The Legacy of Stalin's Leadership During World War II and Its Relevance to Today's War in Ukraine
What this covers
On March 29, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs hosted Dr. Stephen Kotkin as he dove into the Soviet Union's victory in World War II and its relevance to contemporary conflicts. He examined topics such as the importance of strong leadership in times of crisis, the use of propaganda and disinformation, and the role of international alliances and diplomacy in resolving conflicts.
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Cotkin argues that winning wars requires destroying the enemy's ability or will to fight, but winning the peace—sustaining victory across generations—requires political alternatives to the opposing regime and is far harder than military victory; Ukraine must secure an armistice, EU accession, and security guarantees rather than pursue maximalist territorial demands if it wishes to build a durable peace.
- Most wars lasting over six months become wars of attrition where will to fight and capacity to fight matter more than battlefield maneuver; the US won WWII by destroying German and Japanese productive capacity, not by breaking morale
- Stalin won the war militarily through management of production and willingness to absorb casualties, but lost the peace because all Soviet territorial gains were reversed after his death, showing that military victory without a sustainable political settlement is ephemeral
- To deter Putin from future aggression, the West must foster political alternatives to his regime rather than consolidate his rule through sanctions; Ukraine's durable peace depends on NATO/EU integration and a security guarantee, not maximum territorial recovery
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A prevalent theory that emerged from German generals sponsored by the US military after WWII portrayed Hitler as a poor military commander who made mistakes, while Soviet victory is often incorrectly attributed to 'General Winter' (the Russian winter) rather than Soviet military achievement.
“one theory is probably still the most prevalent in some ways which is that Hitler made mistakes Hitler was a poor military leader he made a lot of mistakes and then of course there was General winter that is to say the severity of the Russian winter and so Stalin didn't really win Hitler lost that explanation comes from the generals the German generals who survived the war and were sponsored by the U.S military to write an analysis of the war”
Destroying the ability to fight (productive capacity: tank factories, airplane factories, ball bearing factories, aluminum factories) is distinct from and more decisive than destroying individual military assets on the battlefield; the US won WWII primarily by using air power to annihilate German and Japanese industrial capacity, not by killing soldiers.
“the ability to fight is not the stuff you have and you're using it's the stuff to replenish what you have and you're using that's lost in the fight so if you destroy German tanks or Japanese planes that's one thing on the battlefield okay I get that but the point is they can potentially replace them and if they can replace them at scale and if they can produce even more than they lost they can continue the fight but if you destroy their productive capacities if you annihilate their tank factories their airplane factories their bull bearings factories their Metals factories they're aluminum factories if you annihilate that productive capacity then their ability to continue the fight at some point is lost”
Nazi atrocities consolidated Soviet patriotism, transforming it from a pre-existing sentiment into an unbreakable will to resist; the combination of Ukrainian valor and Russian atrocities is the driving force of the current war, demonstrating that atrocities can paradoxically strengthen enemy resolve.
“Nazi atrocities completely Consolidated Soviet patriotism such that they were ready to die they were ready to absorb any costs to defeat these Nazi Invaders and so you can see this Ukrainian Valor right plus Russian atrocities is the driving force of the war that we have currently going on and you can see that this was a decisive factor for the Soviets able to sustain the Eastern Front battle despite everything”
The US and European technology transfer to the Soviet Union in the 1930s—including tank prototypes, blueprints, and machinery for every major Soviet Five-Year Plan except synthetic rubber—enabled Stalin to build the military-industrial complex that produced Soviet weaponry decisive in defeating Nazi Germany during WWII.
“there was a post-world War II Cold War accusations against the foreign companies that had Supply technology in the 1930s to Stalin they said you know every single Five-Year Plan first and second Five-Year Plan 1930s a technology that the Soviets used to industrialize was supplied by a European or American company with the exception of synthetic rubber and so Stalin could have never industrialized without the west... when the Soviets say that it wasn't Len lease it was Soviet production they don't say that the original technology for the Soviet tank industry was American and British through the sales of the western companies in the 30s so unintentionally the U.S and others enabled the Soviet Union to have the military-industrial complex that produce the Soviet production during World War II”
Tanks on the battlefield have a shelf life of a few days before breaking down and require skilled workers in nearby workshops for repair; sending tanks without sending thousands of workers and workshops close to the battlefield makes tank supply ineffective because damaged tanks cannot be repaired and returned to the front.
“tanks on the battlefield have a shelf life of a few days and then they break down and then you need skilled workers and workshops to fix the tanks so you can send 100 tanks provided you send 10 000 workers and workshops close to the battlefield so that when the tanks break down after four or four and a half days you can fix them and send them back to the front as opposed to ship them all the way back to Germany on a rail on a flat car to be fixed there”
Stalin could absorb vast casualties among enslaved collective farmers without concern for human cost because he ruled a totalitarian system with a young, large population compared to Germany, allowing him to use mass casualties as a substitute for sophisticated military strategy.
“when Stalin lost millions and millions of people he didn't care they were enslaved Farmers so-called Collective farmers and if he lost a million of them to encirclement he would just get another million more... the Soviet Union was one of the youngest countries in the world much younger population than Germany and a much larger population of Germany and they were enslaved so Stalin had vast resources to lose on the battlefield in his mistakes and he didn't care about the number of casualties”
Democracies cannot fight like totalitarian systems because they care about every soldier and cannot throw soldiers into a meat grinder to compensate for lack of resources or military skill; this structural difference constrains how democracies can sustain wars of attrition.
“democracies can't fight like that we care about every one of our soldiers on the battlefield and we can't throw them into a meat grinder and just say well we lack this and we lack that so we'll use Mass Stalin could do that and he did do that and he had no Pains of conscience”
Stalin's territorial gains achieved by the Red Army in Eastern Europe, including advances to Berlin, were subsequently lost over decades after his death; Soviet troops retreated along the same roads that Napoleon had retreated centuries earlier, demonstrating that military victory without a sustainable peace settlement is ephemeral.
“Stalin lost the peace decades after he died you see because all those positions that he attained with the Red Army in Eastern Europe all the way up to Berlin right when Stalin got to Berlin Harriman congratulated him Marshall Stalin you made it to Berlin... the Soviet Union itself dissolved and the troops which were now Russian troops no longer Soviet troops by 1994 retreated out of those Advanced positions all the way back to Russia along the same roads that Napoleon had retreated Napoleon retreated in One Direction and the Russian troops now retreating in the opposite direction much later than Napoleon”
Drones are essentially munitions, not fundamentally different items; they are high-tech on social media and the battlefield, but they function as consumable ordnance in the same way as artillery shells, and their depletion constrains fighting capacity just like ammunition depletion.
“drones are just Munitions by the way they're only high-tech things on Twitter and the battlefield drones are just Munitions and so artillery shells and drones are how you continue to be able to fight”
Most wars lasting longer than six months or a year transition from a war of maneuver to a war of attrition, where victory depends on each side's will to fight and capacity to fight rather than rapid tactical success.
“after about six months of a war of maneuver a war of Maneuvers when somebody attacks and they move really quickly after about six months if you haven't won a decisive victory you end up in a war of attrition and the vast majority of wars that last more than six months or more than a year are Wars of attrition”
China is dependent on Western technology transfer and has hundreds of thousands of students studying in US universities and labs, demonstrating that technology development remains China's central strategic dependency despite sensationalist narratives about Chinese technological dominance.
“despite the sensationalist discussions about how China is ahead in Tech there's a reason that they had hundreds of thousands of students at our universities in our science labs and we had 15 students studying Chinese language in China most recent year or maybe was 35 in 2020 2021 whatever it was and so yeah so the relationship is more complex than we understand... the West are those countries that have rule of law... they're dependent on Tech transfer as far as the eye can see because we have it we develop it they do try to develop it themselves they do try to obtain it without paying for it on occasion”
By 1943-1944, the US possessed phenomenal and increasing productive capacity for destructive equipment, which barely existed in 1939 and was not ready in 1941, demonstrating that the US mobilized industrial capacity over time rather than possessing it at war's outset.
“by 43 and 44 we were producing just phenomenal amounts of destructive equipment to take on the Germans and the Japanese right... by the U.S's productive capacity during World War II was phenomenal and kept increasing it didn't really exist in 1939 and barely existed in 1941. we were not ready for the war but we developed this productive capacity”
If the West does not destroy Russian production facilities and does not create political alternatives to Putin's regime, the West must break Russia's will to fight, which is the remaining lever; without ability destruction or alternative creation, forcing war termination requires breaking Russian political will.
“we're not destroying his ability to fight the war and we're not destroying his will to fight the war and so if we're not going to bomb his production facilities or the production of facilities of Iran North Korea and other places he's getting stuff then we have to go after his will to fight and that's this political alternative space”
The death toll of World War II was approximately 55 million, exponentially more than World War I, and a World War III with modern weaponry would represent another exponential increase in casualties.
“the death total of World War II is around 55 million if you take the low end estimates for deaths in China 55 million which is exponentially more than World War One so you can only imagine World War III with the Weaponry that we have today there would be another exponential difference between the potential casualties there”
The Crimea problem creates a difficult constraint on sustainable peace: Crimea has a large Russian-speaking, Russian-loyal population, and Ukrainian control of Crimea might be strategically necessary (as a platform for attack) but politically destabilizing (as an ethnic Russian territory ruled by Ukraine).
“think about that for winning the piece of Russian president today tomorrow 20 years from now will they accept Ukrainian control over Crimean Peninsula for generationally having a large Russian speaking Russian loyal population inside your country in Crimea how would that work for stabilization and your ability to sustain the peace over time... the ukrainians say that we if we don't take Crimea back the Russians can use it to attack us again it's a platform for attacking us again and I say they have that platform already it's called Russia and it's on your borders”
The Western media is not covering the war objectively but is fighting the war on behalf of Ukraine by amplifying Ukrainian military intelligence propaganda about Russian disintegration, which becomes self-fulfilling prophecy coverage rather than factual reporting.
“Ukrainian military intelligence right propaganda Prosecuting the war that enters our bloodstream and becomes media coverage of the war our media are not covering the war they're fighting the war on behalf of Ukraine by putting this Ukrainian effective in some ways disinformation about Russia is going to disintegrate soon to be a self-fulfilling prophecy”
Sanctions consolidate authoritarian regimes by forcing private sector dependence on state and driving opposition underground or into exile, reducing political alternatives and thus strengthening rather than weakening autocrats, making sanctions counterproductive for regime change.
“the political effects are consolidating the autocratic regime driving the opposition underground into prison or into exile annihilating the private sector for the most part forcing everybody into the state forcing dependence on Putin like they're greater than before you can't get loans you're not protected unless you're part of the Putin regime once your fall under sanctions”
Putin's public position is that Ukraine does not exist as a separate nation but is a fake country, which means the NATO expansion argument is irrelevant to Russian justification for the war; destroying Ukrainian civilians, infrastructure, and cultural artifacts to prove Ukraine does not exist as a separate nation is irrational.
“Putin's position which he's publicly stated is that Ukraine does not exist as a separate nation that it's a fake nation and a fake country so that's not that has nothing to do with whether they're joining NATO or not but let's go further Ukraine's about to join NATO so I have to murder their civilians I have to bomb there residential neighborhoods I have to bomb their schools and hospitals I have to annihilate their cultural artifacts to prove that they don't exist as a separate nation”
Authoritarian regimes fail across nearly all domains of governance and appear organized only in suppressing political alternatives; if political alternatives become possible, autocrats can panic and lose control.
“authoritarian regimes fail they fail across the board at just about everything we think they're they're organized they're able to mobilize they're efficient they don't have this chaos and berserk of democracies and well it turns out no authoritarians regimes are so corrupt that you can't even call them corrupt because corruption is the system here corruption is something that happens in New York City because the government is bad right... but they only have to succeed at one thing which is the suppression of political alternatives if they can suppress political Alternatives they can survive everything famines lost Wars you name it but if all of a sudden there's the possibility of a political alternative they can panic”
Approximately 80 percent of all German military casualties in WWII occurred on the Eastern Front fighting the Red Army, making Soviet sacrifice—approximately 27 million total deaths (7-11 million military, 18-20 million civilian)—the decisive factor in defeating Nazi Germany.
“about 80 percent of all German military casualties casualties are estimates but about 80 percent of German casualties were on the Eastern Front fighting The Red Army so really the Soviets defeated if you go by casualty numbers that we're talking about dead here you go by killed in action or missing in action the Soviets defeated the German land Army on the Eastern front and the Soviets did that by sacrificing 27 million of their own lives about seven to 11 million uh Army side the figures are complex and and and hard because they they didn't have good accounting on such a battlefield at that scale and then something on the order of 18 to 20 million civilian deaths”
The war tide turned by late 1943, after the Axis peaked in 1942; the war was winnable for the Axis in 1942 in retrospect, but appeared winnable in prospect at the time, demonstrating the importance of distinguishing between historical inevitability and actual contemporary contingency.
“the war tide has turned by late 1943 and it's clear that the axis which peaked in 42 and was looking like it could win the war in 1942. in retrospect everybody says they could never win it but in Prospect 1942 looked like the axis had quite an opportunity to consolidate Victory”
The wartime vision for peace held by Britain (Churchill), the US (Roosevelt), and the USSR (Stalin) did not coincide, leading to conflicts that are often portrayed as misunderstandings but are better understood as genuine conflicts of interest that could only be managed, not resolved.
“discussions about the piece come up with various blueprints that are in uh let's see they're in contradiction to each other they're clashing the British war aims for the peace the Roosevelt's vision of the peace and Stalin's vision of the peace don't coincide we end up with the Cold War and the cold war is often portrayed as some kind of misunderstanding people think oh you know uh if we just sat down and talked to each other and worked on the issues and it didn't have to happen”
The Cold War is not a failure but an achievement: standing up to a totalitarian regime without sacrificing 55 million people again through hot war or accepting capitulation to Soviet expansion; the alternatives to Cold War were capitulation or hot war, making Cold War the best available option.
“the cold war is not a failure it's an achievement it's standing up to a totalitarian regime without sacrificing 55 million people or more again the alternatives to Cold War are capitulation or hot War so cold war is the best alternative and its achievement to mount the Cold War so Truman should get credit not blame for the Cold War”
Boris Yeltsin (not Putin) first demanded return of Crimea to Russia as the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, and the Ukrainians dismissed his demand because he lacked the military force to enforce it, demonstrating that force capacity determines state demands
“Boris Yeltsin demanded the return of Crimea to Russia not Putin first but Boris Yeltsin as the Soviet Union was dissolving in late 1991 he told the ukrainians I want it I want Crimea back which Khrushchev had given them in 1954 in ukrainians just laughed at yeltze because he didn't have an army”
South Korea obtained an armistice (not a peace treaty) with a U.S. security guarantee without ending the war, and became one of the world's most successful countries through integration into a post-WWII Japanese economy and U.S. security umbrella, demonstrating an alternative model for Ukraine
“remember South Korea got an Armistice only not a peace treaty and they got a security guarantee from the U.S Ironclad without a end to the war without a peace treaty just with an armistice and South Korea is one of the most successful countries in the world and it was built up behind the U.S security guarantee integrated into a Japanese post-world War II economy”
Stalin was a very poor military commander with no understanding of tactics or combining tactical with strategic operations, continued to make mistakes throughout the war, but was extraordinarily skilled at organizing production on the home front and managing the Soviet command war economy with detailed knowledge of factories, directors, and production profiles.
“Stalin was a very poor military commander he had no understanding of Battle of tactics of combining the Tactical with the Strategic he made tremendous mistakes he continued to make those mistakes all the way through to the end of the war he didn't get better like his General said he was sometimes good but often not very good... but the thing that he was incredible at he was unbelievably good at was organizing production on the home front running a command or War economy... Stalin knew the names of the factories he knew the names of the directors there he knew their production profile he knew the raw material list that they needed and how much he had a photographic memory detail of the production front and he micromanaged it”
The West should deconflate Russia from Putin and avoid consolidating his narrative that losing the war means losing Russia; supporting a political alternative to Putin that is still Russian nationalist and patriotic would split the Putin regime from the broader Russian population.
“you deconflate Russia and Putin you deconflate the personal regime and the civilization so Putin says if we lose the war we'll lose Russia but you'll lose Putin you won't lose Russia we have to not consolidate his conflation but deconflate we're afraid to do this because we don't want to get into an escalatory spiral we don't want to do some of the things we could do to support a political alternative so instead we impose sanctions”
The Russia-China relationship has two competing axes: the personal bromance between Putin and Xi Jinping that brings them together, and the shallow societal relationship and clashing state interests that can pull them apart; anti-Westernism is a powerful unifying force but not necessarily permanent.
“there were two axes in the relationship there's the Bromance between Putin and she they are very similar people but societally it's very shallow the relationship so to the extent that the Bromance continues... the Bromance brings them together and societal shallowness brings them apart that's one axis the other axis is anti-westernism the U.S led order that's dominant that is the world order unites them... but State interests are often clashing so to the extent that the anti-westernism and the Bromance are more powerful the relationship stays close to the extent to which the societal part shallowness of societal relations or the state interest clashing predominate then they can be pulled apart”
The US has not initiated any peace process for Ukraine and has abandoned the peace arena entirely, discussing only 'all in' or 'all out' positions; this has given China an opening to position itself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine through various diplomatic initiatives.
“we have not initiated any peace process we don't talk about the peace we don't talk about winning the piece we only talk about all in or all out and so ironically us abandoning the peace Arena has given China an opening and that trip to Moscow and the rumors of calling zelenski on the phone and zelenski not repudiating the so-called Chinese propaganda peace plan is an indication that he's smarter than some of our people in government”
The Japanese continued fighting in WWII despite being nearly defeated because their will to fight was very difficult to break; they only capitulated after the atomic bombs, demonstrating that some regimes can sustain fighting through overwhelming material defeat.
“the Japanese went all the way they barely capitulated after the atomic bombs so the will to fight there was very hard to break and in the German case they fought to The Bitter End right Hitler only committed suicide at the end of April 1945 after Germany was wrecked”
Russia under Putin could attempt to reconquer Kyiv and Ukraine again in the future (next year, 10 years, 20 years from now), as demonstrated by Boris Yeltsin's demand for the return of Crimea in 1991, showing that Russian revisionism is a persistent threat that a peace settlement must address across generations.
“Russia could come again and try to take Kiev again next year the year after next 10 years from now 20 years from now Boris Yeltsin demanded the return of Crimea to Russia not Putin first but Boris Yeltsin as the Soviet Union was dissolving in late 1991 he told the ukrainians I want it I want Crimea back which Khrushchev had given them in 1954 in ukrainians just laughed at yeltze because he didn't have an army”
The West has not destroyed Russian production facilities or the production facilities of Iran and North Korea (suppliers of munitions to Russia), and we are not bombing Russian productive capacity for artillery shells and drones, therefore we are not winning a war of attrition against Russia.
“if you're looking at Russia Today and you're not bombing from the air Russian production facilities to produce the ability to fight in the war you're not winning a war of attrition if they're able to produce what it takes to continue fighting and you haven't broken their will to fight you're in a war of attrition where they are able and willing to continue”
The Lend-Lease program supplied crucial materiel (Jeeps, trucks, radios, uniforms, boots, food) that the Soviet Union could not produce internally, enabling continued Soviet military operations, though the Soviets counter-argued they produced the decisive heavy armor (T-34s, KV-1s, KV-2s) themselves, making the debate about Lend-Lease's relative importance inconclusive.
“Lend Lease it was really the American contribution to the Soviet war effort sending them all sorts of really crucial items that they could not themselves produce that was decisive in in the war efforts so that the sure the Soviet Army took the brunt of the German land Army they fought the German land Army in those horrible battles that that you know well Stalingrad and the rest of them but the Americans were supplying crucial stuff”
The US has been strategically second-to-none on the battlefield in recent decades (Iraq, Afghanistan) but has systematically failed at consolidating military gains and winning the peace, which requires sustained political and economic commitment over generations.
“America has become very adept at that recently where we're Second To None on the battlefield whether that be Iraq or Afghanistan and then we have trouble consolidating those gains and winning the peace”
Ukraine's definition of victory as regaining every inch of internationally recognized Ukrainian territory is not practical for winning a sustainable peace; a more realistic definition of victory would be armistice, EU accession, and security guarantee, even if this means not reclaiming all territory including Crimea and the Donbass.
“the definition of victory in my view and I'll end here so that we can have a little bit time for questions if that's if there are any would be not the current definition of War aims which is regaining every inch of internationally recognized Ukrainian soil but no more war no more fighting accession process into the European Union and some type of security guarantee if they gain all their territory back including Crimea and the completely wrecked donbass but they don't get into the EU that's a failure but if they don't get all their territory back and they do make it into the west where the security guarantee and EU accession that's an incredible victory”
The war in Ukraine works against China's strategic interests because Ukrainian resistance plus Russian atrocities have revitalized and unified the Western alliance, closing a wedge that China had exploited between Europe and the US on China policy.
“the biggest thing that's happened globally from the war has been the revitalization and unity of the West right Ukrainian Valor plus Russian atrocities equals Western unity and resolve and that's left China high and dry China had a wedge between Europe and America on China policy America hostile trying to hold China down trying to contain China this is China's point of view but Europe hates conflict they love trade there was this wedge between Europe and the U.S and China pulse that wage is gone now why because China rhetorically supported Putin's invasion of Ukraine European country”
Russia does not decide whether it becomes China's vassal; China decides whether a country becomes its vassal, and China has not permitted Russia to become its vassal, evidenced by Russia remaining in a junior partnership rather than dependent position.
“Russia does not decide to become China's vassal China decides whether a country is going to become its vassal or not and I don't think that's happened I don't think the Chinese are permitting Russia to be their vassal”
Autocratic Russia conquering neighbors predates NATO expansion by centuries and reflects a persistent historical pattern of Russian coercion and conquest; Stalin's conquest of Eastern Europe before NATO existed demonstrates that NATO expansion cannot be the root cause of Russian imperial expansion.
“an autocratic Russia that is a menace to its neighbors and conquers its neighbors or its claims it has to conquer its neighbors it's not a new phenomenon is it we've seen this before in fact it predates NATO expansion it predates the existence of NATO this pattern of an autocratic Russia using coercion and taking over its neighbors threatening menacing or conquerance Neighbors we have centuries of that example before the NATO expansion Canard so you want to tell me that NATO expansion triggered this and I'm going to ask you well how did Stalin decide he needed to conquer all of Eastern Europe because he was looking forward for when President Clinton the incompetent that Clinton was was going to expand NATO right okay”
Richard Avery's recent book argues that Lend-Lease cooperation and resource sharing among the Allies was more decisive than destruction of enemy productive capacity in winning WWII; this argument is presented as an alternative to Phillips Payson O'Brien's production-destruction thesis.
“A Richard Avery more recently has gone after uh Phillips Payson O'Brien with a book about how it wasn't the destruction of fighting capacity it was the sharing of resources among the Allies that was decisive so Len leads to the British and lend lease to the Soviets and cooperation of sharing ability to fight was decisive”
Ukraine has achieved a strategic victory on the battlefield by defending Kyiv from conquest, keeping the country sovereign, and preventing Russian occupation or rule by a Russian puppet regime; however, this military victory must be converted into a sustainable political settlement.
“they've won a strategic Victory on the battlefield by defending their Capital Kia from Conquest by keeping their country sovereign by not being conquered by Russia and disappearing from the map or being ruled by a Russian puppet regime that's a major strategic victory”
Putin will prioritize regime survival above all other considerations and will make major concessions if his regime is directly threatened; if the regime is not threatened, he will continue mobilizing prisoners and mercenaries indefinitely.
“he'll do anything to save his regime and so if his regime is at stake he has an incentive to cut bait and run out you know take some type of deal but if his regime is not at stake if it's further Consolidated by our Behaviour he'll continue to throw his prisoners he's got murderers on the battlefield he's got death squads that he released from prison to go murder on the battlefield”
Predictions that Russia would run out of ammunition, missiles, microchips, and mobilization capacity have been consistently wrong; Russia produces approximately 60 missiles per month and continues mobilization, demonstrating that Western predictions of Russian collapse have been ineffective propaganda.
“it's been more than a year remember the predictions that Russia was going to run out of stuff they were going to run out of missiles there's a missile barrage or two every month sometimes every week they seem to be able to still produce they're producing 60 missiles a month on average and that's going to ramp up and remember how they were they didn't have microchips anymore and so they had to move the chips from the washing machine into the tanks and missiles remember all of that that was March 2022. well guess what they got plenty of chips they're not running out”
Russia and China do not have an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline because China does not need it (Power of Siberia One is not at capacity) and China is not buying Russian gas at discount prices despite assumptions that it is; China is buying Russian oil at retail prices, not discounted prices.
“Xi Jinping just went to Moscow and there was no agreement on the gas pipeline so-called power of Siberia 2. why power of Siberia one is not a capacity can you imagine they don't actually need power of Siberia too because the Chinese don't are not buying as much Russian gas as they could the Chinese are not buying Russian oil at a discount that's also phony they're buying Russian oil at retail”
China has not supplied munitions to Russia despite supplying large numbers of microchips through third parties (mostly Dubai) overland through Iran, demonstrating that China is hedging its support to Russia rather than fully committing to the partnership.
“the Chinese have not supplied Munitions to Russia they've supplied the chips in big numbers through third parties mostly through Dubai and then over land through Iran into Russia really big numbers of Chip sales but not the Munitions and the Munitions are artillery shells and drones and killer drones”
Economic sanctions have not destroyed Russia's military capacity or will to fight, and sanctions are not an effective tool for military defeat—the only ways to destroy a city are bombing and rent control
“we thought that sanctions might do that that economic sanctions would do that but in fact economic sanctions have not destroyed Russia's military capacity or its will to fight and they never do sanctions are not the tool you think there are only two ways to destroy a city bombing and rent control that's it sanctions no you think I'm kidding that's actually a true statement okay”
Putin's visit to Mariupol two days before Xi Jinping visited Moscow indicates continued Russian control of southern Ukraine and demonstrates that U.S. strategy has not achieved its goal of disrupting Russian territorial control despite all the predictions.
“Putin just visited mariopal two days before Xi Jinping went to Moscow so we haven't been able to do that yet despite all the predictions”
The China-Russia partnership is not popular within the Chinese establishment because Russia is viewed as a losing bet on a basket case country that China does not want to depend on; Xi Jinping supports it as a hedge against potential US military conflict, but this represents a strategic blunder by China.
“the Putin thing is not popular inside the Chinese establishment because they think it's a Bad Bet on a basket case losing country that they don't want to be their vassal and that they don't want to be dependent on but Xi Jinping thinks it seems that it's a hedge against the U.S if he gets in deeper trouble with the U.S including a potential military conflict... they've committed a massive strategic blunder”
If Putin is removed from power and replaced, the successor regime might be more escalatory than capitulatory, making regime change alone an insufficient strategy; the West must prepare for the peace regardless of who leads Russia.
“if Putin gets removed maybe he gets replaced by an escalatory regime not a capitulatory regime and so you got to win the peace”
The US has sent 13 years worth of Javelin production to Ukraine and has not ramped up production facilities to replace these stocks; without increased production, Ukraine will eventually run out of munitions and lose the ability to continue fighting regardless of its will to fight.
“we've sent 13 years worth of Javelin production to the Ukraine let me see that again 13 years worth of Javelin production and so we would need to ramp up our production facilities in order to continue to support Ukraine's ability to fight”
Russian mobilization drew 300,000 troops to the battlefield despite predictions of mass desertions and collapse of will to fight; those who did not want to fight fled Russia to Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Georgia where Russians do not need visas, indicating survival of sufficient political willingness to continue fighting.
“when they mobilized they called up the troops that they were all fleeing and nobody wanted to fight and they fielded 300 000 troops somehow right tens of thousands fled and three hundred thousand got to the battlefield and they weren't trained but they're just there to die they're just there to degrade Ukraine's ability and will to continue to fight he's got a lot of that and those who didn't want to fight they're not in the country anymore they live in Armenia they live in Kyrgyzstan they live in Turkey they live in Georgia they go wherever you don't need a visa if you're a Russian citizen”
Poland controlled vast swaths of contemporary Ukrainian territory historically, but Poland is not invading Ukraine to reclaim those territories despite historical claims, showing that state behavior choices exist independent of historical territorial claims
“Poland controlled vast swaths of contemporary Ukraine's territory what is today Ukraine was once Poland I was in the city of leviv at their Museum before the war you know it as lavoof in Polish Lemberg and German and Yiddish and lavolf in Russian and they had a room which was called the 700 year polish occupation of the city of leviv and then they had 70 years or so post-polish occupation when they were a Ukrainian City so you could argue that the polls have just as big a claim to Ukrainian territory but the polls are not invading Ukraine they're not destroying murdering Ukrainian civilians raping Ukrainian women and girls destroying Ukrainian Cultural artifacts somehow they're refraining from that”
Ukraine gains significant value from an armistice even without full territorial recovery because it stops fighting, gains a DMZ buffer, and allows 1.5+ million Ukrainian children displaced to foreign countries to return home and go to school in Ukrainian language rather than becoming fluent in Polish, German, or other foreign languages
“you get an armistice the fighting stops you get a DMZ you get your children who are studying in school in a foreign language learning a different culture and learning going to school in a different language million and a half plus Ukrainian children not going to school in Ukrainian language a year goes by two years go by four years ago by five years go by and that's your future that now speaks fluent polish or fluent German or fluent fill in the blank so you've got a lot to gain with an Armistice and you got a lot on the table that you could potentially lose to sustain this piece”
Despite Western definitions of 'the West' as geographic, it is actually an institutional concept referring to countries with rule of law and treaty relationships with the United States, including NATO members and bilateral allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia
“the West is not a geographic concept it's an Institutional concept the West are those countries that have rule of law and in most cases a treaty relationship with the United States where there was a a body like NATO or bilaterally as we have with Japan South Korea Australia and many other countries”
Ukrainian military casualties are estimated at 120,000 to 150,000 killed and seriously wounded not returning to the battlefield, while Russian casualties are probably around 200,000, with a higher percentage of deaths relative to severely wounded on the Russian side.
“Ukrainian casualties are at least a hundred and twenty thousand probably a hundred and fifty thousand dead that is killed and seriously wounded not returning to the battlefield wounded main 120 to 150 000 on the Ukrainian side and something probably around two hundred thousand on the Russian side and on the Russian side the dead are a much higher percentage of the total casualties than the severely wounded”