Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Geopolitics in the South Caucasus

Armenia has adopted a new, transactional strategy based on a belated recognition that Russia is an unreliable partner, deliberately diversifying security partners not to replace Russia with the West but to balance, contain, or counter Russia—dismissing NATO membership, choosing India (and Japan, South Korea, China) for arms precisely because they are less provocative to Russia.

“Armenia in diversifying security partners is not looking to replace Russia with the west but rather to balance contain or counter Russia... the one and only arms procurement deal since the war was with India on purpose because it's less provocative to Russia”

When Azerbaijan attacked in 2020 and 2023, Russia and the CSTO declined to support Armenia on the grounds that the fighting was confined to Karabakh, which is not juridically part of Armenia—leading many in the Armenian elite to question why they should accept the compromises of Russian dependence if Russia won't provide support when needed.

“Armenian appeals for support were not particularly answered... because the fighting is confined to Carbach which is not jeritically part of Armenia this isn't our problem... why accept all of the compromises that come from being dependent on Russia if at the end of the day Russia's not going to actually be there”

There is a fundamental tension between the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, which is a recurring problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of embedded ethnic autonomies, and it underlay the failure to reach a lasting Karabakh peace deal.

“there's a tension between territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. And this is a problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of these embedded ethnic autonomies”

The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast was a principally ethnic-Armenian region (almost 90% in the early 1920s) assigned to Azerbaijan by the Soviet leadership consistent with Soviet nationality policy, which created ethnically autonomous regions within republics—a pattern that produced many post-Soviet conflicts (Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova).

“the population in the first Soviet census was almost 90% ethnic Armenian of Nagorno Carabach... this was consistent with Soviet nationality policy... many of the postsviet conflicts that we focus on are based on this practice of creating ethnically autonomous regions within individual Soviet socialist republics”

The 2020 war and September 2023 military capture of Nagorno-Karabakh set two dangerous precedents: the validation of the use of force over diplomacy, and the victory of authoritarian power over democracy—both of which, if left unaddressed, could undermine faith and confidence in democracy and Western ideals.

“The first dangerous precedent is this was very much a validation of the use of force over diplomacy and second it was very much a victory of authoritarian power over democracy”

For Armenia the real obstacle to EU aspirations is not the CSTO or the Russian military base but its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union ('Putin's prison'), and there is no real Armenian will to leave that bloc—largely as a lesson learned from Georgia about not provoking Russia.

“It's Armenia's position as a member of Putin's prison, the Eurasian Economic Union. That is really the contradiction that will prevent Armenia's EU aspirations full stop. And there is no real will or decision by Armenia to leave that block.”

Azerbaijan has uniquely among Russia's post-Soviet neighbors established its autonomy from Russia not by integrating with NATO or the West, but through a strong defense, security, and political partnership with Turkey, which allowed it to act militarily in its own region (retaking Nagorno-Karabakh) while remaining insulated from strong Russian military responses.

“Azarbaian more than just about any of them has pushed relatively successfully to establish its autonomy from Russia not by pursuing integration with NATO... but through having a very strong defense and security and political partnership with Turkey and acting autonomously in its own region”

The third element of the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations—connectivity, the restoration of road and rail links plus Armenia-Turkey normalization—is the most promising because economic interdependence is the most effective way for Armenia to restore lost deterrence, making connectivity a strategic imperative, not merely an economic one.

“This connectivity is actually an imperative strategically to regain the loss of deterrence. In other words, economic interdependence as the most effective way to restore deterrence.”

The principal worry for Armenia is not the legitimacy of its democracy—whose credentials are real and hard-fought—but the weakness of the institutions of democracy, whose institutional development should be the coming priority, especially for the West.

“what worries me is not democracy The credentials, the achievements are real... I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy... it's the institutional development of democracy that needs to be the coming priority, especially by the West.”

Geography limits both US and EU engagement: the EU formally expanding into the South Caucasus is challenging because it would share no borders with any regional state, and including Armenia without Georgia is even more complicated since everything must pass through Georgia, which is moving in a retrograde direction.

“The idea of the EU formally expanding into the region would be a challenge given that there would not be any shared EU borders with any of the states in the South Caucuses and including Armenia without including Georgia would be even more complicated because everything would have to pass through Georgia.”

Azerbaijan's 2010s oil and gas boom funded a major military buildup and, combined with the strategic Turkish alliance that trained and in some cases commanded its forces, shifted the balance of power away from Yerevan, enabling Azerbaijan's rapid victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War.

“Azarbaijan's economy booms on the back of its oil and gas. A lot of that money gets funneled into building up the military and so the balance of power between Yeravan and Baku shifts”

Pashinyan's 2018 'velvet revolution' rise to power looked to the Kremlin like a color revolution akin to those in Georgia and Ukraine, generating mistrust; but Pashinyan deliberately emphasized that his accession did not portend a geopolitical reorientation away from Russia, unlike Saakashvili's Georgia.

“His assession to power looked to a lot of people sitting in the Kremlin like a color revolution... Pashanyan made an effort from very early on to emphasize that his assession to power did not pretend a geopolitical revolution that Armenia was not seeking to change its orientation”

US interests in the South Caucasus are comparatively limited; the region is an important transit route, but one of much more benefit to the EU and Turkey than to the US, so it will be the EU (via Global Gateway, TRACECA, and energy companies interested in Caspian oil and gas) that drives engagement, especially if regional peace opens new transit routes.

“the question of of what US interests in the region are... is comparatively limited. It is an important transit route, but one that is of much more benefit to the EU and to Turkey than it is to the United States... it really is going to be the EU that's driving these activities and there's investment through programs like the global gateway, Tresca”

Azerbaijan publicly photographed arrested Russian journalists and citizens who had clearly been physically abused in government custody, and highlighting this is a deliberate, open effort at humiliating Russia—striking coming from a country the size of Azerbaijan.

“these individuals were photographed looking like much the worse for wear like they'd clearly been given the business in in government custody. And to do that and then highlight it uh very publicly is a very open effort at humiliating Russia”

A key Armenian objective of the peace agreement is to plug NATO-member Turkey into the regional security complex and open the Armenia-Turkey border to trade, dramatically reducing Armenia's dependence on Russia and Iran; the Turkish government has signaled it will move quickly on normalization once a deal is signed, with Azerbaijan—not Turkey—being the current obstacle.

“Opening the border between Armenia and Turkey to trade, which would dramatically reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia and Iran... the obstacle right now is not Turkey so much as it is Azarbaijan and that the Turkish government has made clear that as soon as there's a deal, they're ready to move very quickly”

The escalation of tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan can be read as a Russian effort to 'throw sand in the gears' of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, pressuring Azerbaijan to adhere to Russian preferences, because the consummation of a bilateral peace deal negotiated with minimal Russian participation would be a significant blow to Russia's ability to manipulate regional dynamics.

“one way to read the escalation of tensions between these two countries is an effort to throw sand in the gears of this process to force... Azarbaijan to adhere to a certain subset if you will of Russian preferences”

The current round of Armenia-Azerbaijan talks has excluded both the West and Russia, which localizes the post-war negotiations and helps prevent Russia from becoming more of a spoiler; the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh thus also means the loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.

“the current round of talks between Armenia and Azure John have now excluded both the West and Russia. And this is very much localizing both the post-war negotiations, but also doing a good job at preventing Russia from becoming more of a spoiler... the loss of Norno Carabah is also a loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.”

A direct US role in the region is not welcome from an Armenian perspective, because if the US prioritizes Armenia-Turkey normalization it would provoke an unnecessary reaction from both Moscow and Erdogan; the EU is the less provocative and already-engaged actor, with an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia.

“a US role is not welcome... when and if the US prioritizes Armenia Turkey normalization that will be a blow to that potential opening... it will provoke an unnecessary reaction from Moscow as well as Erdogan. At the same time, it's the European Union that's the less provocative actor.”

Armenia's 2018 change of government was a rare victory of nonviolent people power, which (from an American perspective where nonviolence usually fails) gives Armenia a rare commodity—legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials—positioning it better than its neighbors for real stability.

“We saw a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia, defying the odds and expectations. From an American perspective, nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails... Armenia is now better positioned than all of her neighbors in terms of the outlook for real stability.”

Azerbaijan's government under Ilham Aliyev uses conflict with external actors (Russia, Armenia, Iran) as a domestic political tool, since the father-to-son dynasty benefits from having a cause to rally the public around, especially now that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is off the table.

“there are domestic political reasons for the government of Il Hamalyia of the importance of you know having a cause to rally the the public around now that the negro Carbach issue is sort of off the table”

The Armenian church conflict is both less and more than it seems: less because it is unfinished personal business between the impulsive prime minister and a notoriously corrupt, authoritarian church head tied to the previous government; more because it connects to Russia, evidenced by the arrest of a Russian-Armenian businessman and a weapons seizure tied to a fifth alleged coup attempt.

“It's less than it seems because it's not new... This is a personal clash more than a political conflict... It's also more than it seems because it's also about Russia where we see the arrest of the Russian Armenian businessman. We see also the seizure of weapons in the fifth now fifth coup attempt allegation”

Russia's distraction and being overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine created both an opening and an opportunity for Azerbaijan to challenge Russia, leaving Moscow reactive and not paying attention to developments on the ground.

“There is both an opening and an opportunity for Azeran to challenge Russia and that is Russia's distraction where Moscow is overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine”

The Armenian government has reached a post-war accommodation in which it is 'cutting its losses,' treating Nagorno-Karabakh as gone, with no move to rearm or retake lost territory—and the current peace treaty is strictly bilateral, having nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh directly.

“for the Armenian prime minister, what is lost is gone. There is no move by Armenia's government to rearm or to actually retake lost territory... the current bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Alzaran is just that bilateral. It has nothing to do with Norno Carabach directly.”

After the 2023 loss of Karabakh, Armenia pushed away from Russia—freezing CSTO membership, skipping summits, floating EU membership, signing arms deals with India and France, and engaging Turkey—largely to demonstrate that it had other options and was not a Russian vassal.

“the Armenian government made a big push to move away from Russia to deepen ties with Western institutions and this meant you freezing membership in the CSTTO... signed a big arms deal with India and also with France”

Two indicators signal whether the Russia-Armenia relationship has reached genuine crisis: first, whether Vladimir Putin himself (rather than Lavrov, Peskov, or the foreign ministry spokeswoman) elevates the anti-Armenia discourse; and second, a 'bellwether test'—whether Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.

“The messenger is very important... it's not Vladimir Putin... And the second reason is there's a bellweather test. We will know we've crossed the line with Russia when and if Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.”

Iran has long neglected and refuses to return to its traditional role as a regional player in the South Caucasus, remaining overwhelmed by everything else, so the current dynamic is essentially between Russia, Turkey, and to a degree the EU—with Iran notably absent.

“Iran has long neglected and still refuses to return to its role traditionally as a regional player. Iran is not present. This is between Russia and Turkey and to a degree the EU. Iran remains overwhelmed by everything else.”

A democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not much of a threat to Putin's Russia given Russia's economic leverage and dominance over key sectors of the Armenian economy, especially energy—so there is no genuine crisis or real risk of direct Russian intervention at present.

“for Putin's Russia, a democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not that much of a threat given Russia's economic leverage and Russia's position over key sectors of the economy, especially energy... I don't see a real risk or threat of direct Russian intervention”

Negotiations over the language of the peace treaty are effectively closed; the only remaining holdup is the signing ceremony itself, which is important to Azerbaijan as a 'certificate of achievement' heralding its victory.

“they have closed negotiations over the language of the peace treaty. The preconditions, the holdup is only over the signing ceremony. And I do think it's important to Azer John as a diploma, a certificate of achievement heralding their victory.”

The Pashinyan government, despite approval ratings below 20% and a heated dispute with the Armenian Orthodox Church, is most likely to win the June 2026 election—less because of support for the government than because of fear and hatred of the opposition, as there is no credible alternative.

“We have an incumbent government that was reelected after losing a war that is most likely to win the next election in the coming June. This is less about support for the government than it is about fear and hatred of the opposition. In other words, there is no credible alternative”

In September 2023, after blockading the single road to Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a rapid offensive that dissolved the de facto Armenian state institutions and caused most of the ethnic Armenian population to flee, so that Nagorno-Karabakh no longer exists as an entity and is now under effective Azerbaijani control.

“they launch an offensive into what remains of Armenian controlled Carabach... They dissolve the de facto state institutions and most of the ethnic Armenian population flees to Armenia. So as an entity, Nagorno Carabach doesn't exist anymore.”