The Russian Way of Warfare

Russian military officials talk extensively about problems with scalability and C4ISR challenges in operating across the entire theater from the Arctic to the Black Sea, suggesting Russia cannot yet fully coordinate large-scale operations across geographic distance.

“from very senior official Russian military officials, they talk a lot at length about problems they have with scalability. Um how how can we as a Russian military perform these kind of operations throughout an entire theater of military operations against NATO um from the Arctic down to the Black Sea? Um in particular, they talk about C4ISR challenges. Um we are only in year eight of joint Russian commands.”

Women in Russia can be subject to conscription in certain specialties including science, math, and medicine per Russian law (same as Soviet law), and in some periods universities would require students in these fields to undergo military training.

“Some women can be subject to conscription in Russia. I mean, my last read of the law, which was actually the same as the Soviet law... women in certain specialties, science, math, medicine, can be subject to conscription at need.”

The problem with military signaling is that if you perceive the other side as a threat, any military action they take signals they want war and will win; if you don't perceive them as a threat, any military action short of invasion signals they fear you.

“if you're inclined to see the other guys a threat, any military action they take sends the signal I want to have a war with you and I think I'm going to win it. And if you think they're not a threat, then any military action short of invading you says, I'm not willing to have a war with you. I'm kind of scared of you.”

Russia may threaten or employ its nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that threatens the very existence of the Russian state or damages or destroys Russia's nuclear deterrent, per Russian military doctrine.

“Russia may threaten to employ or employ its nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that threatens the very existence of the state or damages or destroys Russia's nuclear deterrent per their military doctrine.”

Russia's arms export sales are second-largest in the world after the United States, with a significant gap between first and second place, but Russia still sells weapons to many countries including US friends and partners as well as prospective adversaries.

“Russia is the world's second largest uh arms seller after the United States. There's a big gap between the two, but Russia does sell a lot of weapons uh to our friends as well as to prospective adversaries and other other folks.”

Russian military planning shows tension between theory (military theory and the algorithms of war studied by the General Staff) and practice (actual military operations), and Russians historically have not minded this gap, accepting that the ideal form of warfare and actual warfare differ significantly.

“if you look at Soviet military planning before that Russian military planning, now Russian military planning, there's a lot of tension and effort spent on military theory... The actual fighting doesn't always fit those. And I I think what's interesting about the Russians is they don't seem to mind historically, right? That you've got the platonic ideal of how you fight the war and you've got how you fight the war. There's a relationship between them, but you know, shadows on the cave wall and all of that.”

Everybody uses capability-based planning rather than threat-based planning, and both Russia and the US look at what the other side could possibly do to them and what bad things they have done to others in the past, leading both to assume worst-case intentions.

“everybody claims that they do threat based planning, but they all everybody really does capability. You know, they they look at the other guy and they think, 'What is the worst thing the other guy could possibly do to me?' Mhm. And then you think, 'What are the What are the bad things this other guy has done to other people?'”

Frank Hoffman's original conception of 'hybrid warfare' referred to adversaries intentionally integrating conventional warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, and state technologies on battlefield, and was primarily oriented toward non-state actors like Hezbollah, not state-on-state conflict.

“That term had clear meaning. Uh my colleague Frank Hoffman came up with it If not something else, though. many years ago and and it meant something very different than the way it's being used now...it was about adversaries that intentionally on the battlefield integrate conventional warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, and other means as part of the operational concept...it was actually a lot more oriented towards adversaries like Hezbollah at the time than it was towards state actors”

The argument that anything done to achieve political objectives by political or economic means rather than military means is somehow bad is a dangerous argument that conflates politics as extension of war with the more dangerous trend of militarization of policy.

“in terms of, um, politics being an extension of war by other means, which is, you know, what the this this narrative basically suggests that anything you do that attempts to attain military attain if it's a goal you might be able to attain with the military and you're trying to attain it by political or economic means, um, that's somehow bad, uh, which is an argument I've been hearing... so vis-a-vis Russia. I think that's I think that's a very dangerous argument.”

Ukraine made early strategic choice through multiple mobilization waves to create large pool of manpower with combat experience as insurance against Russian occupation, at the cost of not building financially sustainable professional military with modern technology and permanent standing force Ukraine could sustain long-term.

“Ukraine made some choices early on through multiple waves of mobilization to create a large pool of available manpower with combat experience and service in the event of a large-scale invasion and occupation where they have both the arms and people with combat experience in order to create a real problem for Russia and make that highly unattractive. However, as a price of deterring what you might think to be the worst-case possible option for Ukraine... the cost of that is all right, not putting in the real time and money to build financially sustainable professional military with the right amount technology and permanent standing force that Ukraine could afford to sustain.”

When asked how Russia plans to replace tactical nuclear weapons with long-range conventional precision strike, Russian officials respond that this is impossible, suggesting Russia does not believe conventional weapons can truly substitute for nuclear weapons as deterrent.

“when I ask them the question, 'Well, how do you uh plan on replacing tactical nuclear weapons with long-range conventional precision strike? Which type of missions will be replaced with one another?' They say, 'Well, it's impossible. This is impossible.'”

NATO does not need to deter Russia from attacking the Baltics (Russia has no particular plan to do so), but NATO does need to reassure Baltic allies, and any war in Europe will inevitably involve the Baltics because Kaliningrad is adjacent and geographic proximity makes avoidance impossible.

“the Russians aren't even they don't even need to be deterred from attacking the Baltics so they don't have a particular plan to attack the Baltic. I mean, they that's not an intent. We do need to reassure the Baltic countries... And we have to recognize that any other kind of war in Europe will enter into the Baltics because that's where everybody is, and that's where you know, that's very hard to avoid Kaliningrad.”

Ukraine deters Russia not through military denial (defeating Russian military) but through punishment (making Russian occupation unacceptable and costly), and Russia understands that occupying Ukraine would be difficult requiring more than just military forces.

“Ukraine deters not by denial but by punishment. Um in the sense that it would not be fun for Russia to try to occupy Ukraine and the Russians know it. Um and they that and that they don't have an interest in doing that.”

The term 'hybrid warfare' has become an unhelpful kitchen sink term with no clear meaning since 2014, replacing the original concept meaning integration of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and terrorism, and is now used so broadly (information warfare, narrative warfare, political warfare) that it obscures rather than clarifies.

“hybrid warfare... had clear meaning... many years ago... meant something very different than the way it's being used now, which is rendered useless... since 2014, hybrid warfare exploded as like kitchen sink term that means absolutely nothing. You go to a hybrid war panel, you have no idea what you're going to hear that day.”

NATO and US NATO-reliance on aerospace domain superiority creates escalatory threshold asymmetry: NATO treats space domain conflicts as escalatory while Russia considers space degradation part of normal initial battle plan, creating potential for unwanted escalation.

“One of the challenges you get is that domains are escalatory thresholds for the United States in terms of how it thinks about war fighting, whereas not necessarily for adversaries. And if you're principally an airspace attack blitzkrieg power, the first thing your adversaries part of general war fighting plans would reach for us to take away both your communications and your ISR and will go for space immediately as part of just the immediate battle plan.”

NATO should study not only Russian military weaknesses and strengths but also where Russians think they have gaps and where Russians see Western advantages, particularly regarding numbers, superior air power, and the US ability to conduct contactless warfare.

“I think it's worth and you know, and we look at them and we look at the A2/AD capabilities and get very nervous. I I think I think it is really interesting to dig a little deeper and think about... what are the weaknesses of the way they fight? And what do they think are the weaknesses of the way they they fight? And what's the difference?”

During the Cold War, the US designed forces based on assumptions about what would be needed against the Soviets, but today's situation is anomalous because the two RAND reports on Russian military capabilities have been interpreted as alarmist by the Armed Services Committee and used as force-building exercises rather than analytical products.

“the two RAND reports that you wrote, which I think are basically moderate, have been interpreted by both Armed Services Committee members as alarmist. Certainly you that the Russians could get through the Baltics in 36 hours in the more recent report was seen by many as a force building exercise.”

Russia has shown a willingness to accept and gain advantages from civilian casualties, but starting from Georgia, Russia denies responsibility for civilian casualties beyond what might be reasonable, competing for global opinion in a way Russia did not before Georgia.

“you've got a willingness to accept, perhaps even some cases seek to gain advantages from what we might call collateral damage. Um On the other hand, starting from Georgia, there's this requirement to deny that that's what's happening. Um that the Russian armed forces are responsible for civilian casualties beyond what might be reasonable.”

When higher-technology adversaries degrade through warfare games scenario, conflict often devolves into lower-technology warfare, forcing high-tech militaries to fight at degraded capability levels they do not prefer.

“We play it in war games and a lot of times it just goes away. Um some some level of the higher higher technology level of the adversary, the lower technology war you end up fighting when they can take away a lot of the really advanced capabilities.”

The smart way to signal is to do the things you actually intend to do, communicate with words what you're doing, do it consistently, and defend the territory you actually need to defend in a way that is as clearly defensive as possible.

“I would argue the smart way to signal is to do the things you actually intend to do, right? And to communicate with words what it is you're doing and do it consistently. Defend the territory that is your territory that you need to be defending. Try to do it in a way that is as clearly defensive as possible and say that.”

Syria is a different context from Europe because the United States lacks clear sense of what it's defending or trying to attain in Syria, making it very difficult to use military force appropriately for defensive signaling.

“I I think Syria is a very different matter. Um, I I I think in part because the United States doesn't have a clear sense of what it's defending or trying to attain in Syria, it's very difficult to, um, use your military appropriately.”

Military signaling rhetoric is problematical from civil-military relations and security standpoints, and while it doesn't go away absent mutual decisions to stand down, there is nothing new about this pattern of rhetoric every time things spiral.

“the rhetoric is problematical from a civil-military relation standpoint and from a security standpoint. I don't know that it goes away absent, um, a decision on both sides to stand down off of it because it is uh, it's unhelpful, but there's also nothing new about it. This is the way we talk every time, uh, things spiral.”

Russians believe Western conventional offensive firepower in the aerospace domain is sufficient to achieve effects that nuclear weapons used to achieve, so Russians feel safely coasting along in terms of their perceptions of vulnerability.

“Russians believe that our conventional offensive firepower in the aerospace domain is sufficient to achieve the same effect that nuclear weapons used to achieve in the old days. And so, we're now safely coasting along where we are in terms of their perceptions of vulnerability.”

How NATO talks about Russia and deterrence is unhelpful and makes over-promises and over-threatens simultaneously, though this reflects structural features of political rhetoric rather than analytically-driven policy choices.

“I do think some of the rhetoric around how we talk about it is unhelpful, over-promises and over-threaten simultaneously.”

Ukrainian military needs reform despite increased defense spending to 5% of GDP in recent years, particularly in restructuring its Soviet-model force structure with high personnel numbers, bureaucracy, and corruption.

“So, basically uh how can you evaluate the capabilities, the military capabilities of Ukrainian army right now? And from what I know, a RAND Corporation works in Ukraine... was it despite we increased our budget by 5% of GDP for the last 2 years, from what I heard from the ground, from the Ukrainian troops, they complain. I mean, they don't have enough supplies. And of course, we still inherited this Soviet model of army, like which is a high number of personnel, bureaucracy, corruption, and so forth.”

Recent US Treasury sanctions on Russian arms export company used vague language that non-Americans with dealings with the company might also be subject to sanctions, which could complicate ally relationships.

“the newest sanctions the Treasury imposed uh are on Russ- the Russian um arms export company with that very vague language that non-Americans who have dealings with them might also be subject to sanctions.”

Escalation response should be proportional and matched to specific threat type (military, political, police) rather than categorical response treating all Russian actions as attacks or all NATO actions as provocations.

“We're not going to I hope NATO does not make a categorical decision that everything Russia does anywhere is an attack, and I'm hoping Russia doesn't do the same thing vis-a-vis NATO. Um one response to threats based on how they emerge, what form they take, whether they are military, political, policing, or something else. And I I think that's the appropriate way to do it.”

Russia and China do not exhibit signs of rapidly moving toward joint military operations similar to US-South Korea or US-Japan, though they are building some pillars slowly and gaining operational experience through Syria.

“Do you think that China and Russia can fight like US and South Korea or US and Japan to have a joint fight war in the exercises? Yeah. My short answer is no. I I I don't see that happening. I mean China's China's only recently started exercising with other countries.”