Claims

John Maynard Keynes wrote 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' in 1919, correctly predicting that the reparations imposed on Germany would destroy the German economy, leading to hyperinflation in the 1920s and ultimately to Hitler and World War II; this shows that a generation that understood economic consequences was able to see the danger ahead, unlike today's leaders living through a 'placid idyllic period' like the pre-WWI Victorians.

Rome's emperors believed they could print their way out of a fiscal crisis by striking coins from cheaper metal, believed a coin that looked like silver was functionally equivalent to silver, and believed the complexity and scale of their empire was proof of its permanence—but the complexity was the vulnerability, and the scale made the unraveling faster, not slower.

The post-WWII Federal Reserve contraction was abandoned quickly in favor of balance sheet expansion because policy makers feared a return to 1930s-style secular stagnation and deflation; modern policy should replicate this expansionary approach rather than austerity.

The decline of reserve currencies historically occurs as a 'slow grind' followed by a sudden drop, as with the pound sterling which declined for decades before the Suez Crisis in 1956 ended its reserve status.

The last 50 years of globalization and peaceful trade have been historically anomalous; for most of history, economics was driven by power dynamics and political authority; investors in developed markets must now adopt the geopolitical and political risk analysis frameworks that emerging-market investors have always used.

Nixon's unilateral suspension of the gold standard was controversial and many predicted the end of the dollar, but 10 years later all US allies were still doing business with the US; the dollar survived and thrived despite the prediction of its demise, suggesting similar resilience is likely for the current US under Trump.

Globalization is the historical anomaly, and mercantalism is the norm; the pendulum has swung toward mercantalism far faster than most people anticipated.

When the US allies got frustrated with Nixon and France especially began siphoning out US gold reserves, Nixon closed the gold window; this was not a response to enemies but to allies losing confidence.

The Depression of 1921 saw GDP decline by one-third, but because policymakers allowed liquidation of bad debts and bad investments through austerity (raised interest rates and cut government spending), the economy recovered strongly by 1923, whereas the Great Depression in the early 1930s was prolonged because policymakers did the opposite.