Dan Carlin Explains Why Autocracy in America Was Inevitable (Making Sense #433)
What this covers
Dan Carlin and Sam Harris examine the structural conditions that enabled executive overreach in America, arguing the problem runs far deeper than any single administration. Rather than treating the current crisis as a recent aberration, Carlin traces it to decades of accumulated presidential power and the steady erosion of constitutional checks—a process that has involved both parties and left the system vulnerable to any leader willing to disregard unwritten norms. The conversation frames this not as a failure of individuals to behave but as a systemic collapse: by the late twentieth century, only informal protocols, not laws, stood between a determined president and nearly unchecked authority.
The discussion ranges across the mechanisms that sustain this trajectory and why reversal appears structurally locked in place. Carlin contends that political incentives punish restraint—a candidate who voluntarily surrendered executive powers would face accusations of unilateral disarmament, making the voluntary return of authority to other branches near-impossible. He also argues that the sheer accumulation of extreme acts across recent presidencies produces something categorically different from any single precedent, and that tools like executive orders and signing statements operate at a scale and frequency unlike the past. The conversation touches on hyperpartisanship as a systemic feature, the role of population tolerance shifting over decades, and potential irreversible thresholds ahead. Additional topics include media gatekeeping, AI-generated content, foreign interference, and the historical parallels Carlin draws between contemporary politics and the 1930s and 1940s. Harris and Carlin also discuss the ideological backdrop—Carlin's outsider perspective during years hosting conservative radio, his view of libertarianism, and the crowded landscape of modern podcasting.
Carlin argues that contemporary American political dysfunction stems from decades of accumulated constitutional erosion, weakened institutional guardrails, and the replacement of law with informal norms—allowing a president unconstrained by protocol to operate with historically unprecedented power, a condition enabled by systemic incentives that prevent any candidate from voluntarily relinquishing executive authority.
- Constitutional guardrails have been systematically weakened over decades through executive power growth, leaving only norms and protocols as backstops
- The system is structurally incentivized against any candidate returning power to Congress or courts, as supporters would frame it as capitulation
- Trump's authority to unilaterally order mass death represents a concentration of power unprecedented in human history
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Carlin learned more about political arguments and concerns from fighting with conservative audiences as a contrarian radio host than he would have learned growing up in Los Angeles in the period when he did, demonstrating value in engaging with fundamentally disagreeing audiences.
“I mean, they didn't like me all that much a lot of the time. And and uh and I found that I learned things from them that I didn't know as a kid from Los Angeles, you know, growing up when I did. And and at the same time began to understand their arguments and concerns a little bit more”
The question of executive power and its limits dates back to the founding era and even predates the Constitution through the Articles of Confederation—it is fundamentally unresolved.
“Well, it it goes back to the founding, right? It predates the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation. We're still having these questions about the power of the executive and whether or not we need a king and how much the other branches of government should be involved in in being able to checkmate what a powerful executive wants to do.”
All the carrots and sticks in the U.S. political system are designed to make each party match or exceed the constitutional imbalances created by the previous party, so any candidate who tried to return power from the executive would be accused of unilateral disarmament—making voluntary curtailment of presidential power structurally near-impossible.
“all of the carrots and sticks in our system are designed to run with any constitutional imbalances caused by the previous party and the previous occupant of the White House”
The defense that Trump is doing nothing other presidents haven't done ignores that quantity has a quality all its own: combining the single most constitutionally extreme act of each past president into one presidency produces something categorically different, and tools like executive orders and signing statements are now used differently and more frequently than before.
“there's a quantity has equality all its own standard there also”
By the end of the 20th century, the only thing restraining a president who didn't want to be bound by protocol was norms—not laws—so the system was vulnerable to anyone willing to violate those norms with impunity.
“until you eventually get somebody who isn't bound by protocol, which by the end of the 20th century was really the only thing holding back some president who didn't want to be bound by protocol”
America's current political crisis is the end result of decades of cumulative trends—growing executive power, the erosion of constitutional guardrails, and the weakening of checks and balances—rather than a development of just the last 10-12 years, and these trends implicate both political parties.
“look to me like decades of of dominoes tumbling to get us to where we are now”
As AI-generated and artificial content proliferates and it becomes harder to tell what is real, human beings will seek authenticity in a pendulum reaction, creating renewed demand for in-person, unpredictable live experiences.
“as we move into an era where it's harder and harder to tell what's real and what's not and a lot of the content out there is artificially or computer generated, I think human beings start to seek authenticity”
Living through the current era helps Carlin better understand past historical periods like the 1930s and 1940s, because humans 'devolve toward the mean' when placed in large groups within similar structures.
“I feel like watching what's happening to us now unfolding, I understand the 30s better, the 40s better.”
The powers of the presidency today are infinitely stronger than they were in the early 1970s when Arthur Schlesinger coined 'the imperial presidency' to describe the Nixon-era presidency that was then seen as having gone too far.
“the powers of the presidency now um 40 years later are infinitely stronger than they were when we were worried about an imperial president in the early 1970s”
The current abuses could not succeed if the American population were the same as it was 40 years ago; the public's tolerance for these actions has shifted, like a frog in slowly heating water.
“you couldn't get away with a lot of the stuff that's being done now if the American population were, for example, the same people they were 40 years ago”
Modern presidents possess unprecedented power, including a sitting president accusing a former president of a capital crime and the unilateral authority to order the deaths of a billion or more people—power no individual has held until relatively recently—which Carlin characterizes as obviously corrupt and dangerous.
“We have a sitting president claiming that a former president is guilty of a crime that may carry the death penalty”
Americans have developed the capacity to engage in motivated self-deception about what is happening in their country—they observe signs of serious dysfunction but repress recognition of them, essentially denying reality rather than accepting unwelcome truths
“the unquantifiable ability we human beings have to tell ourselves we're not seeing what we're really happening. That to me is also I find instructive. Like I'm learning about humanity by our ability to fool ourselves into not seeing what we think we're seeing. Like we smell brimstone. We don't want to smell brimstone, so we pretend we're not smelling brimstone.”
There is significant money and incentive structure built around dividing Americans from each other, which fuels hyperpartisanship as a systemic feature rather than an accident.
“there's a lot of money in dividing Americans from each other”
People tend to devolve toward the mean behavior when in large groups within similar structures, which explains how societies can collectively make decisions that seem destructive in retrospect—it's not a unique failure but a pattern that repeats across history.
“I think we sort of devolve toward the mean when we get into large groups of people in similar kinds of structures. And I feel like watching what's happening to us now unfolding, I understand the 30s better, the 40s better.”
Arthur Schlesinger's 1970s book 'The Imperial Presidency' identified the Nixonian presidency as having accumulated excessive executive power, and was considered by the public at that time as a cautionary warning from which future presidents would learn, but in reality the presidency's powers have become infinitely stronger in the 40 years since than they were when Schlesinger warned about imperial overreach
“You mentioned earlier the the the term the imperial presidency. Well, that dates back from a book from the early '7s that Arthur Schlesinger wrote and he's writing about the presidency from his era, right? The Nixonian presidency, right? Which we when I grew up that was considered to be sort of the the the went too far president and we're going to learn from that, right? But the powers of the presidency now um 40 years later are infinitely stronger than they were when we were worried about an imperial president in the early 1970s.”
Executive orders and signing statements have historically existed but were used differently than they are now—George W. Bush inaugurated the practice of using signing statements to preemptively exempt himself from congressional legislation he disagreed with by claiming it interfered with presidential powers
“If you look at the way those things used to be used, so people will say something like, well, you know, they've been using executive orders and signing statements forever. Yes, but not for the same thing, right? So, for example, when George W. Bush started um issuing signing statements to bills that he disagreed with but he wanted to pass for political reasons. What he essentially did was say, 'I'm signing this bill.' The signing statement would say, 'I'm signing this bill, but I'm not being bound by anything that I feel later interferes with the, you know, actual powers of the presidency.' In other words, it was like putting an asterisk next to your signature.”
The political system is structurally incentivized to preserve and expand presidential power because there is significant financial benefit to dividing Americans through partisan politics, making it rational for candidates not to voluntarily constrain presidential power even if doing so would benefit the country
“how the system is incentivized. I mean, you know, there's a lot of money in dividing Americans from each other.”
The current American political crisis involves identifiable systemic problems: growth in executive power and authority, erosion of the Constitution ('Swiss cheesing' over eras), and weakening of institutional guardrails, until eventually a president emerges who is not bound by protocol.
“the growth in executive power and authority, the uh Swiss cheesing over the eras of the Constitution, the uh weakening of the guard rails and all these sorts of things until you eventually get somebody who isn't bound by protocol, which by the end of the 20th century was really the only thing holding back some president who didn't want to be bound by pro protocol”
The founding documents of the United States, particularly the Federalist Papers, demonstrate that the founders, many of whom were in their early 20s, were deeply concerned with the fundamental problem of constraining executive power and preventing presidential tyranny through constitutional design
“The difference is though, when you read, and I'm a huge fan of the founding documents, when you read things like the Federalist Papers and you realize the guys writing this are like 23, 24 years old, it it's shocking, right? Um, but when you read what they're talking about, they're talking about all these questions like what the role of a chief executive could be, what what do you do if the chief executive is not a wise person? You know, what other elements in the country are there to to uh to to play off against that, right? And what do you do if somebody goes rogue?”
The current president possesses the power to unilaterally order the deaths of billions of people, representing a concentration of destructive power unprecedented in human history, raising the fundamental question of what happens when such power is wielded without adequate constitutional constraint
“This man has the power to go back in the other room and order the deaths of a billion or two billion people. Nobody's had that power in human history until relatively recently. That seems just obviously corrupt. When bombs start going off and people start dying, what do we do?”
This is the most dangerous Carlin has felt the country has been in his lifetime, with potential 'Rubicon moments' (irreversible thresholds) at hand—though crossing them is not inevitable.
“this is the most dangerous I've felt the country's been in in my lifetime”
The sitting president is publicly claiming that a former president is guilty of a crime carrying the death penalty, while simultaneously portraying his own supporters as good Americans and critics as bad Americans, representing an unprecedented use of presidential authority for personal vendetta disguised as justice
“We have a sitting president claiming that a former president is guilty of a crime that may carry the death penalty. We have my supporters and we have the bad Americans. Okay. Well, this is a divide and conquer strategy.”
American problems result from a combination of systemic factors and the people—the American population is fundamentally different from 40 years ago, and the same systemic problems would not succeed against populations with different values, suggesting both structural and cultural decay.
“when you talk about our our problems here, it's a combination in my opinion of systemic and then the people, right? Because you couldn't get away with a lot of the stuff that's being done now if the American population were, for example, the same people they were 40 years ago.”
Evergreen content (like Hardcore History) should be optimized for quality over speed because it serves two audiences—current fans awaiting episodes and a much larger future audience that doesn't care how long production took, only that it's good.
“that audience doesn't care how long it took you to make the production. They just care that it's good.”
Trump's constellation of constitutionally extreme actions is not technically unprecedented because each individual extreme action was taken by some previous president, but Trump is the first president to combine and execute all of these extreme actions simultaneously, creating a cumulative effect beyond what any individual president achieved
“Let me make a distinction. So, let's say you take the most constitutionally extreme thing that Bill Clinton ever did and add it to the most constitutionally extreme thing Ronald Reagan ever did, etc., etc., etc., and then you get a president in the future who does all those things, right? Right? In other words, I'm not doing anything Ronald Reagan didn't do or or Bill Clinton, but I am doing what both of them did. In other words, there's a quantity has equality all its own standard there also.”
Carlin's podcast production strategy is based on creating evergreen content rather than topical content, which means he optimizes for an audience that doesn't exist yet—people who will discover the material years or decades later—rather than only serving the immediate audience waiting for new releases
“Well, it sort of depends on the nature of the content. And in our in our case, we figured it out slowly. I mean, it was a it was something we sort of came to the understanding over time that you're dealing with something that's sort of evergreen. And when you have something that's evergreen instead of topical, um you got two audiences for this stuff. You've got the audience that's waiting with baited breath for the next episode and then you've got the people that aren't maybe even born yet that are going to hear it down the road.”
As it becomes harder to distinguish real from artificial content and as computer-generated content proliferates, humans will increasingly seek authenticity, potentially driving a cultural pendulum swing toward live performance, unexpected elements, and human improvisation that cannot be artificially generated
“I think there's a pendulum aspect to it too. I think as as we move into an era where it's harder and harder to tell what's real and what's not and a lot of the content out there is artificially or computerenerated, I think human beings start to seek authenticity. You know, when the pendulum swings so far in the other direction, all of a sudden maybe oldtime theater comes back and you want to see people spitting on stage and unexpected lights falling from the ceiling and aud, you know, actors having to improv. Um maybe this this creates a a thirst for au authenticity, you know.”
Many contemporary political problems that seem like recent 10-12 year developments are actually the result of decades of accumulated constitutional and institutional erosion, requiring both major political parties to bear responsibility due to their cumulative contribution
“I look at this in a much sort of zoom out longer term lens. I mean, many of the things that we look at as relatively recent political developments, 10 years, 12 years, whatever you want to say, look to me like decades of of dominoes tumbling to get us to where we are now. Um, like one of the things that I'll get slammed for by some people is that they'll say that I blame both sides for things. You know, I'm a bothsidarism kind of guy. But when you've got problems that I assert are decades and decades and decades in the making, it's not only one part of the political system that's involved in it by its very nature, right?”
Harris would find it politically attractive to run on curtailing presidential power because he has concerns about both Trump's actions and the precedent they set for any far-left president who might use the same expanded powers to the opposite end
“Yeah. I mean it would I I guess I could be an audience of one here but it would be a very attractive uh thing to run on from my point of view because I you know obviously I have a many concerns about what Trump is doing and uh intends to do but um I have similar concerns if anyone too far to the left took instruction from his example and we had a president AOC or someone like that uh who just decided to to you know declare a state of emergency left, right, and center and and uh issue executive orders like we've been seeing.”
The population is tolerating practices now that would never have been tolerated 40 years ago, suggesting the populace has either become accepting of authoritarianism or has decreased vigilance toward democratic norms—the 'frog in hot water' dynamic applies to both individual policies and the population's capacity to resist them.
“how many people are either good with it. Um things that we never would have put up with a long time ago or the unquantifiable ability we human beings have to tell ourselves we're not seeing what we're really seeing. That to me is also I find instructive.”
If a Democrat ran on returning power from the executive branch to Congress and the courts to fix constitutional imbalance, donors and supporters would accuse them of unilateral disarmament while the opposing party maintains accumulated power.
“So, for example, let's say you had a Democrat run and say, "Well, we never have to have this can't happen again. So, you elect me. I'm gonna return power from the executive branch to the courts and and to the Congress and we'll fix this imbalance. Right?... Well, the people that raised money for that candidate, the people that elected that candidate, they're going to accuse that candidate of surrendering to the other side of behaving in a uni unilateral disarmament, right?”
Contemporary political crises help historians and observers better understand past eras of decline and dysfunction because observing the mechanisms in real time provides insight into how societies deteriorate, allowing for improved understanding of historical periods like the 1930s and 1940s
“I feel like the era that we're living through now has helped me better understand errors in the past. I mean, um there tends to be, you know, the times change and and and you never dip your your toe into the same river water twice, but you can dip your toe into the same river. And I feel like what we're seeing now helps me better understand other eras in history where you were going, 'What were they thinking?' or how do people behave? Because I think we sort of devolve toward the mean when we get into large groups of people in similar kinds of structures.”
Carlin's Common Sense podcast branding deliberately reframed his ideological differences and weaknesses (not being a Democrat or Republican, disagreeing with the status quo) into selling points rather than liabilities, by having marketing position these as strengths
“I learned that when you have faults, as many as I have, you try to make lemons into lemonade. and you have the big voice announcers sort of turn all of your problems and downsides and and weaknesses into selling points, right? And so being this guy that wasn't a Democrat or Republican that didn't agree with the way things were, um we turned those from weaknesses into strengths through the branding and the marketing.”
Real-life in-person moments are becoming increasingly precious because digital life has become dominant, and the only thing that cannot be faked is physical presence, which requires tangible sacrifice to achieve
“I'm looking forward to it. It feels like in real life uh moments are more and more precious. I mean, we we've just migrated our lives to this um digital swamp, which I'm sure we're going to talk about. And uh it you know the one thing you can't fake, the one thing you you you really have to make tangible sacrifices for is to to be present with people.”
Questions about the proper power of the executive, whether a chief executive is wise, and what to do if a president goes rogue date back to the founding and predate even the Constitution and Articles of Confederation.
“it goes back to the founding, right? It predates the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation. We're still having these questions about the power of the executive”
Hosting a conservative AM radio show as an ideological outsider—constantly arguing with a hostile audience—was a valuable training ground because it forced understanding of opposing arguments and taught him to coexist with people who fundamentally disagreed, rather than preaching to a choir.
“it was all about learning how to live with people who disagreed with you fundamentally about a lot of things”
There are potential 'Rubicon moments' approaching in American governance—moments of constitutional or institutional crossing that may not necessarily occur but represent serious danger of irreversible change.
“I think we're in an endgame here where there are some Rubicon moments uh happening. That doesn't mean they're going to happen, but this is the most dangerous I've felt the country's been in in my lifetime.”
It is essentially impossible to imagine a credible presidential candidate in 2028 running on a platform of curtailing presidential power, despite this being what the country structurally needs, because such a position is counterintuitive to the ambitions of someone seeking maximum power
“Can you imagine a u a candidate for the presidency in 2028 say picking as a as a central plank of his or her platform uh curtailing the the powers of the presidency.”
The failure to publicly discuss systemic problems with the concentration of presidential power means those problems are never identified or understood by the public, which makes it even less likely that there will be political will to fix them
“The fact that we don't talk more about that is indicative as to the problems. I mean if you're not going to have a conversation about what's wrong systemically with the system, well you're certainly not going to identify the problems and you're going to have even less public support towards fixing them.”
In the second Trump administration, we are getting 'more of that' norm-violation behavior 'more or less as expected' because once norms are demonstrated to be unenforceable, they cannot be re-established and subsequent presidents will exploit the same vulnerabilities.
“the second time around, we're getting more of that uh more or less as expected.”
The current moment is the most dangerous that the United States has been in Carlin's lifetime, and the threats to the country are the same ones he has been discussing since the 1980s, suggesting these dangers have been accumulating with little meaningful response
“That to me is also I find instructive. Like I'm learning about humanity by our ability to fool ourselves into not seeing what we think we're seeing. Like we smell brimstone. We don't want to smell brimstone, so we pretend we're not smelling brimstone. Um, that's not really an answer to your question, but but I think we're in an endgame here where there are some Rubicon moments uh happening. That doesn't mean they're going to happen, but this is the most dangerous I've felt the country's been in in my lifetime. And the very things that I feel is are threatening it are the very things we talked about forever.”
Carlin's position is that he can focus on quality over output speed because he has the financial luxury of not needing to produce content quickly for revenue reasons, whereas many other creators lack this privilege and are forced to prioritize output volume over quality
“once you have the luxury of not having to produce content that quickly you know a lot of a lot of people just need to get it out because they have an audience waiting and they need the ads or whatever it is. We're in a position right now where we can just focus on quality and figure that if you do that and it's good enough, everything else sort of takes care of itself down the road.”
Madison vs. Marbury (case) represents one of many foundational legal precedents for American understanding of executive power limits—basic constitutional knowledge.
“I mean, Madison versus Marberry, these are all I mean, when you study American history, this is the basic 101 level stuff, right?”
Living through longer periods of history provides inherent advantages for understanding historical patterns because experiencing more historical time naturally builds insight into how human behavior repeats and societies evolve across centuries
“and that's something that when you live longer, you just inherently understand history better because you've lived through more of it, right?”
Breaking into podcasting as a new creator in the current market is nearly impossible without pre-existing notoriety, audience, or external platform advantage, making growth from zero audience a virtually insurmountable challenge in a crowded field of millions of shows
“Unless you came in bringing your own sort of notoriety or popularity or audience with you, I don't know how you would grow from nothing. I mean, I know it happens and there's still people, but I don't know how I'd do it if you had to try to stand out in such a crowded field now.”
Dan Carlin has been one of the earliest and most influential podcasters, pioneering the medium and producing podcast series of masterpiece quality, particularly his Hardcore History episodes
“You are a um you're one of the first podcasters. you really are the the OG podcaster and many of us believe the best who has ever uh uh lived thus far. Um you have several series uh of the Hardcore History podcast that are just true masterpieces”
There are now approximately 4.6 million podcasts in existence, representing exponential growth from when podcasting was an unknown medium requiring 45 minutes of explanation at social gatherings
“There's something like 4.6 million podcasts I'm told now. I'm not sure I believe that, but that's... I can remember when no one knew what it was and it was a 45minute conversation at a cocktail party when people say, 'What do you do for a living?' And you'd walk away after 45 minutes and they still wouldn't know.”
Carlin identifies himself as having a 'politics of one' and a 'religion of one', refusing affiliation with either major political party, a position he developed while working as a radio talk show host who was ideologically out of step with his conservative audience
“Well, I mean, a politics, a political party of one, right? a religion of one. I mean, I I I really I think, you know, looking when you look back on your life as you get older, as we are, um, you notice things that didn't really make sense when you were younger that seemed more clear to you. And one of those things for me is being a radio talk show host uh, who didn't fit in the daytime. I mean, I used to call me the Martian in the day part, right?”
Carlin has made a deliberate choice to avoid producing video content for his podcasts, viewing it as failing his audience and being unnecessary for audio-based content, reflecting his empathy for listener experience
“It's empathy, Sam. I have empathy for my audience, and they don't need to see this. They they they hear it. That's hard enough for some of them, especially with my uh loudness and softness uh variability.”
In the 1990s when Carlin began his Common Sense podcast, there was no political constituency that aligned with his centrist, anti-establishment position, but he accidentally caught a wave in the cultural zeitgeist where it briefly seemed like a new generation was emerging that shared his worldview, before that movement collapsed and the situation deteriorated further
“And what was weird, Sam, is that when I started in the 1990s, there literally was nobody on my side. But then somehow we just caught a wave accidentally in the zeitgeist, right? And so for a little while it almost seemed like there was a new generation coming up that was more in tune with the way I thought and it was all false hope because we fell right off the cliff later but uh into a worse situation than before.”
Carlin's Common Sense podcast had multiple pillars of argument, including one pillar focused on partisan hyperpartisanship and its effects on the country, and another focused on the systematic erosion of constitutional checks and balances
“So when you say what was the common sense show about, we had a few pillars and one of the pillars was partisan and hyperartisanism and what that was going to do to us and and how the system is incentivized. I mean, you know, there's a lot of money in dividing Americans from each other. Um, but also the idea of of the checks and balances in our country and how those things have been diminishing over time and that eventually you're going to run into somebody who takes advantage of that.”
Carlin does approximately 4-6 live tour events per year, structured as unscripted conversations with a guest or colleague in front of an audience, followed by audience questions, where each event is completely improvised and different rather than a rehearsed show
“We thought about adding four or six shows a year when possible when it doesn't, you know, decrease our already voluminous uh voluous release schedule. But otherwise, yeah, just it's sort of a lark. I think I think the audience enjoys it and I enjoy seeing them, but it's never going to be a huge part of what we do probably.”
Harris is beginning a touring schedule after not touring for six years and is writing a prepared talk rather than improvising, representing a different approach to live events than Carlin's improvisational model
“Yeah. Yeah. I'm actually touring for the first time in six years starting next week and I'm really enjoying it. I haven't started yet. This is this is the uh we don't know yet. Okay. I'm enjoying preparing for it. I'm writing a talk and um thought I was going to divide the event into talk and then discussion. But I in writing the talk, I found that I have so much to get off my chest that I'm just going to talk the whole time and then and walk off stage.”
There are now roughly 4.6 million podcasts, and the field is so crowded that growing a new podcast from nothing without pre-existing notoriety is extremely difficult.
“There's something like 4.6 million podcasts I'm told now. I'm not sure I believe that”