What this covers
In this conversation, John speaks with political scientist and international relations scholar Professor John Mearsheimer about the recent war in Ukraine, and the potential for conflict in Taiwan.
Mearsheimer argues for what he calls 'offensive realism', which holds that conflicts between states are driven by the need to maximize power in relation to other states. This is in contrast to the heterodox liberal framework, which Mearsheimer contends was only tenable under the recently ended ‘unipolar’ era. Using this framework, Mearsheimer famously predicted the recent Russian invasion, arguing that it was an inevitable outcome of NATO's eastward expansion.
The discussion also turns to the situation in Taiwan and why a conflict in Asia may be more likely than a European conflict during the new Cold War.
This is an important, thought-provoking, and at times controversial discussion—essential viewing for anyone trying to understand the confusing and tumultuous geopolitical climate we find ourselves in.
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Centre for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
His recent and most notable works include, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (2001), "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" (2007), and "Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities" (2018).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 00:00 Intro 00:54 Introducing John Mearsheimer 1:50 What is realism? 4:20 Does realism = 'might makes right' 6:49 Were America's actions wise after WW2? 9:40 Domestic vs International politics 11:13 Why Liberalism needs nationalism 14:30 Why the U.S. should work with Russia against China 19:15 How John predicted Russia's invasion 26:00 America's failed Democratic export to Russia 31:05 Why in 2017 liberal foreign policy died - Unipolar vs Multipolar 33:44 The war in Ukraine is a vestige of American Hegemony 35:09 What makes a multipolar world so dangerous 38:40 American willpower 39:05 The U.S. defends Taiwan 42:45 Does America have the capacity? 45:48 The role of military technology and the quantity/quality trade off 50:30 Free enterprise vs Central command in war time 54:37 How the foreign policy establishment defeated both Trump and Obama 1:02:00 Can we avoid a war with China?" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Conversations feature John Anderson, former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, interviewing the world's foremost thought leaders about today's pressing social, cultural and political issues.
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Mearsheimer argues that the international system has transitioned from unipolarity to multipolarity, requiring the U.S. to abandon liberal hegemony and adopt realist strategies—prioritizing containment of China, improving relations with Russia, and ending the Ukraine war rather than continuing to pursue liberal democratic expansion.
- The unipolar moment (1990-2017) enabled liberal hegemony; multipolarity requires realism as the dominant strategic logic
- NATO expansion into Ukraine violated realist principles by ignoring Russian security concerns and was predictable and avoidable
- The U.S. must choose between competing in Europe (Ukraine) and Asia (China); China is the true peer competitor and strategic priority
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During the unipolar moment (roughly 1990-2017), the United States was the only great power and was able to pursue liberal hegemony—promoting democracy, economic intercourse, and spreading institutions globally without worrying about rival great powers or the balance of power.
“during the unipolar moment which ran from roughly 1990 maybe 1991 to 2017 when the United States was by definition the only great power in the system we were able to pursue a liberal foreign policy I call it liberal hegemony the United States was in a position where it didn't have to worry about rival great Powers it didn't have to worry about the balance of power because it was Godzilla”
Joe Biden as vice president and head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was an arch proponent of engagement with China, but when he became president, he adopted Trump's containment policy toward China rather than returning to engagement.
“Joe Biden when he was vice president and Joe Biden when he was head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was an Arch proponent of Engagement with China when President Trump moved into the White House in January 2017 one of the first things he did was flush engagement down the toilet ball he got rid of it completely four years later when Biden replaces Trump in the White House does he go back to engagement which he had been a proponent of when he was vice president and head of the Senate Foreign Relations no does not what Biden does is he actually follows in Trump's footsteps”
The technological sophistication and quality of Western weaponry remains a significant advantage and has been demonstrated in the Ukraine war, which is a concern to Russia and China because it means technological edge still matters despite manufacturing capacity gaps.
“one of the interesting lessons I would have thought out of Ukraine which must have been noticed in Beijing is that not withstanding everything that you've said about um you know the wind down of manufacturing capacity and keeping up Supply chains and so forth the technological edge of Western Weaponry uh American in particular is still very evident”
The U.S. has made a number of mistakes in managing the defense establishment since the end of the Cold War, as revealed by the Ukraine war—specifically, the U.S. lacks the manufacturing capability to produce large numbers of artillery tubes and ammunition, which the Russians have.
“if you look at what's happening in Ukraine it's quite clear that the United States made a number of mistakes in terms of managing the defense establishment since the end of the Cold War for example it's now quite clear from the Russia Ukraine war that you want to have a powerful industrial base that can pump out lots of uh artillery and lots of artillery rounds and one of the principal reasons that the Russians are in very good shape in the Russia Ukraine war is because the Russians have significant manufacturing capability when it comes to weaponry the United States doesn't have that capability either”
The United States after World War II behaved wisely and realistically in rebuilding Europe through the Marshall Plan and Japan through MacArthur's occupation, attaching conditions to aid and creating the foundations for their recovery into functional democratic capitalist economies.
“America after the second world war as a leader of the Allies...behaved...very wisely and...realistically in relation of both the rebuilding of Europe think the Marshall Plan think putting the place back together strings attached to the 13 billion which was a lot of money in those days”
Realism posits that power is the currency in international politics and states care above all else about the balance of power because they operate in a world where there is no higher authority that can rescue them if they get in trouble, and they can never be sure that a powerful state won't attack them.
“realists believe that power is the currency in international politics and that states care above all else about the balance of power and the reason states care about the balance of power is because they operate in a world where there's no higher authority that can come to their rescue if they get in trouble and at the same time they can never be sure that a really powerful state in that system won't come after them won't attack them”
China was a threat to the U.S. and the West because it was a state capitalist (market-oriented) economy with sophisticated, clever people good at developing high-end technologies, which would enable China to outperform the U.S. technologically.
“the problem with China is that it had something of a market economy it was State capitalism and you turn the Chinese people loose in terms of developing sophisticated Technologies they are definitely going to get of the United States and the West more generally”
There is significant debate over who is leading in AI development, and the winner will be in a position of unbelievable power.
“AI for there's a lot of argument over who's leading in that area and of course the winner will be in a position of unbelievable power”
Wars over the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan would be much smaller in scale than a war in Central Europe during the Cold War, so the consequences of such wars would not be as great, making war more likely.
“it's easy to imagine a war breaking out over the South China Sea or over Taiwan or over the East China Sea so what I'm saying here is because the consequences of a us China war would not be as great as the consequences of a US Soviet War in Central Europe during the Cold War the likelihood of war in East Asia today is greater than it was in the Cold War”
The American free enterprise model, if properly supported by government policy, will enable the US to advance technologies faster than China's command economy model, because centralized command economies kill the development of useful technology into productive economic models.
“is the military capacity keeping Pace with that commitment...the American free enterprise model if I can put it like that will see the advancement of those Technologies...where the Central Command model that's reemerged in China will not be able to emulate it...China seems to be moving towards that command economy sort of model which kills the development even of carefully thought out technology into useful uh economic models”
The decision to expand NATO into Ukraine was irresponsible in the extreme because of the consequences for the Ukrainian people and for Ukraine as a functioning society, which is now being destroyed.
“this decision to expand NATO into Ukraine was irresponsible in the extreme because of the consequences for the Ukrainian people for the consequences that flowed from this decision for Ukraine as a functioning Society I mean it's being destroyed”
The Australian Strategic Policy Initiative (ASPI) found that out of approximately 40 vital and important technology areas, China is leading in well over half, though translating technological leadership into actual production and useful applications is a different matter.
“the Australian strategic policy initiative aspy a think tank which is not particularly liked in Beijing I have to say recently published some material indicating that in an area out of around 40 vital and important technology areas China is leading in well over half Translating that technology of course into actual production and useful things is a different matter”
The United States under Nixon in 1972 peeled China off from the Soviet Union and made China an ally against the Soviet Union, and the U.S. should have worked to have decent relations with China long before 1972 to prevent pushing China and the Soviets closer together—a lesson that should be applied to the Russia-China relationship today.
“what we did starting in 1972 under President Nixon was we peeled the Chinese off from the Soviets and the Chinese became allies of the United States against the Soviet Union that made eminently good strategic sense and what we should have done long before 1972 was work to have decent relations with the Chinese so we didn't help to push the Chinese and the Russians or Chinese and the Soviets closer together”
Democratic peace theory, the prominent liberal theory, argues that democracies do not fight each other because liberal democracy creates incentives for peaceful conflict resolution; realists reject this on the grounds that democracies, like all states, care primarily about the balance of power rather than shared governance type.
“the most prominent liberal Theory because I think it'll be quite clear how it contrasts with realism and that theory is Democratic peace Theory and it argues that in a world where you have lots of democracies those democracies will not fight each other in other words those democracies when they think about each other won't worry about the balance of power the way realists say they will but because they're liberal democracies they will live in peace”
Around 2017, the world transitioned from unipolarity to multipolarity with three great powers (United States, China, Russia), and once you move from unipolarity to multipolarity, great power politics returns to the table because you must worry about the balance of power.
“what happened around 2 17 is that the world transitioned from unipolarity to multipolarity one cannot underestimate the importance of this transition in the distribution of power because once you move from unipolarity to multipolarity great power politics is now back on the table you have three great powers in the system”
Russia's invasion of Ukraine was rational in the sense that it was a logical response to NATO expansion, even if it is not approved of morally or as a policy preference.
“I think you've even gone so far as to say that in a way what Ukraine what Russia did when it decided to invade was actually rational that doesn't mean that we like it or approve of it but that it was rational”
In the 1990s there was a major debate in the Clinton Administration about whether to expand NATO eastward, with realists like George Kennan and Defense Secretary Bill Perry opposing expansion because they believed Russia would see it as a threat, while liberals like President Clinton, Tony Lake, and Richard Holbrook supported expansion to promote democracy and economic prosperity.
“in the 1990s there was a big debate in the Clinton Administration about whether to move NATO Eastward and inside the Clinton Administration there were a good number of people who were adamantly opposed to expanding NATO because they thought in realist terms they believed that the Russians would see this as a threat and as NATO got closer and closer to Russia's borders it would all blow up in our face this included people like George Kennan it included Secretary of Defense Bill Perry who was said he thought about resigning from the Clinton Administration over this very issue but these realists were opposed by a good number of liberals and this included the president himself Tony Lake who was his National Security advisor Richard Holbrook”
Trump's relations with Russia worsened during his presidency despite his intention to improve them; by the time Trump left office, U.S.-Russia relations were worse than when Obama left office.
“if you think about Trump's relations with the Russians just think about it Trump said he wanted to have good relations with Vladimir Putin he wanted to have good relations with Russia Trump made it clear he wanted to put an end to Nato and get out well NATO expansion continued under Trump and by the time Trump left office our relations with the Russians were worse than they were when Obama left office”
A multipolar world is actually an even more dangerous world than a unipolar world because there is greater potential for great power conflict.
“I suspect that the lesson of History would have to be that a multi-polar world is actually an even more dangerous world”
One might get the sense Trump was isolationist because he treated America's allies so badly; Trump was not good at working with allies, whereas Biden is much better at alliance management.
“one might get the sense that Trump was an isolationist even though he talked about containing China because he treated his or he treated America's allies so badly I think one of Trump's real liabilities was that he was not good at working with allies I think Biden is much better at working with allies”
The really important question is whether the U.S. and China can manage crises and avoid a war; Mearsheimer worries that the security competition could morph into war, and once a war starts it would be very hard to shut down, as we see with the Ukraine war.
“the really important question is whether we can manage those crises and avoid a war I mean I think a war over Taiwan or even a war over the South China Sea would be a disaster I think the problem is that once the war started it would probably be very hard to shut down just like we're seeing in Eastern Europe with the Ukraine war”
A counter-argument to Mearsheimer's position is that nuclear weapons make war less likely even in multipolar systems because even regional conflicts risk escalation to nuclear level; however, Mearsheimer argues nuclear escalation scenarios over ocean areas (South China Sea) might not be equivalent to nuclear war on land, so this logic may not fully protect against war.
“a possible counter to that argument is look we live in a nuclear world and even a minor conflict in the South China Sea or a minor conflict over Taiwan runs the risk of escalating to the nuclear level and that threat should go a long way towards preventing a great power war in East Asia I think that's an argument that has a lot of punch I I don't dismiss that argument for one second right the presence of nuclear weapons makes War less likely”
Not suffocating the market is of enormous importance for ensuring that a state wins the technological competition and prevents the other side from getting on top.
“not suffocating the market uh is of enormous importance uh for making sure that you know you end up on top in this competition or at least the other side doesn't end up on top”
Eight or nine years before the current conversation, Mearsheimer delivered a lecture that received 21 million YouTube views arguing that if America and the EU continued to draw Ukraine away from Russia, Ukraine would be destroyed.
“to be fair to you I think it's what eight or nine years ago you delivered a lecture it attracted a staggering 21 million YouTube views in which you argued that if America and the EU continued to draw Ukraine away from Russia then Ukraine would be destroyed”
Technology has an economic dimension which has a security dimension, as well as a pure military dimension in terms of weaponry, making it a multidimensional competition.
“technology has an economic Dimension which has a security Dimension as well as a pure military dimension in terms of the Weaponry that you develop”
The US did not integrate Russia into a new security architecture in Europe in the 1990s when Russia was weak and not a threat, which presented a real opportunity that was missed.
“we did not do much to integrate Russia into a new security architecture in Europe Russia was very weak in the 1990s it was not a threat to anyone...and this...presented a real opportunity...to work with with Russia to see if we could integrate it into some sort of security arrangement in Eastern Europe but we did not do that and on that front we just continued to keep the Russians outside of NATO and push NATO further and further Eastward”
The structure of the system left Biden with little maneuver room; he did what he had to do in a multipolar world, and any president would have had similar constraints and limited options.
“the structure of the system left him with no choice We Now lived in a multi-polar world Biden had little maneuver room he did what he had to do and he didn't behave the way he had acted when he was in the unipolar world so you see the constraints that are on any president are really quite marked”
Vladimir Putin made it unequivocally clear in 2008 that NATO bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance would lead to the destruction of Ukraine.
“the Russians made it unequivocally clear that this was not going to happen and Putin made it unequivocally clear at the time that it was a move move that would lead to the destruction of Ukraine”
Bill Burns, who was U.S. ambassador to Moscow in April 2008, wrote a memo to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stating that NATO expansion into Ukraine would be 'the brightest of red lines' and would lead to unending trouble.
“Bill Burns who's now the head of the CIA and in April 2008 was the US ambassador to Moscow wrote a memo to condalisa Rice then the secret AR of State basically telling her that this is the brightest of red lines and it's going to lead to unending trouble if we continue to pursue bringing Ukraine into NATO”
The United States made strategic errors during the Cold War including: overthrowing democracies it disliked, conducting massive bombing campaigns in North Korea that killed many civilians, and killing numerous Vietnamese civilians in Vietnam, showing that U.S. Cold War management was not entirely positive from an ethical standpoint.
“the United States overthrew a good number of democracies around the world because it didn't like those democracies if you look at the American bombing of North Korea during the Korean War it is truly astonishing how much damage we did to North Korea and how many people we killed a similar case can be found in Vietnam where the Americans killed lots of Vietnamese civilians”
NATO expansion occurred in 1999 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia), and in April 2008 the U.S. announced explicitly that NATO would bring Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance.
“we got away with a big tranch of expansion first in 1999 that's when Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic came in then we got an way with another big tranch of expansion in 2004 this is when the Baltic states Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Slovakia all came in but then in 2008 the trouble started because in April 2008 we thought in terms of a third big trunch and this time we said explicitly that NATO was going to bring Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance”
Both quantity and quality matter in military capability; while quality/sophistication matters (as WWII demonstrated with tank comparisons), quantity also matters greatly, and a military needs both to be effective.
“when it comes to Weaponry there's no question that the quality or the sophistication of the Weaponry really matters if you're fighting World War II you'd much rather have a panther tank or a t34 than an American Sherman so the quality matters for sure but as you know the quantity matters as well”
The Soviets under Marshal Ogarkov in the early 1980s were concerned that the United States was on the cutting edge of new technologies while Russia was way behind the power curve, and Ogarkov believed that if the Soviets didn't catch up with U.S. technology, the American military would be far superior.
“let's just go back to the early 1980s when the Soviet Union saw itself in trouble Visa the American Military remember Marshall ogarkov was greatly concerned that the United States was on The Cutting Edge of all these new technologies that were just coming out and the Russians for their part were way behind the power curve”
Trump decided in December 2017 to arm the Ukrainians, while Obama refused to arm them and would only train them, showing that NATO expansion continued and Ukraine support increased under Trump despite his stated intentions.
“Trump was the one who in December 2017 decided to arm the ukrainians Obama wouldn't arm them Obama said we'll train the ukrainians but the last thing we want to do is arm them Trump armed the ukrainians”
President Obama stated in a famous exit interview with The Atlantic Monthly before leaving office in 2017 that he had been defeated by 'The Blob' (the foreign policy establishment) in his attempt to fundamentally change foreign policy.
“Obama said in a famous exit interview with the Atlantic Monthly right before he left office uh in 2017 that he had been defeated by The Blob which is the euphemism we use for the American foreign policy establishment”
President Joe Biden has said four times that the United States will defend Taiwan, and given Taiwan's strategic importance, there is no question that the U.S. will defend it.
“when your question often gets brought up has to do with Taiwan and people want to know whether the United States will defend Taiwan and my answer to that is the United States will defend Taiwan Joe Biden has said this four times”
We now live in a realist world and the liberal world that existed in the unipolar moment is in the rearview mirror.
“we now live in a realist world that liberal world that existed in the unipolar moment is in the rearview mirror”
All states, including democracies, are locked in an iron cage and behave roughly the same way because of the anarchic international system, contrary to liberal beliefs that democracies behave differently from authoritarian states.
“all states behave that way democracies as well as authoritarian States as well as Communist States all states in in effect are locked in an iron cage and behave roughly the same way”
Liberalism alone does not provide the necessary glue to hold society together because liberalism is predicated on the assumption that people cannot agree about first principles, which is why liberalism requires tolerance; nationalism provides an essential complementary force that holds liberal democracies together.
“liberalism alone does not provide the necessary glue to hold the society together liberalism is predicated on the assumption that people cannot agree about first principles and this is why liberalism preaches tolerance the reason you have to have tolerance to make a liberal society work is because people do not agree about important questions involving the good life”
China is a much greater threat to the United States than Russia is, and in a world where China is the principal competitor, the United States should want the Russians on its side against China rather than driving them into the arms of the Chinese.
“China is a much greater threat to the United States than Russia is and in a world like that it's most important that the United States pivot fully to Asia and not get bogged down in a war in Eastern Europe that matters little for the Strategic balance of power furthermore from an American point of view from a realist point of view you want the Russians on your side against the Chinese you don't want to drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese”
Trump was not an isolationist; he wanted to contain China and believed China was a real threat that the U.S. had to deal with, which is the opposite of isolationism which means going home.
“I I don't think that Trump was an isolationist U you want to remember that it was Trump who uh jettisoned engagement policy toward China and adopted a containment policy toward China Trump believed that China was a real threat”
Donald Trump did want to pull out of Europe and have good relations with Russia, which Mearsheimer personally thinks was the smart policy that would have involved pivoting fully to Asia and focusing on China.
“Donald Trump did want to pull out of Europe and he did want to have good relations with the Russians I personally think that was the smart policy as I tried to make clear before I would have pulled out of Europe pivoted fully to Asia”
Putin became popular in Russia and is more competent than Yeltsin because he rescued Russia from the chaos of the 1990s and improved Russia's situation, though he did not make it a liberal democracy.
“one of the reasons that Putin is so popular today is that he came in and in very important ways rescued the situation Putin of course succeeded Yeltson uh was incompetent in the extreme and Putin has been very competent and Russia's in much better shape today than it was in the 1990s but of course it's not a liberal democracy today”
Based on conversations with investment bankers and experts, many believe China has shot itself in the foot by moving away from a market-oriented economy toward a command economy under Xi Jinping.
“people have said that China is a great threat because it's a communist country and I have said we should only wish that China were a communist country because if it were a real communist country it would have a command economy and it would look like the Soviet Union the problem with China is that it had something of a market economy it was State capitalism and you turn the Chinese people loose in terms of developing sophisticated Technologies they are definitely going to get of the United States and the West more generally”
A liberal nation state combining liberalism plus nationalism is necessary for countries like Australia and the United States to work effectively, and since the end of the Cold War, the West has mistakenly moved toward unbounded liberalism where nationalism is treated as an evil force.
“a country like Australia and a country like the United States is a liberal national state it's a liberal nation state you need liberalism plus nationalism to make countries like Australia the United States and other liberal democracies in the west work and what's happened since the end of the Cold War in my opinion in the west is that we have moved towards what I would call unbounded liberalism it's liberalism all the time and nationalism is treated as an evil force”
Realism is a theory of international politics and foreign policy explaining how states interact with each other, and has hardly anything to say about domestic politics; realists can and should prefer living in liberal democracies while advocating realist foreign policies.
“realism is a theory of international politics or theory of foreign policy it explains how states interact with each other it has hardly anything to say about domestic politics and I often make the case that I thank my lucky stars that I live in a liberal democracy”
The Ukraine war is a vestige of unipolarity and liberal hegemony, having started in the 1990s with NATO expansion, caused trouble in April 2008, and blew apart in February 2014—all before 2017 when the world became multipolar.
“the war in Ukraine is a vesage of unipolarity it's a vesage of liberal hegy it all started back in the 1990s with NATO expansion it really began to cause trouble this NATO expansion in April of 2008 and then it all blew apart in 2014 February 2014 but you notice all those dates are before 2017 when the world became multi-polar”
The U.S. foreign policy elite is committed to running the world and won't pull back; isolationism is not in the blood of the U.S. foreign policy establishment despite Trump or Obama being elected on platforms to reduce commitments.
“I I think the United States foreign policy Elite is committed to running the world and the idea that we're going to pull our horns back is almost Unthinkable to me”
The United States faces peer competition with China and will remain committed to preventing China from dominating Asia; the U.S. will not pull back or embrace isolationism despite some decline in defense spending or hardware readiness.
“the fact is that the United States faces a peer competitor in China and the United States is not going to let China dominate Asia”
If the policy makers who were in charge in the late 1940s and early 1950s (who successfully managed Cold War containment) had been around when the U.S. was getting deeper into Ukraine, they would have avoided it and the U.S. would not be in the current mess.
“I tend to think that had the policy makers who were in charge in the late 40s and early 50s been around when we were getting deeper and deeper into Ukraine they would have avoided it and we would not be in the mess that we're in today”
Trump was no match for the foreign policy establishment ('the Blob'), and if he gets reelected in 2024, the idea that he will fundamentally alter American foreign policy is extremely unlikely because presidents do not have that kind of power.
“Trump was no match for the blob he was no match for the foreign policy establishment and if he gets reelected in 2024 the idea that he's going to come in and fundamentally alter American foreign policy is extremely unlikely it just doesn't work that way presidents do not have that kind of power”
The United States successfully managed the Cold War by containing the Soviet Union, eventually causing it to fall apart, and avoided a great power war and nuclear war with the Soviet Union, demonstrating strategic competence despite some foolish decisions like the Vietnam War.
“the United States did an excellent job managing the Cold War the United States successfully contained the Soviet Union and eventually the Soviet Union fell apart and one could argue in a very important way the United States won the Cold War we avoided a great power war with the Soviet Union and more importantly we avoided a nuclear war with the Soviet Union”
The United States is now learning critical lessons from the Ukraine war about the importance of drones in modern warfare, and the U.S. military is moving quickly to rectify this problem.
“drones is another example I mean I don't think we fully appreciated just how important drones are for waging Modern Warfare and we're moving quickly to try to rectify that problem”
Russia experimented with democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall with openness (glasnost), but it was a disaster because they didn't know how to implement democracy, there was no support, corruption rapidly emerged, and the average Russian household that previously had security and low living standards faced chaos and corruption instead.
“Russia experimented with democracy after the fall of the Berlin wall and openness and all the rest of it they tried democracy and it was a disaster because they didn't know how to do it there was no support the corruption rapidly emerged”
Sometimes doing the right thing morally and doing the strategically correct thing from a realist perspective are aligned, as in the U.S. fighting Adolf Hitler in World War II, which was both morally and strategically correct.
“there are instances where doing the right thing the moral thing the correct thing from an ethical point of view is consistent with what's the correct thing to do for from a realist point of view in other words if you go to war against Adolf Hitler that's the morally correct foreign policy as well as the strategically correct foreign policy”
Great power politics and the balance of power are concepts foreign to younger people who came of age during unipolarity and did not live through the Cold War, in contrast to older people who grew up in the bipolar Cold War system when great power politics was alive and well.
“so many young people not older people like us John who grew up in the Cold War where great power politics was alive and well because it was a bipolar system but for people younger than us who came of age in poity when the United States dominated the system great power politics is a way of thinking about the world that's foreign to them”
Economics is not Mearsheimer's main expertise; geopolitics is his forte, so his economic analysis should be taken with a grain of salt.
“I would just preface my remarks by saying you want to understand that economics is not my forte geopolitics is so what I say should be taken with a grain of Sal”