Peter Thiel on Political Theology | Conversations with Tyler

It is increasingly difficult to maintain financial privacy or exit from the US system; having an illegal Swiss bank account—once a modest form of exit—is now nearly impossible, indicating growing totalitarian control mechanisms.

“I think it's hard to even have a like an illegal Swiss bank account. And that's like a really modest modest way. It's it's it's you know, it's it's hard to exit. It's hard it's much harder to exit the United States than it was you know, 20 30 years ago.”

John Wilkes Booth shot Lincoln in 1865 while thinking he was reenacting the Julius Caesar assassination from Shakespeare, saying 'Sic semper tyrannis'—a literal and tragic example of theatrical imitation driving real violence.

“And then of course, you know, the uh the crazy literal reenactment of it was um John Wilkes Booth shooting Abraham Lincoln in 1865, where uh um you know, um Booth uh was a Shakespearean actor. And then it was sic semper tyrannis was what he said. It was like he was he thought he was reenacting the Brutus Caesar thing.”

Hamlet's problem is that he doesn't believe in the revenge narrative he's supposed to perform; the greatest person would be willing to fight over an eggshell (pure honor, pure mimesis), while average people fight over things that matter; Hamlet is too intelligent to be trapped in the script of revenge drama.

“at the end of Hamlet, where Hamlet says, you know, to be truly great, you must take everything for an eggshell. Because um because an average person would fight over things that mattered, but a truly great person would fight over things as ephemeral as honor or an eggshell or something something like this. And um and of course, you know, the Hamlet's problem is he doesn't really um believe all all the, you know, the sort of insane revenge drama he's he's supposed to he's he's supposed to be in”

Lincoln's Lyceum speech (1838) portrays Lincoln as proto-Caesar, describing ambitious men who would not be satisfied with the presidency but would want to enslave white people or free all slaves, coded references to Lincoln's own ambitions.

“it's 1838 Lincoln's speech, the Young Men's Lyceum address, where um Lincoln sort of portrays himself um sort of in a somewhat coded way as sort of a proto-Caesar, where you know, there he sort of tells the audience there there people in this country who um you know, who um wouldn't be happy to be you know, there all these some people are like really ambitious. And uh um but no one could be like a founder um because that was in the past. And the most you can now be as a president. But there are people for whom being president is not enough. And there's some people who um if you didn't stop them, they would keep going until they enslaved all the white people or freed all the slaves. This is sort of Lincoln talking about himself and saying that he has the ambition to be like a Caesar or Napoleon or or something like this.”

AI will likely hurt mathematicians more than writers, because math ability can be more readily automated than linguistic/verbal ability; within 3-5 years, AI models will solve all US Math Olympiad problems, fundamentally shifting which cognitive skills are valued.

“my intuition leads going to be quite the opposite where it seems much worse for the math people than the word people. Um and what you know, what people have told me is that uh um yeah, they they think within 3 to 5 years um the AI models will be able to solve all the um US math Olympiad problems. And um and uh that would you know, that would um that would shift things uh things quite a bit.”

If AI increases volatility and China cannot match US LLM capabilities, this destabilizes China's low-volatility strategy of slowly beating the West; China might be forced to accelerate its timetable and invade Taiwan soon rather than wait decades, making volatility-increasing AI actually more destabilizing to geopolitics than stabilizing.

“to the extent I think that the second one that it probably helps the US more than China, um is that actually massively destabilizing where um you know, China was a sort of low volatility plan to victory where they were just going to slowly um beat the Western world. Um and if if if you now have this uh volatility increasing technology that China cannot match, does that just accelerate China's timetable? Does China become sort of like Russia where, you know, you're ultimately going to lose and you have to, you know, maybe you have to invade Taiwan in the next year or two and you can't wait for another decade”

AI models will likely have a greater negative impact on people with math abilities than word-based abilities within 3-5 years, as AI will be able to solve all US Math Olympiad problems while word people may remain more durable.

“Um my my intuition leads going to be quite the opposite where it seems much worse for the math people than the word people. Um and what you know, what people have told me is that uh um yeah, they they think within 3 to 5 years um the AI models will be able to solve all the um US math Olympiad problems.”

Thiel is 'very against' DEI (diversity, equity, inclusion) movements, though he acknowledges they may not be the most important issue; his earlier book 'The Diversity Myth' was 'very prescient' in describing Stanford culture wars that later spread nationally, but it was 'completely ineffective' because arguments don't matter—deeper dynamics drive these movements.

“You know, I'm I'm I'm very against it. I don't always know if it's the most important issue either. So somehow uh you know, I I I I wrote a book as an um in my undergraduate years entitled The Diversity Myth and it was sort of focusing on a lot of the um craziness the campus wars, culture wars that were taking place at uh Stanford in the late '80s, early '90s. And uh there are parts of it that seemed very prescient and uh it sort of you know, described a a lot of things that eventually spread to the broader culture. Another level, it was like a completely ineffective book where the arguments didn't matter”

DEI is sometimes silly (low-stakes culture war), sometimes evil (distracting from real issues like economy, science, tech, and religion), but in either case it's a distraction from what actually matters for civilization.

“for the most part, I uh I think that uh you know, it's it's it's just a distraction from more important things. And so there's there's there's you know, there's one level on which I find the issues very silly. Uh there's another level where where it's evil because it's stopping us from paying attention to more important things. And uh and it you know, it's it's things like the economy, like science and tech, or even these these broader religious questions”

Ayaan Hirsi Ali's conversion to Christianity is primarily utilitarian—for civilization's sake in a 'great civilizational war' against secularism—rather than based on belief in Christianity's truth; Thiel emphasizes truth over utility as the proper basis for religion.

“Ayaan Hirsi Ali recently converted to Christianity but it seems mostly for utilitarian reasons. Um something like for the great civilizational war because secularism doesn't provide a good enough answer. Do you see religion as mainly a utility in the post-modern world? You can have you can have utilitarian elements. I don't think one can ever stress those too much. So, my my bias is always to focus more on you know, questions of truth”

Luther and the Reformation had to come from outside the Catholic Church because internal reform was impossible; Luther's less centralized, less globally unified Protestant church was more compatible with libertarian principles than Roman Catholicism, which is why Thiel maintains some Protestant orientation despite his critiques of Protestantism.

“the Reformation had to come from the outside. It couldn't it was not actually possible for it to to start from within and and there is a way that uh you know, the Lutheran piece was it was the it was the less globally um centralized church. It was going to be a it was going to be a a less centralized church and there's probably you know, there's probably still um some part of the the uh um Protestant political project that lines up more closely with a libertarian view”

Post-9/11, Thiel expected global chaotic terrorism to spread, but instead the US implemented surveillance infrastructure (Patriot Act, money tracking, monitoring) demonstrating the 'peace and safety' slogan from 1 Thessalonians 5:3, suggesting movement toward totalitarian control rather than chaos.

“I would have been more on your side. Let's say post 9/11. You know, it was you know, well aren't we just going to have all this chaotic terrorism all over the world and we didn't get that much terrorism and we instead got you know, the Patriot Act and you know, incredible tracking of you know, of money flows, incredible monitoring of people and uh and so the you know, and of course you know, there's still there's still are things that can go wrong but but you know, the the political slogan of the Antichrist first Thessalonians 5:3 I think is is peace and safety.”

Genuine anonymity and pseudonymity in crypto have not developed as hoped in the late 1990s crypto-anarchist utopia; physical cash may still be better than Bitcoin for privacy purposes.

“Um but there are uh the the the questions are you know, the the sort of questions would be can you um can you uh do you have genuine um anonymity, genuine pseudonymity? Um and probably there are certain ways in which, you know, if we want to have decentralized things where um you use money for questionable purposes, you know, maybe maybe physical cash is still better than Bitcoin and and things have not gone in quite the uh sort of um I don't know crypto-anarchist utopia that people were were fantasizing about in the in the late '90s.”

DEI narratives are sometimes silly and sometimes evil—evil primarily because they distract from more important issues like economy, science/technology, and broader religious/philosophical questions.

“there's there's there's one level on which I find the issues very silly. Uh there's another level where where it's evil because it's stopping us from paying attention to more important things. And so there's there's you know, there's one level on which I find the issues very silly. Uh there's another level where where it's evil because it's stopping us from paying attention to more important things. And uh and it you know, it's it's things like the economy, like science and tech, or even these these broader religious questions that we we've we've talked about today.”

The FDA has a global stranglehold on biotech regulation; most governments follow FDA standards rather than establishing looser alternatives, reducing regulatory arbitrage opportunities.

“My my sense is the FDA has a global stranglehold on everything. Um and it's uh it is because there are a lot of different reasons. In In practice, most governments are not willing to have looser regulations than the FDA. So it's actually um so there's less regulatory arbitrage than it looks.”

Walmart was the proto-woke corporation of the 2000s, rebranding as environmentally friendly to split the anti-Walmart labor coalition; this is a Machiavellian use of DEI narratives to distract from worker exploitation.

“Walmart was sort of the proto woke company in the 2000s and they were constantly being attacked by the labor unions because they were um you know, they weren't paying their workers enough. And then uh you know, they could they could pay their workers more or they could rebrand themselves as a green environmentally friendly company. And that turned out to be a very cheap way to split up the the left-wing anti-Walmart coalition.”

Christianity is 'much worse than Islam or Judaism' regarding the problem of violence because it involves the murder of God in person (Christ), which is inconceivable in those other traditions where claiming to be God while being killed would simply prove you are not God.

“I think Christianity probably it is much worse than Islam or Judaism on this because, uh, I don't know, you know, Islam and Judaism it would be inconceivable that you could murder God, you know, in the form of a person. If if someone claimed to be God and and and got killed, that would just prove that he's not God. Um, and so, uh, so yeah, so so the the original sin, the violence in some sense is is is is is far greater in a Christian context”

The Katechon is a mysterious, provisionally stable restraining force that holds back the totalitarian one-world state and the Antichrist, but it is unstable and cannot be reliably identified with any single institution; it may have been anti-communism during 1949-1989, but naming it explicitly is dangerous because it can become entangled with what it resists.

“it's it's a very mysterious idea. I'm not that's it's sort of this this is always a question why the Antichrist hasn't taken over yet and it's this mysterious force that holds back this restraining force that that holds back you know, the totalitarian one-world state and and you know, I don't necessarily put too much stock in it because it's it's sort of uh on its own terms it's somewhat unstable. It's it's provisional. It has these sort of archaic sacred elements. It can it can work for a while. It's but it's not something it's not a you can't identify it with an institution.”

A real Marxist would be preferable to a diversity officer, because Marx at least understood that revolution requires a proletariat with real interests, while a diversity officer (in the Marxist critique) is a corrupt form of crony capitalism, like a bank robber or prostitute.

“I think a real Marxist would be much preferable to a diversity person. If Rosa Luxemburg, who's you know, sort of this uh crazed communist from the early 20th century, was like, you know, I think one thing she said was that there can be nobody more revolutionary than a factory worker. That nobody can be more revolutionary than a proletarian. And so um a diversity officer in a university or corporation, what would Rosa Luxemburg think of this? It would be in the same category as a bank robber or a prostitute. It's someone who's just extremely um corrupt form of crony capitalism.”

Medieval thought distinguished between the intellect (which has power) and the will (which is weak), while modernity reversed this to emphasize will over intellect, but effective altruists and rationalists who claim pure reasoning are actually functioning like Calvinists with total depravity—internally acknowledging everything is 'spaghetti code' even as they outwardly claim rationality.

“there's a Thomistic distinction between the intellect and the will and the medievals believe in the power of the intellect, the weakness of the will. Uh the moderns it's sort of in some ways reversed, but uh but if you sort of take a effective altruist East Bay rationalist these people they're they're much closer to Calvinism. They they claim to be rationalists, but if you're in a you know, if you're in a rationalist Bible study equivalent and you know, the outward-facing thing is that you're rational and you're pure and you're in your thinking, the inward-facing thing is it's all just spaghetti code.”

Crypto was a decentralizing story that might have changed Miami and San Francisco's relative power, but two and a half years ago crypto was disrupted (likely referring to 2022 crypto crash); if the next decades are dominated by AI (a centralizing technology), San Francisco will likely maintain or increase its dominance.

“if if crypto was going to be a big part of the future tech tech story that would have been a you know naturally decentralizing from Silicon Valley narrative. If Silicon Valley had really missed out on the crypto thing in a relative sense and then you know I don't know consumer internet you know a lot of this happened in Silicon Valley for all sorts of complicated reasons you know it's supposed to get rid of the tyranny of place but all happened in one place and then the the AI piece seems seems to be even more centralized in Silicon Valley. So again if we if we say that you know the next decade or two decades are just going to be doubling down on AI um that that probably suggests that you know San Francisco will maintain and Silicon Valley will maintain or even gain gain power”

Luddites have been wrong about technological displacement for a long time, but AI and automation might finally prove Luddites correct in showing genuine replacement without new work.

“the Luddites have have always they've been wrong for a long time. Um there are there are certainly ways who probably scare me some with with with AI and um there there versions of it that where where you you could um you know, you you might but even if you convinced me that the Luddites were right about AI and that it's actually going to just replace people without, you know, you know, if you were a Luddite in you know, the mid-19th century said, you know, the machines are going to replace the humans. And that was well, that would be such a relief because there's so much work for people to do”

Effective altruists and East Bay rationalists are functionally closer to Calvinists than they admit: they claim to be rational, but internally experience their thinking as chaotic 'spaghetti code' where they can never be right about anything, only less wrong—a form of theological determinism masked as rationalism.

“if you're in a you know, if you're in a rationalist Bible study equivalent and you know, the outward-facing thing is that you're rational and you're pure and you're in your thinking, the inward-facing thing is it's all just spaghetti code. You're so you can never be right about anything. Maybe you can be a little bit less wrong, but um it's it's that's and so I'm I'm against both Calvinism and and so-called rationalism.”

Two pre-World War I novels (Benson's 'Lord of the World' and Solovyev's 'War, Progress and the End of History') depict the Antichrist taking over through a kind of mysterious hypnotic power and mass psychological manipulation, but a post-1945 fictional account would be straightforward: the Antichrist comes to power by constantly talking about existential risks and apocalyptic scenarios.

“There were sort of the the two good Antichrist books that were written um, the two best fictional ones in my mind were pre-World War I. There was a 1908 Robert Hugh Benson, sort of a Catholic book, Lord of the World. There was a 1900 one by Solovyev, War Progress and the End of History. They both had these sort of um, accounts of this future totalitarian world dictator who took over the whole world. And both of them it's kind of a um, demonium ex machina. So, really unclear how the Antichrist takes over...if we were to write if we were to try to write a novel like this post-1945, it's it's very straightforward. It would be, you know, um, it'd be like One World or None. This is this is a short film by uh, the nuclear scientists after 1945. If we don't give the nuclear weapons to the to the one-world government, it's going to blow up the whole world.”

Christ is the first political atheist because he challenges the political theology of Roman imperial divinity by existing as a non-divine son (contrasting with Caesar Augustus, also called son of the divinized Caesar); this creates space for less unitary political systems beyond empire.

“Girard liked to always say that um you know, uh Christ was the first political atheist. Because on the on the level of of the uh of the political order, if if you say um Christ says that he's the son of God, son of the father, um there's a way you can go into Trinitarian metaphysics. But the uh the political interpretation of this is that Caesar Augustus, um uh the son of the divinized Caesar, is not um that is is is not um you know, the somehow that's not exactly the son of God. And uh that the Roman Empire is not simply divinely ordained. And then that somehow, you know, opens a space for for um you know, a less a less unitary system”

Ayn Rand should be considered in some ways a good Christian thinker because she insisted that one cannot sacrifice the individual, reason, or mind—despite being Jewish, atheist, and 'shrill and crazy,' she captured a core Christian insight about the absolute value of individual agency.

“I think of, you know, I I think of even Ayn Rand as like a pretty good Christian. And that's why I know that would probably be really scandalous things to say. But it's it's just it's at least, you know, yes, it's Jewish and atheist and shrill and crazy, but it's but it's it's it's just No, you can't sacrifice the individual. And and then um and then, you know, you you shouldn't sacrifice your mind. You shouldn't sacrifice your reason.”

The Soviet Union elevated chess grandmasters and number theorists as symbols of meritocracy, but this was possibly a control mechanism: by putting mathematicians on a pedestal and telling everyone to be like them, the Soviets ensured that 'singularly clueless' math people were celebrated while being incapable of understanding the actual world.

“by the time you get to the Soviet Union and Soviet communism in the 20th century where you give um you know, a um um number theorist or chess grandmaster a medal, which I is always a part I was somewhat sympathetic to in the in the uh Soviet Union. Um um um um you um it may be it's actually just sort of a control mechanism where the math people are singularly clueless. They don't understand anything. But if we um put them on a pedestal, we tell everyone else you need to be like the math person, then um it's actually a way to sort of control or that the chess grandmaster doesn't understand anything about the world.”

Christ was the 'first political atheist' because by claiming divinity while denying Caesar Augustus' divinity, he asserted that the Roman Empire is not divinely ordained and opened space for less unitary political systems.

“Christ was the first political atheist. Because on the on the level of of the uh of the political order, if if you say um Christ says that he's the son of God, son of the father, um there's a way you can go into Trinitarian metaphysics. But the uh the political interpretation of this is that Caesar Augustus, um uh the son of the divinized Caesar, is not um that is is is not um you know, the somehow that's not exactly the son of God. And uh that the Roman Empire is not simply divinely ordained.”

Ayn Rand is a 'pretty good Christian' from a political-theological standpoint despite being Jewish, atheist, and 'shrill and crazy' because she refuses to sacrifice the individual and refuses to sacrifice reason and mind.

“I think of, you know, I I think of even Ayn Rand as like a pretty good Christian. And that's why I know that would probably be really scandalous things to say. But it's it's just it's at least, you know, yes, it's Jewish and atheist and shrill and crazy, but it's but it's it's it's just No, you can't sacrifice the individual. And and then um and then, you know, you you shouldn't sacrifice your mind. You shouldn't sacrifice your reason.”

The Soviet Union's practice of awarding medals to mathematicians and chess grandmasters may have been either a meritocratic practice Thiel was 'somewhat sympathetic to' or a Straussian control mechanism where elevating mathematicians (who are 'singularly clueless') tells everyone else they should be like the math person.

“and then I think by the time you get to the Soviet Union and Soviet communism in the 20th century where you give um you know, a um um number theorist or chess grandmaster a medal, which I is always a part I was somewhat sympathetic to in the in the uh Soviet Union. Um um um um you um it may be it's actually just sort of a control mechanism where the math people are singularly clueless. They don't understand anything. But if we um put them on a pedestal, we tell everyone else you need to be like the math person, then um it's actually a way to sort of control or that the chess grandmaster doesn't understand anything about the world.”

A real Marxist would be preferable to a diversity officer because diversity officers represent 'corrupt form of crony capitalism' while Marxists at least identify real class conflicts.

“I think a real Marxist would be much preferable to a diversity person. If Rosa Luxemburg, who's you know, sort of this uh crazed communist from the early 20th century, was like, you know, I think one thing she said was that there can be nobody more revolutionary than a factory worker. That nobody can be more revolutionary than a proletarian. And so um a diversity officer in a university or corporation, what would Rosa Luxemburg think of this? It would be in the same category as a bank robber or a prostitute. It's someone who's just extremely um corrupt form of crony capitalism.”

A libertarian reading of Christianity is that when Christ is tempted in the desert and Satan says worship me and you'll have all the kingdoms, this is saying that all governments are more satanic than divinely ordained; people don't understand this—they think governments are somehow divinely ordained.

“the libertarian you know, another libertarian cut on Christianity is that you know, when Christ is tempted in the desert and Satan says just worship me and you can have all these kingdoms in the world, it's uh it's somehow saying that all the governments are more satanic than divinely ordained and um and then people don't understand that they think the govern- governments are somehow divinely ordained. And so, once once you see how satanic the government is, how satanic taxes are, other things besides the governments do, um um it it will have this unraveling effect.”

Thiel rejects cyclical views of history and prefers to stress that each historical moment happens only once with one-time, world-historical significance, which is the Judeo-Christian view of history (linear and teleological) rather than the classical Greco-Roman view (cyclical).

“I think you can you can stress the the aspects that are timeless and eternal. Uh, I prefer to stress the aspects that are one-time and world historical. I think that, you know, in some sense every moment in history only um, only happens once and uh, you know, I think I think there is some kind of a meaning to history. Um, I I think it has a certain type of linearity to it. Um, and if you um, I think that is sort of the, let's say the Judeo-Christian view of history as distinct from, let's say, the the classical um, Greco-Roman one.”

Effective altruists may not be consciously colluding with the CCP, but they are functionally doing what the CCP wants by pushing for AI restriction and regulation, thus sabotaging US AI development; this is possibly the CCP's preferred outcome because it slows the US without requiring China to act.

“there's an intuition that the effective altruists are not just fifth columnists on the part of the CCP where they're trying to sabotage us, but where they actually simply are uh um um doing what the CCP wants, uh which is actually to stop the LLMs and that that's very disruptive.”

There is a deep link between the university and the universe; understanding the failings of the multiversity provides access to understanding the structure of reality, and one must start with human-scale political and social questions rather than microscopic or cosmic scales to solve cosmological problems.

“There's some deep link between the university and the universe. There's some deep link between the failing multiversity and the um crazed multiverse...the sort of political orientation I have is you're never going to solve these things by uh you have to start with the university or or whatever that's that's gone wrong uh if you're ever going to make sense of the universe”

Thiel's multi-pronged skepticism about muddling through is that whenever people think you can just muddle through, you're probably set up for some kind of disaster; this is his actual real political theology.

“So this multi-pronged skepticism about muddling through, would you say that's your actual real political theology? Like if we got into the bottom of this now? That would be that would be a you know, it's it's it's whenever people think you can just muddle through. Yeah, that you're you're probably set up for some kind of disaster. That's that's fair.”

The muddling through view and the Calvinist view share the same flaw: distrust in human agency, distrust in human thought, distrust in our ability to make choices.

“So the muddling through view and the Calvinist view in your opinion they have the same flaw actually. It's a distrust in human agency, a distrust in human thought, a distrust you know, in our ability to uh yeah, to to make choices.”

The key questions about AI that deserve more focus are: (1) Will it increase GDP more than inequality? (2) Is it a centralizing technology? (3) What will it do to the US-China geopolitical rivalry?—rather than narrow optimization questions or cosmic speculation.

“So, I think yeah, I think one question is, you know, is it going to how much will it increase GDP versus how much will it increase inequality? And probably it does does some some of both. Um um is it a very centralizing technology? That's another question I'd like to get a better handle on...the geopolitical question, you know, um you know, if if it is as big a technology as you and I think it is, um what is it going to do to the China-US rivalry?”

Thiel employs a Girardian anthropological framework where humans have deep links with scapegoating—projecting violence onto scapegoats and turning them into gods—which characterizes both archaic religion and atheist liberalism, making Calvinism merely an extreme form of scapegoating God.

“a Girardian anthropological uh frame is that um is that you know, um there is this deep link between um gods and scapegoats and we tend to always we have these scapegoats we turn into gods. We project our violence onto them and this is what you know, archaic religion does. This is in some ways what you know, atheist liberalism does. You blame everything on Mr. God. And um isn't Calvinism just an extreme form of scapegoating where uh Mr. God did everything.”

In late modernity, society operates under hyper-specialization where individuals cannot think about the big picture, similar to Adam Smith's pin factory on steroids, requiring integration of different facets of life through political philosophy and theology to make progress.

“I think that in late modernity we're often living in this world of hyper specialization where you can't think about the big picture and it's sort of like I don't know it's like Adam Smith's pin factory on steroids...I think there is some way that we have to try to integrate all these different um facets of our life to try to make progress and that's that's what political philosophy does. That's what political theology does.”

Three rough theological positions on history exist: (1) the Christian position that history is terrible but requires forgiveness; (2) the woke position that history is terrible and rejects forgiveness; and (3) the right-wing Nietzschean position that denies or ignores history. The Christian middle position is the most tenable despite internal tensions.

“if you want to maybe outline three three rough possibilities. There's this, you know, hard to define Christian in between one which is the history's terrible, um, and it's awful, but we need to try to find a way to forgive people. And then there is a, let's say, uh, let's say a woke version where the history is terrible, but, um, we're going to forget about the forgiveness part. And then there is, I don't know, maybe maybe sort of a right-wing Nietzschean bronze age pervert alternative which is, uh, we, um, we're just, um, you know, we're going to forget about the history. It's kind of oppressive. I'm I'm sick of the guilt trip and don't want to hear anything more about the history. And, uh, and somehow the the, um, the the sort of in between Christian one I I think is is the most tenable”

The key AI-related questions to ask are: (1) will AI increase GDP versus inequality? (2) is AI a centralizing technology? (3) what will AI do to China-US rivalry? (4) does AI necessarily require massive centralization for governance?

“I think yeah, I think one question is, you know, is it going to how much will it increase GDP versus how much will it increase inequality? And probably it does does some some of both. Um um is it a very centralizing technology? That's another question I'd like to get a better handle on...is it going to what is it going to do to the China-US rivalry?”

One-world totalitarian government is as much an existential risk as nuclear weapons, biotech, AI, and climate change; it deserves equal consideration in apocalyptic threat assessments and represents the 'Antichrist' in biblical eschatological terms.

“one one other existential risk is a one-world totalitarian government. And I find that at least as scary as the others...in sort of a uh, biblical eschatological context, uh, you know, you're supposed to worry about Armageddon. You're also supposed to worry about the Antichrist. Maybe you're supposed to worry more about the Antichrist because the Antichrist comes first.”

Carl Schmitt is valuable for his insight that politics is fundamentally defined by the division of friends and enemies, but this insight is dangerous if taken as a complete framework for political action because it can turn into a scapegoating machine that only works if unexamined.

“one of his books was the concept of the political and sort of what what defines politics and it's sort of this, uh, it's some of this division of friends and enemies and that there's then that that somehow is really foundational...That's that's sort of where where I find, um, Schmitt quite powerful as a thinker. The you know, the place, um, where, uh, it probably tends to always go haywire is there's always a question whether, um, politics is like a market where um, or is is it is it a sort of thing where if you understand it better, it works better. Um, and, uh, and so or is it something like a scapegoating machine where, um, the scapegoating machine only works if you don't, uh, look into the sausage making factory.”

AI could be described as 'communist' in the sense that it tends toward centralization and returns to scale, similar to how Thiel earlier described crypto as 'libertarian'; this is a useful political-technological frame.

“I had this riff 5 6 years ago where if um if crypto's libertarian, why can't we say that AI is communist? Um and that it it and um and one of the things that I I'm I'm still probably a little bit uncomfortable about it is that it seems to lead to these incredible returns to scale.”

After 1989, anti-communism morphed into neoliberalism, with Bush 41 rebranding the post-Cold War project as the 'new world order'; once the enemy was defeated, anti-communism could not simply stop but instead perpetuated itself in transformed, totalizing form—a warning about how restraining forces become totalitarian.

“in 1989, something like anti-communism morphs into neoliberalism. And that's actually, you know, uh well, if you're anti-communist, you're not aspiring for world control. You're just trying to stop the communists from getting world control. Once you've defeated the communists, what are you supposed to do? And like maybe you can just go home and forget about all all of what you did. But in practice, these things have a tendency to perpetuate themselves. And it was like Bush 41, anti-communism became the new world order. And we're now going to just govern the world in the name of anti-communism.”

The Bible, especially the Old Testament, presents a reversal of perspective compared to non-biblical history: it tells stories from the viewpoint of victims (Abel, the Israelites leaving Egypt) rather than victors, which is a distinctive Girardian intuition about biblical narrative.

“the Girardian intuition I would have is it's just always this this this reversal in perspective where uh the Bible takes things from the the side of the victim. There there's a and and it's it's already in the book of Genesis where it's the story of Cain and Abel. Um you know, the founding of the first city in the history of the world is a parallel but opposite story to the story of Romulus and Remus the founding of the greatest city where you know, Romulus and Remus story is told from point of view of Romulus. Uh the Cain and Abel story is told from point of view of Abel”

The woke movement's assertion that 'history is bad' is partially correct, and conservatives whitewash history by downplaying atrocities like slavery, but the woke solution—abandoning forgiveness—is flawed; a Christian middle path acknowledges historical horror while seeking reconciliation.

“Yes, I think that history was very bad. I think it's always a mistake for, um, conservatives or anti-woke people to whitewash it too much. And so if we if we say that, you know, um, you know, yeah, there used to be slavery, but the slaves were all happy people, they were all happy slaves, that is a loser argument and you should you shouldn't you shouldn't do this. Um, you know, the what I would say the the again, they sort of rough Christian frame on this is somehow the history is really bad. And I I think Christianity probably it is much worse than Islam or Judaism on this because, uh, I don't know, you know, Islam and Judaism it would be inconceivable that you could murder God”

Thiel suggested at a Harvard talk that the left needs to 'relativize its victimhood,' meaning people should not absolutize their victim status because it becomes psychologically unhealthy; no one can claim to be a greater victim than Christ.

“there was a way that, uh, you can you can identify yourself as a victim. I'm not I I don't want to have some blanket rule where you you can never say that you weren't a victim...if I absolutize that too much, it's probably unhealthy in sort of a, um, you know, a Christian division that I I I I suggested at the Harvard talk was that, uh, if, um, it's okay to say you're a victim. It's it's okay to do these things up to a certain point. You can't say that you're a greater victim than Christ. And, uh, once you do that, um, um, you've probably lost perspective.”

Politics functions like a 'scapegoating machine' that only works if people don't understand how it works; if you make the mechanism explicit (as Schmitt does), it breaks the illusion necessary for political unity, likely accelerating disintegration rather than strengthening politics.

“the place, um, where, uh, it probably tends to always go haywire is there's always a question whether, um, politics is like a market where um, or is is it is it a sort of thing where if you understand it better, it works better. Um, and, uh, and so or is it something like a scapegoating machine where, um, the scapegoating machine only works if you don't, uh, look into the sausage making factory. And so if you say we're having, you know, a lot of conflicts in our village and we have to find some, um, random elderly woman and accuse her of witchcraft so that we'll achieve some psychosocial unity as a village. Um, this sort of thing doesn't really work if you're if you're that self-aware.”

The Book of Daniel, not Thucydides, represents the true origin of history because it presents a one-time, unique sequence of events (four kingdoms) that will not repeat, whereas Thucydides presents timeless patterns with invented details, making him not a true historian.

“you contrast this with something like the Book of Daniel in the Bible, where it's um, it's a succession of four kingdoms. And it is a one-time world history um, where everything that happens is unique, not not to be repeated in and there's sort of a sense which I would say the the real first historian was Daniel. Um, and Thucydides isn't even close.”

Contemporary apocalyptic anxieties (nuclear war, climate change, bioweapons, AI) differ from historical millenarian fears because they arise from purely human, non-religious sources (science, technology) rather than being orchestrated by divine judgment, making them qualitatively different.

“if it's millenarian um, or apocalyptic, it's uh, it has a very very different feel. Um, it is um, it's sort of a apocalyptic violence that comes to me purely human source. It's not it's not really being, you know, orchestrated by by uh, by God. Um, you know, um, uh, the one of the one of the one of the points that Rene Girard always liked to make was that uh, in the in the Catholic Church was I I think the sort of um, during the Advent season, you'd often have these sort of sermons on the end times and the terrible things that happened at the end of the world. And um, and Girard's telling the church stopped those sermons and after 1945 because people needed to be reassured that uh, um, the nuclear weapons had nothing to do with Armageddon”

A one-world totalitarian government is an existential risk at least as scary as nuclear weapons, climate change, biotech, or AI, and it is the political risk that corresponds to the Antichrist in biblical eschatology; the Antichrist is actually more dangerous than Armageddon because it comes first.

“one other existential risk is a one-world totalitarian government. And I find that at least as scary as the others. And um, you know, in the in the in sort of a uh, biblical eschatological context, uh, you're supposed to worry about Armageddon. You're also supposed to worry about the Antichrist. Maybe you're supposed to worry more about the Antichrist because the Antichrist comes first. Um, and uh, and so, you know, if we're going to find a pathway through this apocalyptic age, you have to sort of navigate between the the Scylla of all these, you know, existential risks that are and and the Charybdis of the sort of political totalitarian uh, catastrophe.”

Post-9/11, the US moved toward greater centralized surveillance, monitoring, and financial control (Patriot Act, tracking of money flows, monitoring of people) rather than descending into chaotic terrorism; the slogan 'peace and security' (1 Thessalonians 5:3) describes the Antichrist's government, and the US has been moving in that direction rather than toward disorder.

“well weren't we just going to have all this chaotic terrorism all over the world and we didn't get that much terrorism and we instead got you know, the Patriot Act and you know, incredible tracking of you know, of money flows, incredible monitoring of people and uh and so the you know, and of course you know, there's still there's still are things that can go wrong but but you know, the the political slogan of the Antichrist first Thessalonians 5:3 I think is is peace and safety. And it seems that we've gone far more in the peace and safety direction than the the global chaos direction.”

The Antichrist and the Katechon are Girardian mirror images—memetically entangled opposites—such that the Katechon (restraining force) always risks becoming the Antichrist through a reversal of perspective, exemplified by the Nero-Claudius relationship where the good emperor was the Katechon but his opposite (Nero) was still a Roman emperor.

“if you think of the Katechon as the thing that restrains the one-world state there were you know, there were various thing or that restrains the Antichrist. Um Anything that's sort of like the opposite, this is a Girardian cut, is always going to be memetically entangled and so it's going to have sort of this parallelism. And so there's always a risk that the Katechon becomes the Antichrist. This is the you know, the original anti the proto-Antichrist was Nero. Claudius the the good emperor was the Katechon. He was restraining Nero but then at some point you know, it's yeah, Nero's the opposite of Claudius but they're both they're both Roman emperors”

The contemporary progressive activist (Greta Thunberg on climate change) functions as a Katechon, claiming to restrain climate apocalypse, but through this very logic the Antichrist comes to power—by advertising itself as the necessary restraint against catastrophe.

“Or or even what I said about the Antichrist in this apocalyptic thing. Doesn't the Antichrist just come to power by acting as a catacon? Like this is what Greta says she's doing. She is the catacon stopping climate change. And um and so it's Yeah, it's a it's a somewhat useful concept, but um I wouldn't put too much weight on it.”

Bostrom and communism, despite opposite starting premises, arrive at the same conclusion: the need for one-world government, which Thiel sees as an 'attractor well' rooted in Enlightenment rationality—if one modality of governance is best, it should be everywhere.

“No, I I think there's a there's a certain rationality to it. If if if we may maybe just an enlightenment rationality where if we if we say that uh there's you know, some set of things that make sense and uh that are good and then you know, it's it's it's probably there's some kind of a way you should have you know, world order.”

The solution to memetic competition is not psychological awareness of it (which rarely works) but avoiding the 'worst memetic entanglements' and finding work that is genuinely independent rather than caught in competitive hierarchies.

“you can't uh you you have to try to avoid the worst memetic entanglements the worst forms of memetic competition possible. It's I I don't think one you know, I I don't think psychology really works. I don't I don't think sort of awareness of these things is is quite quite the way to to do it.”

Scaling the Thiel Fellowship or 'Zero to One' advice is paradoxical: the core message ('think for yourself') cannot be automated or turned into a formula without becoming its opposite (a 'Maoist little red book'), losing the crucial element of individual discovery.

“I worry that um trying to scale things you know, the only way you can scale things is by somehow automating them, mechanizing them, turning it them into more of a cookie-cutter type process. And then um I always worry that that uh deranges it at scale...it's something like, well, you should think for yourself and figure it out. And then but then um if I try to to scale that, it's like, I don't know, it's like some kind of I don't know, Maoist little red book or something you're producing and that's it's quite the opposite.”

Woke corporations like Walmart have used DEI as a distraction tactic: Walmart was attacked by labor unions for low wages, but rebranded as a green/environmentally friendly company, successfully splitting the left-wing anti-Walmart coalition—a Machiavellian but effective deployment of woke ideology.

“there probably are Machiavellian ways where this can also work where it sort of you know, just distracts people. So there's a you know, I don't know, Walmart was sort of the proto woke company in the 2000s and they were constantly being attacked by the labor unions because they were um you know, they weren't paying their workers enough. And then uh you know, they could they could pay their workers more or they could rebrand themselves as a green environmentally friendly company. And that turned out to be a very cheap way to split up the the left-wing anti-Walmart coalition.”

The Luddites were wrong for a long time, but AI might be different; even if AI replaces humans without creating new opportunities, Thiel would still favor AI development because 'muddling through' is worse—the default outcome is bad, so risk-taking is preferable to drift.

“Well, I think I think the Luddites have have always they've been wrong for a long time. Um there are there are certainly ways who probably scare me some with with with AI and um there there versions of it that where where you you could um you know, you you might but even if you convinced me that the Luddites were right about AI and that it's actually going to just replace people without, you know, you know, if you were a Luddite in you know, the mid-19th century said, you know, the machines are going to replace the humans. And that was well, that would be such a relief because there's so much work for people to do and they would just free them up to do other things. And And so maybe it's um maybe it's less complementary, more game of substitution. Even if you could convince me of that, I'm still in favor of the of the AI because um because my default is muddling through isn't good. My default is, you know, the default is really bad.”

The Straussian interpretation of the Bible focuses on esoteric, hidden meanings that have disruptive potential; the Book of Revelation is called the 'Apocalypse' (unveiling), and unveiling the true nature of social order can destabilize it, so these truths must be carefully guarded.

“well, I think I think um well, I think uh Stra- Strauss was this uh political philosopher who's you know, wouldn't describe as Christian was probably sort of uh very very classical um but the the place where I'd say both let's say someone like Strauss and Girard agreed on was that's there there's certain ways of understanding the world that um um have this disruptive way and you know, you don't want enlightenment simply that if you if you just tell people the secret messages um it it has a sort of unraveling effect”

The libertarian Christian interpretation sees all governments as satanic (not divinely ordained) because Christ was tempted in the desert by Satan offering him 'all the kingdoms of the world'—suggesting Satan, not God, orchestrates earthly governance and this truth destabilizes state legitimacy.

“the libertarian you know, another libertarian cut on Christianity is that you know, when Christ is tempted in the desert and Satan says just worship me and you can have all these kingdoms in the world, it's uh it's somehow saying that all the governments are more satanic than divinely ordained and um and then people don't understand that they think the govern- governments are somehow divinely ordained. And so, once once you see how satanic the government is, how satanic taxes are, other things besides the governments do, um um it it will have this unraveling effect.”

The narrowing definition of 'technology' from the 1960s (broad: medicine, space, agriculture) to today (IT and AI) is itself a manifestation of stagnation and centralization; true technological progress would involve many simultaneous breakthroughs, not the dominance of a single domain.

“this narrowing is you know is sort of a manifestation of the centralizing stagnation that we should be trying to get out of.”

The Thomistic distinction between intellect and will is crucial: Medieval thought prioritized the power of intellect and weakness of will, but modernity has reversed this, making will primary and intellect secondary, which parallels the Calvinist/rationalist problem.

“there's a Thomistic distinction between the intellect and the will and the medievals believe in the power of the intellect, the weakness of the will. Uh the moderns it's sort of in some ways reversed”

Libertarians failed to be critical enough of one-world government in the last 20-30 years; they didn't believe their own theories about power concentration; they failed to apply their understanding of corruption and absolute power to global structures; this was a failure of imagination, not necessarily a moral failure, but a fundamental lapse in applied political theory.

“I don't think the libertarians were critical enough of it last 20 or 30 years. So there was some way they didn't believe their own theories. They didn't connect things enough and I don't I don't know if I'd say that's a moral failure but there was some failure of the of the imagination”

Julius Caesar depicts the pessimistic scenario: there is no Katechon, no muddling through; Brutus is manipulated into sacrificing Caesar by appeals to historical precedent (the ancestor Brutus overthrowing Tarquin), and the result is civil war and mass death, with nothing gained; this is the Thiel mental universe fully realized.

“I find the play Julius Caesar very interesting, because there's no catacon. There's no muddling through. So they sacrifice Caesar. There's a civil war and a lot more people dying. And no one came to that insight. It's the the pessimistic scenario of the Teal mental universe, I think”

A major problem with globalization and world order thinking is the confusion between synthesis and superposition: people believe that globalization is the 'synthesis' (Hegelian final form) when it is actually still a superposition (unstable combination) of a global market with no global government, which cannot be sustained indefinitely.

“this is this these are sort of maybe maybe this is just a sort of a paradox of globalization like Hegelian thought is always you know thesis antithesis synthesis even if you agree this is the correct framing the problem is people always confuse the synthesis with the superposition of the thesis and antithesis. So if we say globalization some global world order is the final synthesis is globalization as it's described today just a superposition of a slightly unstable you know global market but no global government and then can that can that really be maintained?”

Thiel doubts that the future can be assessed as an empirical question through tracking variables; instead, believing that the West will 'muddle through' is itself a moral and metaphysical position, not an empirical claim, and the refusal to ask difficult questions about muddling through is already a form of intellectual failure.

“I I don't think it's a really empirical question. So this is it's if if yes, if you could convince me that it was empirical and you'd say these are the variables we should pay attention to. If I if I could if I agreed with that frame, you've already won half the argument...it's it's somewhat analytic. It's and moral even. It's it's that you're laying down some duty by talking about muddling through.”

Political theology and philosophy should start with Socratic questions about common sense—the human scale and the world around us (politics, economics, society, culture)—rather than with microscopic, atomic, or cosmic scales, because there is a deep link between understanding the university and understanding the universe.

“there's always sort of a question um you know, if we're trying to figure out something about the whole about our whole world, you know, do you start on sort of a human scale or do you start on you know, sort of a microscopic telescopic atomic or cosmic scale? And um there's probably some way these things are related, but the you know, the political theology philosophy debate our frame I think this was also a Socratic idea. We we start the sort of turn to common sense human the world around us questions about politics, economics, society, culture. Um and that's that that's sort of actually this important way to get access. You know, there's some deep link between the university and the universe.”

The Girardian anthropological frame shows that religion and atheist liberalism both engage in scapegoating—projecting violence onto scapegoats and turning them into gods—and Calvinism represents an extreme form where God is blamed for everything, including seemingly arbitrary details like what color jacket someone wears.

“a Girardian anthropological uh frame is that um is that you know, um there is this deep link between um gods and scapegoats and we tend to always we have these scapegoats we turn into gods. We project our violence onto them and this is what you know, archaic religion does. This is in some ways what you know, atheist liberalism does. You blame everything on Mr. God. And um isn't Calvinism just an extreme form of scapegoating where uh Mr. God did everything. He determined everything. He's why you're wearing that blue uh jacket”

Shakespeare's vision differs from Marx's because Shakespeare (proto-Girardian) sees conflict as most intense when people are identical rather than having objectively different interests; Romeo and Juliet's houses are 'alike in dignity,' and Hamlet observes that great people fight over eggshells rather than real differences.

“I think the the contrast I always frame is that uh I think I think um uh the way I understand Shakespeare is always in contrast with someone like Karl Marx, where um Marx believed that people had battles over differences that mattered. It was, you know, the different classes and they had objectively different interests. And this is what led to the intensity of the the struggle. And there's something in um Shakespeare that's sort of proto-Girardian or very mimetic, where um people have conflicts over um when they uh the conflicts are the most intense when they don't differ at all. And so it is, you know, it's the opening line of Romeo and Juliet. It's uh the Capulets versus the Montagues, two houses alike in dignity.”

In Julius Caesar, Brutus is manipulated into killing Caesar by the promise of future fame—the prospect of being reenacted on stage by Shakespeare actors centuries later—suggesting that people can be moved by memetic desires (future applause) even more than by present material gains.

“the way Brutus uh gets pulled into the conspiracy in Julius Caesar is that uh he um he gets reminded or he that, you know, his ancestor or another person named Brutus had overthrown Tarquin, the the last of the kings of Rome in 509 BC. So he thinks he's he's just, you know, reenacting that murder. And then of course, there's a you know, there's a um And then I think I think there is uh some part in the in the in the in the play where um um um the Shakespeare has the actors say, you know, I'm going to get get this slightly garbled, but it's something like um you know, and uh centuries hence there'll be people reenacting this on a stage in front of an audience. And and this is what motivates Brutus to do it. It's like the the future applause in the Shakespearean uh theater.”

From the French Revolution forward, societies biased hiring and advancement toward math ability (rather than verbal ability) because math was believed to be distributed across the population like 'idiot savant' ability (meritocratic and egalitarian) while verbal ability ran in families (aristocratic).

“if you ask when did um when did our society bias to uh testing people more for a math ability? I believe it was during the French Revolution because it was believed that uh verbal ability ran in families. Um math ability was sort of distributed um in the sort of idiot savant way throughout the population. And so, if we um if we prioritized uh math ability, um it had sort of this meritocratic but also egalitarian uh effect on society.”

The Thiel Fellowship's paradox is that it cannot scale: scaling requires mechanization and cookie-cutter processes, which deranges the core message of thinking for yourself.

“It's it's probably quite quite hard to to scale. It's always you know, the the sort of the paradox of something like the Thiel Fellowship or my zero to one book or any sort of self-help thing is like, you know, um it's it's always bad to sort of give advice or okay, these are the things you're supposed to do. Because it's sort of like um and so um the I I I I I worry that um trying to scale things you know, the only way you can scale things is by somehow automating them, mechanizing them, turning it them into more of a cookie-cutter type process. And then um I always worry that that uh deranges it at scale.”

Shakespeare would be distrustful of extreme ideological differences today, being more aligned with a 'political atheism' that rejects grand ideological claims.

“I think I think there is probably a um a place where I would I would say uh yeah, Shakespeare would probably be very distrustful of, you know, um extreme ideological differences. Today, I would probably in some ways also be be a kind of a political atheist.”

Julius Caesar exemplifies the dangers of reenactment: Brutus is motivated to murder Caesar by recalling his ancestor who overthrew Tarquin, creating a cycle where actors reenact historical precedents and generate future reenactments, with no escape from the cycle.

“the way Brutus uh gets pulled into the conspiracy in Julius Caesar is that uh he um he gets reminded or he that, you know, his ancestor or another person named Brutus had overthrown Tarquin, the the last of the kings of Rome in 509 BC. So he thinks he's he's just, you know, reenacting that murder.”

Muddling through as an investor is equivalent to writing lottery tickets to everyone who asks for money; it is a formula for losing everything, and the same principle applies to civilizational strategy.

“if you're an investor and you know, you can just think okay, I'm just muddling through as an investor here. I have no idea what to invest in there are all these people. I don't I can't pay attention to any of them. I'm just going to write checks to everyone, make them go away. And I'm just going to set up you know, a desk somewhere here in on South Beach and I'm going to give a check to everyone who comes up to the desk or you know, not everybody but I'll just it'll it's just I'm writing lottery tickets and that's just a formula for losing all your money.”

Political theology and political philosophy were abandoned since the Enlightenment partly because they were too difficult to figure out, but primarily because they were too dangerous and divisive, particularly regarding religion, which was supposedly settled at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

“the reasons these sorts of things were abandoned you know, I think I maybe maybe it's already was like the enlightenment sort of abandoned it from you know, and you know, one one one type of reason it was abandoned was because it's too hard to figure this stuff out or you it's just a sort of a fool's errand. I'm inclined to think the other reason was that it was often things too dangerous too divisive. You're not supposed to have debates about religion. We settled that in 1648 at the Treaty of Westphalia.”

Miami is doing well in part by focusing on real estate theories (Georgist economics) where value created can either be captured by corrupt real estate interests or go elsewhere; Miami risks becoming another geographically expensive city captured by landlord interests.

“I'm always into these sort of Georgist real estate theories where if you're not very careful all the the value in a place gets captured by the sort of corrupt real estate group of people...But but the you know the the worry in Miami is that is it have we really escaped the Georgist disaster that is San Francisco that is New York that is London where even though there's been a tremendous increase in in GDP you know it's it's it's it's not good if 100% of it gets captured by you know by by slum lords or something like that.”

The Katechon is a mysterious restraining force that holds back the totalitarian Antichrist and one-world state, but it is unstable, provisional, and defined by archaic sacred elements that cannot be explicitly identified without losing efficacy.

“this is always a question why the Antichrist hasn't taken over yet and it's this mysterious force that holds back this restraining force that that holds back you know, the totalitarian one-world state and and you know, I don't necessarily put too much stock in it because it's it's sort of uh on its own terms it's somewhat unstable. It's it's provisional. It has these sort of archaic sacred elements. It can it can work for a while.”

History was terrible and Christianity acknowledges this worse than Islam or Judaism because only Christianity includes the idea that one can murder God (in the form of Christ), which is inconceivable in Islam and Judaism; therefore, Christianity carries a unique burden of original sin and violence within its theological framework.

“I think Christianity probably it is much worse than Islam or Judaism on this because, uh, I don't know, you know, Islam and Judaism it would be inconceivable that you could murder God, you know, in the form of a person. If if someone claimed to be God and and and got killed, that would just prove that he's not God. Um, and so, uh, so yeah, so so the the original sin, the violence in some sense is is is is is far greater in a Christian context”

The left needs to learn to 'relativize' its victimhood, meaning one cannot claim to be a greater victim than Christ; once one absolutizes victimhood beyond this limit, one loses perspective.

“if, um, it's okay to say you're a victim. It's it's okay to do these things up to a certain point. You can't say that you're a greater victim than Christ. And, uh, once you do that, um, um, you've probably lost perspective.”

The Book of Daniel is the first true history because it narrates a succession of unique, unrepeated kingdoms in linear progression, whereas Thucydides merely describes patterns that repeat and makes up speeches, failing to capture what is genuinely historical.

“the Book of Daniel in the Bible, where it's um, it's a succession of four kingdoms. And it is a one-time world history um, where everything that happens is unique, not not to be repeated in and there's sort of a sense which I would say the the real first historian was Daniel. Um, and Thucydides isn't even close.”

Questions about whether society will 'muddle through' are not empirical questions but partly analytic and moral; if you can persuade someone that muddling through is the answer, you have already won half the argument by presupposing a particular frame.

“I I don't think it's a really empirical question. So this is it's it's if if yes, if you could convince me that it was empirical and you'd say these are the variables we should pay attention to. If I if I could if I agreed with that frame, you've already won half the argument.”

The Antichrist might come to power by acting as a Katechon—claiming to stop climate catastrophe (like Greta Thunberg does)—because the restraining force and the thing it restrains are memetically identical and reversible.

“Or or even what I said about the Antichrist in this apocalyptic thing. Doesn't the Antichrist just come to power by acting as a catacon? Like this is what Greta says she's doing. She is the catacon stopping climate change.”

The Bible presents an anti-sacrificial theme—a rejection of sacrificing individuals—which undergirds the Christian concept of the individual and the idea that the state is not absolute or providentially ordained.

“certainly um if you uh if you if you think of it as as um this this shift away from um uh sacrificing individuals. So uh sacrificing people. Um there there is sort of an anti the anti-sacrificial theme.”

Shakespeare differs from Marx because Shakespeare understood that conflicts are most intense when parties don't differ substantively (they are 'proto-Girardian' or mimetic), whereas Marx believed different classes had objectively different interests that drove conflict.

“the contrast I always frame is that uh I think I think um uh the way I understand Shakespeare is always in contrast with someone like Karl Marx, where um Marx believed that people had battles over differences that mattered. It was, you know, the different classes and they had objectively different interests. And this is what led to the intensity of the the struggle. And there's something in um Shakespeare that's sort of proto-Girardian or very mimetic, where um people have conflicts over um when they uh the conflicts are the most intense when they don't differ at all.”

Libertarians have failed to properly apply their own theories to one-world government, not believing that concentrated power would corrupt absolutely despite their theoretical commitments.

“I don't think the libertarians were critical enough of it last 20 or 30 years. So there was some way they didn't believe their own theories. They didn't connect things enough and I don't I don't know if I'd say that's a moral failure but there was some failure of the of the imagination.”

A desirable world order would have libertarian features (many nations with mobility between them) but without a transnational force that actually rules all nations, navigating between globalization and anarchy.

“you would like to have you know, a libertarian world order you know, many nations and you can you can move between them but and so there's some there's some there's some transnational thing you're not completely stuck in a particular country but then the transnational thing can't be so powerful that it actually controls all the nations”

There is a Hegelian paradox in globalization: thesis (nation-states) and antithesis (global markets) should synthesize into a global order, but the synthesis risks being confused with a superposition of unstable elements (global market but no global government).

“Hegelian thought is always you know, thesis antithesis synthesis even if you agree this is the correct framing the problem is people always confuse the synthesis with the superposition of the thesis and antithesis. So if we say globalization some global world order is the final synthesis is globalization as it's described today just a superposition of a slightly unstable you know, global market but no global government and then can that can that really be maintained?”

If one has too concrete a picture of exactly what the ideal world order looks like, that precision probably becomes dangerous; ambiguity and mystery are necessary for stability.

“if if if we have too concrete a picture of exactly what the world order looks like that's probably really bad.”

Thiel's 'The Diversity Myth' (written as undergraduate) focused on campus culture wars at Stanford in late 1980s-early 1990s and proved prescient about trends that spread to broader culture, but was ultimately ineffective because arguments about DEI don't matter—the driving force operates at a different level.

“I I wrote a book as an um in my undergraduate years entitled The Diversity Myth and it was sort of focusing on a lot of the um craziness the campus wars, culture wars that were taking place at uh Stanford in the late '80s, early '90s. And uh there are parts of it that seemed very prescient and uh it sort of you know, described a a lot of things that eventually spread to the broader culture. Another level, it was like a completely ineffective book where the arguments didn't matter um and uh and uh what what what drove these things so much was was on a on a very uh very different level.”

Whether muddling through is likely depends on deeper metaphysical/moral choices about human agency and the nature of thought, not on empirical observation or prediction, making questions about civilizational collapse fundamentally questions of theology and philosophy

“I I don't I don't think it's metaphysical but it's it's somewhat analytic. It's and moral even. It's it's that you're laying down some duty by talking about muddling through”

It was reasonable to avoid theological debate in the 18th century, but in the 21st century it's more dangerous not to think about these things because it's dangerous to become smaller cogs in an ever bigger machine.

“but and I think that might have been a reasonable compromise in the 18th century. Um it's my view that when you you know, fast forward to the 21st century, it's maybe more dangerous not to think about things and it's a it's again more dangerous to go into become it for us to become ever smaller cogs in an ever bigger machine.”

Calvinism is an extreme form of scapegoating where Mr. God did everything, determined everything, and is blamed for everything including why the speaker is wearing a blue jacket; we should be deeply distrustful of scapegoating Mr. God for everything.

“isn't Calvinism just an extreme form of scapegoating where uh Mr. God did everything. He determined everything. He's why you're wearing that blue uh jacket and it's it's uh it's why uh you every everything you did wrong, it's all Mr. God's fault. And um it is just it's just sort of we should be deeply distrustful of of scapegoating Mr. God for everything like that.”

You're not supposed to imminentize the eschaton (try to bring about the end times); you're also not supposed to imminentize the Katechon (try to institutionalize the restraining force); if you identify the Katechon with one specific thing, it can go very wrong.

“if you're not supposed to imminentize the eschaton, you're also not supposed to imminentize the Katechon. And and so if you if you if you identify too much as one thing, that can go very wrong.”

Thiel rejects Calvinist doctrine, particularly the five points (total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, perseverance of the saints), because Calvinism implies humans cannot think rationally and such depravity would make philosophical conversation itself impossible.

“I don't know if I agree with even one out of those those five things...if if you're you know, so depraved that you can't even think which is sort of I think a core Calvinist thing, we shouldn't be having a conversation. So if I were if I were a real Calvinist, we wouldn't even be able to have have a conversation here”

One could read the Old Testament and conclude history is something really bad, which is the central message of the woke, and then conclude the woke are correct and should be sided with because they highlight this fundamental historical badness and its excesses, though terrible, are a method of advertising that conclusion; conservatives are wrong to whitewash history by claiming slaves were happy.

“Is it possible that we can read the Old Testament, conclude essentially history is something really bad, that's the central message of the woke, and then just say the woke basically are correct. We should side with the woke. They have all these excesses that are terrible, but they're in a way a method of advertising the fundamental conclusion that history is bad. And they're the ones who make us deal with that and thus you and I should be woke. What's wrong with that line of reasoning? Yes, I think that history was very bad. I think it's always a mistake for, um, conservatives or anti-woke people to whitewash it too much. And so if we if we say that, you know, um, you know, yeah, there used to be slavery, but the slaves were all happy people, they were all happy slaves, that is a loser argument and you should you shouldn't do this.”

Both communism and Nick Bostrom's AI safety alignment (starting from different premises) end up in the same place: the need for one-world government; this is due to rationalist thinking that assumes the best system should be implemented everywhere.

“there's a certain rationality to it. If if if we may maybe just an enlightenment rationality where if we if we say that uh there's you know, some set of things that make sense and uh that are good and then you know, it's it's it's probably there's some kind of a way you should have you know, world order. It sounds more peaceful in both cases than having you know, a divided world.”

There are versions of the problem like: Do you want to worry about Dr. Strangelove (technological catastrophe) or Greta (climate alarmism)? Dr. Strangelove seems more dangerous, but if everyone has to ride a bicycle, that requires some real enforcement, which is a totalitarian project; the alternatives are not simply technological safety vs. chaos but safety through totalitarianism.

“do you want to worry about Dr. Strangelove or Greta? Um, and it seems like Dr. Strangelove's more dangerous, but uh, if if everyone's going to have to, you know, ride a bicycle, um, that's not just going to happen on its own. And that requires, you know, some some uh, some real real enforcement of this stuff.”

DEI (diversity, equity, inclusion) is something Thiel is 'very against' but acknowledges it may not be the most important issue.

“You know, I'm I'm I'm very against it. I don't always know if it's the most important issue either.”

The best fictional accounts of the Antichrist taking over the world (Benson's 'Lord of the World' and Solovyev's 'War Progress and the End of History') show it happening through hypnotic speeches and inexplicable persuasion, but in the post-1945 nuclear age, a more plausible literary account would be the Antichrist coming to power by constantly warning about Armageddon.

“if we were to write if we were to try to write a novel like this post-1945, it's it's very straightforward. It would be, you know, um, it'd be like One World or None. This is this is a short film by uh, the nuclear scientists after 1945. If we don't give the nuclear weapons to the to the one-world government, it's going to blow up the whole world. And um, and basically um, the the the literary version would be that the Antichrist comes to power by constantly talking about Armageddon and constantly telling us scary millenarian stories.”

Political theology is a broad concept that attempts to integrate different facets of life to make progress, contrasting with late modernity's hyper-specialization where people cannot think about the big picture and instead work like cogs in an Adam Smith pin factory on steroids.

“in late modernity we're often living in this world of hyper specialization where you can't think about the big picture and it's sort of like I don't know it's like Adam Smith's pin factory on steroids... I think there is some way that we have to try to integrate all these different um facets of our life to try to make progress and that's that's what political philosophy does. That's what political theology does.”

Thiel's core intellectual project for the foreseeable future is understanding 'the wonderful and terrible history of the world that we're living through as Christianity is unraveling our culture' and figuring 'a way to get to the other side.'

“I'm I'm just I don't know, it's just sort of a few core ideas I come back to and it's it's something like this uh you know, wonderful and terrible history of the world that we're living through as, you know, um you know, Christianity's unraveling our culture and we have to figure out a way to get to the other side.”

Thiel's core intellectual project concerns the decline of Western civilization and Christianity, figuring out how to navigate it; this requires understanding both the 'wonderful and terrible' history of the world and how to reach the other side of Christian cultural dissolution.

“it's something like this uh you know, wonderful and terrible history of the world that we're living through as, you know, um you know, Christianity's unraveling our culture and we have to figure out a way to get to the other side.”

Hamlet is thematically constrained because he doesn't believe in the revenge-drama narrative he's supposed to perform; his tragic flaw is disbelief in his own narrative.

“the Hamlet's problem is he doesn't really um believe all all the, you know, the sort of insane revenge drama he's he's supposed to he's he's supposed to be in.”

Crypto is libertarian and decentralizing, while AI appears communist and centralizing, according to Thiel's crude typology from 5-6 years ago; large language models show incredible returns to scale that concentrate power.

“I had this riff 5 6 years ago where if um if crypto's libertarian, why can't we say that AI is communist? Um and that it it and um and one of the things that I I'm I'm still probably a little bit uncomfortable about it is that it seems to lead to these incredible returns to scale.”

Silicon Valley's contemporary overemphasis on math and STEM is similarly unstable and will be reversed; it mirrors either French Revolutionary meritocratic thinking or a Straussian control mechanism, but either way, it is 'deeply unstable' to bias society so heavily toward math.

“Silicon Valley in the early 21st century, it's way too biased towards the math people. I don't know if it's a French Revolution thing or a Russian uh sort of um Straussian uh secret cabal control thing where you have sort of pri- pri- prioritize it. But uh but that's that's the thing that seems deeply unstable and I would bet on on getting reversed”

Large language models (LLMs) represent a major technological breakthrough, but Silicon Valley is singularly bad at discussing them, oscillating between trivial questions (20% performance improvement) and cosmic ones (simulation theory) while missing important medium-scale questions.

“the AI thing broadly, the LLMs, it's a big breakthrough. It's very important. Um and it's striking to me how um how bad Silicon Valley is at talking about these sorts of things. And uh and uh they're they're sort of you know, there's sort of all kinds of the questions are either way too narrow where it's something like I you know, we're going to have um uh you know, is the next transformer model going to be improved by 20% on the last one or something like this? Or they're maybe too cosmic where it's like we go straight from there we go straight to the simulation theory of the universe.”

The pro-China argument on AI is that China will implement it broadly without hesitation across its population, gaining speed advantage; the pro-US argument is that the US is ahead and can nerf LLMs less severely than rivals, though heavy neutering (e.g., preventing Winnie the Pooh questions) could render them non-functional.

“The pro-US argument is that uh is that we are probably ahead of China. Maybe the large language models are not really communist, you know, maybe if if you can't ask large language model who Winnie the Pooh is, uh you have to nerf it so badly that it doesn't even work or something like that.”

Effective altruists (EA) advocating for AI safety restrictions may not be 'fifth columnists for the CCP' but are instead unknowingly doing what the CCP wants: slowing AI development to prevent the U.S. from pulling further ahead

“there's an intuition that the effective altruists are not just fifth columnists on the part of the CCP where they're trying to sabotage us, but where they actually simply are uh um um doing what the CCP wants, uh which is actually to stop the LLMs and that that's very disruptive”

Thiel draws ideas and inspiration from the Western canon (Shakespeare, Cervantes, Goethe) which should be treated with semi-divine reverence similar to holy books, though not quite as sacred as the Bible; science fiction is included in principle but Thiel reads little of it now because it is too depressing.

“I think I think it's probably all, you know, in some sense it's all the great books. We're, you know, we're these sort of I I don't know. They're they're not quite they're not quite at the scale of of these holy books, but but, uh, there was there was a way that, uh, you know, we we treated, you know, I don't know, Shakespeare or Cervantes or Goethe as these almost semi-divine writers.”

The advice 'You're not a lottery ticket' (from Thiel's Zero to One) means that as an investor or strategist, if you treat your future as random (writing checks to everyone, refusing to focus), you will lose all your money; this applies equally to civilization—muddling through is a formula for losing.

“I always think you know, I don't know as a as a you know, it's one of my chapters in in the zero to one book was was you know, you're not a lottery ticket and it's sort of like the basic advice is if you're if you're an investor and you know, you can just think okay, I'm just muddling through as an investor here. I have no idea what to invest in there are all these people. I don't I can't pay attention to any of them. I'm just going to write checks to everyone, make them go away...I'm just going to set up you know, a desk somewhere here in on South Beach and I'm going to give a check to everyone who comes up to the desk or you know, not everybody but I'll just it'll it's just I'm writing lottery tickets and that's just a formula for losing all your money.”

Paradoxically, having some form of world order or global governance is necessary to prevent chaos and conflict, but any actual global government will tend toward totalitarianism; the ideal is a libertarian world order with multiple nation-states and transnational connection, but one that is loose enough to prevent any one entity from controlling all nations.

“Well I'd like to avoid the first type and then it's always yeah the second one I I I will concede it's it's a little bit more confusing and you know there's and so yeah you I would like to have you know a libertarian world order you know many nations and you can you can move between them but and so there's some there's some there's some transnational thing you're not completely stuck in a particular country but then the transnational thing can't be so powerful that it actually controls all the nations”

Miami's growth has been driven by the finance sector moving away from New York, and Thiel remains pro-Miami, though concerned about Georgist real estate capture (where all value gets extracted by landowners) replicating the problems of San Francisco, New York, and London.

“I'm still very pro Miami. I I think I think the Miami story has been more more of a anti-New York story. So it's a tale of two cities of and and the finance part of the economy doesn't have to be centered in in New York and and and that alone I think you know explains you know a great deal of of Miami's success...I'm always into these sort of Georgist real estate theories where if you're not very careful all the the value in a place gets captured by the sort of corrupt real estate group of people”

Thiel treats Shakespeare as a source comparable to holy texts and great literature, reading him seriously as someone who understood mimetic conflict and victim perspective, making Shakespeare almost semi-divine as a writer.

“there was a way that, uh, you know, we we treated, you know, I don't know, Shakespeare or Cervantes or Goethe as these almost semi-divine writers. And, uh, and, uh, that's and that I think that's the sort of attitude one has to have to to, um, read any of these books you know, appropriately and seriously.”

Apocalyptic dangers today (nuclear weapons, bioweapons, AI, environmental degradation, climate change) come from purely human sources and scientific technology rather than from God or divine orchestration, making apocalyptic threats feel very different from 17th-century millenarianism.

“if it's if it's millenarian um, or apocalyptic, it's uh, it has a very very different feel. Um, it is um, it's sort of a apocalyptic violence that comes to me purely human source. It's not it's not really being, you know, orchestrated by by uh, by God.”

Henry George was a late-19th-century economist who was described as socialist and now seems libertarian, suggesting that political categorization has shifted significantly or that his ideas transcend the conventional spectrum.

“Henry George was late 19th century economist who was sort of like sort of socialist then today seen as sort of libertarian which probably just tells something about how our society's changed.”

We are entering a new age of millenarian thought (similar to the English 17th century) with fertile conditions for scientific revolution, technology revitalization, diverse theologies, regicide (king execution), strange happenings; but Thiel rejects this as too cyclical a frame—no moment ever repeats itself, it's radically different.

“Do you think we're entering a new age of millenarian thought, somewhat akin to the English 17th century, where everything was very fertile, there's a scientific revolution, tech you could say is revitalized again, a lot of people went crazy, uh, highly diverse theologies, uh, they executed a king, many strange things happened, but in in many ways we're living in the world of the English 17th century, right?...It's it's just No, I I don't think any moment ever repeats itself. It is just radically different.”

Consumer internet happened to develop in Silicon Valley despite being supposedly about 'getting rid of tyranny of place,' making it unclear whether decentralizing tech narratives can overcome gravitational forces that concentrate power.

“you know consumer internet you know a lot of this happened in Silicon Valley for all sorts of complicated reasons you know it's supposed to get rid of the tyranny of place but all happened in one place”

Thiel had a quarter-life crisis in his mid-20s regarding what to do, recognizing the need to avoid 'worst memetic entanglements' and 'worst forms of memetic competition.'

“And um and so yeah, I I sort of had some kind of a quarter-life crisis in my mid-20s. And uh you know, it's was you know, unclear what what what to do. But somehow um you um you can't uh you you have to try to avoid the worst memetic entanglements the worst forms of memetic competition possible.”

It is not predetermined whether technology centralizes or decentralizes; it depends on human choice and work to push it in one direction or another.

“I don't know, my my my intuition is these things are not you know, absolutely written in stone and it's up to us to work on you know, making the technologies happen to push it one way or the other.”

Bitcoin remains valuable as a one-time way to get money outside the control of particular governments, making it extremely useful for those who need capital mobility despite limitations.

“On the other hand, um uh you know, I I think it probably is still um you know, if if if if you're just you know, thinking of it as a you know, one-time way to get money outside of the control of a particular government, it's probably still extremely good for that.”

Thiel attended Stanford, went to law school, and worked at a law firm in Manhattan that appeared desirable from outside but was internally miserable because everyone wanted to leave.

“I went to Stanford. I went to law school. I ended up you know, at a a law firm in Manhattan. From the outside, it was a place um where everybody wanted to get in. On the inside, it was a place everybody wanted to get out.”

Questions of religious truth should be focused on rather than utility, though utility is important.

“You can have you can have utilitarian elements. I don't think one can ever stress those too much. So, my my bias is always to focus more on you know, questions of truth.”

Even if Luddites are correct that AI displaces workers, Thiel would still favor AI because the default (muddling through, no action) is 'really bad'; with AI or without it, civilization faces risks, so one might as well pursue technological solutions.

“Even if you could convince me of that, I'm still in favor of the of the AI because um because my default is muddling through isn't good. My default is, you know, the default is really bad.”

Thiel's two-word rebuttal to Roman Catholicism is 'Pope Francis'; he grew up Lutheran; the one good thing about the Reformation is that it was necessarily external to the Church and could not start from within; Lutheranism was less globally centralized than Catholicism and the Protestant political project aligns more closely with libertarian views.

“I have it's it's always a little bit of a cheap shot. My my my two-word you know, rebuttal to Roman Catholicism is Pope Francis. Um and um and you know, and um and you know, we we were talking a little bit about you know, the you know, the uh you know, what what you know, I grew up as a Lutheran. Um you know, there probably all these things that are you know, problematic um about Luther. There are things that were were good about him, but you know, I I I think the the you know, the one the one part of it that uh um if we judge him by the standards of the 16th century, you know, I don't know um I think the Reformation had to come from the outside. It couldn't it was not actually possible for it to to start from within and and there is a way that uh you know, the Lutheran piece was it was the it was the less globally um centralized church. It was going to be a it was going to be a a less centralized church and there's probably you know, there's probably still um some part of the the uh um Protestant political project that lines up more closely with a libertarian view.”

AI exhibits 'incredible returns to scale,' meaning even San Francisco—which Thiel thought had 'committed suicide'—may survive and even thrive due to the centralizing effects of AI economics.

“you know, I thought I thought so you know, I thought San Francisco had at least, you know, committed suicide. And we could move on from San Francisco. And then um but the uh the returns to scale on AI are so big that uh may maybe even San Francisco will will survive with um with uh the AI revolution.”

Psychology (self-awareness) is probably not sufficient to escape memetic entanglements; structural changes to one's life are necessary.

“I don't think psychology really works. I don't think sort of awareness of these things is is quite quite the way to to do it. But uh but uh yeah, there was there was some some some some some part of that was very important for me.”

Anti-communism from 1949-1989 functioned as the Katechon, restraining communist expansion, but it was not motivated by Christian values—it was 'pretty violent' and 'hard to morally justify.' After 1989, anti-communism morphed into neoliberalism, which continued the totalizing impulse under a new name.

“from let's say 1949 to 1989, I would identify the Katechon as anti-communism. I would identify communism as the ideology of the Antichrist in the 20th century and anti-communism was this, you know, it was not You know, what what stopped communism was not, you know, the United States couldn't have done it. It was not just one country. It was not um it was not like some libertarian debating society. It was, you know, something was like pretty violent, pretty pretty hard to morally justify, not really that Christian.”

Math tests are a poor gating factor for medical school: being good at prime factorization has no correlation with neurosurgical dexterity, yet calculus and physics block entry despite not measuring actual clinical ability.

“if you want to go to medical school, okay, we weed people out through uh physics and calculus. And like I'm not sure that's really correlated with your you know, I don't know your dexterity as a neurosurgeon. I don't really want someone operating on my brain to be, you know, doing prime number factorizations in their head while they're operating on my brain”

Thiel's personal commitment to action stems from a competitive childhood (track), a Stanford education, and a quarter-life crisis in his mid-20s at a prestigious Manhattan law firm (where everyone wanted to leave), which forced him to reckon with memetic competition and find genuine work outside prestige hierarchies.

“the the the were sort of all these ways I was you know, I I was like incredibly competitive in track as a kid. You know, in my eighth grade junior high school yearbook, one of my friends said, "I know you're you're going to you're going to get into Stanford in four years." I got into Stanford and I went to Stanford. I went to law school. I ended up you know, at a a law firm in Manhattan. From the outside, it was a place um where everybody wanted to get in. On the inside, it was a place everybody wanted to get out. And um and so yeah, I I sort of had some kind of a quarter-life crisis in my mid-20s.”

Open-source AI might help with decentralization but has precedent issues (Linux vs Microsoft operating systems didn't change much about centralization dynamics).

“I If decentralization is great, it should have more dynamic properties, should innovate more, should be safer, has many other virtues. I don't quite know if that's the the main variable that's going to push the centralization or decentralization with it. But yeah, that the the probably some version of it that that would be helpful. I I don't know, the Linux versus Microsoft precedent. Not sure that changed anything that much on the on the level of the operating system.”

Thiel had significant responsibility and competitive drive as a kid, predicted early to achieve great things, which contributed to his sense of having to live up to those expectations and create impact.

“Um I don't know, the you know, the the were sort of all these ways I was you know, I I was like incredibly competitive in track as a kid. You know, in my eighth grade junior high school yearbook, one of my friends said, "I know you're you're going to you're going to get into Stanford in four years." I got into Stanford and I went to Stanford.”

Bitcoin is on the anti-one-world-order side based on the enemies it has made, though Thiel acknowledges this is a 'little bit too simplistic' Schmittian analysis; genuine anonymity and pseudonymity in crypto remain uncertain, and the crypto-anarchist utopia of the 1990s has not materialized.

“I'm still hopeful that on net um Bitcoin is on the anti-one world order side just based on all the people who are against it. But maybe that's a little bit too of a simplistic Schmitty and analysis. Um but uh yeah, no. Um there are uh the the the questions are you know, the the sort of questions would be can you um can you uh do you have genuine um anonymity, genuine pseudonymity?”

The pro-China argument on AI is that China will ruthlessly deploy and train AI on its entire population without restraint, giving it an advantage; the pro-US argument is that the US is ahead in LLMs, but large language models may be 'communist' (requiring heavy censorship like not being able to ask about Winnie the Pooh), making them hard to weaponize effectively.

“My um I I can do the I'll do the pro-China argument is they um they will not hesitate to use the AI and uh train it on all their people. And so, um it will be more quickly implemented. The uh pro-US argument is that uh is that we are probably ahead of China. Maybe the large language models are not really communist, you know, maybe if if you can't ask large language model who Winnie the Pooh is, uh you have to nerf it so badly that it doesn't even work”

AI has massive returns to scale, which might keep San Francisco economically viable despite earlier predictions that it had 'committed suicide'; San Francisco could survive the AI revolution if returns to scale stay concentrated there.

“I thought so you know, I thought San Francisco had at least, you know, committed suicide. And we could move on from San Francisco. And then um but the uh the returns to scale on AI are so big that uh may maybe even San Francisco will will survive with um with uh the AI revolution.”

Bitcoin is probably anti-one-world-government on net because most people opposing it are powerful centralized actors, making it (despite limitations) a decentralizing force.

“I I'm still hopeful that on net um Bitcoin is on the anti-one world order side just based on all the people who are against it.”

Miami's success has been primarily an anti-New York story about decentralizing finance from the imperial center, rather than primarily a tech story.

“the Miami story has been more more of a anti-New York story. So it's a tale of two cities of and and the finance part of the economy doesn't have to be centered in in New York and and and that alone I think you know explains you know a great deal of of Miami's success.”

Crypto is a decentralizing technology and the companies doing crypto were themselves decentralized and distributed globally, not concentrated in Silicon Valley, suggesting crypto could have been a decentralizing narrative.

“crypto is a decentralizing technology but also the companies that were doing crypto were decentralized not just in the US there's a decent number of them outside the US and so if if crypto was going to be a big part of the future tech tech story that would have been a you know naturally decentralizing from Silicon Valley narrative.”

AI's centralization tendency is 'even more centralized' than consumer internet, suggesting that if AI dominates the next era, geographic decentralization becomes even less likely.

“the AI piece seems seems to be even more centralized in Silicon Valley. So again if we if we say that you know, the next decade or two decades are just going to be doubling down on AI um that that probably suggests that you know, San Francisco will maintain and Silicon Valley will maintain or even gain gain power.”

Kasparov's defeat by computer in 1997 undermined Thiel's earlier belief that chess ability should be the primary gating mechanism for elite selection, suggesting that AI displacement of human-validated abilities is a historical pattern that will repeat with math

“in the late '80s, early '90s, I I had sort of a chess bias cuz I was a pretty good chess player. And so, my chess bias was you should just test everyone on chess ability and that should be the gating factor. Why why even do math? Why not just chess? And that got undermined by uh by the computers in 1997”

Ayaan Hirsi Ali's conversion to Christianity appears motivated by utilitarian reasons (fighting the civilizational war) rather than believing in Christian truth, but this utilitarian Christianity may be acceptable.

“Ayaan Hirsi Ali recently converted to Christianity but it seems mostly for utilitarian reasons. Um something like for the great civilizational war because secularism doesn't provide a good enough answer.”

Thiel considers himself religious but not spiritual, a position he claims is related to Calvinism in that both distrust human claims to transcendent knowledge (such as claims about heaven), though he rejects five-point Calvinism itself.

“I recall you saying in a recent talk you consider yourself religious, but not spiritual. And that strikes me as quite a Calvinist point.”

Thiel is not a Calvinist because Calvinism's doctrine of total depravity (that humans are so depraved they cannot think) would make rational conversation impossible, and if he truly believed humans could not think, the conversation itself would be undermined.

“So that's that's an anthropological argument reason I'm I'm not Calvinist is that I think we should be trying to make sense of the world and if if um if you are you know, if if you're you know, so depraved that you can't even think which is sort of I think a core Calvinist thing, we shouldn't be having a conversation. So if I were if I [5:48] were a real Calvinist, we wouldn't even be able to have have a conversation here”

Thiel considers himself religious but not spiritual, a position rooted in Calvinist epistemology which holds that claiming knowledge about heaven constitutes arrogation of human power and that one cannot know the transcendent.

“I recall you saying in a recent talk you consider yourself religious, but not spiritual. And that strikes me as quite a Calvinist point. So if you put aside predestination and think of Calvinism as insisting we know nothing about heaven. So it's an arrogation of man's power to claim to know about heaven.”

Testing medical school applicants on chess ability (Thiel's earlier bias) was no more rational than testing on math, because neither correlates with neurosurgical dexterity or actual medical competence.

“I don't really want someone operating on my brain to be, you know, doing prime number factorizations in their head while they're operating on my brain or something like that.”