What this covers
Glenn Carle, a former CIA officer who spent twenty years in clandestine operations before retiring as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, examines whether the framing of Trump as a Russian asset misses the deeper strategic picture. Rather than debating Trump's formal status, Carle argues that Russia's central project—refined by Vladislav Surkov from Soviet disinformation traditions—is to dissolve Western perceptions of truth and erode social cohesion. He traces this logic through Operation RYAN, a 1983 KGB operation that produced a fictional but dangerously consequential crisis when paranoid Soviet leadership demanded confirming reports of an imminent U.S. first strike, demonstrating how authoritarian systems generate self-fulfilling delusions. The conversation moves from the mechanics of Russian active measures to America's own authoritarian drift, examining how that drift has independent domestic roots and what it means to operate as an intelligence asset across multiple simultaneous levels of conviction.
Carle distinguishes between Russia's strategy (supporting opposing factions to sow distrust rather than advance any single cause) and America's homegrown ideological movements that Russia merely exploits. He identifies two primary drivers of American authoritarianism: Grover Norquist's project to drastically shrink federal government, and the unitary executive theory enshrined in Project 2025, which traces philosophically to Carl Schmitt, the Weimar jurist who became Hitler's personal lawyer. On Russia itself, Carle examines Putin's significance not as a low-level KGB functionary but as a Russian nationalist operating from a zero-sum view of international power, and discusses the deep traditionalist opposition to democratic norms articulated by Aleksandr Dugin. The conversation encompasses European vulnerabilities, the collapse of Soviet collectivization's brutality, and the marriage of Russian intelligence services with oligarchs and organized crime. Throughout, Carle argues that whether Trump is literally a Russian asset is less important than the practical reality that he consistently acts to Russia's benefit, making the distinction between asset, fellow traveler, and manipulated individual largely immaterial.
Carl argues that Russia's central strategic project—refined by Vladislav Surkov from Soviet disinformation traditions—is to dissolve the West's perception of truth and social cohesion, and that America's current authoritarian drift (Trump, Doge, unitary executive theory) is partly a sincere domestic ideological movement that Russia merely exploits, making the 'is Trump a spy' question a red herring.
- Russian intelligence supports opposing factions simultaneously to sow distrust rather than advance any cause, because the goal is to make truth unidentifiable and erode social cohesion
- America's authoritarian drift has independent domestic roots (Norquist's anti-government movement, Carl Schmitt's unitary executive theory via Project 2025) that Russia exploits but did not originate
- Whether Trump is a formal Russian asset is irrelevant because intelligence work operates across multiple simultaneous levels of conviction and a person can sincerely serve their country while being a tool of a foreign power
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Operation RYAN illustrates how an authoritarian intelligence system that only accepts confirmation of leadership's presuppositions produces circular reporting and genuine mass delusion: in 1983 the paranoid Soviet leadership tasked the KGB to warn of an imminent US first strike, field officers fabricated confirming reports to please their masters, the leadership then took real preparatory measures, the US detected those and escalated—an entirely fictional yet dangerously real crisis.
“operation Ryan was to provide advanced warning of when America was going to launch its uh first strike nuclear attack which they believed was uh if not imminent sincerely being planned”
A falsehood repeated sufficiently becomes perceived as truth in the mind; this has been empirically shown and is the mechanism by which religious catechisms and state propaganda work, because no human has time to examine every question empirically and so accepts paradigms.
“if you hear a falsehood enough it becomes the truth in your mind... that's how religious catechisms work through uh endless repetition of phrases”
British intelligence ran one of history's great operations from roughly 1936 to December 1941, manipulating the American political system to support Britain and enter WWII—including strong evidence they selected the 1940 Republican presidential candidate and fabricated the Panama map scare presented by Roosevelt—demonstrating how layered, seemingly contradictory manipulation serves a larger strategic operation.
“there's strong evidence that no one ever talks about that the British Intelligence Service selected the Republican candidate for president in 1940”
Vladislav Surkov is an overlooked seminal figure who took age-old marketing and propaganda techniques plus postmodern theater and distilled them into Russian state policy whose objective is to so distort people's perceptions that truth becomes impossible to identify, thereby empowering the state—a strategy that has reaped dramatic success over 25 years.
“Cir's uh objective is to so uh distort people's perceptions that truth becomes impossible to uh identify... and that empowers the state”
Intelligence assets should not be understood in a binary spy/not-spy way; people operate at multiple simultaneous levels of conviction, so one can sincerely be an American patriot while working to undermine the country, and intelligence services exploit a person for some purposes while undermining them for others at the same time.
“all of us operate at multiple levels of conviction and sincerity with respect to the infinite number of issues to which we react in our our lives. And so I can simultaneously be an American patriot and work to undermine my country.”
Any traditional culture confronted by a more dynamic and powerful culture faces a binary: embrace and reform, thereby losing its essence/identity, or oppose and be destroyed while remaining true to itself—and cultures that define themselves by their essence (Russia, certain readings of Islam, the American Indian against gunpowder) tend to choose opposition, preferring to lose existence rather than essence.
“the choice is I I um evolve and I I embrace uh or I oppose. If I uh reform and embrace, then I no longer am who I am.”
America's authoritarian drift is driven primarily by two domestic intellectual strains independent of Russia (which merely exploits them): Grover Norquist's project to cut the federal government by 50% and restrict it to defense and border control, and the unitary executive theory (incarnated in Project 2025) that centralizes power to overcome the inefficiency of separated powers.
“his objective is to reduce the size in absolute terms of personnel and budget of the central government, the federal government of the United States by 50%. That's the basis of the now dominant wing of the Republican party that leads to that gives us Doge.”
The flaws of Marxism, specifically centralizing economic decision-making and control, were apparent within moments of the Communist Manifesto's publication, and Russia's New Economic Policy under Lenin—reintroducing capitalist features—almost instantly reversed WWI economic losses, demonstrating the superiority of rule-of-law/market mechanisms over command economies.
“as Russia liberalized and established, you put your your finger on the central single point which is the rule of law uh rather than the rule of men or decree uh then uh efficiency will go up”
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was the greatest disinformation campaign in history and was written by the Russian intelligence service, exemplifying Russia's enduring superiority at disinformation since before the Soviet revolution.
“the protocols the electors of Zion the greatest disinformation campaign in history was the Russian intelligence service that wrote it”
Putin's significance lies not in having been a low-level KGB functionary but in being a highly intelligent Russian nationalist trained in a distinctly Russian (not uniquely KGB) view of international relations as a zero-sum game of pure power, fundamentally different from the Western norm that both sides can benefit from agreement.
“his view of international relations is the zero sum and he wants to uh retain and extend the Russian influence”
Europe—France, Britain, Germany—has been targeted by the same Russian strategy for decades, ranging from kinetic operations (multiple assassination attempts on Montenegro's prime minister, severing North Sea cables) to softer shaping of acceptable discourse via think tanks, friendship societies, and journalist associations that subtly loosen the threads binding Europe to the United States as a long-term project.
“Europe is is directly uh has been targeted for for decades in the same ways in absolutely the same ways.”
The philosophical lineage of the unitary executive theory traces to Carl Schmitt, an eminent Weimar jurist who became Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer; basing the American system of government on one of the chief thinkers of Nazism is something Carl would be wary of even if Schmitt's structural arguments were coherent.
“the the philosopher of this unitary theory of executive power... is a man named Carl Schmidt who was an eminent jurist... He was Adolf Hitler's personal lawyer.”
Whether Trump is literally a Russian asset is irrelevant—a red herring—because if he consistently acts to Russia's benefit it makes no practical difference whether he is a direct asset, a fellow traveler, or an individual being manipulated; the certain part is that he is at minimum being manipulated.
“It's irrelevant whether he is actually a a uh direct um Russian asset or if he's a fellow traveler uh or or simply an individual being manipulated. And certainly the latter is the case.”
Totalitarians have for 250 years underestimated democracies because they appear incoherent, yet democracies can marshal greater force than authoritarian states when they manage to—a pattern true until now, with China being the open question.
“totalitarians have for 250 years underestimated democracies because they're they seem incoherent. Um, and yet they can marshall when they manage to greater force uh than uh an authoritarian state.”
Russia's deeper motivation is traditionalism (articulated by Dugin): the conviction that the destabilizing rise of individual rights and democratic norms undermines authority and capital-R Rightness and must be opposed—a worldview deeply laced into deep-conservative movements across Europe and the US, and shared structurally with Islamic jihadists who likewise reject decadent Western norms.
“it gets gets us back to the roots of Vladimir Putin's thought which is frankly traditionalism which is this change destabilizes uh rise of individual rights ergo of democratic norms... undermine authority and power”
The United States faces the greatest crisis to its democracy, culture, and institutions since at least 1861—arguably the greatest in its history—because unlike the Civil War, when both sides largely affirmed the government's norms and ideals, a significant portion now explicitly and viscerally rejects those norms out of grievance, resentment, and hope.
“the United States faces the greatest crisis to our culture, society, and institutions to our democracy uh since at least 1861”
Soviet collectivization intentionally starved roughly 8 million Ukrainians to death, an atrocity so grotesque that Ukrainians were reduced to welcoming Nazis as liberators.
“8 million Ukrainians, um were were killed from uh communist policies intentionally starved to death... And intentionally so.”
Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting US and Western interests than the CIA employed in the entire world, and this did not change after the Soviet Union collapsed.
“the Russians Russian intelligence services had more officers active and residing in the United States targeting the United States and Western interests than the CIA employed in the world”
As Russia turned away from market-economy features and rule of law toward old Soviet/Tsarist imperialist policies and all-out authoritarianism, social indices like personal wealth, security, and longevity—which had risen during the earlier liberalizing period—began to collapse again, demonstrating that approaching rule of law brings tangible benefits.
“It's when Russia has turned to far more I would say sort of old uh Soviet and Tsarist imperialist uh sort of policies and allout authoritarianism. you're starting to see those indices collapse again. Personal wealth, security, longevity.”
The Russian oligarchs, the 'Russian mafia,' and the Russian intelligence services cannot be separated: after the Soviet collapse the security state (KGB/FSB/GRU) retained the levers of power and the ruthless people willing to kill took advantage of poorly executed privatization, producing a marriage of overlapping criminal and intelligence sets that defines the Russian state, with Putin at the top of that heap.
“You one can't separate the Russian uh oligarchs, the Russian quote mafia unquote and the Russian intelligence services.”
Russia exhibits a cultural inferiority complex: it must acquire the superficial features—luxuries, technology, machinery—of the societies it envies while constructing a narrative that it loathes the very societies that produced those prized things, captured in the joke of Khrushchev ordering 'the eastern half of the western sandwich.'
“they have an inferiority complex at the same time which means that they must acquire the superficial features of those societies they envy while creating a narrative that actually they they loathe the societies”
The cheaper and more effective way to challenge the United States than building military equals (e.g., MiGs matching F-22s) is to undermine the foundations of American coherency: social cohesion, belief in democracy, belief in the rule of law, and faith in institutions—achieved by supporting opposing factions and seeding cross-purpose messaging—and this is the explicit strategy of Russian intelligence.
“better is to undermine the foundations of American coherency and and power. And that is social cohesion, belief in democracy, belief in the rule of law, faith in institutions.”
The cynicism that the international 'normative system' or rules-based order was never real is itself a triumph of Soviet and Marxist propaganda; the rules-based order is grossly imperfect but objectively real and the US has genuinely constrained itself and lost arguments by playing by rules it created.
“the normative system much derided by um the third world... is is frankly a legacy uh and triumph of Soviet and and Marxist propaganda”
Putin chose to oppose and destroy rather than reform because reform would have meant dismantling Russia's vertical of power and economic model and thereby betraying the cultural narrative that justifies that control—he had effectively lost the contest in central Europe because nothing is more powerful than an individual's desire to make his own decisions.
“the the alternative was he either loses reform forms and then all can win or he opposes and destroys and holds on and he chose of course the latter”
Russia simultaneously fosters racial tension by supporting both white supremacists and Black civil rights leaders, which seems contradictory but makes perfect sense because the objective is not to advance either cause but to put people at odds, breed distrust and grievance, and make them more manipulable—and the same simultaneous exploit-and-undermine logic applies to individuals like Trump.
“the Russians have simultaneously u fostered um social tensions with regard to race relations in the United States. at the same time that they are supporting um white supremacists and black civil rights leaders”
Russian intelligence has assassinated on the order of 49 individuals in Great Britain over the last 20 years, and oligarch money plus the daunting nature of the Russian service have led Britain to turn a blind eye to this situation for decades—a passivity Carl finds shocking given British courage and a superb intelligence service.
“the Russian intelligence service has assassinated something like 49 individuals in Great Britain in the last 20 years”
For the United States to divert its attention away from Russia is not merely an error but an existential blunder, because one should be able to focus on more than one threat at a time and China being the top priority does not justify diminishing focus on Russia.
“for the west, for the United States in particular to uh divert its eye uh and attention from Russia is an error. It's a huge error... it's even an existential blunder”
Trump is almost the archetype of the totalitarian personality: for him life is zero-sum and about power and himself, the rule of law is good only insofar as it supports what he wants, and he embodies impulses of grievance and resentment that surged for decades before his rise—'the man has met the moment.'
“It's all irrelevant. It's all life is zero sum. Life is about power and life is about him.”
Polls have shown for years that about 40% of the American public considers democracy irrelevant and prefers efficiency and an authoritarian who can get things done, indicating the country is at least heading toward quasi-authoritarianism.
“the polls have shown for years and years that 40% of the American public um, considers democracy irrelevant uh, and prefers to have quote efficiency and someone who can get things done and authoritarian”
The core conflict in Ukraine is not NATO encroachment but Putin's determination as a Russian nationalist to prevent the 'near abroad' (Ukraine) from wholeheartedly turning to Western norms—individual rights, rule of law, open society, and challenge to authority—because that turn is antithetical to Russia's history.
“the fundamental issue of in Ukraine is uh Putin's determination because he's a Russian nationalist... the clash between uh Ukraine's definitive clear... turn... to the west to western norms wholeheartedly”
Roughly 2.5% of Russia's relevant military-eligible male population (around a million casualties out of an estimated 40 million eligible men) has been killed or destroyed in the war, and Putin likely has no fixed casualty threshold, so losses could rise to 3 million unless his economy is choked off.
“there have been a million casualties in a population of 140 million... so that's that's 2 and a half% of the the uh relevant male population of all Russia has now been destroyed”
Getting out an episode a day plus running live events in Ukraine and elsewhere is difficult and is made possible by patrons and supporters.
“It's not easy getting an episode out a day, plus all the live events we've been putting on in Ukraine”
There is no 'greatest' of anything—no single most beautiful woman or single greatest intelligence operation—because such superlatives are conceptually empty given infinite instances.
“what's the greatest of anything? There's no greatest of anything... what a stupid thing. You know, there are infinite number of beautiful women in the world.”