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3 May 2024 - EPC Talks Geopolitics with Sergey Radchenko
The European Policy Centre had the pleasure of hosting the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor Sergey Radchenko from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. EPC Talks Geopolitics is a signature initiative, that aims to engage with globally renowned speakers in an interactive conversation on geopolitical issues. Professor Radchenko discussed the impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Sino-Russian relations, long-term trends in Russian foreign policy, and the extent of the measures adopted by the West to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine.
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Renko argues that Russian foreign policy is characterized by deep continuity rooted in the pursuit of great power status, legitimacy, and security rather than ideological commitment, and that Russia's current revisionist imperialism reflects a failure to develop a coherent national identity after the Soviet collapse.
- Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev prioritized legitimacy and recognition as a great power over communist ideology, as evidenced by their desperate need for US validation despite military strength
- Russia's search for identity oscillates between discredited ideologies (communism, fascism, nationalism) because it lacks genuine soft power and cultural appeal, forcing it to rely on military coercion
- The West's ambiguous deterrence policy toward Russia throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War periods reflects genuine uncertainty about whether firmness prevents or provokes Russian aggression, leaving policy paralyzed
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Soviet leaders from Stalin through Gorbachev valued status and legitimacy as much as or more than ideology; they desired to be recognized as a great power on the international stage and felt deeply insecure despite their military strength, requiring external validation particularly from the United States.
“the Soviet leaders from Stalin really all the way to gorbachov valued uh status they wanted to be recognized as a great power on the international stage they wanted a sense of legitimacy... I saw uh people who were obsessed by issues like legitimacy issues like security and actually those issues were interrelated so they for for for them to be secure they they had to feel legitimated by somebody else”
Brezhnev told Kissinger in 1973 at a hunting lodge near Moscow that the Soviet Union's objective was to 'manage the world together with the United States,' reflecting an aspiration to co-manage global affairs rather than unilateral domination, though the Soviets lacked the economic means to realize this ambition.
“brn told Kissinger you know I'll tell you without you know no takers without anything what we want to do is we want to manage the world together with the United States we want to run the world”
The Soviet leadership recognized by the mid-1960s that the idea of building communism was an unachievable dream, as evidenced by internal Party debates on economic policy recorded in Politburo documents.
“by the mid 1960s they realized that this idea of building communism was actually an unachievable dream and you can see this very clearly in the internal records of the Soviet Communist party when they debated the economic questions of the polit bureau”
Russia is a much weaker partner to China than in the past, and if China chooses to exercise power over Russia on key issues, Russia has historically claimed strategic independence and would face a difficult situation being effectively vassalized by China—which would contradict Russia's long-term strategic interests.
“today Russia is a much weaker partner to China and China has not cracked the whip yet um but if they do on some issues with regard to Russia you know I want to see how Russia reacts to this because they've always talked about strategic Independence and you know breaking out from this dictat of the West only to find themselves in the you know as a effectively vassalized by China not good idea from Russia's perspective of Russia's long-term strategic interest”
Russian intentions are not static; Russia's intentions shift in response to Western intentions and signaling, so if the West openly declares it will not defend Ukraine, this will adequately inform and shift Russian intentions toward greater aggression.
“intentions are not static and intentions of Russia would respond to what intentions of the West are so you know if you openly declare that we're not going to defend Ukraine well it it will adequately inform Russia's intentions”
In the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections following Yeltsin's crackdown, the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), an ultranationalist/fascist party under Vladimir Zhirinovsky, won the most seats, followed by the Communist Party, meaning that fascists and communists together commanded a large part of Russian parliamentary support.
“when after the um after the after yon's Crackdown against the uh against then Parliament Supreme Soviet in in October 1993 new constitution was adopted and elections were held for the Duma uh the first Duma if you remember which party won the elections effectively ldpr Vladimir jankowski's liberal Democratic party which of course was neither liberal nor Democratic uh but really fascist party they actually came first uh followed by the prover party followed by the Communists”
Historians and policymakers cannot definitively resolve debates about whether earlier Western toughness toward Russia (in 2013, 2014, or otherwise) would have prevented Russian aggression, since neither the 'firmness would have deterred' nor the 'firmness would have provoked' positions have empirical evidence.
“those people who argue that it would have changed things don't really have any evidence those people who argue that it would not have changed things also don't have any evidence so that's a debate that cannot be resolved”
Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in March 1985 and subsequent reforms show that major system change can happen rapidly and unexpectedly, contradicting assumptions that the Soviet Union was destined to persist indefinitely.
“we have to be uh mindful of uh similar debates back in the 70s and 80s when nobody really thought that the Soviet Union was going to collapse then M gorbachov comes to power in March 1985 and things start to change really really rapidly”
The post-Cold War comparison to pre-WWI world is incorrect because nuclear weapons, which emerged from 1945 through late 1950s-early 1960s, have permanently changed international politics in ways that continue to affect our lives.
“one people today say the world is very similar to the first to the world prior to First World War I disagree strongly because we do have the element of nuclear Revolution that unfolded from 1945 until really the late 1950s early 60s uh and that really changed International politics forever in ways that continue to affect our affect our lives today”
During the early Cold War, the West faced uncertainty about whether Stalin had maximalist (complete domination of Europe) or limited (great power cooperation) intentions, and could not definitively determine his true aims.
“during the early Cold War the West faced very similar questions should we should we push back against Stalin or uh should we try to cooperate with Stalin and maybe indulge him maybe make concessions uh when we started this question now from the Soviet side we recognized that Stalin may have not had the maximalist aim so in other words he was looking for cooperation in some form you some form of great power cooperation this is no longer really even a Content contentious issue however here's the problem the West did not know at the time what Stalin's intentions were Washington nobody you Truman did not know”
The West and Russia are both nuclear powers with capability for mutual destruction, so acknowledging Russian nuclear weapons as a constraint on policy is not 'playing into Russian threats' but rather recognizing a geopolitical reality that will not change regardless of whether the West acknowledges it.
“the uh uh it doesn't really have to anything to do with us fear in nuclear escalation or not I mean the reality is that Russia is a nuclear power doesn't nuclear weapons it has the ability to destroy the world and we can say ah you know that doesn't matter we can just ignore it but the fact that we ignore that will not actually change this basic fact now you might argue that by acknowledging this that this actually uh is playing into Russia's nuclear threats and so this is actually helping Russia in some way but the counter argument to that is if you don't acknowledge that does that change anything”
The Soviet economy failed fundamentally because it could not compete in consumer goods and broader economic competition with the West, as symbolized by poor-quality Soviet toilet paper, making economic failure a key reason for Soviet collapse rather than political or military factors.
“here I've got a prop here on my shelf I'll show you show our viewers I always have that I I use it in my class but this here is of course Soviet toilet paper um and and you can see if you if you could feel it you would recognize that it's not of great quality the Soviets could not compete”
Countries take generations and centuries to change, so there is an unchanging aspect to Russian policies from Tsarist times through Soviet times to today, though this should not be overemphasized.
“countries take Generations centuries to change and there is an unchanging aspect I won't say I won't overemphasize it because if we say that Russia never changes it just means that we're ignoring uh in parts of History where it did rapidly change um but there is some continuity to the kind of policies that Moscow has pursued from the Taris times to the Soviet times and you might argue even today”
In 1968, Soviet Politburo member Yuri Andropov wrote a memorandum to Leonid Brezhnev stating 'we're losing the Cold War' due to inadequate investment in education, lagging R&D compared to the United States, and lower labor efficiency.
“in 1968 Yuri andropov wrote a memorandum to to bnv in which he said we're he Lally said we're losing the Cold War we're not investing enough in education our R&D research and development is lagging far behind the United States we have lower labor efficiency”
Russian economic transition in the 1990s did not succeed, contributing to public desperation and support for extremist parties, consistent with Truman's 1947 statement that tyranny thrives on misery and want.
“there's the economic component the fact that Russia was obviously badly affected by uh economic reforms that were launched in the late 1980s and things were really falling apart on that front and when you're effectively starving then you know who do you vote for it's like Truman said said in his address to Congress in 1947 that uh uh that you know seeds of of tyranny are nurtured by misery and want and that's of course what we had in Russia as well uh Russia's economic transition did not succeed”
Leonid Brezhnev adopted a foreign policy centered on bringing peace to the world and seeking nuclear arms control with the United States, representing a shift from communist ideological expansion to pragmatic great-power management.
“brnik comes through with his vision of a peace you know he was a peacemaker Vlad zubok writes about it in his book on the on the Soviet period And I discovered this as well in all conversations that brn was having with foreign leaders domestically said you know I'm M motivated by this idea of bringing peace to the world and hence we have DET taunt with the United States nuclear arms control”
We are currently living through a period that resembles the Cold War in many ways, returning to themes prevalent during that era after 30 years of apparent departure following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991.
“We are living through a period now that in so many ways resembles the Cold War and that is something uh somewhat unexpected remember that moment in 1989 November 1989 the Berlin Wall Falls... well here 30 years later we are returning uh to some of those themes that were also prevalent during the uh Cold War”
Nikita Khrushchev promised in 1960 that the Soviet Union would build communism by 1980, but instead of fulfilling this promise, the USSR diverted resources to hosting the Olympics in 1980, which reflects the vast gap between communist promises and achieved reality.
“cornicopia of just you know boundless wealth Etc and toilets made of gold and so on and so forth uh and you read it you think you know are these people real I mean is but they were really driven by this ideas that you could increase material Prosperity... kov promised in 1960 to build communism by 1980 as the joke goes you remember the Soviet joke that instead of full fulfilling This Promise they decided to host the Olympics in 1980 and that's that's about that kind of tells the story”
The idea that Russia would expand beyond Ukraine to occupy Europe or other territories is not a realistic threat because Russia does not have the military capabilities to accomplish such conquest, despite Russian victories in Ukraine.
“but you could also say well but on the other hand you maybe they won't because Article 5 is a real thing maybe they will not dare to test it and so as horrible as things are in Ukraine but really the threat of Russian expansion and occupation of Europe or whatever is not a realistic threat because they don't have the capabilities of doing so”
Countries like Georgia and Ukraine aspire to self-determination and are being pulled away from Russian sphere of influence not primarily through Russian choice but through their own aspirations and Western opportunities.
“there are lots of countries Georgia today that is you know as sping for self-determination which is predominantly not you know not being pulled into into the sphere of influence of of Russia”
The Soviet Union continued searching for a coherent national identity and ideology throughout the 1980s as communism lost credibility, which created a vacuum that contributed to the rise of nationalism in Soviet republics and ultimately to the USSR's disintegration in 1991.
“they were still looking for an identity and of course in that context in the 1980s you have the beginning of real stirring of of kind of nationalism uh in some Soviet republics leading all the way of course to uh to disintegration of the USSR in 1991 and still they were looking for idea”
Russia experienced only a flawed, brief period of democracy from roughly 1989 (under Gorbachev's reforms) through at most 1993 (Yeltsin's crackdown on Parliament), characterized as 'unruly democracy' rather than consolidated democratic governance.
“if Russia was ever Democratic it was very flawed democracy um I would say period from sort of the height of gorbachov's reforms maybe from 1989 from the election into the Supreme Soviet uh although that of course was not really free and fair election... through I don't know even when to end this perhaps in 93 with yelton's Crackdown against the Supreme Soviet”
Russia is deeply opportunistic and recognizes its limitations sometimes; it responds well to the logic of force more than to the logic of reason, as George Kennan observed in his 1946 Long Telegram, and this observation remains valid today.
“my reading of Russia is that it's deeply opportunistic and it recognizes sometimes sometimes at least sometimes it recognizes its limitations uh I think Kenan writing The Long Telegram in 1946 wasn't too far off the mark the Russians are impervious to the logic of reason but are highly sensitive to the logic of force I think that observation Still Remains”
Even when Soviet reforms in the mid-to-late 1980s did trickle down to the masses, massive demonstrations in Moscow in the late 1980s and early 1990s showed that mobilization is possible, suggesting Russian society can be mobilized if conditions permit.
“some of those reforms did trickle down to large masses of population you remember massive demonstrations in Moscow in late 1980s early 1990s that is also certainly a fact so people can can be mobilized”
Putin's 2007 Munich speech marked an important turning point in which he expressed bitterness and resentment toward the West, suggesting that Western policies may have catalyzed rather than merely responded to Russian revisionism.
“rightly identify 2007 as an important Turning Point with his Munich speech and if you read it today you'll see the bitterness the resentment of being somehow mistreated that's another feature of Russian and and Soviet policy makers anger oh anger your resentment”
There is a fundamental dilemma in deterring Russian aggression: overly firm deterrence may actually trigger the very Russian aggression it seeks to prevent, creating a 'security spiral' where attempts to deter provoke escalation instead.
“there's a danger of in in over deterring in other words you you think you're deterring somebody but then you actually end up triggering further uh deterioration of relations it's a you know spiral of in security spiral is um as Robert Jervis of course an IR theorist has described it”
The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit's promise of potential NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, though without a real timeframe or clear pathway, was a strategic mistake because it encouraged these countries while simultaneously triggering paranoid Russian reactions and reinforcing Russian imperial anxieties.
“one thing that did happen in 2008 which I think in retrospect was a strategic mistake uh was the way the Bucharest um promise about NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia was handled why was it a strategic mistake because we know now with the passage of time that there was no real intention to allow any of you know other of these countries to join in any foreseeable future but this was a kind of a way to know that encouraged encouraged those countries and into thinking that they could potentially join NATO without actually providing any real uh um any real PA you know path towards membership and that but that also did enough to basically trigger paranoid Uh Russian governments into thinking that Russia was being surrounded by NATO”
After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Russia briefly flirted with the idea of becoming part of Europe and joining NATO, but this path was not viable, leading Russia to embrace 19th-century imperialism as its governing ideology—a tragic return to historical patterns.
“even after uh the Soviet Union disintegrated new Russia was trying to figure out what to do in the world they briefly flirted with the idea of becoming part of Europe and you know were hoping to join NATO it turned out that they couldn't really do that um in the end I think the you know looking through the list of tried and tested ideas they thought oh check this one out the 19th century idea of imperialism that that seems to work for us right so they tragically embrac this idea and here we are again history is repeating itself”
Putin made initially reasonably positive statements in the early 2000s about democracy, economic recovery, and Russia's potential membership in NATO, suggesting his ideological commitment to historical revisionism may have evolved rather than existing from the start of his tenure.
“if we go back to the early 2000s uh Putin was making sometimes reasonably positive sounds you know he was on good terms with Western leaders and he did not always talk about historical revisionism he talked about democracy he talked about you know the importance of economic recovery hence his statement that Russia is rising from its knees... he talked about Russia's membership in NATO”
Russia's claim to a 'sphere of influence' and its insistence on imposing itself on neighboring countries reflects a return to 19th-century imperialism, whereas other rising powers like Japan have demonstrated an alternative model: soft power based on innovation, technology, and creativity that makes other nations want to associate with them.
“if you look at Japan which is you know also former let's say aggress the country you know it has it it has a vision in a sense that you know it doesn't have the natural resources for example the way Russia has but it has it uses the brains you know the innov ation technology creativity um in order to lead by example and this way dominate if you wish the world”
Russia has not developed genuine civil society or democratic institutions comparable to those in Western countries or in former Soviet states like the Baltic states and some Latin American countries that successfully transitioned.
“in terms of the Civic Awakening or the you know institutional reforms as we understand them in the west that they haven't that hasn't really happened in the in the way for example it happened in the Baltic states or perhaps in Latin American countries”
Modern Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, has more economically adaptable consumer goods and cultural sectors; it is not as economically sclerotic as the Soviets were, which provides regime stability even under sanctions.
“Russia's economy today is more adaptable than the Soviet economy if you think about why the whole Soviet Enterprise collapsed... if you go to Russia you'll recognize that actually in terms of consumer goods in terms of you know culture in many across a large number uh of economic indicators Russia is not doing too badly”
The Putin regime is more ideologically fragile than the Soviet regime because the Soviet system had a well-structured, consistently applied ideology enforced through party cells at every level, whereas Putin's regime relies on personalistic power without coherent ideological institutions.
“in the ideological sense the Soviet regime was more resilient than the current regime why is that because the Soviets did have a fairly well structured ideology there was an ideological depart Department it was all consistent the party had far you was was influential at every level there were party cells everywhere the party directed Affairs of of every aspect of State life and foreign policy we don't see this today there is no real party of power you know there's United Russia that doesn't matter there's there's the siki that obviously you know do their own thing uh and then there's Putin which calls you know who calls all the shots”
Russia is currently suffering under sanctions and having difficulty importing computer chips, and its long-term economic prospects are uncertain due to heavy military spending, which is a long-term liability for the regime.
“Russia is suffering under sanctions and it's having trouble importing chips and and long-term prospects of the Russian economy very uncertain uh and the fact that it's over investing in the military certainly a long-term liability”
The Sino-Russian relationship is highly complicated and should not be presented as a monolithic alliance; China does not back Russia on every issue, and the 'No Limits partnership' is a phrase China and Russia have not used for more than two years (since around 2021-2022).
“the AO Russian relationship is is highly complicated presenting it as um an alliance is misguided uh simply because they have a lot of contradictions China does not back Russia on every issue uh the so-called No Limits partnership is a phrase that they have not been using for more than two years”
The West possesses both nuclear weapons like Russia and greater collective economic and military might, which is often forgotten in discussions of nuclear deterrence, suggesting Western asymmetric advantages are underappreciated.
“Russia is nuclear but so are we that's right that's right which is often forgotten”
The West should take a more proactive stance toward Russia and Ukraine, overcoming its fears; the current paralysis is partly driven by fear of escalation and nuclear retaliation, but this fear is not proportionate to rational analysis of the actual risks.
“let's believe in ourselves we can do better than this”
Renko distinguishes between comparing Putin to Stalin (which he rejects as unfounded) and analyzing Putin's regime independently; he notes that while Putin's regime is 'certainly not a Stalin,' it is still a troubling dictatorship with potential for further deterioration.
“this is not to draw a direct comparison between Stalin and Putin by the way when people make that comparison I think they don't really know what they're talking about simply because stalinism was with all you know with all uh uh with all that we know about hideous regime uh of of putins it's he's certainly not a Stalin um thankfully he may still become but not yet”
Modern Russia, like the Soviet Union, possesses a sense of 'special entitlement to Greatness' based on historical achievements (space exploration, World War II victory, nuclear weapons) but lacks the economic and cultural resources to translate this into actual global influence, creating a chronic mismatch between aspirations and reality.
“the Kremlin the elites even you might say the broader public have a sense of some kind of a special entitlement to Greatness we are so great why is it that we're so great well you know but we sent the person into space and we won over you know the Nazis and uh uh and we have the nuclear bomb that really empowers it gives you feeling of greatness but but there's just not all that much else”
The Great Leap Forward under Mao Zedong in China in the late 1950s-early 1960s led to the death of at least 35 million people, perhaps more, representing a catastrophic failure of centrally planned economic policy and utopian revolutionary ambition.
“China of course tragically so in those very years launched the great Lort which led to the death of at least 35 million people perhaps even more”
In 1958, Khrushchev and Mao met in a swimming pool in Beijing and discussed a vision of absolute utopia with boundless wealth and even toilets made of gold, reflecting grandiose and unrealistic expectations.
“I I I discovered in the book was the was uh was a conversation between kov and mount song in 1958 which we haven't seen before where where they uh kov goes to Beijing and they meet with M inside of a swimming pool it's a well-known episode but we didn't have the record of this particular conversation and there they start to talk about the future of the world and it is ridiculous it is ridiculous what they were proposing you know this kind of vision of absolute Utopia uh cornicopia of just you know bound you know boundless wealth Etc and toilets made of gold”
Russia's search for identity and place in the world is fundamentally driven by internal questions about who Russia is, with Russia's vision defined relationally (through others) rather than internally, making it cyclically expansionist and revisionist.
“sometimes it seems to me why is Russia having this this Take On The World and and this revisionist expansionist take that is recurring it's like cyclical um and perhaps that's to do with Russia searching um who it is and for its Vision or purpose and that's fundamentally being defined Visa others”
Resentment and anger are recurring features of Russian and Soviet policymakers' psychology, manifesting in bitterness toward perceived mistreatment and unfair treatment—a psychological pattern that explains some of Russia's foreign policy behavior.
“bitterness the resentment of being somehow mistreated that's another feature of Russian and and Soviet policy makers anger oh anger your resentment how you know why is it that we're treated like this that's unfair”
Even if free and fair elections were held in Russia today, Renko cannot vouch that liberal democrats would win a majority, suggesting that the Russian population's preference for authoritarianism may be deeper than recent historical circumstances.
“and that's very disturbing thought that if today we held uh free and fair elections in Russia they would of course be very contentious and uh uh there would be a lot of quarreling going on but I cannot vouch for the fact that liberal Democrats would actually uh win a majority in those selections”
After Putin's death or departure from power, the Russian system could prove more fragile in ideological terms than the Soviet system proved after Stalin's death, potentially creating an opportunity for more moderate policies or system transformation.
“so with Putin gone there is certainly a possibility that the system will prove to be more fragile in ideological sense than the Soviet Union proved after Stalin's death”
Khrushchev was hopeful in the 1950s that the Soviet Union would surpass the world with its accomplishments and break through to demonstrate superiority.
“kov was very hopeful in the 1950s that Russia would the Soviet Union would break through and uh would just wound the world with all of its uh accomplishments”
Valentin Berezhkov served as interpreter for Brezhnev during his hunting outing with Kissinger in 1973, providing a witness to the conversation about running the world.
“not a little actually for a large daa outside of Moscow in zavida and um uh they they were went hunting BS if you can imagine that Kissinger they're in a hunting Tower with BR hunting BS they was just the two of them plots the Victor suad The Interpreter”