What this covers
David Brady, a political scientist at Stanford, sits down with Russ Roberts to examine the 2010 midterm electorate through the lens of polling data, historical voting patterns, and structural shifts in party identification. The conversation draws on Brady's survey work and forecasting models to assess likely outcomes in the House and Senate, then broadens into why both parties face a common long-term fiscal crisis that neither has shown the capacity to solve. The talk moves between concrete electoral mechanics—which districts are actually in play, how independent voters are behaving, what generic ballot numbers really signal—and deeper questions about whether American democracy can sustainably cut entitlements when no other elected democracy has managed it.
The range spans several distinct territories. Brady argues that standard midterm-loss models miss the real action by averaging across all 435 House seats when roughly 360 are effectively locked in by gerrymandering and incumbency, leaving only 60–70 swing districts worth tracking. He maps the electorate on two axes (economic and social conservatism), showing that centrist voters decide elections and that independents, now roughly 40 percent of the electorate, have shifted toward Republican economic positions. The conversation turns to why the Affordable Care Act became a flashpoint despite the pre-existing health system already being government-heavy and unsustainable, and considers whether current partisan polarization is historically anomalous or a return to American norm. Brady contends that parties are ideologically non-overlapping in ways they were not in the mid-20th century, making the filibuster purely partisan where once it cut across party lines. He concludes with the observation that no working democracy—not European parliaments, not Japan—has successfully rolled back entitlements once granted, and that the U.S. fiscal trap may yield only to state-level experimentation or wholesale structural redesign of how health care is financed.
Brady argues the 2010 midterm will turn on the independents—now ~40% of the electorate—whose mood has shifted toward Republican economic concerns, and that the deeper structural problem facing both parties is an unsustainable web of entitlement promises that no democratic system has yet shown it can roll back.
- Independents, not the partisan bases, are the swing bloc and they now approximate the Republican mood on the economy
- Standard midterm-loss models are weak; party-identification shifts (especially movement toward 'independent') may predict outcomes better
- The U.S. has over-promised on entitlements and no elected democracy has successfully taken benefits away, making the long-term fiscal/health-care problem politically intractable
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The filibuster is not used more often than in the past, but because the parties have become ideologically non-overlapping (bimodal), filibusters are now along strict partisan lines on economic issues—whereas in the mid-20th century the 'conservative coalition' of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats created cross-party overlap that made the filibuster a less purely partisan tool.
“the filibuster in my view it's not used less the threat if it's used more for partisan it's used more in a partisan sense now”
Standard congressional forecasting regressions over all 435 seats are misleading because gerrymandering and incumbency fix the outcome of roughly 360 seats, leaving only about 60-70 genuine swing districts; the meaningful action is therefore in those swing districts, not the averaged national model.
“the number of swing districts is about 6070 at max because... of cheering the district the way they draw the districts the incumbency factor so it turns out there's a lot of seats that we know... aren't up for grabs”
Contrary to nostalgia, the bipartisan-overlap era of the post-WWII period (roughly 1938 onward) is the historical anomaly; American politics, when measured back to 1840, has normally been polarized, so current polarization is a return to the norm rather than a departure from it.
“the period that truly stands out is not the period where... there's no overlap what stands out is the post-world War two period... normally American politics has been polarized”
No democratic system—including European parliamentary democracies and Japan—where representatives are elected on short terms has yet shown it can sustainably take back benefits it has granted, raising doubt about whether the U.S. (whose slow system resists radical change) can confront its over-promised liabilities, though the German cutbacks were a surprisingly impressive first round.
“none of the Democritus Europe Japan they have not any democracy where representatives are elected short term has not faced up to this question very well and we don't know very many instances where they take something away from people that they've given”
Opponents of Obamacare wrongly portrayed the pre-reform status quo as a free-market Nirvana of simplicity; in reality the existing system was heavily government-involved (government already paid for most people's health care) and was itself unsustainable, so opposition framing was misleading.
“opponents of Obamacare would put up a chart of how horrible health care organization with look... as if the current world were some Nirvana of simplicity... of course government pays for most of people's health care”
Presidential-election outcomes are far more predictable than congressional ones: a 'guns and butter' model (real income/economic growth plus involvement in foreign wars) predicts whether the incumbent party wins because voters hold the president responsible for the economy and for foreign wars—the model fails mainly in 1952 and 1966.
“if you put the guns in butter model which... makes present sense in that the electorate holds the president responsible for the state of the economy and they hold the president responsible for whatever foreign wars you're in”
The American electorate can be mapped on two axes—economic liberal-conservative and social conservative-liberal—and tracking the same 1,200-person panel since 2004 shows roughly 7% are economically and socially liberal, ~9% economically and socially conservative, ~24% economically conservative, with the bulk of the public clustered in the middle on both dimensions; these centrist voters decide elections.
“there's about seven percent who are true to the traditional liberal on the left side and socially liberal about nine percent that are economically and socially conservative twenty four percent or so who are economically conservative and the bottom line though is that the bulk of the American public is sort of in the middle”
Since the New Deal, U.S. health and social policy has steadily expanded entitlements and coverage (Roosevelt, Kerr-Mills, Medicare/Medicaid, SCHIP, Bush's Medicare drug benefit), and now that nearly everyone is covered, the era of expanding rights gives way to an era of paying bills the government cannot afford—so the eventual solution must look very different, likely removing the employer tax deduction and letting insurance markets vary coverage, or else resembling Britain's system.
“now about everybody's covered by this bill and now it's time to pay the bills and the Congress cannot pay the bills... take away the deduction for... the tax deduction for employers... or it's gonna look like Great Britain”
The traditional explanation for midterm seat loss—that marginal voters drawn out by presidential-election hype stay home in off years, returning the electorate to its normal party affiliation—broke down around 1988 because Republicans kept winning presidencies while Democrats held the House, so political science lacks a single good explanation for why the president's party loses midterm seats.
“that explanation sort of went to hell because why are the Republicans continuing to win the presidency in the house... we don't have a very good so one explanation is well who votes in the presidential versus the off year”
In generic congressional ballot data back to 1946, Republicans have led within three months of an election only twice—before 1946 and before 1994, both major Republican victories—because Democrats systematically do better on the generic ballot than they perform; so Republicans averaging 1.5-2 points ahead in 2010 is a strong sign for them.
“the only two times the Republicans ever led was before the 1946 election before the 1994 election and those are the two major victories they had”
When a newly empowered congressional majority overplays its hand, it makes the president look like a centrist and aids his reelection—Republicans in 1994 (with the Contract with America) and 1946 (seeking to repeal the New Deal) overreached, repositioning Clinton and Truman as moderates and helping both win.
“the Republicans overplayed their hand yeah and Bill Clinton didn't grow a spine all he did was veto what he could veto and it worked”
Polls touting a large Republican generic-ballot lead overstate the edge because they screen for likely voters, who skew Republican; YouGov/Polimetrics data confirm independents and Republicans are much more motivated to vote in 2010 than Democrats.
“the data we have from YouGov paulo metrics that we just completed... clearly show independents and Republicans much more motivated to both this year than... Democrats”
If Democrats lose seats but retain control of both chambers, that is paradoxically the worst-case scenario for Obama's reelection, because the party then bears full responsibility for the economy; when control of a chamber is split with Republicans, the president can run against the opposing party—as Clinton did after 1994 and Truman after 1946.
“I think that actually strangely enough is the worst-case scenario for his reelection why because then the Democratic Party is fully responsible for the economy”
Congressional Democrats acted in self-interest, not against it, in passing unpopular health care: facing a choice between no bill (appearing incapable of governing, repeating the 1993 humiliation) and passing a bill whose real costs don't bite until 2016, they bet on a short-term burst of positive press for an achievement, since the painful costs would arrive only after the 2010 and 2012 elections.
“the costs of the bill... don't even really start until 2016... the real cost of this bill aren't coming down if we pass this bill will get a short term burst in public... versus having failed once again”
The current period is structurally unusual: in normal partisan realignments when one party gains the other loses, but in this cycle both Democrats and Republicans have lost share while independents have risen—Republicans declined from about 2005, Democrats then fell without Republicans regaining, an asymmetry rarely seen in data going back to 1937.
“normally when one party gains the other party loses right and now both parties are losing and independents are gaining”
Since 1946, the president's party has lost House seats in the first midterm at different average rates depending on party—Democratic presidents lose ~30 seats, Republican presidents ~16—but a major reason for the gap is that Democrats controlled the House for more of that period (a larger sample), so the overall average is roughly 20-23 seats with large variance.
“Democratic presidents in their first term have lost about thirty seats Democrats Republican presidents in their first term have lost about 16 seats but one of the reasons for that discrepancy is because over the time period from 1946 to 2010 the Democrats have... controlled the house more”
Current polarization is driven by genuinely irreconcilable issue stakes: on energy/global warming and health care, one side believes markets (entrepreneurs, individual choice) solve the problem and the other believes only government regulation can, leaving no natural compromise point—you cannot split the difference between regulating half the energy economy or letting markets work.
“if your view is that's not going to happen and entrepreneurs won't do that then your view is the government should step in and regulate these things now I don't see where's the compromise”
Health care must be rationed somehow; the only real question is whether it is rationed by a market in which individuals make choices or by the government as in Great Britain—Brady favors market rationing on efficiency and freedom grounds.
“of course it has to be rationed in some way the question is is it gonna be rationed by a market where individuals get choices or is going to be rationed by the government as it is in Great Britain”
Party identification, conceived not as a fixed inherited trait but as a measure that people revise based on events, is a potentially better predictor of the president's party's fortunes than generic-ballot polling, because voters tend not to jump directly from one party to the other but move through 'independent' as a halfway station—so tracking movement toward independent signals trouble for the president's party.
“voters don't really switch from Democrat to Republican or Republican to Democrat they use the independency as a half way... they'll become independent or Democrat independent those are bad signing for the president's party”
The final votes for health care were obtained through 'the Cogan rule of ten'—once you get within ten votes you can buy them with targeted goodies (e.g., Central Valley California legislators getting more water)—and the bill was sold as deficit-neutral/deficit-reducing (which it wasn't) to close the deal.
“the Kogan rule is you get down to ten boats you can buy them... the guys from the Central Valley here in California they got more water”
The mood of the electorate varies sharply by party: Republicans and Tea Party members are unhappy about government spending, Democrats remain largely satisfied (Obama has ~80% approval among Democrats), but independents—now about 40% and growing—are unhappy about the economy, health care, taxes and spending, and their mood more closely approximates Republicans than Democrats.
“it's the all-important independence where the mode of the country has changed the independents who are growing a number over the past year and a half their numbers increase there there are now about 40 percent or so”
Republicans went along with financial reform because polls showed about 75% of Americans blamed banks for the crisis and opposed the bank bailouts, creating overwhelming pressure on Republicans not to be seen opposing bank regulation—so a finance bill was politically inevitable.
“if you look at polls about 75% of Americans blame banks for the whole thing in the first place... the pressure on the Republican Party to respond to that... was pretty high so you knew they were gonna get a finance bill”
Reagan lost 26 House seats in 1982 but the economy turned around in spring 1983 and his approval rose, so he trounced Mondale—illustrating that midterm losses need not doom reelection if the economy recovers.
“Reagan lost 26 seats in 1982 which of Obama loses 35 37 seats the prediction is about the same percentage and if he lose that many seats but the economy did turn around... he trounced Mondale”
The likeliest path for confronting unsustainable spending in the U.S. is experimentation at the state level—governors innovating (e.g., Chris Christie in New Jersey, Andrew Cuomo campaigning in New York)—rather than federal action, because the federal government is least able to act and successful state models could spread.
“my view is it'll be in the states where it's first taken care of won't be the federal government it'll be the states that start to work on and governors will innovate and that... that's our best hope”
Approval of the health care bill is heavily correlated with personal job status, which helps explain why Nevada (with high unemployment) is one of only two states where 50% approve—so Harry Reid's vote for the bill likely did not hurt him given his state's profile.
“approval is actually pretty heavily correlated with what your job status is so I don't think he hurt himself with that”
Republicans call themselves the party of small government but in practice their voting record does not differ much from Democrats—they spend on their own friends rather than cut—though they may feel more reluctant or guilty about spending.
“the Republicans who call themselves the party of small government but that's but have not been never have our voting nope so they talk the rhetoric RIS different but they seem to do the same thing as Democrats”
Most Americans are center-right on the economic dimension and roughly centrist (trending leftward over time on issues like gay marriage) on the social dimension, so when a party wins and overreacts in an extreme direction, the centrist public recoils.
“I believe the United States is essentially most people are center-right on the economic dimension sort of center-right on the social dimension but not... nasty on issues of gay marriage that's changing”
Even in July 2010 with widespread voter worry about deficits, there is no political mandate to cut spending—no politicians say we are living beyond our means and must cut; instead they propose a value-added tax or invoke the Laffer curve—reflecting the historic American assumption that growth would let us grow our way out of fiscal problems.
“there is no political mandate to cut spending nope no politicians come out and said we're living beyond our means and therefore we have to cut spending”
Republicans campaigning on outright repeal of health care would be unwise overreach because no plausible majority can override a presidential veto; the smarter play (as Pelosi modeled in 2006 by refusing to pursue impeachment) is to campaign on fixing the law's negative aspects while focused on winning future elections.
“it's pretty dumb because it ain't gonna happen the president no matter how many seats the Republicans were... not gonna be able to override a presidential veto”
With the economy unlikely to improve dramatically before November 2010, the Democrats' best electoral strategy is to avoid a national referendum on the economy by casting doubt on what Republicans would do—but blaming Bush no longer works because while Democrats still buy it, independents and Republicans now hold Obama accountable for the economy.
“if the election is national if it's a national issue like the economy then the Democrats will lose more seats so they're their best chance is to cast doubt among the electorate as to what the Republicans would do”
Public opinion on health care barely moved after passage: about 70% consistently believed their own coverage would get worse and cost more both before and after the bill passed, with Obama gaining only a 3-4 point bump, so voters in competitive states are more likely to punish a Democrat who supported it than reward one who opposed it.
“seventy percent are my what my health care will get worse... that stayed absolutely constant across voters before before and after the bill passed”
The Erskine Bowles deficit commission's 'austere' target of capping federal spending at about 21% of GDP would actually be an all-time peacetime high, since spending historically ranged from roughly 8-20% of GDP and stands near 25% now—so the proposal is not austere by historical standards.
“where the fair governor would only be 21% of GDP which i think would be an all-time high it's Gotham right now where it's 25 but historically it's in the night 8 10 to 20 percent”
When the Tea Party movement is polled without defining its issues, more people are unsympathetic than sympathetic; but among those who are somewhat sympathetic, the dominant driving issue is taxes and spending rather than social issues.
“are you sympathetic to the tea party movement it turns out that that's not so high there are more people that are actually unsympathetic to it that's sympathetic but the people who are somewhat sympathetic to it the main issue driving it is taxes and spending”
The 2012 Republican nominee will likely not be Sarah Palin or Mitt Romney but will emerge from a successful state-level (gubernatorial) election, much as George W. Bush vaulted to the front by winning Texas in 1998 with 69% overall, 59% of women, and 49% of the Hispanic vote.
“I don't think it'll be Sarah Palin and I don't think... it'll be Mitt Romney I think that the presidential candidate for the Republicans will come out of the states”
Hoover's own district-level modeling, which oversamples key swing districts rather than relying on the national average, predicts Democratic House losses of 28 to as many as 50 seats in 2010, meaning Democrats could lose control of the House depending on events before the election.
“our numbers are looking at key went back in over sampled and key districts and we're twenty eight minimum to as many as fifty so the Democrats could lose control of the House of Representatives”
Presidents enter office with unrealistic expectations that cannot be met, so core supporters fall away (e.g., critics like Krugman and Dowd faulting Obama on the Gulf spill and cap-and-trade, and disappointment over continued Afghanistan involvement), draining enthusiasm from the party and contributing to midterm losses.
“the president goes in with very high expectations and then those... unrealistic expectations... some of his core supporters fall away”
Obama will almost certainly win the Democratic nomination in 2012 because a serious primary challenge to the first black president is highly unlikely, even if the economy double-dips; conditions would have to be extraordinarily bad.
“I don't think the odds of there being a serious Democratic challenger to the first black president is not likely”
In the Senate, Brady forecasts Republicans picking up six to eight seats—not enough for a majority—with North Dakota, Indiana, Delaware and Arkansas likely flipping Republican and about eight toss-up races (e.g., Missouri), so Democrats would lose their filibuster-proof majority.
“if I had to make a bet I would say they'll pick up six to eight seats not enough to get the majority”
The economy is not very good and is unlikely to improve dramatically before the November 2010 election, with three to four monthly jobs reports left and most observers presuming, at best, mediocre conditions.
“most people set presume there's not going to be a lot of improvement it could get worse even but they're not gonna be dramatic improvement for November”