Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan: crisis and conflict in the context of a new cold war
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Event on 7 November 2023
For five years, Niall Ferguson has warned of the dangers of a new cold war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the terrorist attacks on Israel, and the growing Chinese pressure on Taiwan cannot be seen in isolation, but must be understood as part of a global challenge to the predominance of the United States and its allies.
There are however important differences between Cold War II and Cold War I. In this lecture Niall Ferguson, visiting professor at the School of Public Policy will bring historical perspectives to his analysis of the emergent breakdown of the U.S.-led world order.
Meet our speaker and chair Niall Ferguson (@nfergus) is visiting professor at the LSE School of Public Policy. He is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a senior faculty fellow of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. A historian by training, Professor Ferguson received his DPhil from the University of Oxford in 1989. He has had a distinguished teaching career, having been a professor at Oxford, New York University and Harvard. He is the author of 16 books, and an accomplished biographer and journalist.
Andrés Velasco (@AndresVelasco) is Professor of Public Policy and Dean of the School of Public Policy at LSE. He was previously the Minister of Finance of Chile between March 2006 and March 2010.
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Ferguson argues we are in Cold War II with China, a more technologically complex and economically consequential conflict than Cold War I, where the Taiwan semiconductor crisis represents the most dangerous flashpoint, and the optimal Western strategy is détente-style engagement rather than confrontation to avoid World War III while allowing China's internal contradictions to undermine its system.
- Cold War II is ideological, technological, economic, and geopolitical—checking all boxes that define Cold War I, but with China as a far more sophisticated economic rival than the Soviet Union ever was
- A Taiwan blockade (not invasion) is the most likely and catastrophic scenario, equivalent to Cuban Missile Crisis but with roles reversed; the US lacks credible deterrent capability due to fiscal crisis and military-industrial decline
- The West should pursue Nixon-Kissinger détente with China—relaxing semiconductor restrictions and tariffs in exchange for strategic stability—rather than confrontation, allowing demographic collapse and economic dysfunction to weaken China organically over 10 years
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The deterioration in China's global reputation has occurred almost everywhere Pew does survey work—South Korea, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada, Germany, UK—with only a few exceptions like Italy (because Italians sell luxury goods to China), showing a dramatic shift in Western attitudes driven partly by COVID blame and partly by Wolf Warrior diplomacy
“where Pew does survey work in South Korea in Japan in Australia you see it in Sweden you see it in Canada and Germany you see it in the UK huge shifts in attitude towards China with only a few countries Italy being one where there hasn't been this big uh shift that's of course because the Italians sell so many luxury goods to China”
The optimal Western strategy toward China is détente: restate the One China policy (post-1972), avoid trade/investment restrictions, and reduce sanctions on semiconductors and tariffs, offering China things of interest to its leadership (not vague statements from Gina Raimondo or Janet Yellen) in exchange for reduced geopolitical risk
“you absolutely need to prevent this from happening by making sure that when by is coming up they talk about this and instead of we're going to hit you with yet more restrictions in semiconductors it's let's restate One China policy let's go back to where we have been since 1972 and let us not have World War I over this fin”
We are in Cold War II, defined by ideological, technological, economic, and geopolitical competition between the United States and China, analogous in structure to Cold War I but with China as a far more formidable economic rival than the Soviet Union ever was, and increasingly obvious since Xi Jinping became China's leader with the CCP drawing a clear distinction between Chinese authoritarian governance and Western democratic ideals
“the notion that we could have an even more dangerous cold war is I think a troubling one... it taks all the boxes now I'm not saying it's the same before anybody starts formulating a devastating question... it's ideological particularly since Susan ping became China's leader there is a very clear distinction drawn by the CCP leadership between what goes on in China and ideas in the west uh rule of law democracy Etc that are fundamentally at odds with the Chinese way”
Ukrainian technological entrepreneurs have remarkably advanced drone and military technology innovation during the war, improving upon American systems and moving the frontier of military capability, to the point that defense tech startups in Ukraine could support a dedicated Ukrainian defense tech fund
“it's really inspiring to see the Innovative entrepreneur approach that ukrainians taken to this war it absolutely has blown my mind to see young craning technologists refining drone technology improving on things the Americans s and moving the frontier of military capability for so much so that I was approached earlier this month by a proposal for a Ukrainian defense Tech fund where are now enough defense Tech startups in Ukraine somebody to to raise”
As a consequence of Chimerica, Chinese manufacturing value added was about half that of the United States at the beginning of the 2000s but today is double that of the United States, representing one of the most striking shifts in global manufacturing in the last 20 years
“an even more striking consequence of cherica was to create a role reversal at the beginning of the 2000s Chinese manufacturing value added was about half that of the United States today it's doubl that of the United States this is one of the most striking charts in the world if you ask me”
The benefits of Chimerica disproportionately flowed to the top 1% of American income earners, while the median household saw its real income stagnate from 1999 through 2016, creating distributional injustice that fueled protectionist sentiment
“another way it man Ed itself was that the benefits of cherica disproportionately flowed to the 1% uh in the United States they they certainly didn't flow to the median household which saw Its Real uh income stagnate from 1999 through until 2016”
Taiwan is more strategically valuable than Cuba because Cuba exported cigars but Taiwan exports the most sophisticated semiconductors in the world on which every major AI company depends, meaning an economic war over Taiwan would have 10x the impact of the Ukraine war and 100x the impact of the Israel-Gaza conflict
“The problem with The Showdown over Taiwan is that Cuba exported cigars Taiwan exports the most sophisticated semiconductors in the world on which every major AI company depends so if you have a war over Taiwan or even the risk of the war of Taiwan the economic impact will be 10x that of the war in Ukraine which is pretty big and probably 100x that of the war in Israel”
Chimerica—the fusion of the US and Chinese economies from 2001 onwards—was always a chimera that could not possibly last because the payoffs were asymmetrical: China did the exporting and saving while the United States did the importing and consuming, resulting in a trade imbalance so large that by around 2014 China accounted for nearly half the total US trade deficit
“the United States and the People's Republic of China had sort of fused economically uh but we argued this was a chimera so the word chimerica was always a pun and the idea was that this couldn't possibly last and the reason that it couldn't possibly last we suggested was that the payoffs were very asymmetrical China did the exporting and the United States did the importing uh China did the saving and the United States did the consuming and so forth and the result was an absolutely huge imbalance in trade between the United States and China which became so large that at one point in around 2014 China accounted for nearly half the total us uh trade deficit”
China's demographic collapse is severe: the UN revised projections showing China's population will halve between now and 2100, and there's even a scenario where the US population could exceed China's by 2100, making it very hard to sustain historical Chinese growth rates
“the scale of China's demographic problems is kind of stunning when the UN revised their population projections uh it was Starling to see uh that China's population base case median case halves between now and the end of the century there's even a scenario in which the population of the United States could exceed that of China by 2100 this makes it very hard to sustain the growth rates that we've seen in China uh in the past 50 years”
Manufacturing employment moved away from the American Heartland to China at large scale as a consequence of Chimerica, creating concentrated geographic pain in regions dependent on manufacturing, which became politically decisive
“One way in which this imbalance manifested itself was that China began to take manufacturing employment away from the American Heartland uh on a pretty large scale”
South Korea achieved one of the most remarkable economic success stories of the second half of the 20th century despite the unresolved Korean War and persistent threat from North Korea, suggesting Ukraine could rebuild successfully even if territory is lost to Russia
“the less any people from South Korea here so what the fact South Korea and it's also true West Germany but it's even more amazing the case of South Korea is that despite the fact that the war did not end conclusively wasn't State the B is this danger today South Korea had the most incredible economic Miracle one of the most remarkable economic success stories of the entire second half”
If China were to blockade Taiwan, the US would be in the position of Khrushchev in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis with roles reversed: the island is off China, and a US president would have to decide whether to send a naval expeditionary force or cede the Indo-Pacific to China, risking World War III with far worse odds than in 1962 because a 1962 Monte Carlo simulation repeated 100 times would not necessarily result in 100 successes avoiding World War III
“this time the island is off China the other side and it's the Chinese of the option to blockade they're not going to invade Taiwan they blockade it we know they can do that they've already rehearsed the operation they rehearsed it when Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and what then then any US president is in the position of kof having to send the naval expeditionary force or or what or seed the Indo Pacific to China convincing the Japanese that it's all over for the Pax Americana”
The West ends up buying solar cells and electric vehicles manufactured in China by burning coal, which is illogical if the goal is to save the planet and reveals the contradiction between climate goals and the actual geographic locus of manufacturing emissions.
“we end up in a world in which the West buys its solar cells and electric vehicles from China where they're manufactured by burning coal if you think that's going to save the planet I have a tier three City TI block to sell you”
The October 7th Hamas attack on Israel occurred almost to the day 50 years after the Yom Kippur War, creating the most serious Middle East crisis since 1973, though Israel is strategically more vulnerable than it was 50 years ago, and Western sentiment has shifted markedly against Israel among younger people
“it was almost too symmetrical uh to have almost to the day a surprise attack on Israel 50 years after of the yam Kapur War that's what happened on October the 7th and I believe that these attacks have created the most serious crisis uh in the region since 1973”
One of Ferguson's core historical laws is that if a great power spends more on debt service than on national security, it probably won't be a great power for much longer, and this applies to the contemporary US situation
“one of my few General theoretical uh laws of history is that if you're spending more on debt service than on National Security you probably won't be a great power for very much longer”
Détente worked during Cold War I: it allowed the US 10 years to recover from Vietnam failures, enabled the US to focus on recovery, gave the Soviets time to hang themselves through systemic dysfunction (Afghanistan), and buying time rather than confronting a weakening system is the lesson to apply to Cold War II with China
“when you look at it again and this will really be the argument of the second volume they allowed the United States 10 years to recover from the Fiasco in Vietnam and in that 10 year period the United States fixed a lot got broken in the late 60s and early 70s and it gave the Soviets time to get out of the road and hang themselves which they D did uh in Afghanistan and elsewhere and I think if you just avoid The Showdown this would be my advice to any personent Republican or Democrat avoid The Showdown and let the pathologies of their system work their inexorable Mischief you will no longer have so much to fear from China 10 years from now as you as you do today”
China is not in coordination with Russia, Iran, and North Korea in the sense of a formal alliance (unlike the Axis in WWII or the formal Warsaw Pact), but rather they have aligned interests in ending American primacy, which Ferguson calls the 'axis of will' to distinguish it from formal alliances; however, their interests diverge on multiple issues (e.g., Russia wants higher oil prices, China fears them)
“when David from wrote the AIS of evil speech for George dou verion for the State of the Union 2002 he totally made it up there was no access at all I mean it wasn't like Iran and Iraq North Korea on the phon to one another I was on David college class at yeah he made up a lot of I don't experence but the access of ill will which is my coage is real I mean they are unquestionably in cahoots”
Cold War II is structurally beneficial to the United States domestically because it gives Americans a unifying external enemy, focusing the society on strategic challenges and ending internal divisions; the US becomes more productive and innovative under external threat, without any external enemy America is a dividing society
“cold war is very good for the United States very good because the United States stops engaging in deranged internal battles and actually focuses on a strategic challenge without any kind of exernal enemy America is a very diving Society get focused on the external enemy things really important and then you start actually investing in stuff that you haven't been investing”
Brazil under Lula has been an embarrassment in Cold War II, with Lula suggesting Ukraine was asking for invasion and blaming the West for the war; BRICS has become a vehicle for Chinese propaganda, having started as a Goldman Sachs marketing device for emerging market investment
“but this in the sense this illustrates the way bricks became a kind of vehicle for the uh the act of Civ Wills propaganda I mean it's interesting bricks started out as a golden sack marketing device by get people invest in emerging maret and now it's become part of Chin's propaganda weird how ideas second very much hated by people who love the phrase Global so glad toar you say that”
Richard Haass's 2020 article calling for the end of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan was reckless because it gave 'everybody permission to be more hawkish on Taiwan at a time when for the first time in many years the US actually can't credibly threaten to' defend Taiwan, accelerating a dangerous policy shift.
“I said to Richard H not long ago what the hell did you WR that face gave everybody permission to be more H in Taiwan at a time when when for the first time in many years the US actually can't credly threaten to that”
The doctrine of Cold War II is strategic ambiguity broken by risk-taking decisions when the model breaks down; when economic systems fail (as the Soviet system did, and China's is beginning to), totalitarian regimes increase geopolitical risk rather than decrease it, as evidenced by Soviet actions in the late 1970s (Africa, Afghanistan)
“I worri that that the lessons of Chinese imperial history are totally irrelevant here the only question is what does a communist what does a totalitarian regime do when the wheels begin to come off the economic model Japan did not go to war uh because things were going well nor the German read Adam su's uh book uh the wages of War authoritarian or totalitarian regimes I think take more geopolitical risk when the economic system begins to under”
Generational politics is the key to most things in democracy today, with real divides in American politics being generational rather than traditional left-right axes, exemplified by younger Americans' shift against both Israel and toward hawkishness on Taiwan
“the real divides in American politics are generational the the question is now that we've had a crisis in Eastern Europe and one in the Middle East neither of which is over do we go the whole hwk and rerun the Cuban Missile Crisis which was the most dangerous Moment In Cold War I uh over Taiwan”
China is responsible for two-thirds of the 32% increase in CO2 emissions since Greta Thunberg's birth and 93% of the 39% increase in coal consumption, making rational climate discussion impossible without addressing Chinese and Indian emissions, which environmental movements are reluctant to do
“China is responsible for 2third of the 32% increase in CO2 emissions since gr tbb's birth and 93% of the 39% increase in Coal consumption these are startling figures I've long argued that one can't have a rational conversation about climate change unless we discuss how to curb Chinese emissions and it must be said increasingly Indian emissions and that's a conversation that very few people uh in the environmentalist movement want to have”
The only small problem with Trump reelection is that the republic would be gone; Ferguson has very limited confidence the US Constitution can survive a second Trump term, distinguishing between his (moderate) optimism about Cold War II outcomes and his (deep) pessimism about American democratic institutions
“Cold War II will probably be a lot less dangerous if Donald Trump is reelected the only small problem is that the Republic will be a goner uh if he is reelected I have very very limited confidence that the US Constitution can survive a second Trump term”
A second Trump administration would be fundamentally different from the first: it would lack establishment military figures like General McMaster; it would be authentically populist, isolationist, and nativist; the American First Institute is preparing a plan to purge the deep state of perceived constraints; and this would be far more serious a threat to the republic than 2016-2017
“the second Trump ad Administration may not be at all like that because it's not going to have all this establishment military figures that the first TR administration had in it no General is going to be left within five miles of the white house because Trump realizes that they're all actually CIT deep State liberals so the the second from Administration won't be like the first one it won't be as chaotic but it will also be I think much more authentically populist and isolationist uh and nativist”
American sentiment on Taiwan has shifted dramatically in the hawkish direction—two-thirds of Americans support sending additional arms to Taiwan, and 62-63% support using the US Navy to prevent a Chinese blockade, compared to much lower support in the 1970s-1990s when Taiwan was last a major crisis, though support peaked in 2021 and has come down slightly since
“if China were to invade Taiwan would you support or oppose the United States imposing economic uh and diplomatic sanctions on China massive uh support for that um sending additional arms two-thirds of people support that using the US Navy to prevent China from imposing a blockade around Taiwan that's basically 62 63% of Americans these are way higher numbers than in Cold War I when Taiwan first really was an issue”
The Ukraine war has gone wrong for Putin worse than expected; he has needed more help from Iran and North Korea than anticipated; Russia is now in the North Korean supply chain (receiving ammunition and equipment), which represents a sign of actual coordinated multilateral support against the US
“one can see that the war in Ukraine has gone WR for Putin and he's therefore needed more help than we expected uh from Iran and now from North Korea too so when you know Kim jongan gets the trade that's definitely coordination I think uh we need to pay more attention to what she and others uh have said rash doi's book is very good on this uh and you know Russia is now in the”
Ferguson believes Putin would not have invaded Ukraine without a green light from Xi Jinping prior to the invasion, and Russia cannot continue its war effort without substantial Chinese exports of dual-use equipment that go directly into the Russian military, making the February 2022 invasion the Korean War of Cold War II
“I do not believe that so uh that Vladimir Putin would have launched the invasion of Ukraine had he not received a green light from shisen ping prior to the war and I don't believe that it would be possible for Russia to continue its war effort in Ukraine without substantial exports of dual use equipment from China to Russia which goes straight into the Russian war effort so for me the significance of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February of last year is that it's the Korean War of Cold War II”
Xi Jinping has made a calculated choice to prepare China for war by 2027 (according to CIA assessments) and is centralizing power while cracking down on the private sector, displaying a totalitarian pattern of behavior seen in previous authoritarian regimes before they engaged in aggression
“there's some probability that Shan pain does use uh the Taiwan issue to deflect from the obvious uh and growing problems of China's eony that's the risk this is an argument for how brands has made bot has made it m things and I'm not sure I disagree that Shan ping has resolved that China must be ready for war Bill burs the CIA says in 2027”
The US missed critical opportunities to end the Ukraine war: first, after the failure of Russian armies outside Kyiv (March 2022), when Zelensky was open to a negotiated settlement; second, at the end of 2023 when Russian armies were in disarray and could have been decisively defeated, but the US gave Russians time to dig in and prepare defenses
“I think we had an opportunist there are two things we could have done that we didn't do one was just to end the war very quickly after the failure of the Russians to take you and I think future historians will realize there was a huge missed opportunity to end the war at that point when zilinski was open to a relatively compromised like this uh I don't think we really know why that did not happen but I have my theories the other opportunity I already mentioned which is when the Russians were absolutely breing at the end of last year”
It took an amazingly long time for Americans to notice the manufacturing shift enough for it to become a politically decisive issue, with bipartisan consensus in favor of Chimerica lasting until around 2011; the real spike in Chinese unfavorability occurred in the last five years, which Ferguson associates with Cold War II awakening
“it was to me amazing that it took so long for Americans to notice this enough for it to be politically a decisive issue I can remember shortly after I began teaching in the United States in around 2004 asking friends in the government department at Harvard hey where are all the protectionist candidates they're all to be lots and there was a bipartisan consensus that everything was awesome about CH America and it lasted amazingly long you can see the the shift in sentiment um towards China was really quite recent that actually China's uh favorability numbers were pretty much okay until 2011 and the real spike in unfavorability is in the last five years”
The US loses credibility with its deterrent capability because of fiscal unsustainability: running a 7% of GDP deficit at full employment is astonishing; the Congressional Budget Office projects no scenario where federal debt does not rise, and in three or four scenarios debt approaches 250% of GDP by mid-century (Japan level); the US has unsustainable fiscal policy that is getting worse each year
“we read all the time of how strong the US economy is how its exceeded expectations this year but of course it succeeded expectations they're running a 7% of GDP deficit at full employment that's an astonishing number so unbalanced as us fiscal policy that there is no scenario that the Congressional budget office can think of where the debt does not rise and in three or four of the scenarios it gets get close to 250% of GDP by the middle of this Century that's Japan level the US has an unsustainable fiscal policy I've been saying this for years and each year it gets worse”
A blockade of Taiwan is the operational method the PLA is actually preparing, not an invasion; blockades are far easier than amphibious invasion (the hardest military operation), and China has already rehearsed blockade operations, particularly during Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan visit
“they can do the invasion scenario which is most of the war games the US has done any any number of War games in The Invasion the pla is not ready to do an amphibious Invasion really diff difficult it's like the hardest things that stra is not something that you just kind of sa across um really difficult pass wat I think that whole scenario is for the birds we know what they're going to do because they keep rehearsing and if you look at what goes on around that's a lot ofal activity”
China has invested hugely in its nuclear arsenal and nuclear deterrence capability, which receives little coverage because it's 'so last Cold War', but this is critical because if China has sufficient nuclear weapons for deterrence, the US cannot replay the 1990s Taiwan Strait playbook (sending carriers)
“it's also really important to notice that China has invested a huge amount of money it's nuclear AR uh and that gets very little coverage because it's so last Cold War but guess what that really matters because if China has sufficient nuclear weapons to have deterence then you can't replay the 1990s Taiwan straight uh Playbook”
Trump's reelection would probably solve Cold War II to an extent: Ukrainians would be screwed (he'd end support), Israel would be saved (he'd support it), and Taiwan would depend on Trump's mood that day, with Trump credibility for madness (unpredictability) serving as a deterrent where Biden's traditional diplomacy failed
“my sense is that the re-election of Donald Trump will probably solve Cold War II to an extent the ukrainians will be screwed Israel will be saved and Taiwan kind of depends how president Trump feels on the day”
John Bolton's memoir describing Trump explaining Taiwan to him with a Sharpie—where Trump says Taiwan (the Sharpie) is not worth sending two aircraft carrier strike groups across the Pacific for—captures Trump's cost-benefit logic about geopolitical commitments.
“if you read John Bolton's Memoir describing his brief time as National Security advisor he describes Trump explaining Taiwan to him with a of a Sharpie anybody read it it's really great scene Trump's in the overal office John see this Sharpie that's Mr President the Sharpie is Taiwan see the desk they all look at the desk the desk is China John and Trump makes a very straightforward argument that it is not worth sending two aircraft carriers strike groups across the Pacific Ocean for a Sharpie”
Henry Kissinger would embrace the Détente-style China policy Ferguson advocates because it has been his foreign policy approach for half a century, and when you look at the alternative (confrontation patterns that preceded and followed Détente), Kissinger's balanced approach remains strategically sound.
“I expect well yes yes I mean I think that that's been his that's been his his policy for half a century and I think if the alternative is Breakman ship of the sort that preceded it and followed it because remember we had six in 83”
The Soviet Union's economy was never more than 44% the size of the US economy on a purchasing power parity basis (in the 1970s at its closest approach), whereas China overtook the United States on a PPP basis in 2014, making China a fundamentally more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was.
“The Soviet Union's economy was never more than 44% the size of the US economy on a purchasing power parity basis that was as close as the Soviets got in the 70s China overtook the United States on a PPP basis in 2014”
Europe lacks the fiscal resources or political will to achieve 'strategic autonomy' from the US; achieving independence would require 10 years and 2% of annual GDP spending increase on defense, which countries like France cannot manage because they cannot even raise the retirement age (as shown by pension reform politics)
“it would take oh I think about 10 years to get the wers anywhere close to being so 10 years in about two points of GDP a year to no you know French talk about but they can't even they can't even raise the retirement age so the whole for the record can if you want to have resources to get to your NAT”
A 'trembling hand equilibrium' is optimal in game theory for deterrence: you want the opponent to be slightly uncertain about whether you might press the button, but not so uncertain that you actually do it (not 'pure shis'), and Ferguson questions whether Trump provides the right level of trembling or too much trembling to be reliable
“the Mad Dog or the mad man theory of of governance um there lomics are probably game theories in the room you know game theorist know something called a trembling hand equilibrium you know you want a little trembling because you want the other guy to be unsure whether you might not just press the button right but the game theories in the room will also know want a little trembling not too much trembling you wouldn't put pure shis you know to run uh American foreign policy”
Trump's first administration actually had a successful foreign policy relative to W. Bush, Obama, and Biden; Trump changed US China strategy (with General McMaster's help), putting China on the defensive; Trump pressured Iran far more successfully than Biden and inherited the Abraham Accords; and no Trump administration catastrophic foreign policy failures occurred unlike predecessors
“if you just judge up a presidency by outcomes not by tweets I think the Trump presidency was much more successful than George W bush Barack Obama Joe Biden all of whom presided over disastrous conference either by intervening in them or just letting happen nothing like that happened on Trump's watch uh Trump was able to the Iranians far more successfully look at the Su of money hit which really shut the Iranians up for a bit”
An American president having to negotiate with China to keep TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) producing semiconductors after a Chinese Taiwan takeover would represent such humiliation that it would be politically devastating—this image illustrates the economic catastrophe at stake in Taiwan conflict.
“can you imagine the humiliation of an American president having to bargain to keep tsnc open so the Fabs don't stop producing China she p in taipe try to imagine that on the news”
The appeal of Taiwan as a prize that could unite the Russia-China-Iran coalition is so powerful that it temporarily overrides their different interests in the Middle East—capturing Taiwan would be an enormous strategic coup that outweighs divisions over oil prices and Middle East strategy.
“my scenario where we bungle it fail to detour China do a Cru JW over Taiwan they get Taiwan can you imagine the humiliation of an American president having to bargain to keep tsnc open so the Fabs don't stop producing China she p in taipe try to imagine that on the news that is such an attractive prize that it sets aside the differences between Moscow Beijing and Teran”
Cold War was a concept coined by George Orwell in 1945, defining it as a peace that is no peace, characterized by ideological, technological, economic, and geopolitical dimensions without direct military confrontation between superpowers
“it was actually George Orwell in this city who coined the term Paul war in 1945 and he defined it as a peace that is no peace”
The Cuban Missile Crisis involved a moment of genuine danger that most people did not know about: a Soviet submarine commander was ordered by his superiors to fire a nuclear torpedo at US naval surface ships conducting depth charges, and the only reason the war didn't start was by chance—a superior officer was conducting an inspection aboard the submarine and cancelled the order
“it got extremely close to World War III though nobody knew it at the time because the Soviet subcommander they gave the order to fire a nuclear torpedo at US Naval surface ships who had been depth charging so they actually had been depth charging the Soviet submarines and the only reason that that that torpedo wasn't fired was that by chance a superior officer was on the submarine that day conducting an inspection they were completely out of radio contact with Moscow and the superior officer canceled the order if he hadn't World War III would have begun in 1962”
The Biden administration's foreign policy has been terribly bad despite being given a very easy ride; there have been failures of deterrence in Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Middle East, and impending failure in East Asia, yet the administration faced minimal political consequences until recently
“I actually think the Biden administration's foreign policy has been terribly bad and they have been given a very easy ride despite failures of deterrence in Afghanistan failure of deterrence in Ukraine failure of deterrence uh in the Middle East and I think impend failure of deterrence in East Asia”
India is not a reliable ally in Cold War II; despite the QUAD (US, Japan, Australia, India), India maintains a transactional relationship with all parties and will not credibly commit to containing China; India's non-alignment has changed style but not substance—they are aligned with everybody, which is the same as being aligned with nobody
“I don't really think the non alignment has changed the style has changed now they're align with everybody but if you're align with everybody it's the same as being on Al so I'm skeptical about how much we can really expect India to do especially in the Taiwan scenario they have their own reasons for um being at odds of China but they have very the Taiwan on on r”
Europe is geopolitically negligible in Cold War II because it is transatlantic while Cold War II is transpacific; European business communities (especially German) want to maintain friendly relations with China and avoid Cold War II, but Europe cannot opt out; some countries like the Baltics understand the threat but Germany's business interests create ambivalence
“Europe was much more united in ukra than most people would ever expected true it's totally dividing Israel is so divided that issue uh and on Taiwan I asked the maon advisor what would you do what would France do and who would be on on the US side in the event of the conflict River long and he gave a memorable rep of course the Australians I think there would be kind of no sh in the event that that show as things currently stand so the reason I don't talk about Europe is geopolitically negligible Germany for the record was a country where the business Community wanted to keep buying R gas”
Ukraine could still win the war despite setbacks, but it would require escalation in military technology (air dominance via advanced aircraft), which the US cannot provide without unacceptable risk; Ukrainians have not given up and there is will to win, which is a critical variable, but the military math is extremely unfavorable
“I think it's extremely difficult to Envision what would be needed for Ukraine to win which would be another upward step in the military technology that we make available you can't possibly make an offensive like that successful without air dominance as it was saying as I was he ing this evening on our recording of Good Fellows uh with Ben Hodes you wouldn't send the US Army into an offensive like that without her dominance”
A Polish senator told Ferguson that ordinary Americans blamed China for COVID and all the disruption it caused, suggesting people underestimate the extent to which ordinary Americans hold China responsible for pandemic consequences
“I want asked the senator of a red State why your people why do they feel hostile to China he replied NE it's simple mad people blame China for Co that was it I think that's got a lot to do with it actually”
Breakdown of legitimacy is occurring on both sides of American politics: Trump denied the legitimacy of the 2020 election, Clinton denied legitimacy of 2016, and if Trump wins 2024 Democrats would deny its legitimacy, creating dangerous institutional fragmentation
“the response of American liberals if he wins would be to deny the legitimacy of his victory as much as he denied the legitimacy of their Victory which was as much as Hillary denied the victory of 2016 and we have this kind of breakdown of legitimacy on on both sides”
The war in Ukraine reveals the degree of US military decline: the Ukraine experience has shown that the US manufacturing and defense capacity is inadequate to sustain a major conventional war, with US precision munitions stocks rapidly being drained
“We learned from the war in Ukraine just how much the American military industrial complex has deteriorated to the point that if there were a war between the United States and China gol B for to happen us will run out of precision missiles in a week”
Russia is a colonial power with a colonial army, sending conscripts from peripheral regions (Buryatia) to die in grinding battles in Ukraine, which allows Russia to sustain casualties at higher levels than Ukraine but is not sustainable indefinitely, and Putin's political survival depends on American political outcomes
“Russia is kind of colonial power with a colonial army uh they send a lot of people from the boings to die in these grinding battles um the problem is there's a lot of them that they can they can continue burning through and from Putin's point of view American politics is his get out of jail card if you look at the polling Republicans stop really believing in this war some while ago and it's DEC if they ever did”
If Trump abandons NATO and US commitment to Europe, Europe will face extreme vulnerability because it cannot build autonomous military capability in the timeframe necessary; Trump's potential withdrawal would likely trigger Russian opportunism in Eastern Europe, particularly if Ukraine falls
“the Poles get it the people the voltic states get it but I don't think it's really sunk in and it may take uh it may take a Russian Victory in Ukraine make M Focus”
China is losing the AI race; the informed view in Silicon Valley is that two years ago it seemed AI advantage would go to China, but it turns out large language models at massive scale are hard and US companies are doing it better
“partly because of restrictions imposed by the Commerce Department last year China's losing the AI race at least that's the the informed view in Silicon Valley where I spend time for my SS we thought two years ago that it would go the other way turns out doing large language models on massive scale is hard and the US companies are doing it better”
Henry Kissinger stated in 2019 that we are in the 'foothills of a Cold War,' upgraded it to 'mountain passes of a Cold War' in 2023, and stated the second Cold War would be more dangerous than the first, which is alarming given the extreme danger of the first Cold War
“he replied memorably we are in the foothills of a Cold War I thought that was a great headline a year later he up graded it to the mountain passes of a cold war when I interviewed him for the Sunday Times last year ahead of his 100th birthday he said something really striking quote the second Cold War will be even more dangerous than the first which when you consider how dangerous the first cold war was is rather an arresting thought”
China is creating massive overcapacity in manufacturing, particularly in electric vehicles: 'they're now making enough EVs to supply the entire demand of the western world' despite finite global export markets, suggesting the model that worked (exporting excess capacity) is no longer sustainable
“Michael pet is not in charge of the Chinese she is and she is creating ever more over capacity in manufacturing as if the world's export markets are kind of infinitely elastic you know they're make they're now making enough EVS to supply the entire Dem of the western world”
A stalemate in Ukraine is the most predictable outcome: one year of kinetic warfare followed by two years of attrition, then an armistice (not a peace agreement) and a dangerous border that persists, which is the Korean War analogy playing out
“when my colleagues Francis fukiyama and others were looking eagerly towards Ukrainian Victory last year I said no what happens here is you have a year of very kinetic Warfare and then things grind to a halt and you end up with two years of attrition and at the end of that you probably get an Armistice but you don't get get a peace agreement because there's no way of agreeing at peace and then you get a dangerous border which persists uh and that I fear is the most likely outcome of the war in Ukraine as things currently stand”
The US cannot credibly defend Taiwan because it lacks military-industrial capacity; it would run out of precision missiles in a week of war with China, and aircraft carrier task forces are already committed to the Middle East, making a Taiwan defense mission impossible without unacceptable vulnerability elsewhere
“if there were a war between the United States and China gol B for to happen us will run out of precision missiles in a week uh so these empty uh these empty silos are a big concern in the pentan people are realizing that uh just find CR start to to drain uh US stocks of 155 Mill shells”
Donald Trump is highly likely to be reelected and win a second (non-consecutive) term; he is currently pulling ahead in swing states, the Biden administration can't catch a break politically despite full employment and falling inflation, and polling shows Trump now above 50% likely to win because he's ahead in swing states while Biden polls poorly even with good economic data
“Donald Trump I've been saying this for over a year now is highly likely to be reelected to have a second term he'll be only the second uh president to have two non-consecutive terms... if you were watching closely it's been obvious for some time that Trump's pulling ahead in the swing States uh and the Biden Administration can't catch a break”
Biden has made four public statements that the US would defend Taiwan militarily, and although White House spokespersons walked back each statement, the walking back stopped working: 'if you say something four times and people walk it back the walking back stops working'
“Joe Biden the president of the United States starts to say that too four times and each time White House White House spokes people have to walk it back but you know if you say something four times and people walk it back the walking back stops working so we have had a significant shift in attitudes and policy STs”
The phrase 'global south' is problematic and confusing: the two biggest countries in the 'global south' (or southern hemisphere) happen to be Norway (if you count Europe/Arctic regions) and Australia, and using the geographic/hemisphere label creates misleading categories
“I have such an aversion to the phrase Global I wish I wish I could just stop it being used as somebody pointed out the other day um the two biggest countries in the global sou Happ to be nor most and of course Australia to be in the southern Hare”