative was he either loses reform forms and then all can win or he opposes and destroys and holds on and he chose of course the latter”
Russia simultaneously fosters racial tension by supporting both white supremacists and Black civil rights leaders, which seems contradictory but makes perfect sense because the objective is not to advance either cause but to put people at odds, breed distrust and grievance, and make them more manipulable—and the same simultaneous exploit-and-undermine logic applies to individuals like Trump.
“the Russians have simultaneously u fostered um social tensions with regard to race relations in the United States. at the same time that they are supporting um white supremacists and black civil rights leaders”
The unitary theory of executive power, which seeks to consolidate power in the presidency and abandon separation of powers, is literally revolutionary in American constitutional terms—though it may be coherent policy, it would fundamentally alter the American system.
“let's centralize power. And this is called the unitary theory of executive power which is we have to have to stop essentially all of this separation of powers the three co-equal branches of government and so on bring it all together in the executive so that he can act and that's quite coherent and maybe it's correct but it is also literally revolutionary in American terms.”
Russian intelligence has assassinated on the order of 49 individuals in Great Britain over the last 20 years, and oligarch money plus the daunting nature of the Russian service have led Britain to turn a blind eye to this situation for decades—a passivity Carl finds shocking given British courage and a superb intelligence service.
“the Russian intelligence service has assassinated something like 49 individuals in Great Britain in the last 20 years”
Project 2025 represents a second strain of American political thought based on conviction that American government is deliberately inefficient to prevent tyranny, but this inefficiency prevents effective foreign policy—so the solution is to centralize power in the executive and abandon separation of powers.
“the other is project 2025 which is the current incarnation of the second strain and that is the conviction that the uh American government is inefficient and it is by design by intent inefficient the explicit decision being that it is better to be inefficient to separate powers rather than allow them to concentrate because that can lead to tyranny. Um now you can say I think it's pretty clear that the a separation of powers decentralized uh federal system in many ways is less efficient than the CCP of Beijing uh or or the you know thug state of uh Vladimir Putin. They don't have to worry about the law. They can simply seize land and direct resources as they wish.”
Grover Norquist is one of the unknown influential figures of American lifetimes who has devoted his life to changing American government by reducing the size of the federal government by 50% in absolute terms of personnel and budget, with the belief that government's only functions are military and border control.
“one of my classmates in college at Harvard 50 years ago...Grover Norquist...has devoted his life...he's devoted his life to uh changing the American government in in two ways one he thinks that government only the national government of the United States only has two functions literally two national defense that me means the military and border control that's it and otherwise his objective is to reduce the size in absolute terms of personnel and budget of the central government, the federal government of the United States by 50%.”
Dostoyevsky visited Victorian London and was both awed and horrified by its industrial mechanism and advancement; his reaction exemplified Russian traditionalist rejection of Western modernity—'we cannot copy this, we have to tear it down.'
“which is called um which is winter winter notes on summer impressions when he visited London. Can you imagine V Victorian London with the great exhibition and these huge advancements of technology and a lot of the suburbs recently built you know shiny brick streets etc. He was both aed and horrified by this industrial mechanism. And again, I think what you've said there, his reaction was one, we cannot copy this, two, we have to tear it down.”
Democratic systems have been underestimated by totalitarians for 250 years because they appear incoherent, yet democracies have been able to marshal greater force than authoritarian states when they manage to act coherently—though the outcome against China is uncertain.
“totalitarians have for 250 years underestimated democracies because they're they seem incoherent. Um, and yet they can marshall when they manage to greater force uh than uh an authoritarian state. That's been true up until now. We'll see if that's true with regard to China.”
For the United States to divert its attention away from Russia is not merely an error but an existential blunder, because one should be able to focus on more than one threat at a time and China being the top priority does not justify diminishing focus on Russia.
“for the west, for the United States in particular to uh divert its eye uh and attention from Russia is an error. It's a huge error... it's even an existential blunder”
The U.S. is not engaging in equivalent black propaganda operations against Russia despite having capacity to do so; the U.S. could be doing much more to destabilize the Russian regime and Russian-aligned actors like Belarus.
“That's why the Russians uh refer to us, the propagandists often refer to us as the main bastards. Um but I only wish we lived up to that uh history now. Um we do not seem to be really engaging in in in blackformational ops with Russia. we could be doing so much more to destabilize their regime. We seem not to be doing that in Russia or Belarus.”
40% of the American public has consistently shown in polls that they consider democracy irrelevant and prefer efficiency and someone who can get things done (authoritarianism) over democratic processes.
“the polls have shown for years and years that 40% of the American public um, considers democracy irrelevant uh, and prefers to have quote efficiency and someone who can get things done and authoritarian.”
Trump is almost the archetype of the totalitarian personality: for him life is zero-sum and about power and himself, the rule of law is good only insofar as it supports what he wants, and he embodies impulses of grievance and resentment that surged for decades before his rise—'the man has met the moment.'
“It's all irrelevant. It's all life is zero sum. Life is about power and life is about him.”
Polls have shown for years that about 40% of the American public considers democracy irrelevant and prefers efficiency and an authoritarian who can get things done, indicating the country is at least heading toward quasi-authoritarianism.
“the polls have shown for years and years that 40% of the American public um, considers democracy irrelevant uh, and prefers to have quote efficiency and someone who can get things done and authoritarian”
While the U.S. shifted strategic focus from Russia to China as the primary peer competitor (a strategically rational shift), this does not necessitate deprioritizing Russia entirely, as Russia continues to pose an existential threat through intelligence operations and state capture.
“I certainly agree with the overall strategic shift of the United States over a period of 25 35 years really really 25 uh to 30 years uh from uh having the Soviet Union uh as the number one priority to having China and and that's you know all the data shows that that really there's only one peer competitor of the United States and that is China... So strategically in in the macro sense that's that is all sensible and I agree with those changes... that said... for the west, for the United States in particular to uh divert its eye uh and attention from Russia is an error. It's a huge error... one should be able to do more than one thing at a time. So while I agree that we need to have as our one number one priority China, that doesn't mean we diminish our focus actually on Russia either. We'll come back to Putin... it's it's even an existential blunder.”
This Russian strategy is explicit and is the deliberate strategy of Russian intelligence services and the Russian government, and has been continuous since the Russian Revolution, with Russian intelligence services being the best at it—the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was a Russian intelligence operation and the greatest disinformation campaign in history.
“that is the explicit uh strategy of Russian intelligence services the Russian government and has been uh the Russians are the best at this and have been since the Soviet revolution and even before uh because the protocols the electors of Zion the greatest disinformation campaign in history was the Russian intelligence service that wrote it.”
The British intelligence service had one of the greatest successes in intelligence history from 1936-1941 by manipulating the American political system to support Britain and enter WWII, including selecting the Republican presidential candidate to ensure pro-British alignment.
“the British Intelligence Service to me um had one of the great successes in in intelligence history in uh 19 let's say from 1930 certainly from 36 uh to 19 December 7 1941 uh in manipulating the American political system to support Great Britain and to enter the war to the point that um it there's strong evidence that no one ever talks about that the British Intelligence Service selected the Republican candidate for president in 1940 so that he would be in supportive of America supporting the Great Britain and entering the war”
President Roosevelt's 1940 press conference showing a map of Nazi operations in Panama and Colombia was in part based on British intelligence-generated disinformation designed to convince the American public of Nazi threat and necessity of U.S. entry into the war.
“President Roosevelt himself gave a press conference and he showed a famous map of here's where we have found the Russ the German operations in Panama and Colombia and they've some of which was true. Some of which was true. But the m all of this was an explicit British intelligence operation to convince Roosevelt and the American public that the Nazis had to be opposed because it harmed American interests...and Roosevelt never knew that this was this was the uh the British intelligence service who jinned the entire thing up.”
Trump is the archetype of totalitarian personality—he sees all life as zero-sum, about power and himself; he is sincere about wanting America to succeed because it's where he's from, but his definition of success is centered on his own power and attention.
“It's all irrelevant. It's all life is zero sum. Life is about power and life is about him. Um he loves his country because that's where the country he's from. So he likes wrestling and Madison Square Garden and baseball and you know he he's an American. So he will try to do things that he thinks are good for America. But what's good for America is what makes him think that he's um received praise or is the center of attention or or makes the decisions he has the power.”
The Western normative system based on rule of law, democratic norms, and international institutions constrains Western behavior in ways that do not constrain Russia or China, which pursue national interests without such normative constraints—and this is a substantive advantage of the West that is widely derided as propaganda.
“the normative system does except on issues of vital existential national security interests as perceived by uh American leaders or other leaders that that uh northern assistant does uh shape the behavior and constrain the behavior of regulate let's say the behavior of western nations in a way that is not the case for Russia or China.”
The United States has constrained itself and allowed itself to lose various arguments an infinite number of times, playing by rules it took the primary lead in creating, resulting in outcomes that adhere to general welfare rather than solely to American hegemon interests—this is empirically demonstrable in infant mortality, women's rights, contract respect, and opportunities for non-American entities to thrive.
“you compare uh the actions of the United States um from those of other uh hedgemons in human history and the United States has constrained itself and has allowed itself to uh to lose various arguments an infinite number of times and does play by rules that uh it took the primary lead in in uh standing up and creating. Uh but then the results uh are just uh stunning in uh in how that system uh aduces to general welfare rather than solely to the welfare of the hedgeimont of the United States. Um you look at infant mortality and uh women's rights and uh contractual uh respect for contracts and opportunities for non-American non-hgeimon entities whether it's Airbus or Bata in India or um or Ibrahim's vegetable stand in Marrakesh to thrive in ways that have ever happened in human history.”
The unitary theory of executive power originates from Carl Schmitt, Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer in Weimar Germany, who wrote legal justifications for Nazi rule—though his constitutional theory may be coherent, basing American government on his philosophy is deeply troubling.
“the philosopher of this unitary theory of executive power. Just like we look to Marx and Lenon and Mao as the fathers of communism, not Steve Bannon or Roger Stone, they're just Steve Bannon is a disciple. Steve is a disciple. It's a man named Carl Schmidt who was an eminent jurist. And where was he an eminent jurist? He was Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer. And you know he was a highly respected and well regarded you know brilliant uh lawyer and thinker in then still Vhimar Germany although he was one of the one of the masters of its destruction uh and he justified no he was the one who wrote the brief for Christ and on and on and on and you can say well the fact that he did that doesn't dis you know undermine the coherency and the necessity and the rightness of his philosophy on governmental structures. Well, possibly. I personally would be wary of basing the American system of government on one of the chief thinkers of Nazism, but that's where it comes from.”
Norquist's 50% government reduction objective is the basis of the now dominant wing of the Republican Party that leads to DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency).
“That's the basis of the now dominant wing of the Republican party that leads to that gives us Doge.”
The core conflict in Ukraine is not NATO encroachment but Putin's determination as a Russian nationalist to prevent the 'near abroad' (Ukraine) from wholeheartedly turning to Western norms—individual rights, rule of law, open society, and challenge to authority—because that turn is antithetical to Russia's history.
“the fundamental issue of in Ukraine is uh Putin's determination because he's a Russian nationalist... the clash between uh Ukraine's definitive clear... turn... to the west to western norms wholeheartedly”
The United States faces the greatest crisis to its culture, society, institutions, and democracy since 1861 (the Civil War)—and potentially the greatest in its entire history, because unlike the Civil War where both sides defended the norms and ideals of American democracy, now those norms are being rejected by a significant portion of the population.
“that the United States faces the greatest crisis to our culture, society, and institutions to our democracy uh since at least 1861 when most will know the American Union split in two and we had a hideous civil war for 4 years and I argue actually the greatest crisis in our history. Why? Because even during our civil war, the government uh and its norms, its ideals were largely supported and the point of the war was for half of them to uh affirm them. Uh and now all of those norms and structures are being rejected by a significant portion.”
The fundamental dilemma for any culture confronted by a more dynamic, powerful culture is choosing between evolution/embrace or opposition/destruction—if a culture embraces, it loses itself; if it opposes, it will be destroyed—but opposition at least preserves identity before losing existence.
“The option the the choice is I I um evolve and I I embrace uh or I oppose. If I uh reform and embrace, then I no longer am who I am. And because by definition I have the truth, the great Russian soul...So if we don't if we don't uh remain true to that, we are betraying who we are and and and the whole point of existence.”
The fundamental conflict in Ukraine since 2014 is not NATO encroachment but rather a clash between Russia's vertically-integrated, nepotistic, corrupt command system and Ukraine's shift toward decentralized Western norms—a civilizational choice, not a geopolitical one.
“the struggle actually can be characterized not as NATO encroachment which of course again is the favorite argument of realist geopolitics politicians analysts and vatnik and others um and and and those who have a sort of a loathing of their own uh western societies. But actually it's it's that struggle between a sort of command economy uh highly verticalized uh nepotistic and corrupt um system which of course is the Russian system with a massively decentralized or or elements of massive decentralization um uh which is which is Ukraine in 2014”
Russian intelligence has assassinated approximately 49 individuals in Great Britain in the last 20 years, with the number likely increased; oligarch money has deeply influenced British financial system and policy while the British government turned a blind eye for decades despite knowing about Russian assassinations.
“What has alarmed me is and and I can't prove this and I've been out of the service for years and and even if I had uh classified information, of course, I couldn't share it. But um I believe that the Russian intelligence service has assassinated something like 49 individuals in Great Britain in the last 20 years. I think the numbers will have gone up. uh and the uh amount of of oligarch money uh is not definitive for uh the city for uh you know London's financial center but deeply influential uh on the British political system and policies and it appears that the money is so um helpful...that uh the British have uh in a number of ways turned a blind eye for decades to this uh situation.”
Roughly 2.5% of Russia's relevant military-eligible male population (around a million casualties out of an estimated 40 million eligible men) has been killed or destroyed in the war, and Putin likely has no fixed casualty threshold, so losses could rise to 3 million unless his economy is choked off.
“there have been a million casualties in a population of 140 million... so that's that's 2 and a half% of the the uh relevant male population of all Russia has now been destroyed”
Vladislav Surkov is an overlooked but pivotal figure in 21st-century geopolitics; he combined marketing and propaganda techniques with postmodern philosophy to distort people's perceptions of truth itself, making it impossible to identify reality—this has been systematized into Russian state policy and explains current global chaos.
“I rather suspect that uh he hasn't gone into retirement, but decided to take a slightly lower profile. fascinated to hear what you think. You name Gre or what his function is is is actually I think now irrelevant because his approach has been so profoundly incorporated into the foreign policy and the intelligence policy and the governmental policy and the specific paradigm and approach of of um Vladimir Putin that you know whether he's alive or dead is now secondary.”
Steve Bannon and others advocating unitary executive power are disciples of Carl Schmitt—they are not originators but followers of Schmitt's constitutional theory, just as communism looks to Marx and Lenin, not contemporary communists.
“Just like we look to Marx and Lenon and Mao as the fathers of communism, not Steve Bannon or Roger Stone, they're just Steve Bannon is a disciple.”
Traditionalism is profoundly laced into deep conservative movements throughout Europe and the United States, and it unites seemingly disparate actors—the French right (following Alain de Benoist), Islamic jihadists, and European far-right movements—all sharing opposition to Western norms and individual rights.
“This is what dosayes writes about and to this is the soul of Russia to oppose the the perverse west and modernism and uh it's profoundly laced into the deep conservative movements uh throughout Europe and the United States. The the French right bases itself upon a thinker named Hane Gon. He's a traditionalist. He deres his basis of his thought in his opposition to the west. Islamic jihadists are the same. In fact, the the far right in Europe has profound associations with jihadist Islam because both of them reject Western norms which are decadent”
Putin operates within a system of perverse incentives that rewards confirmation of leadership assumptions rather than objective assessment, similar to Operation Ryan—this systemic distortion of reality is the world Putin inhabits and makes his decision-making process fundamentally delusional.
“And so this is the world in which uh Putin operates and and anyone who's spoken to a Russian or frankly you could say the same thing about an American except our our uh delusions tend to be more benign unless you're an Iraqi you know say um uh or unless you consider January the sixth which is we'll come to that in a minute because it seems our delusions are becoming more toxic.”
In intelligence work, individuals and assets can be simultaneously patriotic and treasonous, believing multiple contradictory things at once; the binary notion of 'spy or not spy' is naive—people work across purposes simultaneously and this is how intelligence operations actually function.
“Um it one imagines the the average layman will imagine okay one's a spy one's not a spy but that's not really how it works. Sometimes it does sometimes I could say um Mr. Fink will you spy for the United States and you say oh yes and I say okay we'll sign right here and now you're a spy. Okay, that happens. Um, more often all of us are contradictory and all of us operate at multiple levels of conviction and sincerity with respect to the infinite number of issues to which we react in our our lives. And so I can simultaneously be an American patriot and work to undermine my country.”
The threat to American democracy comes not from Trump being an explicit Russian asset, but from his functioning as a fellow-traveler or tool of Russian interests while simultaneously pursuing a coherent (if authoritarian) American political project.
“Absolutely. That's the critical point. I'm glad you said it. We are two two times of a tuning fork. It's irrelevant whether he is actually a a uh direct um Russian asset or if he's a fellow traveler uh or or simply an individual being manipulated. And certainly the latter is the case. The former two definitions I think have been in various degrees.”
Putin's core motivation is Russian nationalism and belief in greater Russia; he is determined to prevent Ukraine and the near abroad from adopting Western norms because this would undermine the Russian model and force him to reform or lose power.
“the fundamental issue of in Ukraine is uh Putin's determination because he's a Russian nationalist and he believes in, you know, greater great Russia. uh is uh the clash between uh Ukraine's definitive clear but this only in the last or 2025 only in the last 20 years perhaps you you would know better than I I think um turn and uh to the west to western norms wholeheartedly to western norms and desire to have individual rights uh rule of law uh open society to challenge authority uh as a basis of truth be it at an individual level or up to the level of state power. Uh all of which is antithetical to Russia's history.”
The authoritarian toolkit for state capture—involving destabilization of democratic norms, erosion of rule of law, control of oligarchs and security forces, and information warfare—has been developed and systematized, and this toolkit is now being utilized in the United States by those with authoritarian inclinations.
“Without question. Absolutely. I I I tried to just say say that is occurring. Let's use uh like all American intelligence officers, I was focused on u on terrorism for many years. that became my my thing more than than the Russians became a terrorist person. But let's take some terminology from our good friend um Osama bin Laden. Actually, it was one of his mentors, but no matter uh and so the United States is the head of the snake or the great Satan or both. But there are little Satans and there are other snakes or the body of the snake.”
The man and the moment have met: Trump's personal psychological makeup aligns with long-building authoritarian impulses within American society, creating a convergence of individual pathology and historical currents.
“So I have been saying and the man has met the moment or the moment has found the man. uh because these impulses and and and perceptions and desires and resentments have been surging uh for decades prior to his rise to actual national power.”
Putin is a classic KGB officer shaped by Russian nationalist ideology and zero-sum international relations thinking, not an outlier—his behavior reflects Russian strategic culture where law has always been a pretense for power rather than a regulator of society.
“he's a Russian nationalist. He's a Russian patriot. uh he uh is a KGB officer. Uh Russian culture is because it realizes the law has always been a pretense or a shroud to over uh power rather than uh the regulator of society and of power. Uh so that makes him a classic Russian, highly intelligent and trained in in uh a particular view which I don't think is unique to the KGB. I think it's a Russian one of international relations which is cynical and that uh uh one morals are a fool's uh design uh and norms are a fool's design. It's it's all pure exercise of power in a zero sum game.”
The ultimate strategic objective of Russian operations is the deconstruction of the United States as a superpower, and this is an explicit goal—though it is also true that some deconstruction efforts (like DOGE and small-government conservatism) come from sincere domestic ideological movements, not Russian origin.
“the the ultra ultimate strategic strategic objective is the deconstruction of a superpower. As I've said, that's absolutely true. It it's not true. So it so it is true that that the Russians say my counterpart would say oh what a good idea it would be to to um support and uh isolationists in the United States for example or little government advocates that that aduces to Russian national you know helps Russian national interest but the people who are isolationists or little government conservatives are completely sincere and and are completely patriotic”
Russia would not support executive-power concentration in the U.S. (unlike small-government conservatism which it benefits from), because a strong centralized American executive would be less vulnerable to Russian manipulation than a weakened, fragmented government.
“Those are those are separate profound and critical strains in what's happening in America and frankly in the west. And that at the same time it's not only America that's going insane. Um and the other is project 2025...not so much the uh the Carl Schmidt centralizing of power. they wouldn't like that so much.”
Dostoyevsky's 'Notes from Underground' depicts a character rebelling against rationality for no other reason than he can and to his own detriment—this captures the essence of Russian traditionalist opposition to Western rationality and modernism: willingness to self-destruct rather than accept Western dominance.
“they won't really talk about um uh Zapiski's PIA the the underground man which is the person who rebelss against rationality for no other reason other than he can and to his own personal detriment.”
The Ukrainian journalist Vitaly Pikov refers to Russia as 'Hezbollah of the snow'—a metaphor capturing Russia's role as an authoritarian proxy fighting the Western order through asymmetric means, validating Carle's argument that traditionalist opposition unites Russia with jihadism.
“When I talk about this, people think that I'm some sort of a loon cuz how can you bring Osama bin Laden, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump together coherently? But well, the Ukrainian journalist Vitalipikov refers to Russia as Hezbollah of the snow. So this is uh this is a thought that's occurred to other people.”
Americans refer to the British as 'the main bastards' due to their skill at propaganda and disinformation, and Glenn wishes Americans lived up to that history—the U.S. should engage in more black propaganda and destabilization operations against Russia.
“that's why the Russians uh refer to us, the propagandists often refer to us as the main bastards. Um but I only wish we lived up to that uh history now. Um we do not seem to be really engaging in in in blackformational ops with Russia. we could be doing so much more to destabilize their regime.”
Carle wakes up literally sick to his stomach about the state of American institutions and democracy, illustrating the depth of his concern about the current crisis.
“So I'm I'm profoundly cons I wake up uh sick to my stomach literally.”
Getting out an episode a day plus running live events in Ukraine and elsewhere is difficult and is made possible by patrons and supporters.
“It's not easy getting an episode out a day, plus all the live events we've been putting on in Ukraine”
There is no 'greatest' of anything—no single most beautiful woman or single greatest intelligence operation—because such superlatives are conceptually empty given infinite instances.
“what's the greatest of anything? There's no greatest of anything... what a stupid thing. You know, there are infinite number of beautiful women in the world.”