French military presence in Africa is characterized by 'F AF'—a cozy web of personal, business, and military ties between France and its former colonies—an 'absurd anachronism' where France operated military operations in 16 African countries, acting as regional policeman with permanent bases long after these countries secured independence in the 1960s.

The prolonged and overbearing French military presence in the Sahel gave rise to widespread anti-French sentiment in the region, which was then fanned by Russian propaganda, creating conditions for military regimes to force France out and invite Russian mercenary forces (Wagner group) to replace them.

Sahel military regimes (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) have established the Alliance of Sahelian States, a new regional security bloc or 'putative confederation' that they trumpet as restoring sovereignty and enabling unrestrained military approaches to security crises without external imposition.

While Sahel military regimes claim France was undermining their counter-jihadist efforts, the objective record shows that during Operation Barkhane (France's counter-terrorism operation), insecurity grew exponentially—suggesting French military involvement was a failure by its own stated objectives.

Burkina Faso is the most worrying spot in the Sahel region: approximately two-thirds of the country is now outside the control of the national army, indicating state collapse and jihadist/insurgent expansion.

Despite attempts at militaristic solutions, Sahel governments will likely realize in the medium to longer term that they cannot defeat insurgents by brute force alone and may turn toward negotiations, as evidenced by tentative signs that Niger's junta has sent envoys to jihadist leaders and Mali authorities have reportedly done the same.

For the immediate future, the alliance of military regimes and Russian mercenaries in the Sahel will continue to be a cause of misery for civilians.

Military leaders in the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad) welcomed France's departure as an end to 'neocolonial hangover'—the legacy of French military and political influence in former colonies—but the real debate is what the disorderly, sudden French withdrawal means for regional security facing jihadism, separatism, and military rule.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have signed partnership contracts with the Wagner group (Russian mercenaries) for military operations and training, but Wagner notoriously doesn't offer much protection for civilians and cares less for them than French troops or UN peacekeepers, as evidenced by a massive increase in civilian-targeted violence including torture, booby-trapped corpses, and severed heads displayed as warnings against collaboration.

Since the end of Operation Burham and France's withdrawal, insecurity has continued to spread across the Sahel: Islamic State has entrenched itself in Northern Mali and elsewhere; Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced escalation of deadly attacks against civilians; and Mali experienced major terrorist attacks for the first time in a decade.

France maintained military presence in 16 African countries acting as a regional policeman, keeping permanent bases long after those countries had gained independence in the 1960s.

France's relationship with its former African colonies, characterized by cozy webs of personal, business, and military ties, is known as 'F AF' and is widely seen as a neocolonial hangover that military regimes in the region have moved to end.

Military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have established the Alliance of Sahelian States as a new regional security bloc and putative confederation to restore sovereignty and assert they can now fight jihadism without French constraints.

During Operation Barkhane (France's counter-terrorism operation spanning a decade) insecurity grew exponentially, indicating that French military involvement was a failure by the metric of reducing jihadist violence.

Approximately two-thirds of Burkina Faso is now outside the control of the national army, representing a catastrophic loss of state territorial control.

Armies in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have signed partnership contracts with the Russian Wagner mercenary group for military operations and training, and Wagner mercenaries notably offer worse civilian protection than French troops or UN peacekeepers.

Civilian casualties have increased massively since the end of Operation Barkhane, with grim reports of torture, corpses being booby-trapped, and heads being stuck on poles as warnings against collaboration with jihadists.

Regional negotiations without external influence could bring more lasting peace deals in the Sahel because previous attempts to forge peace accords led by France were seen as external impositions and were unpopular, but would require Sahelian governments to eventually realize they cannot defeat insurgents by brute force alone.

In Bamako (Mali's capital), there was a major terrorist attack on a police academy and military airport, the first such incident in a decade, suggesting a significant deterioration in security.

French military presence in the Sahel gave rise to widespread anti-French sentiment that was then fanned by Russian propaganda, leading military regimes in the region to force France out and invite Russian mercenary forces (Wagner) to replace them.