A Quest For The Third Rome: Understanding Putin’s Apocalyptical Radicalization | Hoover Institution
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February 9, 2023 Hoover Institution | Stanford University
The Hoover Institution and Stanford's Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies hosted A Quest for the Third Rome: Understanding Putin’s Apocalyptical Radicalization on Tuesday, February 7, 2023 at 4:00 pm PT.
In this talk, Beatrice de Graaf lays out how, since coming to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin has relied increasingly on a toxic combination of Tsarist history and Russian Orthodoxy to two ends: for inspiration and to mobilize his followers. In the process, Putin created an apocalyptical, metaphysical scheme that has served to fuel his own radicalization and helped pave the way to the invasion of Ukraine. The talk is based on research de Graaf and Niels Drost carried out on a collection of over 11,000 speeches, statements, declarations, and interviews from 1999 to 2022.
ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS
Beatrice de Graaf is Distinguished Professor of History of International Relations and Global Governance at Utrecht University. Her books include Fighting Terror after Napoleon: How Europe Became Secure after 1815 (Cambridge University Press), the recipient of the 2022 Duc d’Arenberg Prize for the best book on European History, and Radicale verlossing: Wat terroristen geloven (Prometheus). Her 2022 bestselling essay Crisis! (Prometheus) about how the Dutch state has responded to crises for the last two hundred years started a national conversation about how to create more resilient states and societies. De Graaf is a former chair of the Dutch National Research Agenda and held a visiting fellowship at St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge. She also is the founder of the Utrecht-based Security History Network.
Thomas Weber is Professor of History and International Affairs and founding Director of the Centre of Global Security and Governance at the University of Aberdeen. He also is a Visiting Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Weber previously held fellowships or taught at Harvard, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Chicago. His books include Becoming Hitler: The Making of Nazi (Basic Books) and most recently Als die Demokratie starb: Die Machtergreifung der Nationalsozialisten – Geschichte und Gegenwart (When Democracy Died: The Nazi Seizure of Power and Insights from the Past for Today) (Herder). His books are the recipients of four prizes, including the Duc d’Arenberg Prize for the best book on European History.
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Putin has systematically developed a radical ideology fusing Russian Orthodox Christianity, imperial tsarist history, and apocalyptic theology since 2000, using this to mobilize Russian society toward violent imperial expansion and positioning himself as the Katechon (divine restrainer against Satan), with this radicalization trajectory culminating in the invasion of Ukraine.
- Corpus analysis of 11,000+ Putin speeches from 1999-2022 shows increasing frequency and radicalization of Christian eschatological and tsarist imperial references, triggered by both domestic and foreign events
- Putin deliberately instrumentalized Orthodox Christianity and the Third Rome concept as state ideology to replace communism, mobilize society around imperial mission, demonize enemies as Satanic, and legitimize violence
- The invasion of Ukraine represents the final stage of this radicalization process where Putin frames the war as metaphysical battle for Russia's soul, with soldiers sacrificing themselves as martyrs in an apocalyptic struggle
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De Graaf and her research team created a corpus of 11,000+ speeches, statements, declarations, and interviews made by Putin from 1999 to 2022, collected from the Kremlin website using automated web scraping code before the website was taken down one week after the Ukraine invasion
“We presented in that first findings based on a corpus of texts, 11,000 and more speeches, statements, declarations, and interviews made by Putin from 1999 until 2022. These statements were made by Putin for a wide variety of audiences. They were put up on the Kremlin website. They're taken down now, but we have them all collected right in time.”
The Russian Orthodox Church will not oppose Putin's war because there is no just war theory in Orthodox theology—unlike the Western tradition where limits on warfare are embedded in doctrine, Russian Orthodoxy teaches that when the Tsar or emperor unleashes war, it is automatically righteous because he knows what forces of evil must be stopped
“Um that I would answer with a definite no. They will never say so because um interesting fact, we very much live and work in the West under the theory of righteous war, a just war theory. Michael Walzer wrote extensively about it. And actually, that's kind of institutionalized and ingrained in all the restraining norms and values that are embedded, they come from the just war theory from Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, the Scholastici, and then into the West. So, that's very much that you have the the earthly powers, the secular powers, and there is a kind of an ideational scheme, the principles, the norms, the rules. When are you allowed to wage war and when not? Very much so. This does not exist in the Russian Orthodox creed. There is no theory of just war within Orthodox theory because the theory is if the emperor, if the Kaiser, if the Tsar unleashes a war, it's automatically righteous because he knows what he's doing. He is the Katechon. He knows what kind of what forces of evil need to be stopped.”
During Putin's 2018 presidential inauguration, bombastic music echoed through the Grand Kremlin Palace, cannons fired as salutes, and a choir sang 'Hail, hail our Russian Tsar,' a song commissioned by Nicholas I in the 19th century from an opera, with this performance occurring at the location where Tsars used to be coronated
“When he was inaugurated again as president of the Russian Federation in 2018, bombastic music started to echo through the halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Cannons fired as salutes, and in the final act of the orchestra playing the glory, the life a life of the Tsar for the Tsar was sounded. Euphoric Russians singing for the newly coronated sovereign on the Red Square, 'Hail, hail our Russian Tsar.' The choir performed this song only a stone stone's throw away from the location where the Tsars used to be coronated. And the opera out of which this song came was commissioned by Nicholas the First back in the 19th century.”
In Orthodox theology, the bicephalous eagle represents not true separation of powers between church and state but the dominance of state power, as the theology of 'symphonia' (harmony) means unity where the state is the main leading force in history and the church must follow
“So, in the the the bicephalous eagle is not really bicephalous. Actually, the the the the the state is the main leading force in history and the church has to follow. Unity, harmony, symphonia, it's called. It's the main state theology and the theology of the state. You cannot oppose the leader because the leader is he channels untrammeled divine power.”
Putin published an essay on the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine in summer 2021 that initially barely raised an eyebrow in the West, despite being the prelude to a full-scale invasion, showing that Putin had already begun acting as a history teacher to justify his imperial mission
“Publication of Vladimir Putin's essay on the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine in the summer of 2021 initially barely raised an eyebrow in the West. Some observers wondered why the president would undertake the effort to pen down his selective views on Russia's common history with Ukraine Ukraine, but few faith them that this would be the prelude to a full-scale invasion. But, history was already back in international politics, particularly so in Russia with Putin.”
On March 6, 2022, Patriarch Kirill of the Moscow Patriarchy delivered a sermon equating gay parades with sin and depicting the war as a metaphysical battle between Russia and the Satanic West, claiming that countries accepting gay parades cannot remain human civilization
“On 6th March 2022, 2 weeks after the invasion, uh the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches celebrate the Sunday of Atonement, demarcating the moment of atonement required to enter the period of Lent. The head of the Moscow patriarchy, Kirill, held a sermon. He said, 'If humankind accepts sin, a violation of God's law, if humankind concedes that sin is a way of human behavior, that's the end of human civilization. Gay parades are designed to demonstrate that sin is a variation of human behavior. Any country that wants to join the club of Western countries must organize now gay parades. We have entered a battle outside the physical realm, but of the metaphysical meaning.'”
Contamination requires countervailing force to make believers recognize that their ideological goals won't be achieved in practice, not to convince them ideologically that their ideas are wrong, which is why rational arguments with neo-Nazis and extremists don't work but showing them their ideas cannot be translated into practice does
“But what you need to understand with contamination, it needs counter force, countervailing force to really make people see not their not that their ideas are flawed, but that it won't work. So you will not convince them ideologically or rationally that they have the wrong ideas. Try argue with a neo-Nazi or try argue with an extremist, it won't work. But what you can try to show and that has been done and it it's happening all the time is that they just cannot get their ideas to translate into practice.”
In the aftermath of February 24 invasion, despite unfounded arguments about the necessity to denazify Ukraine, Putin's declarations had an imperial ideological ring, focusing on consolidating Russian society around defending itself to preserve national culture, with the invasion elevated to a metaphysical struggle between good and evil
“Despite unfounded arguments on the necessity to denazify the area, Putin's declarations after 24th of February had an imperial ideological ring to them. If we do not rely, he said, on the basic values of the national cultures of the peoples of Russia, we will not consolidate our society. Without consolidation, everything will fall apart. And the fact that we have to defend ourselves and fight for it is obvious.”
Putin presented Russian Orthodox Christianity as a substitute for the communist state ideology that had gone bankrupt, stating that after the October Revolution the Soviet state went to great lengths to destroy Russia's spiritual and religious roots and that attempts to replace the Bible with the moral code of communism failed
“In 2000, he presented the Russian Orthodox brand of Christianity as a substitute for the communist state ideology that in his eyes had gone bankrupt. Quote of Putin, 'After the October Revolution, the state went to great lengths to destroy our spiritual and religious roots, and was unwavering and cruel in pursuing this objective.' The primary history historian of of of Russia now denouncing the atheism of the Soviet Union. Many churches were raised to the ground. Back then, the attempt the state attempted to come up with quasi religion and replace the Bible with the moral code of the builder of communism. Well, Putin said, his quote, 'It did not work.'”
Radicalization is understood in security and extremism research as a process toward increasing acceptance of violence that explains extremist behavior and social exclusion, characterized by reappraisal of other groups as morally inferior that need elimination based on emotions of contempt
“radicalization is understood here in the terminology that's being used in my field as a process towards increasing acceptance of violence, which explains extremist behavior and exclusions of other groups”
In 2015, Putin postulated Russia's imperial purpose as a unique civilization rooted in Prince Vladimir, the ruler of Kievan Rus, positioning the adoption of Christianity under Vladimir as the source of Russia's development based on 'deep love for the fatherland'
“And in 2015, he postulated Russia's imperial purpose as a unique country civilization, harking back to Prince Vladimir, the ruler of the Kievan Rus. 'Prince Vladimir was destined to become a great ruler. His choice was discerning and extremely responsible. He became the source of Russia's development as a unique country. The adoption of Christianity was based on Prince Vladimir's deep love for the fatherland.'”
The fact that Ukrainians and Russians with family connections report complete social disassociation from relatives in Russia who fully mirror Putin's narratives and cannot be convinced of destruction in Ukraine, ongoing until present day, suggests deep penetration of state propaganda narratives into Russian society
“we hear uh coming out also via the latest issue of Eastern European history has some some great horrible collections actually of Ukrainians who have relatives in Russia. Their fathers even or their brothers. So, they have direct contact with people in Russia and their their they are um uh horrified about the the complete fact of social disassociation of their relatives who completely mirror echo the words of Putin and cannot relate anymore to what's happening in Ukraine. So, if they show the pictures of destruction, their relatives in Russia just do not believe it and that's going on until the present day”
The Katechon was a common figure in European history until 1806 when the Holy Roman Empire was disbanded, at which point the concept was supposedly ended, but Putin is now trying to revive it by positioning Russia as the modern restrainer against evil
“And it's highly charged, highly apocalyptic. And the Katakon is a very Well, it was in in in in European history, was a common figure of speech up until 1806 when the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was considered the Katakon, but it was disbanded in 1806 and now Putin's trying to revive it.”
In 2007, Putin told the Valdai Discussion Club that the basic principles Russia should propagate are the ideals of monarchy, the link with the people, and Orthodoxy, echoing the triad of nationality, Orthodoxy, and autocracy articulated by Tsar Nicholas I in 1833 as a response to the Decembrist revolt
“In 2007, not with President Bush, but with the participant of the Valdai Discussion Club, important a platform for Putin, Putin was asked what Russia's new mission was, which idea Russia should propagate outside its borders, and again, he reminded his audience of businessmen, tycoons, etc., uh politicians, that the basic principles of the Russian Empire are the ideals of monarchy, the link with the people, and Orthodoxy. That's what Putin said in 2007. And you're a Russianist, so these are obviously cornerstones of the Russian Empire, echoing the triad of nationality, Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality, as echoed by Tsar Nicholas the First in 1833 as a response to the Decembrist revolt and an attempt to mobilize society around its Tsar.”
The focus on Putin's speeches needs to be embedded and complemented with other interpretations, including that Putin is also an extreme kleptocrat, a KGB operative, and runs a mafia-like system, but the influence operations undertaken by Putin and his men were not motivated solely by self-enrichment, which Catherine Belton argues was a mechanism for authoritarian control at home and undermining institutions in the West to project uniqueness and greatness
“Of course, what does it all mean, the focus on these speeches? It needs to be embedded and complemented with other interpretations and explana- Putin is also the extreme kleptocrat. Putin is also a KGB crony. Yet, with Catherine Belton, I am of the opinion that the influence operations undertaken by Putin and his men, in the words of Catherine Belton, could not have been just motivated only by self-enrichment. So, the theory that Putin only does it to gain money, I think is not enough to explain what's happening. The takeover of the country, the cash flows were not the end in itself, but, Belton again, a mechanism for authoritarian control at home and for undermining institutions in the West in order to project uniqueness and greatness.”
With ISIS, the proclaimed end of times and final battle (eschatological prophecy) didn't materialize as predicted, which caused members to question where the angels, jinns, and Allah were, leading to the beginning of ISIS's downfall as people realized the prophecy wouldn't be fulfilled
“For example, with ISIS, one of the the the the beginnings of the downfall of ISIS was that the proclaimed end of the times, the last battle in the big, they even named a glossy after the big, which was to about to take place within the next two or three years, didn't take place. So, people started to drop out. So, where is this last battle? Where are the angels, the jinns? When is Allah coming? Why isn't it happening all of a sudden?”
Most scholars writing about Putin's ideological motivation focus narrowly on specific dimensions rather than on the combination of Orthodox Christianity and imperial history as constitutive of his worldview trajectory
“the way in which Putin instrumentalizes historical inspiration has been written about by a variety of scholars, but only few take the combination of history, Orthodoxy to be the heart of their research in studying the trajectory of Putin's worldviews”
Radicalization research suggests that dystopian views are not sustainable and ultimately lead to death and destruction, with the opposite of radicalization not being automatic de-radicalization but rather 'contamination'—the gradual, incremental, but irreparable corrosion of the projected dystopian view and loss of legitimation among believers
“The insight from radicalization research that I myself, at least, cling to as a terrorism terrorism researcher, you need to get some hope out of something. I mean, it cannot only end with bombing and death and decay. So, the hope that we can, and not just me, it researchers do derive from radicalization theories, is that the opposite of radicalization is not automatic de-radicalization. Hardly ever do people truly de-radicalize, whatever that may be. Now, the opposite is contamination, and contamination is the gradual, incremental, but irreparable corrosion of the projected dystopian view, the projected greatness, the projected loss of legitimation amongst the believers.”
De Graaf emphasizes that most things Hitler, Stalin, and Bin Laden said, they put into practice, so while Putin is not a terrorist but a state leader constrained by stricter rules than non-state actors, his words should be taken seriously as predictive of action
“We now know as historians that most of the things that Hitler, Stalin, Bin Laden said, that they put them into practice as well. So, if people argue that why take Putin seriously, uh well, why not take him seriously? But we have to do that very carefully.”
Religious scholars and others have noted that there are different types of rationalities—instrumental rationality (doing something to achieve a goal), epistemic rationality (doing something because it feels true), and rational irrationality (following a logical ideological argument that appears absurd to outsiders)
“As historians and others have pointed out, there are different types of rationalities. There are instrumental rationalities. You do something to achieve a certain purpose. There are epistemic rationalities. You do something because it feels true. And there's also rational irrationalities. Something that we find unbelievable, which but which follows a kind of a logical ideological argument for the perpetrator.”
The research team interviewed 35 terrorists in detention in the Netherlands and Indonesia regarding radical redemption beliefs, published in the book 'Radical Redemption: What Do Terrorists Really Believe?' soon to be released in English by Oxford University Press.
“It's about the role of radical redemption in the radicalization of Islamist terrorists based on her interviews of 35 terrorists in detention in the Netherlands and Indonesia. And and in October, she brought out a little essay as in book form, Crises or Crisis... She's also the author of a book in Dutch which translates into Radical Redemption, What Do Terrorists Really Believe? which soon will come out with Oxford University Press in English.”
From his inauguration in 2000, Putin stressed the importance of Christianity for himself personally, stating Russia has always been a pious and religious country, claiming he reads the Bible regularly, and keeping an icon and Bible in his airplane when traveling
“From the moment of his inauguration as a president in 2000, Putin has stressed the importance of Christianity for him personally. He oftentimes mentioned how his great-grandparents went to church, how Christianity was a unifying force in Russian history, as he said, 'As a matter of fact, Russia has always been a very pious country, very religious country.'”
The research was inspired by Catherine Belton's book 'Putin's People,' which argued that from the beginning, Putin and his KGB men were searching for a new national identity using the tenets of the Orthodox Church and history as powerful unifying creeds stretching back beyond the Soviet era to Russia's imperialist past
“This paper is partly inspired by my student Niels Drost, but also by Catherine Belton, who wrote a brilliant and illuminating book. You must know it, Putin's People. And there she writes, 'From the beginning, they, Putin and his KGB men, were searching for a new national identity. Ideal material with which to rebuild a nation out of hardship and loss. And the tenets of the Orthodox Church and history provided a powerful unifying creed that stretched back beyond the Soviet era to the days of the Russia's imperialist past.'”
Analysis of Putin's speeches shows an increasing frequency of Christian eschatological and historical statements with tsarist references since 2000, and these radicalizing uses of terminology are triggered not only by foreign events like NATO expansion, but also by domestic key events such as security threats and calls for democratization
“What struck us straight away is the increasing frequency of Christian eschatological historical statements on the one hand with tsarist references on the other. Moreover, what also stood out is the radicalizing way in which Putin deployed these terms since 2000 around key moments that, and this is very fascinating, that were not only of foreign making. So, it's not foreign events, expansion of the NATO decisions, speeches by Bush or others that prompted Putin to use these words. If you follow the corpus, the trajectory, you can see that it's prompted by domestic key events as well.”
If Putin dies or is toppled, it could be a major trigger event for contamination, as the sacred leader's apparent non-invincibility could undermine the ideology, similar to how al-Baghdadi's death by American forces contributed to ISIS's delegitimation
“On the other hand, it could be a major trigger event for contamination. Uh if this Katagone, this holy leader drops dead or is toppled, then he's probably not that invincible. That happened with al-Baghdadi. When he was killed by the Americans, then um uh the he committed suicide, but he was under threat while he did it. It was a major trigger event for contamination.”
The U.S. wars in Iraq (2003) and broader war on terror (2001-2004) initially led Putin to think he and the West were aligned in fighting evil, prompting him to support U.S. bases in Russian territory and believe he would be recognized as an equal great power, but when the West did not reciprocate with equal authority for Russian military actions, Putin turned against the West as hypocritical
“If we take that chronologically uh war in Iraq 2003 uh war in uh um uh war again the war against terror after 2001. These were the years 2001 2004 I would say when Putin was the most open to the West and the most supportive. He opened his territories for the US bases to wage their war in Iraq and wage the war against terror. So these were the years that Putin thought oh now the West is experiencing uh their own situations of terror like I am in Chechnya and they're projecting their power. Now they will allow me to do the same and I will be accepted and recognized as a similar great power to the United States and if I help them I'll get something in return.”
Putin invoked Jesus's words from John 15 ('greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends') in a perverted twist, appealing to Russian soldiers to sacrifice themselves for the Russian nation rather than offering his life for them, thereby weaponizing Christian theology to demand martyrdom
“In a highly perverted twist of the Christian gospel, Putin standing in a Moscow station addressed a thousandfold audience echoing the words of Jesus from John 15 but instead of offering his life for that of his subjects he appealed to the subjects to sacrifice themselves for the Russian nation. He said the main goal and motive of the military operation that we launched in Donbas, Ukraine is to relieve these people of suffering this genocide and I recall the words from the holy scripture greater love had no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends”
Putin has positioned himself as the principal historian of Russia and deliberately uses history as a producer of social-cultural appraisal structures to serve the mental mobilization of Russian society, a practice ongoing since the inception of his rule in 2000
“he now has prompted himself up, he says it so himself, the principal historian in Russia. That is Putin. He sees himself, his person, his presidency in historical dimensions and he acts in a way that permits him to achieve his historical goals.”
Putin is not irrational or mad, but rather operates according to a coherent ideological logic that follows deeply seated worldviews rooted in Russian Orthodox Christianity and imperial history, even if his actions appear absurd to outsiders
“What may seem absurd and insane may be the product of long-term planning, strategy, and reasoning along the lines of deeply seated world views. Political strategies always are also the outcome of a specific way of appraising social conditions that follow completely logical lines within the framework of the specific perpetrator if not of ours.”
Putin's myths may or may not be true expressions of his convictions, but what matters is that they are persistent, used consistently over 20 years, triggered as much by domestic bids for power as by perceived foreign political slights, and these narratives of significance should be treated as operational documents even if factually false
“Does it really matter if it's true or not? Putin's myths may or may not be true expressions of his convictions, but in any rate, they are persistent. Being used over 20 years of time, and they are not accounts of facts, obviously, he's lying, but they are narratives of significance promoted and conveyed consistently over time, and this is also important, triggered as much by domestic bids for power as by perceived foreign political slights.”
The research team also collected speeches by Medvedev and Lavrov and found that they follow the same radicalization trajectory as Putin and are dependent on what Putin says, suggesting that if Putin were removed from power, another siloviki (Putin's security service cronies) would likely continue the same ideological trajectory
“We also collected the speeches by Medvedev and uh some of uh the speeches made by Lavrov. And they follow the same trajectory and they are dependent on what Putin says. So, that means that I cannot probably answer your question so what happens if Putin falls away. He is the main factor pushing this forward, but he's helped by his siloviki. And that's the I very much, as you noticed, uh subscribe to the Catherine Belton thesis that it's Putin's men, the siloviki. So, if he would drop out, there would stand up another one. And I I would think that he would follow this trajectory trajectory as well.”
Domestically in Russia, people are seeing evidence of contamination as the projected greatness and uniqueness of Russia fails to manifest—the sanctions have effects, the world doesn't like Russia, Ukrainians are not their brothers—which are signs that the dystopian ideology is beginning to corrode among some believers
“And so but you need a countervailing force to force that into their faces. I mean as with regards to not to Germany, I can just echo that. I mean I think the question on how is things become gradually alters is not an all or nothing question. Start question start to be asked things start to become dystopian. Um and how those kinds of realization act translates into changing patterns of behavior.”
While talking about Ukraine and Zelenskyy in an interview with Oliver Stone in 2019, Putin connected ultra-nationalism about the united identity of Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians to an exclusive role view of Christian Orthodoxy as Russian state ideology
“While talking about Ukraine, Zelenskyy, and the Crimea to Oliver Stone, you may remember this interview 2019, Putin connected this ultra-nationalism to an exclusive role view on the role of Christian Orthodoxy as Russian state ideology.”
In December 2014, Putin equated Crimea and Sevastopol's civilizational and sacred importance to Russia with the status of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for Islam and Judaism, using Christian eschatological language to justify territorial expansion
“In December 2014, Putin explained the thrust of his Holy Russian Empire thus, 'Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast East and Slavic world in the creation of Russian nation and Russian state.' And now, he goes a step further. 'All of this allows us to say that the Crimea, the ancient Chersonesus of Sevastopol, have invaluable civilizational sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism.'”
In 2019, Putin invoked eschatological language stating that any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable and all will be annihilated, but as martyrs 'we' will go to paradise while they will simply perish because they won't have time to repent their sins
“Putin already did so in 2019 where he already invoked the end of times and he also said that any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable and we will all be annihilated and but we as martyrs you know the quote would go to paradise and they will simply perish because they won't even have time to repent their sins.”
Putin did not begin his radical imperial ideology immediately after becoming president but developed it gradually over 20+ years, with the analysis showing this was a process rather than a predetermined plan, though the research team could have predicted the Ukraine invasion if they had recognized the signs
“Now, with Putin now we know. Uh in fact, we made this analysis on Putin's speeches, as I said, we started 3 years ago, and the first analysis was was finished and delivered a month before the invasion of Ukraine. And we looked at the data and we could just not believe what was happening. It was a radicalization process, but we just could not see the next step that was coming only in 4 weeks. So, when Niels defended his master thesis, the invasion had already started and then of course the whole trajectory of the speeches made sense, but we we were blinded in a sense that we saw the words we just couldn't get our heads around the fact that this meant war.”
De Graaf is not a Russianist but a scholar of security, radicalization, and extremism who began her career in 1998 interviewing Wehrmacht veterans and Stasi officers, studied KGB-Stasi influence operations for her PhD, and then applied these radicalization methods to analyzing terrorists before applying them to Putin
“First of all, and Tom already hinted upon this and it's for me important to stress in such an esteemed environment, I'm not a Russianist myself. My student Niels Drost did the language coding for me. I'm a scholar of security radicalization and extremism but I did interview I started my career in 1998 with interviewing Wehrmacht veterans from a German uh uh Hitler army. I interviewed Stasi officers and studied Stasi influence operations that I did with the KGB together. That was what my PhD was about. I then applied these methods to terrorists and radicalization and now we tried to apply it to Putin as well.”