'We’re Living In a Pre-War World. Great Power War Is No Longer Unthinkable.' | Ep. 49 Hal Brands
What this covers
➡️ If you enjoy this podcast and you want to help to make its existence possible, join our community of geopolitics enthusiasts on PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/DecodingGeopolitics
➡️ Sign up to my geopolitics newsletter: https://stationzero.substack.com/
Thank you Conducttr for sponsoring the podcast. Take a look at Conducttr's services and its crisis exercise software at: https://www.conducttr.com
This is a conversation with Hal Brands, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and one of the most influential and respected thinkers on U.S. foreign policy and global power dynamics of today.
In this conversation, we talk about the return of geopolitics. About why are ideas about geopolitics that dominated the world a hundred years ago and that were at the beginning of all the great wars of the 20th century now making a comeback. And threaten to start other great wars in our time and define the 21st century as well. And whether and how, can it be prevented.
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Hall Brand argues that geopolitical competition over Eurasia—driven by the same geographic imperatives that shaped 20th-century great power conflicts—is resurging in the 21st century through coordinated revisionist action by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, and that the U.S. cannot simultaneously abandon Europe and contain China without enabling the breakdown of the international order that constrains all four powers.
- Geography creates durable patterns: control of Eurasia remains strategically vital because it contains most global population, resources, and military potential, just as it did in 1904
- The 'autocratic quartet' shares deep ideological and strategic convergence against the liberal international order—not merely tactical convenience—and Ukraine has accelerated their cooperation in ways unlikely to reverse
- The U.S. cannot execute an 'Asia-first' policy that abandons Europe because doing so would collapse the transatlantic security architecture that prevents European rivalries and leaves no actor to fill the gap against Russian revisionism
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Most alliances in history were not permanent or ideological but temporary and tactical, driven by shared interests; NATO is exceptional, not the rule, and people mistake the NATO model for how all alliances work when in fact most alliances of convenience have had serious strategic effects without lasting forever.
“Americans and to a certain extent Europeans are prisoners of the experience since 1949 when um the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and Americans have a bad habit of uh looking at their alliances namely NATO and assuming that that is how all alliances work when when in fact NATO is is much more the exception than the norm Mo most alliances in history were never considered to be permanent they were thought thought to be temporary and and tactical um most marriages are marriages of convenience right”
The completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and proliferation of railways across Eurasia in the early 20th century created new possibilities for large-scale military conquest by enabling big aggressive powers to move armies over larger distances than previously possible since Genghis Khan.
“the march of Technology was integrating that supercontinent in a new way and so mender gave his famous lecture on the importance of Eurasia in early 1904 just as the Trans Siberian Railway was being completed and the proliferation of Railways in general and that Railway in particular across Eurasia raised the prospect that a big aggressive power could move big armies over larger distances um than really at any time since genas K”
Technology is not static; its evolution changes the particulars of the struggle for Eurasia (carrier-based air power in WWII, nuclear weapons in the Cold War, anti-ship missiles and cyber/AI in the 21st century) even as the underlying geographic pattern remains constant.
“during World War II for instance the Advent of uh carrier-based air power and highly mobile uh armored units uh provided a greater mobility of power certainly than we had seen in World War I or in earlier eras and basically turbocharged these programs of Eurasian Conquest uh in the Cold War uh one of the key questions is how nuclear weapons can either be used as tools of geopolitical coercion uh and aggression by the Soviet Union and its allies or as means of of stabilizing sustaining a favorable Global status quo by the United States as we get into the 21st century um this this whole sort of old story is playing out in different ways”
Geography creates habits and patterns that are hard to break out of, so it remains true today as it was in 1913 that it would threaten America's geopolitical interests if a hostile country was able to take control over East Asia or Western Europe and turn that into a platform for projecting coercion into the wider world, but the ways in which those struggles play out differ over time because of technological change.
“the way I like to think of it is that geography creates habits it creates patterns and it's and it's hard to break out of those patterns and and so it is still true today as it was in 1913 that um it would threaten America's geopolitical interests if a a hostile country was able to take control over East Asia or Western Europe and then turn that into a platform for projecting coercion into the wider world but the the ways in which those struggles play out differ over time and the ways in which advantage is acred uh differ over time as a result of technological change”
Just because the United States decides that the primary threat is in one theater does not mean that problems in other theaters go away—the U.S. has faced this challenge since the late 1930s of figuring out how to execute a global foreign policy even as one region may seem more important than others, and this was evidenced by FDR's willingness to accept high risk of war with Japan before getting into war with Germany despite believing Germany was the bigger problem.
“The Challenge and this is also issue that sort of Echoes throughout the history of this period is that just because the United States or America and its allies decide that the primary threat is in theater a that doesn't mean that problems in theater b or theater C go away and and so a big part of the challenge that us officials have faced really since the late 1930s is figuring out how to execute a global foreign policy even as one region may seem more important than the others”
The more you can do to make one party pay a higher price for supporting another, the more you can introduce at least the possibility of tension into those relationships over time—this is a general principle of how to strain alliances.
“the more you can do to make party a pay a higher price for supporting party B the the more you can introduce at least the possibility of tension into those relationships over time”
Countries can have relationships that do not bring them together in permanent or genuine love-match fashion but can still have serious strategic effects, which is exactly what is being seen in the relationships among the autocratic powers today.
“you can have relationships that um do not bring people or countries together forever in a genuine love masch that can still have serious strategic effects and that's exactly what we're seeing happen in the relationships among the autocratic Powers today”
Americans and Europeans are 'prisoners of their experiences' since 1949 with NATO and have developed a bad habit of assuming that NATO—which is a permanent, values-based alliance—is how all alliances work, when in fact NATO is much more the exception than the norm; most alliances in history were temporary and tactical, and most are 'marriages of convenience' that do not require permanent affection.
“I think people are prisoners of their experiences and Americans and to a certain extent Europeans are prisoners of the experience since 1949 when um the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and Americans have a bad habit of uh looking at their alliances namely NATO and assuming that that is how all alliances work when when in fact NATO is is much more the exception than the norm Mo most alliances in history were never considered to be permanent they were thought thought to be temporary and and tactical um most marriages are marriages of convenience right that that's true in geopolitics and it's it's true you know true throughout history”
The U.S. role in Europe is uniquely trusted precisely because it is not European and is not part of Europe's old system of rivalries—this external role was the key solution after WWII to both deter Soviet aggression and tamp down intra-European tensions that had ripped Europe apart twice in the quarter-century before 1939, and if the U.S. withdrew from NATO, you could see an erosion of these arrangements and a return to more rivalrous Europe.
“what the US and most Europeans concluded after World War II was that having a dominant US security role in Europe was the only way of a deterring aggression by the Soviet Union but equally important B tamping down the tensions that had ripped Europe apart uh twice in in the quarter Century before uh 1939 and so uh the US is sort of uniquely trusted to play a leading role in Europe's security Affairs precisely because it is not European right because it is not part of this old system of European rivalries”
The transatlantic relationship rests on the US playing a dominant security role in Europe because the US is not European—it is uniquely trusted precisely because it is not part of the old system of European rivalries and is not interested in where borders are drawn between specific European countries, making the US role fundamentally different from any European great power.
“what the US and most Europeans concluded after World War II was that having a dominant US security role in Europe was the only way of a deterring aggression by the Soviet Union but equally important B tamping down the tensions that had ripped Europe apart uh twice in in the quarter Century before uh 1939 and so uh the US is sort of uniquely trusted to play a leading role in Europe's security Affairs precisely because it is not European right because it is not part of this old system of European rivalries it's it's not interested in where the border is drawn between country a and and Country B”
In the Cold War, a key question was how nuclear weapons could be used as tools of geopolitical coercion and aggression by the Soviet Union, or as means of stabilizing and sustaining a favorable global status quo by the United States.
“in the Cold War uh one of the key questions is how nuclear weapons can either be used as tools of geopolitical coercion uh and aggression by the Soviet Union and its allies or as means of of stabilizing sustaining a favorable Global status quo by the United States”
10 to 15 years ago, most analysts argued that economic power in the 21st century had fundamentally changed from dominating mass manufacturing (as in the 19th and 20th centuries) to occupying key nodes in value chains, dominating high-tech industries, and leading in services, but the return of great power war dynamics is reminding us that the ability to make things is still really important.
“if you had asked people 10 to 15 years ago most of them would have said that the nature of economic power has changed fundamentally in the 21st century it's it's no longer primarily a matter of dominating Mass manufacturing as it was for much of the the 19th and 20th centuries it's about um occupying keyn noes in value chains and dominating high-tech Industries leading in services and so on and so forth and I I think that's true to a certain extent but as we find ourselves back in an era where big Wars great power Wars seem more likely we're also being reminded that the ability to to make stuff is still really really important right”
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, geopolitical thinkers like Alfred Mahan and Nicholas Spykman became concerned about Eurasia because technological advances—particularly the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1904 and the proliferation of railways across Eurasia—enabled a large aggressive power to move big armies over larger distances than at any time since Genghis Khan, opening new horizons of conquest.
“what made uh Eurasia such an interesting concept to people who were writing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries people like Alfred mender for instance was that um the march of Technology was integrating that supercontinent in a new way and so mender gave his famous lecture on the importance of Eurasia in early 1904 just as the Trans Siberian Railway was being completed and the proliferation of Railways in general and that Railway in particular across Eurasia raised the prospect that a big aggressive power could move big armies over larger distances um than really at any time since genas K”
Increasing the costs to one party for supporting another can incentivize them to work harder to find alternatives to US dollar reliance, but more generally the more the US can make a party pay a higher price for supporting another party, the more it can introduce the possibility of tension into those relationships over time.
“and again over the near term that could simply incentivize Russia and China to try to work a little bit harder to find you know alternatives to Reliance on the dollar and that sort of thing but in as a general matter I think that the more you can do to make party a pay a higher price for supporting party B the the more you can introduce at least the possibility of tension into those relationships over time”
Russian military trade, military co-production, and military technology development with China has already accelerated China's military buildup in important ways, and Russia is now becoming increasingly dependent on and willing to trade away technological crown jewels like marine quieting technology and space launch technology to China and North Korea.
“Russian uh military dealings uh military trade military co-production development with China U has already accelerated China's military buildup in some important ways um and the fear now is that as Russia becomes more dependent on these relationships it will increasingly trade away its technological crown jewels some Marine quieting technology space launch technology uh other forms of of knowhow to China to North Korea in particular in ways that will accelerate the emergence of disruptive military challenges in in other regions”
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are each individually trying to upset the balance of power in key regions (Eastern Europe, the Middle East, East Asia), but collectively they are trying to shift the balance of power in all of the key regions that make up Eurasia and to undermine the rules and norms that have structured the international order that the US and its allies put in place to contain Eurasian anarchy after 1945.
“you can look at what um Russia China Iran and their or doing individually uh and so they are each individually trying to upset the balance of power in key regions whether that's Eastern Europe or the Middle East or East Asia but if you put it all together what they are trying to do is shift the balance of power uh in all of the key regions that make up Eurasia and to undermine the rules and the Norms that have structured the international order that the US and its friends put in place to contain Eur asan Anarchy after 1945”
If Russia is able to force an unfavorable peace deal on Ukraine, that will be a win not just for Russia but for the larger autocratic axis where all other countries have aided Russia partly because they know they stand to benefit if the American-led liberal order is weakened.
“if Russia is able to win in Ukraine and I use that term advisedly because Russia has already suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine but if it's able to force an unfavorable peace deal on the Ukrainian government that's going to be a win not just for Russia it's going to be a win for this larger autocratic onon”
The stakes of the Ukraine war are not limited to Ukraine and Europe; it is much more of a global contest where the fate of the international order hangs in the balance, showing that regional conflicts are systemic.
“so that the stakes of the Ukraine war are not limited to Ukraine and Europe it's it's much more of a global contest now”
What Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are each individually trying to do is upset the balance of power in key regions (Eastern Europe, Middle East, East Asia), but collectively they are trying to shift the balance of power in all of the key regions that make up Eurasia and undermine the rules and norms that the U.S. and its friends established to contain Eurasian anarchy after 1945.
“you can look at what um Russia China Iran and their or doing individually uh and so they are each individually trying to upset the balance of power in key regions whether that's Eastern Europe or the Middle East or East Asia but if you put it all together what they are trying to do is shift the balance of power uh in all of the key regions that make up Eurasia and to undermine the rules and the Norms that have structured the international order that the US and its friends put in place to contain Eur asan Anarchy after 1945”
Russian military dealings and military co-production with China has already accelerated China's military buildup in some important ways, and the fear is that as Russia becomes more dependent on these relationships it will increasingly trade away its technological crown jewels—marine quieting technology, space launch technology, and other forms of knowhow—to China and North Korea in ways that accelerate the emergence of disruptive military challenges in other regions.
“Russian uh military dealings uh military trade military co-production development with China U has already accelerated China's military buildup in some important ways um and the fear now is that as Russia becomes more dependent on these relationships it will increasingly trade away its technological crown jewels some Marine quieting technology space launch technology uh other forms of of knowhow to China to North Korea in particular in ways that will accelerate the emergence of disruptive military challenges in in other regions”
The nature of economic power has not changed as fundamentally in the 21st century as some believed 10-15 years ago; the ability to manufacture goods remains really important, not just occupying key nodes in value chains and dominating high-tech industries.
“if you had asked people 10 to 15 years ago most of them would have said that the nature of economic power has changed fundamentally in the 21st century it's it's no longer primarily a matter of dominating Mass manufacturing as it was for much of the the 19th and 20th centuries it's about um occupying keyn noes in value chains and dominating high-tech Industries leading in services and so on and so forth and I I think that's true to a certain extent but as we find ourselves back in an era where big Wars great power Wars seem more likely we're also being reminded that the ability to to make stuff is still really really important”
Just because a relationship is transactional does not mean it doesn't matter or doesn't have strategic effects; one can do something for another country that is in one's own interests and still strengthen the other country's ability to accomplish its objectives.
“just because uh a relationship is transactional doesn't doesn't mean that it doesn't matter or that it doesn't have strategic effects I I can do something for you that is in my interests and it still accentuates your ability to accomplish something”
While pre-existing strategic and ideological convergences exist among the four autocratic powers, typically what speeds up the formation of such relationships is a crisis that overcomes barriers to collective action, and Ukraine has provided that crisis for the autocratic quartet by forcing them to deepen cooperation in response to Western pressure.
“but but typically the way this works is that it takes a crisis of some sort to accelerate the formation of relationships to to overcome barriers to Collective action and things like that and Ukraine has provided that crisis for the autocratic onun and what became clear pretty early in the conflict was that Russia was going to pay a real price for invading Ukraine um in its relationship with the west and its economic relationship and its diplomatic relationship and the Russian Elite Putin namely decided that the answer to this was to quadruple down on Russia's ties with other revisionist powers”
Franklin Roosevelt believed Nazi Germany was a bigger problem than Imperial Japan, but was willing to run a very high risk of war with Japan and ultimately went to war with Japan before going to war with Germany because he understood that Japan was also challenging the balance of power in a very important region in a fundamental way, providing a historical precedent for managing multiple regional threats simultaneously.
“Franklin Roosevelt firmly believe that Nazi Germany was a bigger problem than Imperial Japan and yet he was willing willing to run a very high risk of war with Imperial Japan and ultimately to get into a war with Japan before he got into a war with Germany because he understood that Japan was also challenging the balance of power in a very important region in a fundamental way”
Just because the United States decides that the primary threat is in theater A (Asia) doesn't mean that problems in theater B (Europe) or theater C (Middle East) go away, and US officials have faced since the late 1930s the challenge of figuring out how to execute a global foreign policy even as one region may seem more important than others.
“The Challenge and this is also issue that sort of Echoes throughout the history of this period is that just because the United States or America and its allies decide that the primary threat is in theater a that doesn't mean that problems in theater b or theater C go away and and so a big part of the challenge that us officials have faced really since the late 1930s is figuring out how to execute a global foreign policy even as one region may seem more important than the others”
Whereas in the 20th century the European part of Eurasia was the primary focus and core of great wars, the momentum and importance has now shifted more towards Asia, and from the US perspective Europe seems somewhat forgotten.
“while in the 20th century if we're talking about Eurasia the primary focus and importance was on the European part of it where the the the core of the wars world wars or the Cold War really took place whereas now it seems that the the momentum or the importance has shifted more towards Asia and Europe especially now I would say from the US perspective seems kind of uh forgotten”
Putin is willing to take a hard bargain with China (involving Chinese economic and technological penetration of Russia) because he believes it increases his chances of prevailing in Ukraine and strengthening Russia against the West over the medium term.
“Putin is willing to take that bargain Because he believes that it is increasing his chances of prevailing in Ukraine and strengthening Russia against the West um over over the medium term”
Typically what happens is that it takes a crisis of some sort to accelerate the formation of relationships and overcome barriers to collective action, and Ukraine has provided that crisis for the autocratic coalition, causing Russia to quadruple down on its ties with other revisionist powers as a response to economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation from the West.
“but but typically the way this works is that it takes a crisis of some sort to accelerate the formation of relationships to to overcome barriers to Collective action and things like that and Ukraine has provided that crisis for the autocratic onun and what became clear pretty early in the conflict was that Russia was going to pay a real price for invading Ukraine um in its relationship with the west and its economic relationship and its diplomatic relationship and the Russian Elite Putin namely decided that the answer to this was to quadruple down on Russia's ties with other revisionist powers”
China and Russia have lingering historical frictions (China periodically claims territory in Russia; China is uncomfortable with Russian actions with North Korea that might provoke North Korean instability affecting China), yet their relationships still shift the strategic equilibrium.
“it it is true that Russia and China have a bunch of lingering historical frictions every now and again the Chinese government will like print a map that shows a big chunk of Russia belonging to China um it it's true that the Chinese are super uncomfortable with what the Russians are doing with North Korea right now because they worry it will lead to more North Korean bad behavior that will blow back on on China”
Putin would have lost the war in Ukraine by now if not for the economic aid, economic support, and trade he has received from China, which has sustained his war economy over the past three years, and also for military equipment and troops from Iran and especially North Korea, showing concrete instances of how challenges to the international order are being intensified and sustained by these relationships.
“I I think it is quite clear that Putin would have lost the war in Ukraine by now if it was not for the economic aid the economic support and trade he has gotten from China which has basically sustained his War economy uh over the past three years and the military kit um and now the troops that he has gotten from Iran and especially North Korea”
An 'Asia first' strategy is intellectually attractive but suffers from serious liabilities, the first being that even if European NATO members magically doubled military spending today, this wouldn't solve the problem of sustaining Ukraine for the next three to four years because European defense industrial bases are not positioned to do that, nor would it solve the problem of dealing with a hyper-militarized, hypersonic-capable revisionist Russia that doesn't appear particularly patient in pressing against the Western security order.
“I think it's intellectually attractive but I think It suffers from some serious liabilities the first of those liabilities is that um it is all well and good and correct to suggest that the US needs to get more military spending and more defense effort and more Collective effort out of its European allies I wouldn't argue against that for a moment but the reality is that even if in some magical world the European part of NATO was to double military spending today that wouldn't solve the problem of how you sustain Ukraine for the next three or four years because European Defence industrial bases just St in a position to do that it it wouldn't solve the problem of how you deal with a hyperm militarized sort of hyper uh revisionist Russia that doesn't appear to be particularly patient in the way that it is pressing against the Western Security order”
The Trump Administration's policy orientation toward foreign policy is quite different from the previous approach, and there is significant confusion and debate about what that new role for the US should be, particularly from a European perspective.
“the US now has an incoming Administration which seems to have a very different idea of the role that the US should play in the world to compare to how what role traditionally the US has played even though it is um quite confusing as to what exactly the new role should be at least from the European perspective”
China is not giving away support to Russia; it is driving a hard bargain in terms of economic and technological penetration of the Russian ecosystem, yet Putin is still willing to accept that bargain because he believes it increases his chances of prevailing in Ukraine and strengthening Russia against the West over the medium term.
“the Chinese are not sort of giving away their support to Russia they're they're driving quite a hard bargain in terms of their economic and technological penetration of the Russian ecosystem a and yet Putin is willing to take that bargain Because he believes that it is increasing his chances of prevailing in Ukraine and strengthening Russia against the West um over over the medium term”
There are questions about what specifically tactically would precipitate a Chinese move against Taiwan, and the outcome in Ukraine will not be the dominant factor, but it will be a factor in influencing Xi Jinping's anticipation of how the West would react if he attacked Taiwan.
“there's there's a question about sort of what specifically tactically as a trigger would precipitate a Chinese move against Taiwan and and I don't think the outcome in Ukraine will be the dominant Factor there it will be a factor then and and so if what xiin Ping sees is that the West supports Ukraine for a while but gets tired of it and it has no appetite for actual military intervention in Ukraine and hesitates even to impose the most crippling economic sanctions on Russia like of course that's going to influence his anticipate the anti the reaction he anticipates from the United States”
Nobody around Xi Jinping believes there is a fundamental reset of Sino-American relations coming, so if high tensions and strategic confrontation with the United States are expected in the coming years, China must keep its relationship with Russia in good shape and continue to deepen it, and if China finds itself in a deeper crisis or war with the U.S., it will need at minimum benign Russian neutrality and ideally active Russian support.
“I also think that the reality is that while you know us China relations will wax and Wayne sort of tactically over the coming years nobody around xianping really believes that there's a fundamental reset of Sino American relations coming and so if you expect that you're going to have high tensions and a degree of strategic confrontation with the United States in the years to come then you've got to keep that relationship with Russia in particular in good shape you got to continue to deepen it because you you certainly can't afford to have hostility on two fronts at once and if China does find itself in a deeper crisis or a war with the United States uh in the years to come it's going to need at the very least sort of but benign Russian neutrality and hopefully from xiin Ping's perspective uh active Russian support”
The 'Asia First' policy argument that the U.S. should focus entirely on China and let Europe handle Russia has intellectual appeal but suffers from serious liabilities: even if European NATO members doubled military spending, it wouldn't solve how to sustain Ukraine for 3-4 years because European defense industrial bases cannot do that, and it wouldn't address Russia's hyperactive revisionism and risky sabotage/subversion efforts within the West.
“I think it's intellectually attractive but I think It suffers from some serious liabilities the first of those liabilities is that um it is all well and good and correct to suggest that the US needs to get more military spending and more defense effort and more Collective effort out of its European allies I wouldn't argue against that for a moment but the reality is that even if in some magical world the European part of NATO was to double military spending today that wouldn't solve the problem of how you sustain Ukraine for the next three or four years because European Defence industrial bases just St in a position to do that it it wouldn't solve the problem of how you deal with a hyperm militarized sort of hyper uh revisionist Russia”
The stakes of the Ukraine war are not limited to Ukraine and Europe but are much more a global contest about the future of the international order and the norms that govern it.
“so that the stakes of the Ukraine war are not limited to Ukraine and Europe it's it's much more of a global contest now”
Chinese microchips and machine tools have played a really important role in sustaining and rebuilding the Russian defense industrial base over the past three years despite heavy sanctions from the West.
“the the best estimates that we hear in Washington is that you know Chinese microchips um you know Chinese Machine Tools things like that have played a really important role in sustaining and rebuilding the Russian defense industrial base over the past three years even as it has been heavily sanctioned uh by the west”
If the US disengages from Europe and abandons its leadership role there, this creates a capability gap that 'no good actor can fill for the time being,' meaning the US cannot safely disengage even if it wanted to, because the geopolitical space would be left empty rather than filled by European reassurance.
“there's this one problem of like how how do you get from where you are today to where you need to be and if the US just says we're done with Europe right now there's this big gap that opens up that the no good actor can fill for the time being”
Autocratic leaders understand Cold War history as well as Western policymakers do and know the US will look for opportunities to split them apart, so they are on guard against that and it will be tough for the US to exploit tensions between them.
“and and so you add that to the fact that you know the these autocrats aren't stupid right they know Cold War history as well as we do they know the United States is going to be looking for opportunities to split them and so they're on guard against that and it's going to be tough”
Russia is carrying out very violent and risky sabotage and subversion efforts within the West, and this aggressive behavior shows that Russia doesn't appear to be a patient actor that can be indefinitely deferred in Europe while the US focuses on Asia.
“and that's carrying out some some very violent and very risky sabotage and subversion efforts within the west”
Russia and China have lingering historical frictions—China periodically prints maps showing large chunks of Russian territory as belonging to China, and China is uncomfortable with Russian dealings with North Korea due to fears of North Korean misbehavior blowing back on China—yet these frictions do not prevent relationships from shifting the strategic equilibrium and having serious strategic effects.
“it it is true that Russia and China have a bunch of lingering historical frictions every now and again the Chinese government will like print a map that shows a big chunk of Russia belonging to China um it it's true that the Chinese are super uncomfortable with what the Russians are doing with North Korea right now because they worry it will lead to more North Korean bad behavior that will blow back on on China but the relationships that these countries have developed are nonetheless Shifting the Strategic equilibrium and having serious strategic effects”
The great conflicts of the 20th century—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—can be understood at a high level as being shaped by fights over Eurasia between aggressive powers trying to conquer or dominate it and offshore powers like Britain and the United States trying to resist this domination.
“at a very high level uh I would argue that this explains the great conflicts of the 20th century World War I World War II and the Cold War and it's also a fair mental map for understanding what's happening as the United States and its friends confront countries like Russia China North Korea uh and Iran today”
The incoming Trump Administration has figures like Elbride Colby who argue that China should not base its Taiwan decisions on how the Ukraine war pans out, suggesting a preference for minimal U.S. involvement in Europe and maximum focus on Asia.
“a lot of people in the incoming Trump Administration people like Albridge Colby for example would specifically say on that point that China when making its calculations about Taiwan doesn't really look at what Russia is is doing in Ukraine”
There might be one or two opportunities to start a very long process of straining autocratic relationships over time, particularly by putting pressure on the weakest member of the quartet, Iran, which has had its air defenses shredded and its proxy network set back dramatically, and the Trump Administration is likely to come out of the gate with sharp economic pressure on Iran to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.
“I do I do think there might be one or two opportunities to start what I think be a very long process of straining these relationships uh over time so one way of doing that would be to put a lot of pressure on the weakest member of the autocratic uh quartet which is Iran uh and so Iran has had its air defenses shredded it's had its proxy Network set back dramatically over the past uh few months and it seems likely that the Trump Administration is going to come out of the gate with some pretty sharp economic pressure on Iran”
There is a gap that opens up if the US withdraws from Europe that no other good actor can fill for the time being, creating a dangerous power vacuum.
“if the US just says we're done with Europe right now there's this big gap that opens up that the no good actor can fill for the time being”
The US will need more effort and contribution from its European allies while also needing to put forward more effort to deal with challenges in three theaters simultaneously, but this should not take the form of saying to Europe 'over to you, we're out of here.'
“I think that it is again true that the us is going to need more out of its European allies just as the us is going to have to put forward more effort to deal with the fact that there are challenges in three theaters simultaneously but I I hope that won't come in the form of basically saying over to you guys we're out of here”
Without Chinese economic aid, economic support, and trade that has sustained Russia's war economy over the past three years, along with military equipment and troops from Iran and especially North Korea, Putin would have lost the war in Ukraine by now, demonstrating that this autocratic cooperation is shifting the strategic equilibrium in concrete ways.
“it is quite clear that Putin would have lost the war in Ukraine by now if it was not for the economic aid the economic support and trade he has gotten from China which has basically sustained his War economy uh over the past three years and the military kit um and now the troops that he has gotten from Iran and especially North Korea”
The great conflicts of the 20th century—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—can be explained at a high level by the dynamics of competing powers trying to control or prevent others from controlling Eurasia, with offshore powers like Britain and the United States trying to resist continental dominance.
“the Insight that these folks had was that the course of 20th century geopolitics was likely to be shaped by big fights over Eurasia between aggressive powers that would try to sort of play out this script and then their enemies including the offshore powers like Britain of the United States that would try to resist and um you know you can argue about who got the details wrong and and right but at a very high level uh I would argue that this explains the great conflicts of the 20th century World War I World War II and the Cold War”
The autocratic coalition relationships will not go into reverse after the Ukraine war ends because Russian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese officials have learned there are real strategic benefits from cooperation, and they will be reluctant to let it go once the war ends.
“doesn't necessarily mean though that these relationships will go into reverse once the Ukraine war ends if the Ukraine war ends anytime soon because I I think what um Russian officials Iranian officials North Korean officials Chinese officials have learned is that there are real strategic benefits from this cooperation and so they are going to be reluctant to let it go once the war ends”
You don't have to believe that the autocratic coalition will hold together permanently to see that it is already having pronounced strategic implications right now.
“you don't have to believe that this autocratic onon will hold together in perpetuity to see that it is already having pronounced strategic implications”
China's support for Russia in Ukraine is limited to things that are purely in China's own interest and do not risk Chinese sanctions—China is not selling arms to Russia and is only buying Russian resources at discounted prices for its own benefit, making it fundamentally limited in scope.
“what China is doing with Russia when it comes to Ukraine is still basically limiting it only to things that are purely in China's interest so for example it's not risking any it's not doing anything where it could which would help Russia but which could risk uh imposing sanctions on China so it's not selling arms to Russia um and it is allowing Russia to survive economically by buying its resources but that's also benefiting China because it's able to buy them uh at a very discounted price”
Critics argue that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are not a true alliance because their interests are too different and even opposing in some cases, that it is only a temporary 'marriage of convenience,' fundamentally different from NATO alliances based on shared values, and that even though these powers talk about having no limits, in practice their relationship is very limited.
“it's often quite swept aside in some debates with the counterargument that basically they're not an Alliance and that they're that the interests of these actors are too different even opposing in some cases and that it's not really an alliance but sort of this temporary uh marriage of convenience and a relationship that's fundamentally different from an alliance like NATO or or the alliances that the US has because it's based purely on on interests rather than shared shared values”
There might be one or two opportunities to begin a very long process of straining autocratic relationships over time, particularly by putting pressure on Iran as the weakest member of the quartet, which has had its air defenses degraded and proxy network set back, and can be shown that Russian support will not be forthcoming if the US and Israel decide to attack Iran's nuclear program.
“I do I do think there might be one or two opportunities to start what I think be a very long process of straining these relationships uh over time so one way of doing that would be to put a lot of pressure on the weakest member of the autocratic uh quartet which is Iran uh and so Iran has had its air defenses shredded it's had its proxy Network set back dramatically over the past uh few months and it seems likely that the Trump Administration is going to come out of the gate with some pretty sharp economic pressure on Iran as well um the the approximate goal of that is to come to grips with the Iranian nuclear program which is an important thing to do but one of the useful byproducts of this will be to demonstrate to the Iranians that you know their good friends the Russians are not going to be there for them if the US and Israel ultimately decide to attack Iran's nuclear program”
Autocrats know Cold War history as well as the West does, they know the United States will be looking for opportunities to split them, and they are on guard against this, making it tough to execute a wedge strategy.
“and so they're on guard against that and it's going to be tough”
Eurasia encompasses the combined landmass of Europe and Asia, running from the Atlantic coast of Europe to Asia's Pacific margins, and includes nearby offshore islands like the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Philippines, and is important because most of the world's people, economic resources, and military potential reside there.
“Eurasia is kind of what it sounds like it's basically the combined expanse of Europe and and Asia and so it encompasses that big land mass that runs essentially from the Atlantic coast of of Europe all the way to Asia's uh Pacific margins but then also is is typically thought to encompass the nearby offshore islands that are that are part of those continents and so the the United Kingdom uh off the coast of Europe for instance and then uh you know Island chains like Japan and the Philippines off the coast of Asia”
Geopolitical thinkers like Alfred Mahan and Nicholas Spykman in the late 19th and early 20th centuries feared that if a country or group of countries managed to conquer all or most of Eurasia, they would wield more power than any other countervailing alliance and could use Eurasia as a platform to build navies and project power across the oceans, threatening even distant countries.
“the fear of mender um also people like Alfred th Mahan and later Nicholas Speakman was that if a country or group of countries managed to conquer all or most of Eurasia they would wield more power than than any other counterveiling Alliance in the world and they could use Eurasia as a platform to build navies and otherwise find ways of intimidating and coercing and perhaps in the worst case conquering um countries is located even across the oceans”
Eurasia encompasses the combined expanse of Europe and Asia from the Atlantic coast of Europe to Asia's Pacific margins, including nearby offshore islands like the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Philippines, and contains most of the world's people, economic resources, and military potential.
“Eurasia is kind of what it sounds like it's basically the combined expanse of Europe and and Asia and so it encompasses that big land mass that runs essentially from the Atlantic coast of of Europe all the way to Asia's uh Pacific margins but then also is is typically thought to encompass the nearby offshore islands that are that are part of those continents and so the the United Kingdom uh off the coast of Europe for instance and then uh you know Island chains like Japan and the Philippines off the coast of Asia”
Some policymakers in the incoming Trump Administration argue that the US needs to leave Europe to Europeans to focus fully on China in Asia, arguing that Russia is primarily a European problem and that America should disengage from Europe as quickly as possible to concentrate resources on the Asia-Pacific theater.
“with the incoming Administration a lot of the people who were there seem to have the idea that you need to in order for you to have the resources to counter China in Asia you need to really leave Europe to Europeans and that Russia is not so much of a threat or a an American problem as a European one and so America should disentangle from it as fast as it can and really focus fully on on on Asia”
The interviewer and others argue that China's calculations about Taiwan are based on China's own assessment of Taiwan's status and US commitment, not on what happens in Ukraine, and that the outcome in Ukraine would not be the dominant factor in triggering a Chinese move against Taiwan.
“a lot of people in the incoming Trump Administration people like Albridge Colby for example would specifically say on that point that China when making its calculations about Taiwan doesn't really look at what Russia is is doing in Ukraine or that it's not going to base its decision on how the war in Ukraine will pan out”
At the same time that global power dynamics are characterized by an autocratic coalition challenging the liberal order, the incoming Trump Administration seems to have a very different idea of the role the US should play in the world compared to how the US has traditionally played that role, though what exactly the new role should be is unclear from a European perspective.
“at a time when all of this is happening and you have all these Global power dynamics the US now has an incoming Administration which seems to have a very different idea of the role that the US should play in the world to compare to how what role traditionally the US has played even though it is um quite confusing as to what exactly the new role should be at least from the European perspective”