Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Geopolitics in the South Caucasus
What this covers
Richard Giragosian and Jeff Mankoff join Max Bergmann to examine the realignment unfolding in the South Caucasus following Azerbaijan's 2023 military conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. The conversation maps how Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine—and the exposure of its military weakness—has left space for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to pursue independent strategies. Azerbaijan has weaponized this opening to consolidate territorial gains and cement its Turkish alliance, while Armenia, having lost its longtime autonomy claim in Karabakh, is methodically diversifying away from Russian dependence through selective partnerships with India, France, and Turkey, without provoking direct Russian intervention.
The discussion traces the historical roots of the conflict in Soviet nationality policy, which embedded ethnic Armenian regions inside Azerbaijani territory—a pattern that produced similar post-Soviet frozen conflicts across the former USSR. It then turns to Armenia's deliberate balancing act: pursuing EU ties and border normalization with Turkey while remaining in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and keeping its Russian military base. The speakers weigh whether a bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement—notably negotiated without Russian or Western mediation—can break Russia's hold on regional leverage through economic connectivity and trade. They also assess the risks: whether Azerbaijan's father-son dynasty will manufacture new conflicts to retain domestic legitimacy, whether Armenia's weak democratic institutions can withstand pressure, and why the EU, not the US, is positioned to drive meaningful engagement given geographic constraints and the risk that American involvement would antagonize both Moscow and Ankara.
Russia-Azerbaijan relations are deteriorating as Azerbaijan aggressively asserts regional autonomy through military actions and diplomatic provocations, exploiting Russia's distraction with Ukraine, while Armenia simultaneously pivots westward to reduce dependency on an unreliable Russian security guarantor.
- Azerbaijan is openly defying Russian interests by downing aircraft, arresting and humiliating Russian journalists, and pursuing independent negotiations with Armenia that exclude Russia
- Armenia has concluded that Russia failed to provide promised CSTO collective security support in 2020 and 2023, prompting a strategic pivot toward EU membership, NATO-interoperable partnerships with India and France, and normalization with Turkey
- Russia's military weakness and preoccupation with Ukraine have created a power vacuum and window of opportunity for both regional states to challenge Moscow's traditional sphere of influence
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
The conflict between territorial integrity and the right to self-determination is a structural problem around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of embedded ethnic autonomies that was not resolved in the Nagorno-Karabakh case despite a long peace process.
“There's a long process of trying to manage the conflict, come to a lasting peace deal for a variety of reasons that fails and we can talk about those reasons, I suppose, but there's a tension between territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. And this is a problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of these embedded ethnic autonomies.”
Azerbaijan has successfully established autonomy from Russia not through NATO membership but through a strong strategic partnership with Turkey and autonomous military action, particularly by using force to restore control over Nagorno-Karabakh despite Russian preferences.
“Azarbaian more than just about any of them has pushed relatively successfully to establish its autonomy from Russia not by pursuing integration with NATO not by you know joining the west whatever that means but through having a very strong defense and security and political partnership with Turkey and acting autonomously in its own region which has meant primarily using military force to restore its control over the breakaway Nagorno Cararabach region.”
The 2018 Armenian velvet revolution that brought Nikol Pashinyan to power was perceived by the Kremlin as a color revolution similar to those in Georgia and Ukraine, raising Russian suspicions about potential Western influence despite Pashinyan's early efforts to emphasize Armenia would not change its geopolitical orientation.
“The Russian Armenia relationship has also gone through a series of cycles over the last several years. And maybe we can trace it back to 2018 with the the people power movement that Richard was alluding to, the velvet revolution that brought the current government of Nicl Pashinan to power. Pashinan was an outsider to the Armenian political scene. I mean, he'd been a journalist, a civil society activist. His assession to power looked to a lot of people sitting in the Kremlin like a color revolution, like the series of upheavalss that had occurred in places like Georgia and Ukraine that led to the emergence of leadership that was more pro- western in its orientation and less receptive to Russian toutelage. Now Pashanyan made an effort from very early on to emphasize that his assession to power did not pretend a geopolitical revolution that Armenia was not seeking to change its orientation, change its axis the way that say Georgia did under Mikuel Sakashili. But nevertheless, I think there was a degree of of mistrust towards Pashinan and and his circle on the part of the Russians”
The treatment of arrested Russian journalists from Sputnik by Azerbaijani authorities, where they were photographed showing signs of torture and mistreatment in government custody, represents a very open and public effort at humiliating Russia by a smaller country, which is striking.
“I think one really striking element of this defiance is how the Azerbaian authorities treated the Russians that they arrested. So you mentioned that the two Azarbaijani businessmen who were killed in Russian custody. So the Azarbaijani authorities arrested several journalists from Sputnik and some other Russians and then these individuals were photographed looking like much the worse for wear like they'd clearly been given the business in in government custody. And to do that and then highlight it uh very publicly is a very open effort at humiliating Russia which coming from a country the size of Azerbaian is quite striking.”
Geography matters for both the United States and EU when looking at the South Caucasus: the EU would face challenges in formally expanding into the region without shared EU borders, and including Armenia would be complicated because everything would have to pass through Georgia, which is moving in the retrograde direction.
“Geography matters and I think this is true from the perspective both of the United States and the EU when it comes to looking at the South Caucuses. The idea of the EU formally expanding into the region would be a challenge given that there would not be any shared EU borders with any of the states in the South Caucuses and including Armenia would be even more complicated because everything would have to pass through Georgia. And as we said, Georgia is moving in the in the retrograde direction at this point.”
The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast was created in the early 1920s as a principally ethnic Armenian region within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic with a population that was almost 90% ethnic Armenian according to the first Soviet census, consistent with Soviet nationality policy of creating ethnically autonomous regions.
“So the region uh the former Soviet Nagorno Carbach autonomous obelist was a region of the Azerbaian Soviet Socialist Republic whose population was principally ethnic Armenian. That was an arrangement that was made in the early 1920s around the establishment of the Soviet Union after there had been very intense ethnic conflict between Armenians and at the time they were called Turks during the 1905 revolution and then again in the aftermath of of the the Bolevik revolution and the Russian civil war...the population in the first Soviet census was almost 90% ethnic Armenian of Nagorno Carabach that diminished over time but it was about 90% in the early 1920s and this was consistent with Soviet nationality policy.”
The Russian missile mistakenly downing an Azerbaijani plane in December and Russian police subsequently torturing and killing two Azerbaijani businessmen in June represent concrete incidents within a broader pattern of Azerbaijan testing Russian resolve and pushing Russian interests.
“But relations have recently soured after a Russian missile mistakenly downed an Azarbaijani plane this past December. Russian police then have recently allegedly tortured and killed a pair of Azarbaijani citizens this past June.”
Russia is distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine and has not been paying attention to developments in the Caucasus, which has created an opening for Azerbaijan to challenge Russia and has made Russia much more reactive rather than proactive in the region.
“There is both an opening and an opportunity for Azeran to challenge Russia and that is Russia's distraction where Moscow is overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine and simply has not been paying attention to developments on the ground. It's been much more reactive.”
During the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, Armenia appealed to the CSTO and Russia for support but was not adequately answered, with Russia arguing that CSTO coverage only applied to territorial integrity of Armenia proper, not Nagorno-Karabakh, which was not juridically Armenian territory.
“And when the conflict with Azarbaijan flared up both in 2020 and in 2023, Armenian appeals for support were not particularly answered. And initially the Russian response was the CSTTO and bilateral support those are about territorial integrity and because the fighting is confined to Carbach which is not jeritically part of Armenia this isn't our problem and you can sort of make the argument that that the Russians had a case but it didn't go over well in Armenia”
US interests in the South Caucasus region are comparatively limited, primarily focused on the region as an important transit route, which is of much more benefit to the EU and Turkey than to the United States.
“As far as the United States goes, I think the question of of what US interests in the region are are comparatively the answer to that question is comparatively limited. It is an important transit route, but one that is of much more benefit to the EU and to Turkey than it is to the United States.”
Regional peace in the South Caucasus creates opportunities for integrated transit networks, as much current transit infrastructure bypasses Armenia due to the 30-year war, but with peace, integrated transit networks and international investment become much more realistic
“Much of the transit infrastructure that exists now bypasses Armenia because Armenia and Azarbaian have been formerly at war for the last 30 years. If you can start building integrated transit networks and both Azarbaijan and Armenia have their visions of regional connectivity, I think those become much more realistic if there's a peace deal and the region is open to international investment”
Baku now portrays the former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast combined with the surrounding regions in a new entity called the Carabakh region, and the Azerbaijani authorities state there is no more Nagorno-Karabakh problem as it previously existed.
“Baku has dissolved the institutions of self-ruule that existed there and has emphasized combining the former Norno Carbach autonomous obelist with the surrounding areas in what they now call the Carabach region...the Azarbaijani authorities now portray this all as a as a single entity and say there is no more Nagorno Carabach problem.”
The humiliation of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh represents both Azerbaijan's emboldened behavior and a reckless belief that it has stronger Turkish support than it actually does, and there will be a price to pay in the medium to long term.
“Even the humiliation of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers that were deployed to Nagorno Carabah is representing an emboldened Azerban sometimes recklessly so believing it has much stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does and at the same time pushing the envelope and I do think there will be a price to pay over the medium to long term.”
The Armenian government under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has adopted a post-war accommodation strategy focused on 'cutting its losses' regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and territorial losses, with no mobilization to rearm or retake lost territory.
“the Armenian government has reached a new vision, a post-war accommodation where Armenia, according to the Armenian government, is now cutting its losses, including the loss of Nagorno Carabah. In other words, for the Armenian prime minister, what is lost is gone. There is no move by Armenia's government to rearm or to actually retake lost territory.”
Russia seeks to regain its lost power and influence in the region and in Armenia, and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh represents a loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia over Armenian policy.
“we do see a storm on the horizon, an angry, vengeful Russia seeking to regain its lost power and influence in the region and in Armenia. So therefore the loss of Norno Carabah is also a loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.”
Armenia's real obstacle to EU aspirations is membership in Putin's Eurasian Economic Union, not the CSTO or Russian military base, and there is no real will or decision by Armenia to leave that bloc.
“For Armenia, however, the real obstacle, the real sticking point is not the collective insecurity treaty organization, nor is it the Russian military base. It's Armenia's position as a member of Putin's prison, the Eurasian Economic Union. That is really the contradiction that will prevent Armenia's EU aspirations full stop. And there is no real will or decision by Armenia to leave that block.”
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted during the Gorbachev reform period of glasnost and perestroika, predating the independence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is significant because the conflict itself set the foundation for the development of statehood and distorted democratization and economics in both countries.
“the Norno Caraba conflict erupted during the Gorbachev reform period of Glasnost and Pedestroa. The reason that's so significant is the conflict itself actually predates the independence of both Armenia and Azerbajan. In other words, as a driver, it set the foundation for the development of statehood. It distorted democratization as well as economics and trade”
Iran has long neglected and still refuses to return to its traditional role as a regional player; Iran remains overwhelmed by other concerns and is not present in current diplomacy between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is instead between Russia and Turkey.
“Iran has long neglected and still refuses to return to its role traditionally as a regional player. Iran is not present. This is between Russia and Turkey and to a degree the EU. Iran remains overwhelmed by everything else.”
The bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan contains no reference to Nagorno-Karabakh directly, and current diplomatic negotiations between the two governments comprise three levels: draft peace treaty (closed), border demarcation, and connectivity (road and rail restoration between Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey normalization).
“the current bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Alzaran is just that bilateral. It has nothing to do with Norno Carabach directly. And even the diplomatic track now ongoing between the Armenian and Azorjani governments are comprising three levels. The draft peace treaty where negotiations have closed much to the credit of both sides and second border demarcation. The third element of these negotiations is the most promising connectivity, the restoration of road and rail links between Armenia and Azeran, but also Armenia Turkey normalization.”
During the 2010s, Azerbaijan's economy boomed on the back of oil and gas revenue, much of which was funneled into military buildup, shifting the balance of military power significantly in Azerbaijan's favor compared to Armenia.
“During the 2010s, Azarbaijan's economy booms on the back of its oil and gas. A lot of that money gets funneled into building up the military and so the balance of power between Yeravan and Baku shifts and by the mid2010s Azarbaian is in a much stronger position militarily.”
In 2020, Azerbaijan launched an offensive to retake Nagorno-Karabakh, quickly overwhelmed Armenian forces, took back the seven surrounding territories, and gained significant chunks of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself, leading to a ceasefire with Russian peacekeepers deployed.
“in 2020 Azerbaijan launches an offensive to take back no carabach. This is the second Karabach war. It proceeds very differently from the first one. Very quickly Azerbaijan overwhelms the Armenian forces, takes back those seven territories surrounding the Berno Cararabach and gains a significant chunk of the NKAO itself. There's a ceasefire deal that's reached that provides for Russian peacekeepers.”
Turkey has made clear that as soon as there is an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, it is ready to move very quickly on opening the border, normalization, and various forms of cooperation, and the obstacle to Armenia-Turkey normalization is not Turkey but rather Azerbaijan's stance.
“there's a belief that this actually would be possible if and when there's a peace deal. That the obstacle right now is not Turkey so much as it is Azarbaijan and that the Turkish government has made clear that as soon as there's a deal, they're ready to move very quickly on opening the border, normalization, trade, cooperation of various kinds.”
Armenia has adopted a new, transactional strategy based on a belated recognition that Russia is an unreliable partner, deliberately diversifying security partners not to replace Russia with the West but to balance, contain, or counter Russia—dismissing NATO membership, choosing India (and Japan, South Korea, China) for arms precisely because they are less provocative to Russia.
“Armenia in diversifying security partners is not looking to replace Russia with the west but rather to balance contain or counter Russia... the one and only arms procurement deal since the war was with India on purpose because it's less provocative to Russia”
When Azerbaijan attacked in 2020 and 2023, Russia and the CSTO declined to support Armenia on the grounds that the fighting was confined to Karabakh, which is not juridically part of Armenia—leading many in the Armenian elite to question why they should accept the compromises of Russian dependence if Russia won't provide support when needed.
“Armenian appeals for support were not particularly answered... because the fighting is confined to Carbach which is not jeritically part of Armenia this isn't our problem... why accept all of the compromises that come from being dependent on Russia if at the end of the day Russia's not going to actually be there”
Economic interdependence through restored connectivity and trade links is the most effective way for Armenia to restore deterrence against Azerbaijan and Turkey and serves as a strategic imperative to regain the loss of military deterrence.
“This connectivity is actually an imperative strategically to regain the loss of deterrence. In other words, economic interdependence as the most effective way to restore deterrence.”
The use of force over diplomacy and the victory of authoritarian power (Azerbaijan) over democracy (Armenia) in the wars of 2020 and 2023 represent two dangerous precedents that, if left unaddressed, challenge Western ideals and values and could undermine faith and confidence in democracy.
“There are two very dangerous precedents from both the war of 2020 and the September 2023 military capture of Norno Carabach by Azerb. The first dangerous precedent is this was very much a validation of the use of force over diplomacy and second it was very much a victory of authoritarian power over democracy. Both of these dangerous precedents, if left unressed, challenge not only Western ideals and values, but could possibly undermine faith and confidence in democracy.”
There is a fundamental tension between the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, which is a recurring problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of embedded ethnic autonomies, and it underlay the failure to reach a lasting Karabakh peace deal.
“there's a tension between territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. And this is a problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of these embedded ethnic autonomies”
The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast was a principally ethnic-Armenian region (almost 90% in the early 1920s) assigned to Azerbaijan by the Soviet leadership consistent with Soviet nationality policy, which created ethnically autonomous regions within republics—a pattern that produced many post-Soviet conflicts (Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova).
“the population in the first Soviet census was almost 90% ethnic Armenian of Nagorno Carabach... this was consistent with Soviet nationality policy... many of the postsviet conflicts that we focus on are based on this practice of creating ethnically autonomous regions within individual Soviet socialist republics”
The 2020 war and September 2023 military capture of Nagorno-Karabakh set two dangerous precedents: the validation of the use of force over diplomacy, and the victory of authoritarian power over democracy—both of which, if left unaddressed, could undermine faith and confidence in democracy and Western ideals.
“The first dangerous precedent is this was very much a validation of the use of force over diplomacy and second it was very much a victory of authoritarian power over democracy”
Armenia is carefully pursuing an incremental reassertion of independence by diversifying security partners with India, South Korea, Japan, and China rather than replacing Russia with the West, aiming to balance, contain, or counter Russia rather than eliminate dependence on it.
“Armenia is very careful in its incremental reasserting of independence not to unnecessarily provoke Russia...Armenia in diversifying security partners is not looking to replace Russia with the west but rather to balance contain or counter Russia to overcome the dependence on Russia. Hence, the one and only arms procurement deal since the war was with India on purpose because it's less provocative to Russia as well. And much of our latest activity in securing new security relationships is actually in Japan, South Korea, and China and not necessarily the West as we traditionally see it.”
Russia's historic ties with Armenia are now merely history and no longer represent current geopolitical reality; Armenia has adopted a new transactional strategy based on recognition that Russia is an unreliable partner.
“Specifically, beginning with the historically close ties between Armenia and Russia. It's important to note those historic ties are just that, history. no longer current. Armenia has adopted a new strategy that's much more transactional based on a belated recognition that Russia presents a new challenge for Armenia. A challenge rooted in Russia's role as a very unreliable so-called partner.”
Richard believes Armenia's engagement with the West should be less provocative than US engagement and should be EU-led, and that the US role might provoke unnecessary reactions from Moscow and Erdogan if it prioritizes Armenia-Turkey normalization.
“I'm very skeptical in terms of doubts and questions over the sustainability of US post-war engagement in Armenia or the South Caucuses...a US role is not welcome. The reason from an Armenian perspective is when and if the US prioritizes Armenia Turkey normalization that will be a blow to that potential opening. In other words, it will provoke an unnecessary reaction from Moscow as well as Erdogan. At the same time, it's the European Union that's the less provocative actor. It's also already engaged. We have an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia”
Conflict is a very convenient distraction for ruling elites in Azerbaijan (and also useful against Armenia, Russia, and Iran as domestic distractions), and a punitive peace treaty without international guarantees or international guarantor means even if a peace treaty is signed tomorrow, it will not be enough for Azerbaijan's domestic political needs.
“I do worry that given the nature of politics in Alerban, a conflict is a very convenient distraction by the ruling elite in Alzer John. if not Armenia, Russia or Iran are domestically seen as productive and effective distractions. And what I mean is even if the peace treaty is signed tomorrow, it's not enough for Azerban and this rather punitive peace treaty has no international guarantee nor international guarantor”
For Armenia the real obstacle to EU aspirations is not the CSTO or the Russian military base but its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union ('Putin's prison'), and there is no real Armenian will to leave that bloc—largely as a lesson learned from Georgia about not provoking Russia.
“It's Armenia's position as a member of Putin's prison, the Eurasian Economic Union. That is really the contradiction that will prevent Armenia's EU aspirations full stop. And there is no real will or decision by Armenia to leave that block.”
Russia's 2018 response to Pashinyan's rise was uncharacteristically passive and pensive because Pashinyan relied on a domestic agenda without attempting regime change and there were no Western operatives like Victoria Nuland distributing cookies in downtown Yerevan.
“Moscow was uncharacteristically passive and pensive because of Pashinan's reliance on the discipline of a domestic agenda. There was no attempt at making Armenia become the Maidon. There was no Victoria Nuland giving out cookies in downtown Yedaban very much on purpose.”
If the US and EU remain aligned on broader strategic objectives in the South Caucasus, this could be an area of cooperation, but the EU will be the primary driver and key interest is EU investment through programs like the Global Gateway and Tresca, plus European energy companies interested in expanding Caspian oil and gas purchases from Azerbaijan and potentially the east side of the Caspian.
“I think to the extent that the US and the EU remain aligned on these broader strategic objectives, and that's an open question in my mind. This could be an area where you see some cooperation, but it really is going to be the EU that's driving these activities and there's investment through programs like the global gateway, Tresca, energy companies that are interested in expanding purchases of Caspian oil and gas from particularly Azerbaijan, but potentially from the east side of the Caspian as well.”
For Putin's Russia, a democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not that much of a threat given Russia's economic leverage and Russia's position over key sectors of the Armenian economy, especially energy.
“Part of the reason is, in my opinion, for Putin's Russia, a democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not that much of a threat given Russia's economic leverage and Russia's position over key sectors of the economy, especially energy”
Armenia is endowed with the rare commodity of legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials, including the rare victory of nonviolent people power in the 2018 velvet revolution that defied odds and expectations, positioning Armenia better than all her neighbors in terms of outlook for real stability.
“Armenia is endowed with a rare commodity, legitimacy, based on genuinely democratic credentials, but also in terms of the change of government prior to the war in 2018. We saw a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia, defying the odds and expectations. From an American perspective, nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails. In the Armenian case, it was an important victory and achievement where Armenia is now better positioned than all of her neighbors in terms of the outlook for real stability”
Azerbaijan has uniquely among Russia's post-Soviet neighbors established its autonomy from Russia not by integrating with NATO or the West, but through a strong defense, security, and political partnership with Turkey, which allowed it to act militarily in its own region (retaking Nagorno-Karabakh) while remaining insulated from strong Russian military responses.
“Azarbaian more than just about any of them has pushed relatively successfully to establish its autonomy from Russia not by pursuing integration with NATO... but through having a very strong defense and security and political partnership with Turkey and acting autonomously in its own region”
The third element of the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations—connectivity, the restoration of road and rail links plus Armenia-Turkey normalization—is the most promising because economic interdependence is the most effective way for Armenia to restore lost deterrence, making connectivity a strategic imperative, not merely an economic one.
“This connectivity is actually an imperative strategically to regain the loss of deterrence. In other words, economic interdependence as the most effective way to restore deterrence.”
The principal worry for Armenia is not the legitimacy of its democracy—whose credentials are real and hard-fought—but the weakness of the institutions of democracy, whose institutional development should be the coming priority, especially for the West.
“what worries me is not democracy The credentials, the achievements are real... I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy... it's the institutional development of democracy that needs to be the coming priority, especially by the West.”
Geography limits both US and EU engagement: the EU formally expanding into the South Caucasus is challenging because it would share no borders with any regional state, and including Armenia without Georgia is even more complicated since everything must pass through Georgia, which is moving in a retrograde direction.
“The idea of the EU formally expanding into the region would be a challenge given that there would not be any shared EU borders with any of the states in the South Caucuses and including Armenia without including Georgia would be even more complicated because everything would have to pass through Georgia.”
Azerbaijan's 2010s oil and gas boom funded a major military buildup and, combined with the strategic Turkish alliance that trained and in some cases commanded its forces, shifted the balance of power away from Yerevan, enabling Azerbaijan's rapid victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War.
“Azarbaijan's economy booms on the back of its oil and gas. A lot of that money gets funneled into building up the military and so the balance of power between Yeravan and Baku shifts”
Pashinyan's 2018 'velvet revolution' rise to power looked to the Kremlin like a color revolution akin to those in Georgia and Ukraine, generating mistrust; but Pashinyan deliberately emphasized that his accession did not portend a geopolitical reorientation away from Russia, unlike Saakashvili's Georgia.
“His assession to power looked to a lot of people sitting in the Kremlin like a color revolution... Pashanyan made an effort from very early on to emphasize that his assession to power did not pretend a geopolitical revolution that Armenia was not seeking to change its orientation”
US interests in the South Caucasus are comparatively limited; the region is an important transit route, but one of much more benefit to the EU and Turkey than to the US, so it will be the EU (via Global Gateway, TRACECA, and energy companies interested in Caspian oil and gas) that drives engagement, especially if regional peace opens new transit routes.
“the question of of what US interests in the region are... is comparatively limited. It is an important transit route, but one that is of much more benefit to the EU and to Turkey than it is to the United States... it really is going to be the EU that's driving these activities and there's investment through programs like the global gateway, Tresca”
There is not yet a genuine crisis in Russia-Armenia relations because the discourse against Armenia from Moscow comes from Foreign Minister Lavrov, spokesperson Peskov, and lower-level officials, not Vladimir Putin himself, indicating the issue has not reached Putin's personal attention level.
“I don't see a real risk or threat of direct Russian intervention and precisely for two reasons. One is much of the discourse against Armenia coming from Moscow. The messenger is very important. It's usually foreign minister Lavrov, presidential spokesman Pescov, or the crazy lady at the foreign ministry. My point here is it's not Vladimir Putin. We're not yet at a crisis because it's not Putin elevating this discourse.”
The conflict between the Armenian Prime Minister and the head of the Armenian Orthodox Church is less about a genuine political conflict and more about a personal clash, with the church leader being notoriously corrupt and authoritarian and affiliated with the previous government.
“The Armenian church conflict is both less than it seems and more than it seems. It's less than it seems because it's not new, nor is it a surprise. This is unfinished business for the Armenian prime minister. The head of the Armenian church, notoriously corrupt, rather authoritarian, was much more closely affiliated with the previous government. And this is a personal clash more than a political conflict. It's also less about the church and more about a conflict or targeting of the church leadership.”
Democracy's credentials and achievements in Armenia are real and hard-fought, but the institutional development of democracy is fragile and weak and should be a priority for the West, just as institutional strengthening of democracy in the United States itself should be a priority.
“I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy as I am worried about the United States to be quite honest with you. But in Armenia, which is more fragile, it's the institutional development of democracy that needs to be the coming priority, especially by the West.”
A reliable indicator that Russia-Armenia relations have reached genuine crisis would be if Russia demands to renegotiate subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia, which has not yet occurred.
“there's a bellweather test. We will know we've crossed the line with Russia when and if Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia. So, we're not quite there yet.”
Current Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations are being conducted bilaterally with minimal Russian and Western participation, which helps prevent Russia from becoming a spoiler while acknowledging that Russia is an angry, vengeful actor seeking to regain its lost power and influence in the region.
“What we see is the current round of talks between Armenia and Azure John have now excluded both the West and Russia. And this is very much localizing both the post-war negotiations, but also doing a good job at preventing Russia from becoming more of a spoiler. Because we do see a storm on the horizon, an angry, vengeful Russia seeking to regain its lost power and influence in the region and in Armenia”
Azerbaijan publicly photographed arrested Russian journalists and citizens who had clearly been physically abused in government custody, and highlighting this is a deliberate, open effort at humiliating Russia—striking coming from a country the size of Azerbaijan.
“these individuals were photographed looking like much the worse for wear like they'd clearly been given the business in in government custody. And to do that and then highlight it uh very publicly is a very open effort at humiliating Russia”
A key Armenian objective of the peace agreement is to plug NATO-member Turkey into the regional security complex and open the Armenia-Turkey border to trade, dramatically reducing Armenia's dependence on Russia and Iran; the Turkish government has signaled it will move quickly on normalization once a deal is signed, with Azerbaijan—not Turkey—being the current obstacle.
“Opening the border between Armenia and Turkey to trade, which would dramatically reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia and Iran... the obstacle right now is not Turkey so much as it is Azarbaijan and that the Turkish government has made clear that as soon as there's a deal, they're ready to move very quickly”
The escalation of tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan can be read as a Russian effort to 'throw sand in the gears' of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, pressuring Azerbaijan to adhere to Russian preferences, because the consummation of a bilateral peace deal negotiated with minimal Russian participation would be a significant blow to Russia's ability to manipulate regional dynamics.
“one way to read the escalation of tensions between these two countries is an effort to throw sand in the gears of this process to force... Azarbaijan to adhere to a certain subset if you will of Russian preferences”
The current round of Armenia-Azerbaijan talks has excluded both the West and Russia, which localizes the post-war negotiations and helps prevent Russia from becoming more of a spoiler; the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh thus also means the loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.
“the current round of talks between Armenia and Azure John have now excluded both the West and Russia. And this is very much localizing both the post-war negotiations, but also doing a good job at preventing Russia from becoming more of a spoiler... the loss of Norno Carabah is also a loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.”
A direct US role in the region is not welcome from an Armenian perspective, because if the US prioritizes Armenia-Turkey normalization it would provoke an unnecessary reaction from both Moscow and Erdogan; the EU is the less provocative and already-engaged actor, with an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia.
“a US role is not welcome... when and if the US prioritizes Armenia Turkey normalization that will be a blow to that potential opening... it will provoke an unnecessary reaction from Moscow as well as Erdogan. At the same time, it's the European Union that's the less provocative actor.”
Armenia's 2018 change of government was a rare victory of nonviolent people power, which (from an American perspective where nonviolence usually fails) gives Armenia a rare commodity—legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials—positioning it better than its neighbors for real stability.
“We saw a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia, defying the odds and expectations. From an American perspective, nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails... Armenia is now better positioned than all of her neighbors in terms of the outlook for real stability.”
A recent Armenian government arrest of a Russian-Armenian businessman represents a preemptive move against Russian interference in Armenia's June 2026 elections.
“What we see now, however, is a recent arrest of a Russian Armenian businessman as a move by the Armenian government to preempt Russian interference in our coming elections in June 2026.”
The European Union deployment of monitors in Armenia despite Armenia's ties with Russia represents EU filling a dangerous vacuum and void left by Russian weakness and questionable or unreliable US policies.
“We have an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia despite Armenia's ties with Russia. And I do think EU engagement, especially in terms of post-war trade and transport...the EU stepping up in terms of filling a dangerous vacuum and void of Russian weakness and rather questionable or unreliable US policies.”
Prime Minister Pashinyan's governance style remains dangerously impulsive and sometimes bordering on reckless, creating risks despite his electoral strength.
“But what we see now is a style of governance by the prime minister of Armenia that remains dangerously impulsive, sometimes bordering on reckless.”
Max Bergman expressed skepticism about the sustainability of U.S. post-war engagement in Armenia and the South Caucasus given the disruption, unpredictability, and volatility of the Trump administration
“I'm very skeptical. I'm very skeptical in terms of doubts and questions over the sustainability of US post-war engagement in Armenia or the South Caucuses. And it's more than just the disruption, the unpredictability, the volatility of the Trump administration.”
Azerbaijan's government under Ilham Aliyev uses conflict with external actors (Russia, Armenia, Iran) as a domestic political tool, since the father-to-son dynasty benefits from having a cause to rally the public around, especially now that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is off the table.
“there are domestic political reasons for the government of Il Hamalyia of the importance of you know having a cause to rally the the public around now that the negro Carbach issue is sort of off the table”
The Armenian church conflict is both less and more than it seems: less because it is unfinished personal business between the impulsive prime minister and a notoriously corrupt, authoritarian church head tied to the previous government; more because it connects to Russia, evidenced by the arrest of a Russian-Armenian businessman and a weapons seizure tied to a fifth alleged coup attempt.
“It's less than it seems because it's not new... This is a personal clash more than a political conflict... It's also more than it seems because it's also about Russia where we see the arrest of the Russian Armenian businessman. We see also the seizure of weapons in the fifth now fifth coup attempt allegation”
Russia's distraction and being overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine created both an opening and an opportunity for Azerbaijan to challenge Russia, leaving Moscow reactive and not paying attention to developments on the ground.
“There is both an opening and an opportunity for Azeran to challenge Russia and that is Russia's distraction where Moscow is overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine”
The Armenian government has reached a post-war accommodation in which it is 'cutting its losses,' treating Nagorno-Karabakh as gone, with no move to rearm or retake lost territory—and the current peace treaty is strictly bilateral, having nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh directly.
“for the Armenian prime minister, what is lost is gone. There is no move by Armenia's government to rearm or to actually retake lost territory... the current bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Alzaran is just that bilateral. It has nothing to do with Norno Carabach directly.”
After the 2023 loss of Karabakh, Armenia pushed away from Russia—freezing CSTO membership, skipping summits, floating EU membership, signing arms deals with India and France, and engaging Turkey—largely to demonstrate that it had other options and was not a Russian vassal.
“the Armenian government made a big push to move away from Russia to deepen ties with Western institutions and this meant you freezing membership in the CSTTO... signed a big arms deal with India and also with France”
Two indicators signal whether the Russia-Armenia relationship has reached genuine crisis: first, whether Vladimir Putin himself (rather than Lavrov, Peskov, or the foreign ministry spokeswoman) elevates the anti-Armenia discourse; and second, a 'bellwether test'—whether Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.
“The messenger is very important... it's not Vladimir Putin... And the second reason is there's a bellweather test. We will know we've crossed the line with Russia when and if Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.”
Armenia's reelection of the Pashinyan government after losing a war is politically remarkable and would be enviable for Western politicians, and the government is most likely to win the next June 2026 election despite approval ratings below 20%, reflecting fear and hatred of the opposition rather than support for the government.
“We have an incumbent government that was reelected after losing a war that is most likely to win the next election in the coming June. This is less about support for the government than it is about fear and hatred of the opposition...there is no credible alternative unfortunately to the Armenian government.”
Azerbaijan's government is still drunk with victory and maximalist in its demands following the 2023 military success, but is now beginning to sense that the dividends from conflict are decreasing.
“Azeran is still rather drunk with victory, maximalist in its demands, but is now beginning to sense that the dividends are decreasing”
Iran has long neglected and refuses to return to its traditional role as a regional player in the South Caucasus, remaining overwhelmed by everything else, so the current dynamic is essentially between Russia, Turkey, and to a degree the EU—with Iran notably absent.
“Iran has long neglected and still refuses to return to its role traditionally as a regional player. Iran is not present. This is between Russia and Turkey and to a degree the EU. Iran remains overwhelmed by everything else.”
A democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not much of a threat to Putin's Russia given Russia's economic leverage and dominance over key sectors of the Armenian economy, especially energy—so there is no genuine crisis or real risk of direct Russian intervention at present.
“for Putin's Russia, a democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not that much of a threat given Russia's economic leverage and Russia's position over key sectors of the economy, especially energy... I don't see a real risk or threat of direct Russian intervention”
Negotiations over the language of the peace treaty are effectively closed; the only remaining holdup is the signing ceremony itself, which is important to Azerbaijan as a 'certificate of achievement' heralding its victory.
“they have closed negotiations over the language of the peace treaty. The preconditions, the holdup is only over the signing ceremony. And I do think it's important to Azer John as a diploma, a certificate of achievement heralding their victory.”
The Pashinyan government, despite approval ratings below 20% and a heated dispute with the Armenian Orthodox Church, is most likely to win the June 2026 election—less because of support for the government than because of fear and hatred of the opposition, as there is no credible alternative.
“We have an incumbent government that was reelected after losing a war that is most likely to win the next election in the coming June. This is less about support for the government than it is about fear and hatred of the opposition. In other words, there is no credible alternative”
In September 2023, after blockading the single road to Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a rapid offensive that dissolved the de facto Armenian state institutions and caused most of the ethnic Armenian population to flee, so that Nagorno-Karabakh no longer exists as an entity and is now under effective Azerbaijani control.
“they launch an offensive into what remains of Armenian controlled Carabach... They dissolve the de facto state institutions and most of the ethnic Armenian population flees to Armenia. So as an entity, Nagorno Carabach doesn't exist anymore.”
The recent weakness and incompetence of the Russian armed forces revealed by the failed Ukraine invasion is an important lesson in the near abroad, but it is an aberration, not the norm—implying the window of Russian weakness is temporary and 'the clock is ticking' for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to lock in gains.
“a surprisingly incompetent, weak Russian armed forces, which is a very important lesson learned in the near abroad. And I do think that is an aberration. It's not the norm. This is why the clock is ticking for Armenia, for Azerban, and looking to Turkey”
The largely discredited opposition in Armenia remains desperate in pleading for Russian support that hasn't come, reflecting both Russia's weakness and its lack of interest in supporting anti-Pashinyan forces despite Armenian political opposition views.
“We will see the largely discredited opposition in Armenia ever more desperate in its pleading for Russian support that hasn't come”
Even if signed, the peace treaty is punitive and has no international guarantee or guarantor, so Armenia's strategy is to resist the Russian orbit by diversifying security partners while betting heavily on Armenia-Turkey normalization as the positive game-changer.
“this rather punitive peace treaty has no international guarantee nor international guarantor. Therefore, much of Armenia's strategy is to resist the Russian orbit, diversifying its security partners, but also betting heavily on the need for normalization with Turkey as the positive gamecher.”
Azerbaijan has closed negotiations over the language of the peace treaty (the preconditions are agreed), and the only remaining holdup is the signing ceremony itself, which is important to Azerbaijan as a diploma and certificate of achievement heralding their military victory.
“to the credit of Azerbaj, they have closed negotiations over the language of the peace treaty. The preconditions, the holdup is only over the signing ceremony. And I do think it's important to Azer John as a diploma, a certificate of achievement heralding their victory”
Azerbaijan is acting with an emboldened, sometimes reckless defiance of Russia, believing it has stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does, and there will likely be a price to pay over the medium to long term.
“an emboldened Azerban sometimes recklessly so believing it has much stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does... I do think there will be a price to pay over the medium to long term”
Russia is described as an angry, vengeful power on the horizon seeking to regain its lost influence in the region and in Armenia.
“we do see a storm on the horizon, an angry, vengeful Russia seeking to regain its lost power and influence in the region and in Armenia”
Regional transit integration should be the next agenda item if and when a peace deal signing ceremony occurs, as it represents concrete economic benefits from the peace agreement
“that's one of the things that should be right next on the agenda if and when we actually get to the signing ceremony.”
The American president seems very intent on trying to win a Nobel Peace Prize and might be drawn to host an Armenia-Azerbaijan signing ceremony in the White House Rose Garden.
“we do have an American president that seems very intent on trying to win a Nobel Peace Prize. So, I wonder if he might see this... sign this thing in the maybe in the Rose Garden”