What's Really Driving China's Strategic Objectives? (w/ M. Taylor Fravel & Mike Green)
What this covers
M. Taylor Fravel, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and director of the MIT Security Studies Program, sits down with his long-time friend Mike Green of Logica Capital Advisors to discuss a multitude of factors affecting China's strategic objectives. Although they examine certain aspects like demographics and the trajectory of growth for China's military, the focus of the interview is on geography and how China’s large number of land borders and their perception of being blocked off from the Pacific Ocean by U.S. military presence in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines makes the "first island chain" a potential flashpoint for conflict. Green and Fravel also discuss Green's hypothesis that Vladimir Putin and the Russians are the deftest participants in the triangular relationship between the U.S., China, and Russia. Filmed on February 25, 2021. Key Learnings: It wasn't too long ago that trade deal headlines were whipsawing markets back and forth. The outcome for U.S.-China relations is not set in stone, and investors need to be aware of the risks and opportunities presented by this conflict.
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Fravel argues that China faces structural constraints on Taiwan military action due to amphibious operation complexity, demographic decline, and logistical limitations, while the US-China relationship is entering a new competitive phase that will define American foreign policy for the coming decade.
- Taiwan would require a large-scale amphibious assault to achieve unification by force, which China likely lacks competence to execute successfully
- China's demographic collapse of young males (15-40) from 200M to 150M over 15 years severely constrains both military expansion and economic vitality simultaneously
- The first island chain and US alliance structure create persistent geographic encirclement that China cannot easily overcome despite military modernization
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China seeks to prevent the formation of counterbalancing coalitions and create security buffers on land through improved political relationships with neighbors, while on sea it faces the first island chain which constrains its freedom of maneuver
“China has this really complex environment, and so it wants to prevent the formation of counter balancing coalitions, but it also wants to be able to have more security and more buffers. On land, it's been able to create buffers in part by improving political relationships with its neighbors”
Despite efforts to limit their power, the state-owned sector's share of GDP in China has remained roughly the same while GDP has grown significantly; the non-state sectors face pointed efforts to signal limits on their activities, serving as an indirect way to keep powerful private entities aligned with party direction
“I think the state-owned sectors or share of GDP in China is more or less the same, but as Andrew Batson mentioned recently, China's GDP has grown a lot. It's not standing still. You've got the non-state sectors, but as we've seen, really, in the last six years, there are pretty pointed efforts, whether it's [?], perhaps most recently, Jack Ma, they have financial right to signal that there are limits to what these private entities can do”
Historically, China has rarely used military force for brute force solutions (simply taking territory), instead using force as an instrument of coercion to bring about political objectives, as evidenced by border wars with India and invasion of Vietnam which were about signaling red lines to Vietnam and Moscow
“If you look at how China thinks about force historically, it's very rarely tried to use military force and what Thomas [?] call brute force... Instead, it uses force as an instrument of coercion to bring about some other political objective... This way even include the border war with India, or the invasion of Vietnam. It wasn't about taking these tariffs away but signaling to Vietnam and to Moscow certain Chinese red lines”
China is still very much playing a home game: its main contingencies are on its immediate periphery relating to sovereignty (especially Taiwan, India, South China Sea), with a huge maritime component; everything except three bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea is based on mainland territory or Hainan Island, giving China a logistical advantage because it's fighting close to its stockpiles.
“The last point I would make in terms of your insight about logistics would be another thing that separates the Chinese military from the US military is China is still very much playing a home game. China's main contingencies are on its immediate periphery relating to its sovereignty, especially Taiwan that we've talked about, India which has been in the news in the last year, South China Sea, and then America, a lot of these have a maritime component. There's a huge maritime component to China's approach. Everything is, for the most part, except for the three new bases that have been built on these artificial islands in the South China Sea, Chinese forces are still based all on homeland territory, on the mainland or Hainan Islands, that does give it an advantage.”
The transition from Lenin to Stalin in the Soviet Union involved rolling back the private sector, reducing foreign investment, and centralizing party control through anti-corruption purges that functioned as mechanisms for centralizing control to Stalin personally rather than to the party or nation broadly
“Lenin had gone in with the best of intentions to bring the socialist worker utopia... introduced the new economic principles which carried roughly through 1929. Then under Stalin, Stalin took power, the role of the private sector was rolled back, foreign investment was reduced, and the party was given control. More accurately, the party in the personage of Stalin. The same anti-corruption purges, et cetera, which are really just a mechanism for centralizing control and an individual as compared to even the party”
There was a second Cold War between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s to late 1980s in which a quarter of Soviet ground forces were deployed against China, and the two nuclear powers engaged in conventional combat over disputed islands
“There is a second Cold War we never talked about, which is the Cold War, the early 1960s to the late 1980s, between China and Russia and the Soviet Union. It was a quarter of Soviet ground forces were deployed against China, that stuff we just never talked about today. They clashed over demands of the islands, one of the only times two nuclear armed powers and engaged in conventional combat with each other”
China emerged from post-Tiananmen isolation through economic engagement with the global economy, most favored nation trading status from the Clinton administration, and ultimately by joining the WTO, transforming from a poor nation to the world's second largest economy
“China's dug itself out of isolation after Tiananmen. Engagement with the global economy was a key part of that, most favored nation trading status from the Clinton administration, ultimately by joining the WTO and then really becoming the economic juggernaut that it now is”
China does not want its military to grow in size and Xi's 2015 reforms cut the PLA by 300,000, continuing a trend from Deng Xiaoping (700,000 cut) and the Sino-Soviet standoff era (6 million down to 2 million), suggesting China is thinking about military power differently than through force size
“I don't think China wants its military to grow in size. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if it downsizes its military further. The reforms that Xi Jinping put in place in December 29th of 2015, early 2016... cut the PLA by 300,000. Previously, [?] cut them by 700,000. At the height of the Sino-Soviet standoff, they were at about 6 million. We've gone from a PLA of 6 million down to 2 million”
Previously, the PLA conducted logistics through geographically defined military regions with separate purchasing and supply chains, but the 2015 reforms for the first time established a unified joint logistics department, which is still undergoing implementation over a decade-long period
“Previously, logistics in China was run through geographically defined military regions along a very old Soviet territorial defense model, which meant that you had different purchasing and supply chains for different parts of China, not one unified supply. They've only gotten to unify that quite recently... will take a long time, or at least probably a decade to make it much more efficient”
China has been aggressively filling its strategic stockpiles whenever oil prices plummet, which reduces its logistical burden because it operates on interior lines close to supplies, similar to how Napoleon used interior lines to reduce supply strain
“It's going to be closer to its strategic stockpiles, and has been pretty aggressively filling, especially whenever oil prices plummet, trying to add more and more to its stockpiles. It can reduce some of the logistical burden, which is the point I want to make because it is operating on its own land, fighting in some ways, or logistically, it's on your so-called interior lines”
China's Taiwan policy has hardened in the last five years as it stripped away allied states that recognized Taiwan as the Republic of China, reducing Taiwan's formal diplomatic recognition to 15 countries, and this acceleration followed Tsai Ing-wen's election because she rejected the 1992 Consensus
“there's been surely a hardening of China's Taiwan policy in the last five years, stripping away some of these ally, these states that formally recognized Taiwan as the Republic of China, citing Taiwan is down to 15 countries... A lot of this accelerated after Tsai Ing-wen was elected as president once Ma Ying-jeou completed his two terms, because she wouldn't bend a knee and under the words 1992 Consensus”
As China's economy continues to grow, it increases its leverage over Taiwan and other regional countries, allowing it to potentially divide any coalition that might defend Taiwan in the future, making time work in China's favor strategically
“It's certainly as China's economy continues to grow, this does increase its other forms of leverage over Taiwan, and even perhaps even over other countries in the region, such that it might be able to divide any coalition that might try to come to Taiwan's defense in the future”
China's collapse of the Soviet Union relieved strategic pressure from the north, allowing China to focus military and strategic attention on the maritime sphere and the first island chain.
“in part by basically the collapse of the Soviet Union which relieves strategic pressure from the north. Now, of course, we can talk about later, this Russia-China relationship today. When China looks to the maritime direction, it has to look east or southeast, either directly into the Western Pacific through the East China Sea or south into the South China Sea”
Russia has real economic need for China due to Western sanctions and its status as a petrostate lacking a robust diversified economy, particularly needing Chinese markets for Siberian hydrocarbons.
“My initial take which is not necessarily a direct reaction to your assessment is that economically, Russia had real need for China, especially as it has been cut off from the west and it's a Petro state. This is more your area than mine, but not really robust developed diversified economy and what seemed to cement the deal was when Russia finally agreed to brand or sell China gas and other hydrocarbons with pretty good prices that they had resisted doing for a decade or more. China is the natural market for everything from Siberia to East.”
China is developing military power through informatization (information technology) and military-civil fusion, seeking to leverage dual-use aspects of its society and economy to reduce logistics burdens and improve efficiency.
“They want to try to leverage as much informatization, as the Chinese call it, or information technology, as well as what's sometimes discussed in this context as military-civil fusion, which has perhaps more relevance to the innovation sector. I think China is also thinking very hard about how it can have dual use aspects of its society and its economy in particular, so that your logistics multiplier can be reduced.”
All accomplishments in defeating COVID are being attributed to Xi by the propaganda apparatus; whether or not this is factually true, Xi is receiving credit for the narrative of defeat.
“That is clearly designed on the one hand to signal that China did defeat the virus internally. Also, this is all being attributed to Xi. These are all his accomplishments, whether or not the fact that that is the case.”
Russia and China now share a long land border and can orient themselves strategically in their preferred directions—China toward Maritime Asia, Russia toward Central and Eastern Europe—without having to contest the zone between them, particularly Mongolia.
“It's very important in this sense, I think, because they share a lot of land border and are now close to the line, they can really orient themselves strategically in the directions to which they want to be focused. China, Maritime Asia, [?], and then Russia, perhaps towards Eastern and Central Europe. Because they don't have to worry about contesting that belt or that zone between them, and Mongolia, in particular, which became a flashpoint in that Cold War.”
Unlike the Soviet collapse which had no economic impact on the United States and only positive strategic effects, China's economic integration with the US makes any Chinese economic crisis or collapse highly consequential for American welfare
“The Soviet economy did collapse in the 1980s and that had no impact on the United States. It had a positive strategic effect, but it had no economic blowback or consequences”
In 2013, Xi Jinping came to power and implemented an inflection point in Chinese policy toward centralization and government control, apparently motivated by concerns about the Soviet Union's collapse following economic opening and fears that the CCP was losing its grip on the economy
“Xi Jinping who came to power was effectively not an unknown, but a middle ground between two competing powers, two competing factions. He was somewhat obsessed with the idea that the Soviet Union had collapsed following the opening of their economy, saw some of the same challenges begin to develop with the CCP beginning to lose its grip on the economy, and reoriented back towards a policy of centralization, government control”
China has 14 land neighbors, four of which have nuclear weapons (Korea, Russia, Pakistan, India), while the United States has only two neighbors, giving the US a fundamentally more secure strategic position
“If you just look at the first map of China, you see that China has 14 neighbors on land, and the United States has two, so China has a really complex continental environment. Four of these countries have nuclear weapons, Korea, Russia, Pakistan, and India”
An amphibious crossing of water with military forces is significant and historically difficult, as evidenced by D-Day being a huge operation, and the Taiwan Strait is six times wider than the English Channel with muddy shoals on the western face that make landing difficult
“There's a reason that D-day was a huge operation. People tend to under appreciate that. Taiwan Strait is six times wider than the English Channel. You're talking in the shoals on the western face of Taiwan are largely muddy. There's not a lot of ground that you can easily-- there's not clean beaches you can purchase on”
Mackinder's Geopolitical Theory posits that Eurasia is a single world power continent and that none of the players on that continent have stable relationships, which is relevant for understanding Russia-China dynamics
“that falls under the camp of what's referred to as the Mackinder Global Theory where the idea is that Eurasia is a single continent, it is a world power continent, and none of the players on that continent have stable relationships”
The Malacca Strait and other chokepoints in the South China Sea represent critical sea lanes for China's access to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and China cannot be confident in accessing these routes even if alternative paths exist through Indonesian waters.
“The same even in the South China Sea, if one is thinking that is the natural gateway into the Indian Ocean, and ultimately, the Persian Gulf, there are a lot of choke points that China has to contend with. Now, there are ways in which Chinese vessels, even if the Malacca Straits were closed, could navigate through other parts of the Indonesian island chain. It doesn't necessarily give, I think, a country with the geopolitical heft as China and the positioning of China, necessarily a lot of confidence and sense of security that it can access the oceans.”
The US is implementing a program to disentangle supply chains from China, with TSMC building next-generation semiconductor fabrication facilities in Texas and other areas, which would reduce China's ability to exploit its supply chain role for coercion and make it easier for the US to blockade China
“the Biden administration just announced a program for detangling of US supply chains from China, or disentangling to be more accurate. TSMC is talking about building next gen equipment and fabrication facilities for semiconductors in Texas and other areas”
Under President Duterte, the Philippines has moved away from a stronger US tilt toward more equidistance or even closer alignment to China, though an upcoming election in roughly a year and a half makes likely a return to closer US ties given the existing alliance treaty
“the Philippines, as you know recently under President Duterte, has I think moved away from a much stronger tilt towards the United States that we saw under the Aquino administration to perhaps more of an equidistance point, or even a little closer to China... there's going to be an election to the Philippines in about a year and a half. We don't know who will replace Duterte, but it's highly likely given the existence of the treaty alliance between the Philippines and the United States”
The relationship between the US and China is now the defining American foreign policy challenge for the coming decade or two, requiring a fine balance between upholding US interests and preventing the most catastrophic outcomes
“It will really be, I think, the defining American foreign policy challenge for the coming decade or two in terms of how to come to grips with China, and how to orient US policy in a way that upholds US interest on the one hand and prevents the most catastrophic outcomes on the other hand. There's a fine balance to be struck here going forward”
China's population of young men aged 15-40 is currently approximately 200 million and will decline to approximately 150 million over the next 15 years, creating a severe demographic constraint on military expansion and economic potential
“that population within China is collapsing over the next 15 to 20 years. It's currently men, young men, 15 to 40 years old, I believe is about 200 million currently in China, that number falls to about 150 million over the next 15 years”
One lesson China has drawn from the Soviet collapse is the importance of balancing defense spending with spending on other areas to avoid allowing defense to grow out of control such that the economy and industrial base are weakened.
“With the comparison to the Soviet Union, another element in the Soviet collapse is simply the massive burden the defense sector plays on the Soviet economy. One of the lessons that China has also tried to draw is how to balance basically spending on defense with spending on other areas and not let defense basically grow out of control such that they actually don't have a vital economy in the industrial base and innovation sector that they want to have in terms of achieving their broader economic goals.”
The PLA has spent the last 25 years since the Gulf War developing joint operations capability, focusing on how to conduct integrated multi-service operations across their periphery within the range of their air cover.
“the PLA really since the Gulf War in the early 1990s, joint operations was the way in which you would project an exercise of military power in the future. Of course, being a ground force dominant People's Liberation Army, they had no joint operations capability. They've really spent the last 25 years figuring out what that means and figuring out how to reform their institutions to be able to conduct those kinds of operations, except they're still just focused on their periphery.”
An amphibious assault is the only real way China could achieve unification through force, because Taiwan would be able to resist any coercive pressure short of that.
“There's only one real way they could do that which would be an amphibious assault because Taiwan would be able to resist coercion short of that. Coercion short of that would also play out over a longer period of time, which would allow other states to mobilize to support Taiwan.”
China's current fielding of approximately 2 million military personnel with a typical logistics support multiplier of 10x means roughly 20 million people from China's labor force are engaged in supporting existing military operations, without deep water navy or extensive foreign bases
“China is currently fielding approximately 2 million people in its military, if I understand it correctly. A typical force multiplier in terms of logistics chains that are required to support that is about 10x. There's probably 20 million people in one form or another out of China's labor force that are involved in the support of its existing military”
China has opened a base in Djibouti in 2017 and may develop bases in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, but is developing global military presence very slowly because its pressing security concerns are in Asia within 200 miles of Chinese territory where its air cover extends
“You mentioned the base in Djibouti, which I don't know, 2017 is when it opened... There may be something in Sri Lanka at some point, there may be something in Pakistan at some point... These are China operations within 200 miles off China roughly, or whatever the bubble of their air cover is”
China was the first major economy to reopen after the pandemic with positive growth over a 12-month period, which the CCP attributes to Xi's accomplishments and is designed to signal internal victory and restore legitimacy after the pandemic response concerns
“China was able to reopen, and the only major economy, I think, at least to their accounting to have positive growth over this 12-month period. That is clearly designed on the one hand to signal that China did defeat the virus internally. Also, this is all being attributed to Xi”
A two-block competition and decoupling between the US and China is not where the relationship is today; it's competitive but hasn't reached the breaking point where you sever the cord across the board, though there will be pressure to do so if Taiwan scenario occurs.
“It's competitive today, but it's not reached this breaking point whereby you really are in some two-block competition, and you're going to really decouple, like sever the cord across the board. There will be pressure to do that. It may be that for the US, the cost of doing so whenever this scenario plays out is too high, and it doesn't go that far.”
Recent US support for Taiwan has increased substantially with high-profile cabinet and senior official visits, raising questions about whether the US still maintains a one-China policy, which concerns Fravel because China's assessment of US commitments shapes how China thinks about Taiwan.
“This has an interactive effect with the United States which has adopted its own increased hardened support for Taiwan in the last 12 months, particularly in the last nine months, including very high profile visits this past summer with a cabinet level individual of the sector of Health and Human Services, and then later on Undersecretary of State...It was going to be a growing US support in a way that was really designed in part to raise questions in China's mind about whether or not the US still had one China policy, which to me was a quite worrisome development, because China's assessment of whether or not the US will abide by what China believes to be the central commitments in the 1972 and 1979 communicates are one aspect of the US-China policy that really shapes how they think about Taiwan more than anything else, and that's come under pressure.”
China's pandemic response was more successful than the US's in terms of deaths and economic growth, but this is not universal proof that China's governance model is superior, as other democracies like Taiwan and Singapore also succeeded.
“This is not at all glorifying this approach. It's okay to say what the CCP can do historically is to mobilize society around different objectives. It did mobilize with respect to the virus in different ways, which was how it would respond in a policy sense. It was successful in Xi's benefit in the end. That's not how the situation played out. China feels, on the one hand in a pretty good place, because the economy is growing...We have to look at other places like Taiwan, South Korea, or Singapore, they have great different approaches that are very successful. This is not at all glorifying this approach.”
China strategically hides behind Russia in security matters outside of Asia, abstaining or vetoing at the UN only when Russia leads, never independently taking coercive diplomatic stances.
“China has, at least so far really, it is trying to hide behind Russia in many ways, especially in security issues outside of Asia. If one looks at the intervention in Syria, or other UN-related interventions, China will go along and veto or abstain [?], but it never is the one leading the veto or the abstention, it always allows Russia to do this.”
Xi's policies can be understood as a party strengthener analogous to the Qing Dynasty's estate strengthening, because the party-state is what anchors China as a political actor, distinguishing this from simple personal power consolidation
“He's really like-- to harken back to the Ching Dynasty, estate strengthener but in this case, it's a party strengthener, because it's the party state that is really what anchors China as a political actor”
Xi Jinping's rhetoric about a strong army and being able to fight and win wars reflects either preparing for war or lacking confidence in the military, and in Xi's case reflects the previous decade of laxity and lack of discipline under Hu Jintao when military leaders including two Vice Chairmen were charged with party discipline violations
“when you have leaders talking to be able to fight and win, they're either doing it because they're preparing to go to war and they want to prepare society for that, or they actually don't believe their military [?]. Leaders, they want to have the sharpest tools in their geopolitical toolkit... This was not a military that has been ready to fight and win, especially if that fight would involve the United States, it would be a high intensity military conflict”
Fravel expresses skepticism of using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations in national security assessments because the ability to convert one's currency is hugely important for demonstrating actual power.
“As an aside, I'm not a fan of PVP calculations when it comes to national security and power, because I think being able to convert your currency is hugely important part of that.”
China's goal is to become a world-class military (best in class, as good as anyone) rather than a global military with the extensive footprint of the United States (800 military installations in 40 countries), which requires global presence and logistics the US built during post-WWII competition with the USSR
“China says it wants to become a world class military, which means they want to be best in class as good as anybody else... but it does not mean necessarily they will also want to be a global military at least with the footprint of the United States, because that's a different sense of world... What makes us a global military power is that we're in 40 countries. We have 800 military installations in 40 countries around the world”
Green theorizes that Putin is the most skillful player in the great power game, strategically replaying Molotov-Ribbentrop dynamics to partner with China while positioning Russia to eventually flip and become a US ally against China, similar to how China played the US card against the Soviet Union in the 1970s.
“One of my pet theories is that the best player in this game is Putin, by far, and I look at the relationship as Russia effectively replaying the dynamics of the Molotov Ribbentrop protocol, effectively choosing to partner with somebody where you know it's an unstable relationship. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it was caused effectively by Stalin being ready to defect to the west. Effectively, he traveled to Vladivostok to meet with Roosevelt and the underlying dynamic was that the Soviet Union was going to flip and so Hitler was forced into an aggressive land grab effectively trying to overthrow the Soviet Union before the forces could be aligned against them...I'm suspicious that the same thing is in play here. Because Russia can't allow China to become a true global hegemon...I'm actually quite suspicious that this is a move from Putin to get the Chinese to overextend themselves, break the relationship with the United States and then flip and Russia becomes a natural ally of the United States in again, containing China in the same way that China played that role in the US-Soviet relationships in the 1970s to the late 1980s.”
Xi's PLA reforms pursued two simultaneous objectives: rooting out corruption and suppressing it to ensure the PLA is focused on warfighting rather than functioning as an interest group extracting state revenue.
“there's a huge anti-corruption component and the most corrupt parts of the PLA are logistics because that's where all the fat can be skinned...I don't want to downplay the reform to a warfighting perspective, which is to say I think at least two things were being-- or two goals were being pursued in the reforms. One of them clearly was to root out corruption or to at least suppress it in the systems that can be rooted out...but to suppress it and to really have the PLA be focused on warfighting and not simply as an interest group, for which it went take its share of state revenue.”
China recently showed in the border conflict with India that it can execute a fait accompli: it occupied 40-60 square kilometers on the north bank of Pangong Lake, clashed elsewhere, called for disengagement without backing down, and when India seized mountain ranges on the southern bank to create countervailing leverage, China accepted this quid pro quo as a way to reverse the fait accompli.
“You're trying to make this move in the north bank of Pangong Lake and occupied an area maybe 40 to 60 square kilometers, you had [?] clash in another location nearby, and then calls for disengagement to which China wanted there to be a military disengagement but it didn't want to have to move its troops back. Didn't want to have its fait accompli in India ponders this for a while and then says, well, we can seize these mountain ranges on the southern bank of the lake that allow us to dominate some Chinese positions. All in which they did, and they even called it a QPQ operation, a quid pro quo operator. Now suddenly, they have leverage to bring about a change they wanted. They were able to reverse a fait accompli without resorting-- it's not clear in this scenario what the countervailing leverage the US and other states might be able to gain because Taiwan is so big.”
When Chinese leaders talk about urgency or deadlines for Taiwan, they tend to project them very far into the future so they cannot be blamed for failure to achieve them, making it difficult to assess whether statements about Taiwan urgency reflect actual near-term plans
“Because even when Chinese leaders talk a little bit about urgency or deadlines, they tend to project them very far out to the future so they can't be the one to fail to achieve anything by that deadline and this or that or be criticized for failure to do so”
China evaluates military decisions using simple cost-benefit analysis where the benefit of unification is huge as a long-standing nationalist objective, but even if military costs were low (analogous to Crimea), there would still be significant US reaction
“I think China always views these decisions, simple cost benefit calculus. What's the benefit? In this case, it's huge. It's bringing about unification, which is a long standing NASA objective for the party... If the costs were quite low, then yeah, the temptation would be quite high... there are still costs that China has to take into account with respect to the United States”
Even if a country attempted to reverse a fait accompli on Taiwan militarily, the US cannot ensure it could stop every other country from resupplying Taiwan, and if Japan and the US attempted to break a blockade, this would significantly escalate the conflict
“When China really stop, be able to stop every other country from resupplying Taiwan, certainly that'd be a very risky situation to do that. I suspect countries would try to break the blockade and Japan and the US would have ways of doing that”
A sustained domestic policy crisis would be required to create a rallying point for change in Chinese political leadership, but such a crisis would need to be much more severe than the pandemic response to challenge Xi's position
“It needs to be like a sustained domestic policy crisis, that then become a rallying point or a point of mobilization for the change in the political leadership... I think it has to be a much, much bigger crisis than what we actually saw”
The old logistics system under military regions was vulnerable to corruption because supply contracts at different regions could be padded with local officials skimming resources, a major source of waste that unified logistics aims to eliminate.
“the most corrupt parts of the PLA are logistics because that's where all the fat can be skinned. I've got a contract to build a barracks here and I'm supposed to build a barracks for 1000 people, I built for 500 and keep the rest. All those stories are very common”
It is difficult to assess Xi's true standing from outside, and people who claim to know what happens in the Politburo Standing Committee are overstating their knowledge.
“Has Xi's standing been weakened enough such that he can't garner support to continue to rule, or would need to do something to significantly elevate his support. As far as I can tell, and it is hard to tell on the outside. I think anyone who tells you what's going on in the Politburo Standing Committee in China doesn't like to-- Why they're doing it with us would be absurd, but yes, I agree. We have to be very humble, like, what we do and do not know. I think sometimes, we talk about knowing more than we do.”
Green observes that China's logistics multiplier is probably significantly less than the US because China's supply chains are not nearly as extended and it doesn't have to manage across 40 different countries; this may obviate some components of the 10x multiplier that Green initially cited.
“That's actually I think, a really, really good point. It's candidly one that I hadn't fully thought about, which is the dynamic that their logistics multiplier is probably significantly less than the United States because their supply chains are not nearly as extended. They don't have to manage across 40 different countries. That may obviate some components of it.”
The US-China relationship has transformed from a 1970s-1980s dynamic where China played the role of counterweight to Soviet power, to a present dynamic where the US treats both Russia and China as equal or comparable bad actors in great power competition
“at least our current policy orientation is one of doing both Russia and China as equal, not equal but as both bad actors, great power competition”
In 2020, there was discussion that Xi Jinping had lost the mandate of heaven due to the coronavirus pandemic, suggesting potential internal vulnerability that could incentivize him to reclaim legitimacy through a Taiwan reintegration achievement
“one of the things we heard a lot in 2020, particularly in the earlier parts of 2020, before it was tamp down was the idea that the components of the coronavirus plague or pandemic... was an indication that Xi had lost the mandate of heaven”
To the degree that people in China were dissatisfied with Xi in February-March 2020 during COVID, that window of dissatisfaction appears to have passed; there's now a phase of celebration around the 100th anniversary of CCP founding (2021).
“To the degree that people were increasingly dissatisfied, and we really can't measure dissatisfaction, because people can't voice it in China, and to the degree that February and March was a moment, I think that it appears that that would have passed. China now is really focused on moving into this new phase of celebration. 2021 is the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. We're going to hear over the next 12 months just unrelenting stream of propaganda and stories about what has been accomplished in this timeframe.”
The Russia-China relationship is fundamentally driven by mutual desire to immunize themselves from US influence and power rather than by shared values or deep cultural bonds, making it a relatively thin alignment despite recent strengthening
“combined forces to immunize themselves as much as possible from US influence where didn't want it to be influenced or to be exercised on them... I think they weren't brought together by shared values, except perhaps in strong man rule. They weren't brought together by any deep cultural bonds, or there's a lot of racism in Russian approaches or views of China”
American views of China changed dramatically after the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre in 1989, which was seen as a watershed moment for how Americans perceived China as a reforming, liberalizing power
“Spring of 1989 overlaps with the demonstrations and the massacre in Tiananmen Square, which I think for most Americans was a watershed moment in terms of how they thought about China”
The CCP can mobilize society around different objectives in ways that many liberal democracies cannot, reflecting its revolutionary roots and demonstrated competence during the pandemic response
“what the CCP can do is mobilize. This goes back to its revolutionary roots. It really mobilized in the face of the virus in a way that many Hormel societies could not do... It's okay to say what the CCP can do historically is to mobilize society around different objectives”
China's military capabilities have grown dramatically since 1989, developing a hard power position in terms of both wealth and military capacity that was absent 30 years ago, making Americans more concerned about China than at any point since 1972.
“China has a military in particular today that it didn't have in 1989, or even in 1999, or even in 2009. From a hard power perspective, if one looks at wealth, and one looks at military power, China's position in the world has really changed quite dramatically, such that we're now back at a point, not to bring the full circle that Americans are certainly much more concerned about China at any point since 1989, perhaps at any point since 1972.”
Fravel has written a book titled 'Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949' which was published in April 2019 and became available in paperback in December (of the conversation year)
“The title of your book is? M. TAYLOR FRAVEL: Active Defense, China's Military Strategy Since 1949... It came out in actually April of 2019... it is now available on paperback as of December”
Green and Fravel both played lacrosse together at St. Ignatius High School in San Francisco, though Fravel transferred after sophomore year when his father was relocated to Taiwan
“You and I have known each other for going on 30-plus years now. We actually played lacrosse together in high school... Ignatius in San Francisco... I graduated a little bit earlier than that”
Fravel received a scholarship to Oxford after attending Middlebury College for its strong Chinese language program, then did management consulting at Bain & Company in San Francisco before pursuing a PhD in Political Science at Stanford and eventually MIT
“I ended up at Middlebury College in Vermont, because I really wanted to learn how to speak Chinese... I was very fortunate enough to receive a scholarship to go to Oxford. I spent a couple of years in Oxford, segued into management consulting for a few years at Bain & Company in San Francisco... then ended up at a PhD program at Stanford in Political Science, and then really been at MIT since receiving my PhD in 2004”
The US has significant military presence in South Korea and Japan including the Okinawa base, and maintains a very strong alliance relationship with Japan, while Taiwan is not a formal US ally but does have commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act
“The United States, as you mentioned. It's present quite significantly in South Korea and in Japan, including the base in Okinawa, but really, the very strong alliance relationship between the United States and Japan. Taiwan, of course, is not a formal ally of the United State. The US has commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act”
Xi Jinping is likely to be reelected as General Secretary at the next party congress because no one will openly oppose him, as such opposition would constitute political suicide in China's system
“he will be reelected as General Secretary of the next party congress because he's got a lock... No one will openly oppose him because that's political suicide in China”
The concept of mandate of heaven is a common trope in discussing Xi and China, but it's not quite the same thing as historical 19th-century China because modern CCP power doesn't rest on the same cosmological foundations.
“The China's mandate of heaven has almost a common trope. It doesn't have the-- MIKE GREEN: Not quite the same thing as the 19th century, but yes-- M. TAYLOR FRAVEL: I have thought the same thing, but the question is a good one.”
Taiwan's birth rate is extremely low, among the lowest in Asia, creating demographic challenges for Taiwan similar to China's, which compounds Taiwan's vulnerability as a smaller economy with fewer resources to address demographic decline
“Taiwan has its own population challenges. I believe the birth rate there is the lowest in Asia, maybe. It's not-- MIKE GREEN: It's actually slightly higher than China, particularly the municipal areas of China but yes, it is extremely low”
2021 is the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, which will be marked by an unrelenting stream of propaganda and stories about CCP accomplishments, much of it framed around Xi Jinping, designed to reinforce his legitimacy
“2021 is the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. We're going to hear over the next 12 months just unrelenting stream of propaganda and stories about what has been accomplished in this timeframe. A lot of that will be perhaps framed around Xi Jinping”