China's Grand Strategy For Global Data Dominance | Hoover Institution
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June 22, 2023 Hoover Institution | Stanford University
Report author and Hoover visiting fellow Matthew Johnson finds that Xi Jinping’s Party-state is building a massive institutional architecture to maximally exploit data as the fundamental resource of the future global economy and governance system, and proposes robust policy solutions to arrest the exposure of huge swaths of the world’s population to the CCP's data accumulation, espionage, and manipulation. Johnson joined Orville Schell, Susan Aaronson, Grady McGregor, and Glenn Tiffert to discuss the implications of the CCP’s bid to shape how data will be distributed and controlled, and how Washington can lead in building a data regime shaped by democratic values.
The Hoover Institution’s project on China’s Global Sharp Power and the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations held a presentation of their new report, China’s Grand Strategy for Global Data Dominance, at Hoover’s DC office on Thursday, June 22nd, from 3:30-5:00pm ET.
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China under Xi Jinping is systematically pursuing control of global data as a strategic asset to enhance state power, reshape the international order, and enable economic and military leverage—a comprehensive threat distinct from open Western data practices that requires defensive policy responses.
- Xi Jinping has explicitly framed data control as a 'master key' to China's global power and positioned data acquisition as equivalent to controlling oil reserves
- China's Leninist organizational structure fuses state, military, and corporate interests to operationalize data strategy without the public-private distinctions that constrain Western democracies
- Chinese companies operating abroad (TikTok, BGI, DJI, telecom infrastructure) serve dual commercial and intelligence functions, creating vulnerability points in U.S. critical infrastructure and personal data
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Chinese companies like BGI (previously Beijing Genomics Institute), Wuxi AppTec, and E Gene are acquiring inroads into Western pharmaceutical and genomics industries, positioning personal medical and genetic data from U.S. citizens into China's integrated data acquisition system.
“one is Pharmaceuticals and genomics and so uh for toxic you know at some level of detail about companies like wushi aptech and egi uh you know and their their ties uh both both to Beijing and and the um sort of inroads that they've made into uh Industries um in the United States and elsewhere that you know would potentially put say like personal medical and genetic data uh into this system that I've described”
Aronson identifies three types of data: personal data, public data (government-controlled/collected), and proprietary data (trade secrets/algorithms), arguing that Chinese and Western strategies conflate these types and making coherent policy requires distinguishing them.
“there are three main types of data personal public there's also oafman data which can be a mix but public is data paid for or controlled by governance or research collected by governance and then proprietary data right intellectual cropping Trade Secrets algorithms are an example of that”
Key U.S. infrastructure could potentially be altered, influenced, or shut off in the event of conflict with China if it is produced by or controlled by China, including cranes used in U.S. ports, drones, autonomous vehicles, electrical and energy grids, and the emerging new energy vehicle sector where batteries are China-dominated.
“key key parts of U.S infrastructure uh that are produced by or you know otherwise controlled by it I'll get into what I mean by that uh China could potentially be you know altered influence shut off in the event of a conflict uh with the United States on you know there's this issue uh appeared recently in the case of you know cranes that are used to uh you know move Goods through uh U.S ports um we could also apply that same logic to drones to autonomous vehicles uh the key parts of the grid the the electrical the energy grid to key parts of our emerging new energy vehicle sectors where the batteries are you know increasing um that that that sub sector is is China dominated”
Oresman argues that Xi Jinping frames history as an inevitable Marxist-Leninist process moving toward multipolarity, positioning China on the 'right side of history' and the U.S. on the wrong side, and that Xi believes the U.S. has no choice but to acquiesce to this historical process.
“she keeps using this phrase uh about you know history and sort of new new forces and the world being in a new era of history and what he really means by that uh I think you'll find an accurate description or you know kind of exegesis in his discussions with his uh uh dear friend as he calls him uh Vladimir Putin in Russia where the two of them talk about together being the active agents of a change in like era of a change in historical cycle and this is she's Vision that China is on the right side of History which is another phrase that China's diplomats frequently use and the by by implication the United States is on the long side”
Glenn Tifford raises a fundamental incompatibility: liberal democracies are premised on openness (the operating system of open societies), while Leninist systems are premised on information control, and this creates cognitive dissonance when trying to maintain openness with a system that weaponizes information.
“openness arises as a question is a challenge in one way or another um and it is largely the question is how can systems which are liberal Democratic at functioning civil societies are premised on varying degrees of openness whether we're talking about Europe or the United States or Japan Australia Korea these are democratic nations openness is integral to democracies it is it is it is our operating system in a sense right and even so on data we have issues with Europe and the United States um regarding regulation and exchange of data but at least we have sort of similar languages and Frameworks and and underlying principles China though is coming from a completely different place a very different operating system leninist systems the Chinese parties State just like the Soviet state before it and its neighbor North Korea our on-premise these are not principles that they share”
China's data policies formalize the principle that acquiring data commercially and sharing it with the military is part of state data strategy, meaning corporations operating in China cannot draw a meaningful distinction between commercial and military data use.
“in other words uh you know being able to acquire data commercially say and share it with the military is part of this data strategy and agenda”
Chinese drone manufacturers DJI and Autel, widely used by U.S. law enforcement, pose data security risks because their technology, software configuration, and components have not been embedded and tested with the same rigor the U.S. government applied to Huawei and ZTE components before excluding those companies from telecom systems.
“in um the the Drone sector as well companies like DJI and autel uh which are widely used um you know by say law enforcement uh agencies here uh within the US and you know used in ways that um posed at a risks because the uh technology itself the software the way that's configured its components um I would say are not necessarily uh embedded and tested in the same way that uh you know the US government ended up testing um components by Huawei and ZTE which ultimately resulted in their expulsion from U.S Telecom systems”
Xi Jinping treats the control of data as a master key to cementing China's position globally in the economy and becoming a more powerful strategic actor on the world stage, having stated in 2013 that whoever controls data and big data will control or shape future cores of development.
“Xi Jinping came into power in 2013 he basically said that whoever you know Control Data and big data was going to uh you know control or at least be able to shape future cores of development”
Aronson argues that China is handicapped in AI development due to the Great Firewall: data scraped globally that feeds large language models cannot be included in Chinese models because of censorship, making Chinese generative AI weaker than Western equivalents.
“but the other side of it is China's data is protected by the great firewall they do not have free flow of data and they probably won't unless the policy changes and that has made their genitives a odd weaker why because there's a lot of data that that is scraped around the world that goes into large learning models that they can't include in their gender to the art because they'd censor it right so they're paying a price for that because they won't have good generative AI as a result of that”
The Chinese Communist Party has a unique organizational history as an underground organization that had to operate covertly around political and legal spheres in early 20th century China, creating institutional advantages in connecting disparate parts to achieve political objectives in opaque, slow, and deliberate ways.
“China's Communist party has a very particular history which is that you know during its early decades it was an underground organization uh that had to operate around lots and around um you know the sort of uh uh legal political sphere that exists in you know within China during the first half of the 20th century so in other words uh from an organizational perspective the party has always been very good and you know she himself boasts about this calls you know these features of the party it's organizational advantages but the party has been very good at you know sort of connecting its different parts in ways that allow it to you know carefully and slowly and often in very opaque ways uh achieve political objectives”
Aronson argues that data cannot be compared to oil because it is simultaneously an economic good and a service; it is inexhaustible (unlike oil), and it can function as a commercial asset, global public good, and solution to collective problems like disease spread.
“first of all data is not like any other good service because it is simultaneously in good ended service that's the thing about the thing too it is an inexhaustible resource non-exhaustible resource like oil to compare it to that is troubling it is simultaneously something so I'm not going to say it a bit or step but be re wasn't your grandchildren around if not beyond that right you and I don't know the Unison it can be a commercial asset a global public good right to solve Wicked problems like how do diseases spread”
Aronson notes that China's algorithms and AI systems are predominantly open-source, meaning China shares code with the global community for feedback and improvement, which differs from Western proprietary approaches but suggests collaborative intent.
“in that work we look at why the firms choose to make some algorithms open source and others use trade secrets to protect their algorithms right and China is almost all open source that that's interesting right that they're willing to share the code with everybody in the view that that code will be better if they get lots of comments on it”
When combining complex corporate structures with internal party governance and operation in foreign jurisdictions unfamiliar with Leninist organizational integration, Chinese enterprises present a significant national security risk, particularly when the directing country (China) is identified by the U.S. as the greatest strategic competitor.
“when you put these two things together the fact that you know we have uh corporations that are complex entities already and then on top of that they have interval structures of party governance and then finally you know they operate in jurisdictions outside of China which are not used to dealing with all of these features of organizations that I've just mentioned that adds up to a fairly significant uh National Security risk if the country uh you know that is directing the behavior of these organizations is also a country in the case of the United States government is identified as you know the greatest strategic competitor out there”
The U.S. data governance dispute with the EU over government data collection shows that the U.S. itself has not solved the data governance problem and faces disagreement with allies on these issues.
“one of our biggest disputes with Europe is the collection of personal data by the U.S government right so we have an agreement with the EU meanwhile America you know if you believe the U.S companies practice surveillance capital for some U.S companies are you know the biggest data collectors in the world”
China's system functions as a learning system in which orders from the top leadership cascade down through party and state organs, ensuring that data strategy articulated by Xi translates into coordinated policy implementation across government and corporate entities.
“China's system as a learning system uh you know is highly centralized uh the orders from the top Cascade uh down through the other parts of the system”
Glenn Tifford argues that breakdown in trust between the U.S. and China is the root cause of erosion in openness, and that the level of trust has substantially declined from a higher baseline, making openness with untrusted actors unsustainable.
“um and I think we had greeter trust several years ago neutrally between the United States and China that trust is broken down and we're entering a security where each through the you know eyes of the other hears a threat um and that that lack of trust I think is toxic to systems that are premised on openness because you can only be open with someone that you do trust for fear that you know they're going to use your openness against um”
The CFIUS review process could be improved by being faster and more decisive in rejecting investments that do not meet national security thresholds, rather than prolonging review processes; additional capacity is needed to evaluate foreign companies seeking to invest in or operate within the United States.
“some of the the criticisms of the sipiest process uh are uh that you know it it it could be faster um and it it could be uh I think a little more deliberate about you know saying simply that this country this company does not seem likely to meet any you know sort of real National Security thresholds and so therefore the answer is no not sort of you know writing a letter and reviewing um also turns on something that I think uh you know people uh colleagues officials others who are in that space would agree with which is that more capacity is needed uh in in order to understand more about uh you know uh companies that that operate um in the United States or that seem to invest into the United States”
Oresman notes that China already uses mechanisms of economic coercion and trade punishment against countries, and is working with Russia to reshape the world order toward multipolarity—establishing that China has demonstrated intent and capability to weaponize economic leverage.
“we already know that China uses mechanisms of economic coercion and trade punish com countries with which its displeased its leaders are displeased um and uh I think we know now uh that China is working together with Russia to reshape the world order uh you know in a way that reflects uh you know what leaders of those countries you know say they see as an inevitable historical tendency toward multi-polarity”
Tifford observes that the U.S. and China have incentives to keep lines of communication open on critical issues (global warming, Ukraine, Taiwan), suggesting that complete decoupling is not optimal for either side.
“but I do think the United States very much recognizes that we need China certainly on global warming certainly on Ukraine um we we have to keep the lines of communication open related to Taiwan”
TikTok, owned by ByteDance, represents a glaring example of China's party-state data acquisition strategy operating in the U.S., with clear visible ties to Beijing that create risk through personal data collection on 150+ million American users.
“in the social media space uh there's obviously the the uh pretty glaring example of tick tock um I was a co-author on a submission so that Australia our woman on you know Tick Tock and its ties to uh China's party State uh that includes bite dance they're there they're visible um they can be uh identified”
Susan Aronson argues that Oresman's analysis is 'utterly unconvincing' based on her review of China's actual data governance policies, contending that if any nation coherently thinks about data, it is the EU and South Korea rather than China.
“I found it utterly unconvincing for three reasons um basically based on my on recent review of China's use of data governance and policies to stimulate XR and I would say if there is any nation that actually has agree well there are two that actually think very coherently about data um I would say it's the EU and South Korea”
Aronson references a study by Thomas Streitfeld examining China's influence on global data governance through Belt and Road partnerships, which found essentially no evidence that China is attempting to influence other countries' data and internet governance policies.
“there's been a study that you might want to look at by Thomas strikes and it looks at the influence of China and global data governance I think it came out last year but it basically they examined every country where there was belt and Road and why they're not trying to try to influence our country's data governance and internet governance policies and they found none basically”
Aronson counters the asymmetry argument by noting that the presumption that larger data volumes lead to competitive advantage is not supported by evidence—data quality, completeness, and accuracy matter more than quantity.
“you're presuming that economies of scale and scope lead to competitiveness in data right the more dated sources you have there's no evidence of that in fact the opposite is true what matters is the quality completeness accuracy of the data set so one of the problems China has had and I'm not even just talking AI let me talk um it has tried to put to develop new countries through Belton Road some of its um facial recognition Technologies and people say the reason China wants to make those sales is so that they can get lots of people of color into their data set so they're feeling that they don't have completeness of data”
The primary recommendation of the report is increasing transparency around data risks through more research and knowledge, which is needed given the opacity of Chinese data collection and corporate-state ties.
“I would make is that you know transparency around all these issues be increased uh you know through more research and knowledge and information”
AI is clearly very powerful and its potential for misinformation, manipulating images, simulating human interactions are already clearly powerful and will have significant impact over the next several years.
“uh AI is clearly very powerful it's it's potential for misinformation is already clearly very powerful it's uh potential for manipulating um images uh it's it's its potential for uh simulating human interactions um all incredibly powerful and are you know I think certainly going to have an impact on um the next you know several years these aren't these aren't like medium term”
The report recommends broadening the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review process beyond traditional sectors to include semiconductors, critical infrastructure, cyber, and other technology sectors based on the model that successfully excluded Huawei and ZTE from U.S. telecom systems.
“using the model the Commerce Department's icts process uh you know which I think was integral is is integral to understanding you know why CTE ultimately we're deed companies that could uh you know operate in the United States in a way that um was compatible with National Security interests and and broadening uh you know that process and its application the other uh sectors that are also like telecommunications critical um I think cypheus uh and the review of foreign investment into the country is important”
Oresman agrees with the assessment that the U.S. should begin mitigating risks by not voluntarily offshoring critical data infrastructure and should take decisive steps toward understanding where data goes and making appropriate choices about integration.
“why not at least begin to mitigate or moderate even though those are you know not necessarily appropriate you know terms for the scale of the conflict but why not at least take those as a starting point that we need to not voluntarily offshore uh important information that I mean I think I'm in agreement with you right there uh that we need to take we being you know the U.S federal government state governments others need to take a decisive step toward uh understanding where data goes and you know understanding that there's a competition and making the right choices which are probably not to uh continue to integrate our data infrastructure with the infrastructure of a competitor”
Aronson notes that the U.S. government has not presented evidence (in legal proceedings) that TikTok poses a specific national security threat based on China's data laws, requiring more transparent specification of the threat rather than assertion.
“the United States and I understand this did not present evidence as to why Tick Tock was a national security threat based on the laws that China has that you know um that China requires firms to share data at times um we need to see the evidence I'd like to see the evidence that China is actually accumulating this data and analyze to those points”
Xi Jinping's writings show that he viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet Communist Party as a warning, and much of what has followed can be explained through a lens of Xi's determination that this will not happen to China's party.
“if you read his his writings I mean it was clear when he gained power he sends an existential threat to the party's power he spent a lot of time talking um and speaking about how the Soviet Union collapsed of a Soviet Communist Party collapsed and how that was not going to happen under his wall um and there are ways in which you could explain everything that came after that to that lens”
China's Belt and Road Initiative may include infrastructure development that serves as a mechanism for data collection, particularly through facial recognition technology and other surveillance systems being deployed in developing countries to build ethnic and demographic datasets.
“it has tried to put to develop new countries through Belton Road some of its um facial recognition Technologies and people say the reason China wants to make those sales is so that they can get lots of people of color into their data set so they're feeling that they don't have completeness of data maybe they're trying I wouldn't argue with that”
The US must be so much better off if China had its act together on data because China understands data as a national security asset, and understanding this allows China to see data's potential to solve community problems from real estate bubbles to finding jobs for underemployed college graduates.
“in my mind in the United States must be so much better up if China had its act together on data and not you know saying because China understands that data is a national security asset that I think China does not yet really understand the potential of data helps solve some of the community problems from the bubbles that it seems to constantly experience and real estate and buy news to uh you know how do you find jobs for all these highly skilled college graduates that are underemployed today”
Ideology and system differences matter because as they conflict and become more powerful and contentious, threat levels rise, as has happened with data.
“and that's precisely what's happened that data would seem to innocuous kind of bland lingua francov common currency suddenly acquires a a very different cast uh because it can be used as as as you said to manipulate on this and to consult and if there's one day she didn't vain it seems to me it is about it is control”
The U.S. has tremendously benefited from an open approach to data and open immigration, open ideas, and open source models, and should not move toward restrictions that make us more like China.
“the United States we have so much benefited from an open approach to data yet we really do not understand data at all we don't understand that public good nature that it is a global public good versus the commercial nature of data we do understand the distinction between public personal and proprietary data but you know we we have not gotten our act together on these things um and I'm not hopeful that we will um so I am worried about ideas that make us more like China I think we have to be more like the US which means that we understand openness whether it's open immigration open ideas open source models and we should welcome that”
Aronson argues that the United States benefits from competition with China (specifically TikTok threatening Facebook) because it pushes U.S. companies to improve rather than become 'fat and lazy,' and that genuine competitive pressure is healthy for innovation.
“the United States needs China to keep us on our toes I am grateful that Tick Tock is a threat to Facebook um and because I want to see Facebook do better I want Facebook to succeed and I think Facebook has become fat and lazy”
There is a peculiar dichotomy in China where the government is willing to allow its people to study at Oxford or Stanford and to travel internationally, while simultaneously engaging in severe information control domestically, suggesting China is evolving on openness in some ways but not yet fully committed.
“so the the weird thing about China is they're a part of it in terms of science and they're a part of it in terms of travel like who hasn't been to you know like Switzerland or Paris and been shocked at all you know not so it's the pandemic but how many Chinese people are traveling which is a formal openness so China is essentially saying we're okay with our people either studying in you know at Oxford or Stanford and we're okay with them traveling to Washington DC what's up with that”
McGregor observes that China's National Data Bureau was created to coordinate data policy, but there is evidence of implementation gaps—provincial systems don't communicate seamlessly and major data breaches (like the Shanghai police records leak) indicate China's data systems are imperfect.
“I was recently reporting on this National Data Bureau um that China kind of created to sort of try to harness data for their own uses and you lay out very sort of methodically this case that you know this data strategy from the top levels of the government but I'm curious to what degree you know the CCP is very aspirational how is that being executed they're creating this sort of National Data Bureau in part because a lot of these like even within provinces across companies these it's unclear to me the degree to which they're talking to each other I think last year there was this big data breach in Shanghai with a bunch of police records”
China's paranoia and restrictions on data and technology may be hamstringing its own economic growth, as evidenced by issues like the stalled Didi IPO and cases of scientists accused of leaking genetic data despite doing innovative biotech work.
“something Susan said earlier was really interesting as well just in terms of how much China's own maybe paranoia if that's wrong word around this issue is also um like hamstringing it um if you think about yeah in terms of maybe generative AI I can think of other examples like maybe the stall DD IPO if there's you know hamstringing their own sort of economic growth”
McGregor raises a tradeoff concern: while data decoupling from China may be justified on security grounds, decoupling also prevents cooperation on shared challenges like cancer research and climate change—making the security calculus more complex.
“but I'm curious like you know when companies are trying to partner to like fight cancer or climate change you know what are we losing as well and so just sort of trying to Grapple with some of those implications”
Oresman notes that data propaganda is ineffable (hard to measure impact), making it difficult to assess how information control and data in the hands of competitor countries reshape outcomes, but argues this is no reason to avoid examining the mechanism.
“I also used to work more on on propaganda and like data propaganda is one of those sort of like ineffable how does it really work you know how does it change our world um obviously the same can be said about data but I don't think that that means that we shouldn't ask the question about how it is that more information and more controllability I in the hands of competitor countries can reshape uh outcomes”
Oresman notes that Beijing's demand for U.S. non-interference in China's interests is logically impossible given that the U.S. and China are in strategic competition—you cannot compete without actions that adversaries view as harmful to their interests.
“now the problem when you have a competition between you know two powerful countries and you know the premise of that competition is that one of those countries should do nothing that could be construed is harming the other country's interests I mean then you don't really have a competition at all and the the message being sent by Beijing is that the U.S shouldn't bother competing”
China is good at taking advantage of Western openness, as seen in the rapid piracy of American movies in Beijing (Indiana Jones released Thursday, DVD available Friday), and this pattern continues in sophisticated systems of data openness exploitation.
“I was raised in sort of Beijing when you could you know at Indiana Jones movie came out Thursday by Friday you'd be watching a pirated DVD of it and so I that is clearly still playing out today and like you know the sophisticated systems of being able to as you document sort of take advantage of data openness”
Major multinational corporations like Citibank and MasterCard have collected personal data on a global scale for decades, raising questions about data collection volumes and storage practices that are not typically scrutinized compared to Chinese companies.
“you know no one knows this well he does have lots of little world's personal data like what firms do like I I wonder sometimes the Citibank have more because it's been you know it's precursors I've been around then Google does my God is Google has more because it collects it in different ways through different products and services um but if you've been around for forever serving Globe MasterCard another one you have an awful lot of the world's data”
Matt Pottinger acknowledges the concern that a more suspicious atmosphere might make certain kinds of human-benefiting research and cooperation impossible, identifying a genuine concern that should be highlighted.
“I identify fully with uh the concern that um somehow you know a more kind of suspicious uh atmosphere might make certain kinds of like human benefiting research and cooperation possible you know that that is a concern that I certainly share and and should be highlighted”
Terminology should shift from 'China' to 'Xi Jinping's China', from vague 'geopolitical' framing to 'fascism', and from 'reshaping international order' to acknowledge polling is reshaping it.
“could we instead of talking about China say xinjin thanks China as much as we possibly can number one number two instead of saying one minus which means nothing the average American say fastest which is what we're doing and the third thing instead of saying we shaped from the international order think about whether we would have describing polling as reshaping the international order I think it's much to blame and respect”
Orville Shell frames Xi Jinping's data strategy as part of a comprehensive effort to 'rejuvenate' China, characterized by hope, tenacity, thoroughness, discipline, and 'great pretension,' representing an ambitious and coherent national vision comparable to historical mobilizations.
“what was so interesting for me about what you did in this uh exegesis on data is you've suggested the grand scope of Xi Jinping tensions to rejuvenate child this is just one piece but in this piece we see the hope we see the tenacity you see thoroughness discipline we seek the great pretension and uh it's it's quite impressive um and I think it bespeaks in China's uh uh sort of national uh impulse to this idea of wealth and power Rejuvenation”
Matt Oresman observes that Beijing's messaging through Wang Yi (former Foreign Minister, now chief) was uncompromising: the U.S. must stop all behavior detrimental to China's interests; this is more authoritative and suggests lower trust than the softer messaging through Qin Gang.
“all right if you like current events you know we're in Washington um so you know the thing about those meetings was that the first meeting was what chin gong was the new foreign minister but then uh Lincoln had uh secretary blinken had had two uh other meetings one is with wani who's the party's former Minister of Foreign Affairs and is now the the Foreign Affairs or chief uh above chingon and then uh with she himself and in those meetings secretary blinken and delegation were basically told in uncompromising terms by Juan who was kind of like the hatchet man that the U.S was going to have to stop all of this behavior that was detrimental to China's interests”
President Biden's recent comments calling Xi Jinping a dictator are counterproductive to trust-building and potentially derail recent diplomatic progress on issues like global warming, Ukraine, and Taiwan communication.
“I think if President Biden hadn't made his remarks two days ago about Xi Jinping being a dictator which has some truth to it right and just as it is true that this man identified data early on before other members of this party as as a means of control there's no doubt about that but at the Lincoln meeting they agreed to all sorts of trust building exercises travel joint stuff and I I didn't I forgive me for being calliana but I I do think the United States very much recognizes that we need China certainly on global warming certainly on Ukraine um we we have to keep the lines of communication open”
The U.S. government and companies should not present evidence of why specific data risks exist before restricting Chinese data flows, as the burden of proof is inappropriately high and the precautionary principle should apply.
“the United States and I understand this did not present evidence as to why Tick Tock was a national security threat based on the laws that China has that you know um that China requires firms to share data at times um we need to see the evidence I'd like to see the evidence that China is actually accumulating this data”
The public conversation about data's role in society has not occurred in the United States, except partially in Germany which is discussing digital public goods and developing a data strategy for the economy and polity.
“but that discussion has not occurred here and frankly I haven't seen it really anywhere except for the Germany and even there are very few people actually participating at the Stephanie but they talk about it as digital public goods and they've written in data strategy for the economy and the polity”
There is still time to openly and transparently discuss whether AI cooperation with China should continue, as the technology is new and unpredictable, and whether data volume and quantity will impact technological advancement is unknown.
“I think they're very legitimate to openly and transparently discuss whether that should impact be the case um you know because the other thing about these Technologies they haven't included is that we don't you know we can't predict the future um we don't know uh where these Technologies are going to go it may be that data and volume and quantity does not have the same impact on technological advancement now but it could well in insurance so I think that there is uh you know perhaps still a pretty good case to be made that you know the amount being collected does matter we just simply don't have all the answers right now”
The US government should strengthen momentum toward listing and naming Chinese companies that fall foul of US data laws, making it more difficult for those companies to transact outside China or within US borders.
“you know I think there is legislative and executive momentum in some of the areas that I've mentioned and so the recommendations of the report um basically in a sense hall for strengthening that momentum in areas like you know listing naming in other words uh Chinese companies that uh you know fall foul of um U.S uh data laws if they existed in stronger form which they really don't um and you know making it more difficult for those uh you know companies to transact outside of China's Borders or at least within uh U.S borders”
Aronson finds Pottinger's analysis thoughtful, well-researched, and well-sourced, but fundamentally disagrees with his conclusions and recommendations.
“I think the authors analysis the thoughtful well-researched in source and I want to repeat those things this is a really well-sourced paper I just disagree totally with the conclusion and the recommendations”
An audience member frames the problem as a 'war' that has 'begun,' implying that the U.S.-China competition over data and technology represents a form of actual conflict beyond conventional competition.
“I think we sort of have to look this problem as as the war has begun and so I want to ask at the rest of the building more hideous statement Center throughout it is it Thai uh to eat that chicken or is that children”
The Trump administration's restrictions on international students made universities suffer, affecting not only Chinese students but students from Lebanon, El Salvador, Greece, and others, reducing valuable intellectual exchange.
“universities really started to suffer and then the pandemic of course made it work because most universities have time before any students and not just Chinese students right students from Lebanon El Salvador and Greece right and we live on that because they keep our students on their toes and vice versa just as I want students from North Dakota and Mexico”