Nathalie Tocci and Matthias Matthijs: Are Europe and the United States Finally Heading For Divorce?

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, is the only European leader who is an open cheerleader for the Iran war, which puzzles many Europeans and Americans because he is supposed to be chairman of an alliance of 30+ countries, yet he is openly cheering for a war that many European leaders wanted to be consulted on and didn't think was a good idea.

“the only European leader who is an open cheerleader for this is Mark Rutte, the the NATO Secretary General, which puzzles many Europeans, especially even many Americans, because they're like, wait, hang on a minute. Isn't he some sort of chairman of an alliance of 30 plus countries? And he's now openly, you know, cheering for a war that clearly a lot of European leaders would have first of all wanted to be consulted on and second didn't think was a good idea.”

There is already an alternative majority in the European Parliament between the far-right and the center-right (European People's Party), showing the structural pollution of the political spectrum by far-right agendas.

“In the European Parliament, there is already an alternative majority between the far right and the center right, the European People's Party.”

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius rhetorically asked what a handful of European frigates could accomplish in the Strait of Hormuz that the mighty US Navy cannot, implying European military contributions to Middle East operations have limited practical value.

“It was the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, I mean, what would a handful of European frigates, a few ships do in the Strait of Hormuz that the mighty US Navy cannot solve?”

A NATO minus US line has emerged where no European country is getting seriously involved in clearing the Strait of Hormuz as long as active hostilities continue, because Europeans weren't consulted on the Iran war and there is no military solution to the Strait of Hormuz—the mighty US Navy cannot be aided by European frigates in solving this.

“there's a very clear NATO minus US line that nobody is getting seriously involved in clearing the Strait of Hormuz as long as active hostilities continue and this active war goes on. Because again, they weren't consulted on this war, right? I feel but that's only happened in the sort of second half of March where this line came together, because in the end, I mean, so a few quick things, right? I think France is kind of in the middle of Spain and Germany when it comes to responding to the US, right? I think it's hard lays where Sanchez's is, but it's also a nuclear power and it I think cares way more about European unity and kind of managing this relationship than than Spain has to worry about. And clearly Germany is, you know, much more dependent on the United States for for its trade. And of course, Eastern Europe is is worried about Ukraine. But when it comes to the Middle East crisis, I mean, I honestly I think the Europeans have very little to offer, right? It was the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, I mean, what would a handful of European frigates, a few ships do in the Strait of Hormuz that the mighty US Navy cannot solve.”

Some European leaders express discomfort with how 'over the top' Trump's rhetoric and demands have been, and far-right parties themselves (Rassemblement National, AfD) have shown discomfort saying his behavior goes 'a little bit too much.'

“there has been a certain discomfort including by far-right parties because Trump has been just kind of so over the top, right?”

The main division in European responses to Trump is between Spain and France on one hand versus Germany and Italy on the other, with Merz and Meloni finding each other and forming what Italians call an 'axis,' reflecting Merz's concern about Marine Le Pen potentially coming to power in Paris.

“the main division has been Spain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other. And Natalie's absolutely right. And Merz and Meloni are finding each other also because I think Merz is realizing or or They even call it an axis in Italy and I shall say no more. Merz is worried that this time next year you'll have a far right person in the Elysée in Paris”

When Europeans have flattered and bent the knee to Trump, they have received slaps in return; when they have stood up—as Spain did by denying base access, or as Ireland did by defending Starmer, or as Europe did on Greenland—the results show that Trump's threats are often empty and the world does not fall on their heads.

“when we have flattered and bent the knee, we have just received kind of slaps in return, right? When we have had the audacity of either, as Matthias's example here in the case of the Irish-US moment, and sort of standing up for Starmer, or simply when Europeans kind of say no, right? When Spain, going back to the earlier example, says, 'No, actually, you know, you cannot use our bases.' When the US folds over Russia, and, you know, suggests actually lifting sanctions on Russia over the course of the Ukraine negotiations, and Europeans say, 'No, we are not going to, you know, lift our sanctions.' When over Greenland, a coalition gets together and puts together Arctic Endurance. Now, in each and every of these moments, actually the result has been that the world has not fallen on our heads, that many of the threats that Trump has made have turned out to be empty threats, right?”

Europe is torn on China because it is simultaneously a partner for cooperation on climate and renewables, an important market for exports, and a source of foreign direct investment, but also a competitor advancing so quickly it's overwhelming Europe by selling into non-American markets as a result of US-China tariff wars.

“Europe is torn, right? When it comes to when it comes to China. On on the one hand it is a partner for cooperation when it comes to climate change, when it comes to renewables, when it comes to energy. It remains a very important market for European exports and it remains a source of foreign direct investment. But at the same time, China is advancing so quickly that it's now, I mean, overwhelming Europe partially due to the US tariffs between the US and China that it's looking for other markets that are not American to to sell its stuff.”

Giorgia Meloni lost a major constitutional referendum to limit judicial independence, local elections in France saw Rassemblement National underperform, and other far-right setbacks suggest 2026 provides slightly more hopeful view on far-right trajectory.

“We are uh living in a Europe in which Giorgia Meloni uh lost a major referendum um a constitutional reform referendum that would have run the risk of seriously limiting the independence of the judiciary. We have had a few, you know, elections both local uh and national. The liberals won in Slovenia. In the local elections in France, the Rassemblement National did not do as well as many uh thought.”

Celeste Wallander wrote a 2025 Foreign Affairs piece called 'Beware the Europe You Wish For' predicting that Europe would withhold base access for Iran operations, and this prediction has been validated.

“I don't know if you guys have seen Celeste Wallander's piece that she did for Foreign Affairs mid-2025, but it was called Beware the Europe you wish for, and she literally laid out the scenario in which Europe withholds access to bases for European military operations to include in Iran. So, she kind of predicted that this could happen.”

Europeans supported international law norms not because they were nice people but because these norms were fundamentally in European interests; abandoning them for a 'survival of the fittest' predatory power model is therefore short-sighted because Europe cannot itself become a predatory power in such a system.

“I think there's this sort of abdication of norms, which basically implicitly endorses a survival of the fittest, you know, predatory powers left, right, and center, which I don't think that as Europeans, we supported these norms cuz we were nice people. We supported these norms cuz they were fundamentally in our interests, right? And so, I think it is also really rather short-sighted to think that somehow you can end up being [music] a predatory power yourself.”

The social contract that kept the transatlantic partnership alive rested on a policy recipe of give-and-take on security and beyond; the US provided security while Europe, even when disagreeing, didn't stand up to America (as in Iraq), maintaining overall reciprocal arrangement.

“I think on the one hand, it rested on a policy recipe, right? I mean, there was a give and take both on security and beyond security. So, I think that this narrative of, you know, the US provided security and, you know, Europeans didn't pay their bills. I mean, of course, as we know, there is some truth to it, but it was not the it was never was the whole truth. I mean, there was a lot in it for the United States as well, including the fact that when the United States did things that actually Europeans did not fully agree with, i.e., invading Iraq, you know, they didn't really stand up to the United States.”

The reason European defense integration is not happening is that the broader far-right problem is preventing it—the center-right's adoption of far-right agendas is dismantling the EU's ability to coordinate defense policy.

“Now, why is that not happening, right? And this is where we circle back to this broader far-right problem. Because I actually think, you know, going back to Chloe, your question of, you know, are we still in the Trump trap when it comes to the far right in Europe?”

Spain has more leverage than other European countries in resisting US pressure not because others are bending the knee and Spain isn't, but because Spain has reduced dependency on the United States through: (1) low trade dependence on the US, (2) advanced energy transition reducing fossil fuel dependence, (3) resulting lower energy prices during crises, and (4) not being on the front line with Russia, giving the US more need for Spanish bases than vice versa.

“I think that Spain has indeed more leverage than other European countries, not because the others are bending the knee and Spain isn't, but because actually, I mean, to use a Trumpian Trumpian language, actually Spain has quite a lot of cards when it comes to its bilateral relationship with the United States. In terms of trade, it's actually not very dependent on the US at all. In terms of energy, it has gone further than most other countries on the energy transition, which comes back to one of the points that Matthias and I made in that piece, that actually accelerating on the energy transition is in Europe's security interest. Spain has done this more than others. And so, now, you know, in the midst of another energy crisis, actually Spain's prices are significantly lower than that of countries that are far more dependent on fossil fuels. Spain, of course, has the luxury of not being on the front line, so actually in security and defense terms, there's more of a need of the US vis-a-vis Spain than the other way around”

The future of transatlantic relations should be a much more equal relationship where Europe occasionally acts as a 'tough love friend' saying 'hang on a minute, you're not getting our bases, this is for your own good, this will backfire and demolish stability in the Middle East and impact energy markets.'

“the future of the transatlantic relations is always been a much more equal relationship. But then, you'll indeed, like Celeste Wallander pointed out last summer, you will have a year a Europe that will occasionally be a kind of tough love friend and say, 'Hang on a minute. Uh no, you're not getting our bases. We don't This is for your own good, right? This is going to backfire. This is going to completely uh demolish stability that what exists in the Middle East. This is going to have an impact on energy markets. And so, think twice before you do this.'”

The marriage analogy describes the current transatlantic situation: the husband (US) told the wife (Europe) to stay home and take care of the kids, and after 5 years the wife wanted to go back to work, but the husband has gotten used to the wife taking care of everything and doesn't like it, creating second thoughts in Washington about whether they wanted Europe to actually do what it's now doing.

“a colleague of mine pointed out, it's kind of like the the traditional scenario where a husband and a wife are married and they're having a child and the husband says, 'You know what? Why don't you stay home and and and take care of the kids and then you can go back to work 5 years later.' And then, 5 years later, she's ready to go back to work and suddenly the husband doesn't like it. Cuz he's gotten used to uh the wife taking care of all these things and just, you know, making his life easier. And then the wife says, 'No, actually I want to go to work. I want to get my own life again.' And I feel like that's where Europe and the US are right now.”

The first ingredient of a recipe for successful European leadership and pushback is policy delivery—for example, Spain's economy growing 3.6% for three years running allows it to say it's legalizing 500,000 migrants, providing legitimacy for other tough decisions.

“The first is there needs to be delivery on policy. I mean, going back to Spain, it kind of helps if your economy is growing three 3.6% for like you know, three years running. It helps to then say and this is why we're legalizing 500,000 migrants, right?”

Europe was much more comfortable with the first Trump administration and Biden administration which had a clear China line, allowing Europeans to coordinate and pivot together on tariffs, export controls, technology, and chips.

“the Europeans and especially the European Commission were much more comfortable with the first Trump administration and the Biden administration which had a very clear line vis-à-vis China that they were then said, you know, you can pivot with us in that way and you know, we can do this together. We can have a global steel alliance for you know, excess capacity and raise our tariffs together vis-à-vis countries that overproduce and that way we protect our own industries. You could do this when it comes to export controls, when it comes to technology, when it comes to chips”

Europeans need to think about China with their own heads rather than reflexively doing what the US does minus a small amount—the derisking approach is potentially good but came from US lead rather than independent European thinking.

“the struggle that Europeans are in is learning to think about China with their own heads, you know, rather than thinking you know, uh the North Star, I eat the United States says A, and so we're kind of going to say and do A minus, right? So, the US says decoupling and we say derisking. Uh so, and maybe derisking is a good policy, right? But the point is that we came to it through a route which at the moment is not available because as Matthias says, what is US policy on China? But I don't know.”

The moment when German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sat silently next to Donald Trump as Trump criticized Spain and other European countries was not merely European submission but European betrayal of itself, because it involved a European leader tacitly endorsing Trump's attacks on another European country rather than defending European interests collectively.

“the tragedy really of that moment, as I see it, is that it wasn't only, quote unquote, yet another moment of European submission, but it was actually, I think, also the risk of a moment of a European betrayal of itself, right? Because one thing is to basically say, 'Hey, what is the smartest way to deal with Donald Trump? Is it flattery? Is it silence? Is it standing up?' Okay, big debate that has been going on in Europe over the course of the last year or so, but in that particular moment, it wasn't just let's flatter Trump. It's not just let's just kind of go along with his policies, in this case the war in Iran. It was actually Trump sitting beside the German Chancellor lashing out against another European country, right? Uh, i.e., lashing out against Spain”

The real harm being done to the transatlantic relationship is not policy disagreement or the possibility of US disengagement from European security, but rather the increasing certainty of US betrayal of Europe, as evidenced by Ukraine (where US military support has stopped except for intelligence sharing and European purchases of US weapons) and Greenland.

“I think the real harm being done in the transatlantic relationship now, as I said, is not one of policy disagreement. It is not one of even, you know, the possibility or even the probability or the reality of a US disengagement from European security, but it's rather the more than thought, but the increasing certainty that there's a US betrayal of Europe. And, you know, Ukraine and Greenland are are really probably the most obvious, you know, sort of cases uh that speak to this.”

The future relationship could be 'conscious uncoupling' rather than either submission or divorce, allowing both US and Europe to move forward independently while potentially eventually cooperating as equals again.

“maybe when it comes to China, this period in which Europeans are forced to think with their own heads, uh and, you know, understand what the tradeoffs, what the pros and cons are, are going to ultimately, you know, lead to Europeans having a policy on China. And then when, you know, the US ends up in a different place politically, we can work together on that, right? But not as a triangle, not as a Europeans doing less than the Americans, but Europeans acting on the basis of what their interests are...Natalie, I prefer Gwyneth Paltrow's term, conscious uncoupling.”

European leaders Merz (Germany) and von der Leyen (Commission President) are explicitly saying that international law is not a useful framework to understand the Iran war, which is shocking coming from European leaders, and this reflects the increasing injection of nationalist far-right ideas into center-right politics.

“when you have basically, not to give a sort of far-right example, but to give a center-right example, i.e., uh both the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz as well as Commission President von der Leyen being really rather explicit in saying, 'Well, kind of international law is not a useful framework to understand this war.' You're like, 'Whoa. I mean, this is a European leader saying this, right?' Uh I mean, it is really quite shocking, right?”

Venezuela, Iran, and Gaza are cases where Europeans have been losing their soul because they follow a shallow strategic logic that 'Iran down, Venezuela down, Russia down means good for us,' when in fact the Iran war is particularly demonstrating to be good news for the Kremlin through oil prices, interceptor depletion, and shattering of international law.

“we have the cases of Venezuela, of Iran now, of of Gaza in which Europeans have been, in my view, slightly kind of, you know, losing their soul over all of this. And they've been doing this either because they have followed a very, I think, shallow strategic logic. You know, Venezuela down, Iran down, it means Russia down, which means good for us. And um I think as the Iran war especially is demonstrating, actually, this is quite good news for the Kremlin, right? For all sorts of reasons. Uh from oil prices going up to interceptors going down to international law being completely shattered.”

Merz has not supported major European defense funds—only 150 billion in loans which is marginal compared to broader national rearmament efforts—and has supported an explicit deregulation/bureaucratic simplification agenda that risks spurring European disintegration, particularly on climate and digital regulations.

“there hasn't been support for major European funds. Yes, indeed, there's 150 billion in loans, but frankly speaking, if you compare it to the broader national rearmament effort, it's still a very marginal share. So, on the one hand, it's what he hasn't done. And what he has done, which takes us kind of slightly away from defense, is supported a very sort of explicit, you know, deregulation under the guise of bureaucratic simplification agenda, rowing back on key legislation particularly when it comes to climate, when it comes to digital, under the guise of this is about competitiveness, but I think implicitly running the risk of actually spurring a process of European disintegration.”

The difference between Greenland and the Middle East/Iran crisis is that Greenland involves sovereign European territory with a clear red line and genuine threat of military occupation, whereas the Middle East involves European responsibility without European ability to influence the conflict, making Greenland a clearer case for unified European response.

“The difference between Greenland and the Middle East is Greenland is sovereign European territory, right? I mean, I think that's a very strict line. It's one thing to negotiate about slightly higher tariffs. It's one thing to, you know, grudgingly agree to spend more on defense that you were even thinking, even though you're already planning on increasing it, because that's good for your own defense, right? And it's one thing to turn a blind eye to your democratic principles uh when you but when you know, if you're going to criticize the US government for whether it's independence of judiciary, whether it's the independence of the media, that it's just going to backfire, right?”

The second ingredient is charismatic leadership, which is in very short supply across Europe and beyond, and requires a kind of Mundane zest—a visceral quality of 'I believe in this and I'm going to do it.'

“There so in a sense, you know, there's a Sanchez piece of the recipe there. You know, you need to have charismatic leadership and that's definitely in short supply in you know, in and across Europe and not only. So there needs to be a kind of Mumdani sort of zest to this, right?”

Europeans don't want to become a superpower like China or the United States; what they are focused on, especially since the second Trump administration, is building up their own defenses nationally and through the EU to deter Russia from future attacks, not to project power in the Middle East or South Pacific.

“Europe is not up to this or that because, you know, Europe cannot become a superpower like China or the United States. And the reality is it doesn't want to, right? I mean, what I think what the Europeans are focused on, especially since the second Trump administration, and this is the most outspoken in Germany with the Merz government, is building up its own defenses, not through the European Union institutionally per se, but doing this nationally. And, of course, the EU plays a role when it comes to financing, when it comes to coordinating, when it comes to industrial policy, and things like that. But, the goal here is to deter Russia from future attacks. The goal is not to project power in the Middle East or in the South Pacific or or anything like this.”

European adoption of submission with Trump inadvertently created more power and more leeway for far-right parties in Europe, creating a 'Trump trap'—the catch-22 phenomenon where submission to external threat empowers internal extremists.

“Europe's by adopting a position of submission with Trump, it inadvertently created more power and more leeway for those far-right parties in Europe to gain influence, which then undoes the European integration projects.”

The AfD would need to fundamentally change to come to power, but in doing so it would also become much less of a threat; the most plausible scenario is AfD as a silent partner in a minority CDU government cooperating on domestic policy but without veto power on foreign policy.

“The only scenario I can see the AfD play a role in a future government is as a silent partner in a minority government led by the CDU where they cooperate on things like, you know, domestic policy, immigration, things like this, uh but, you know, don't don't get a veto on on on foreign policy.”

Europe is in a moment where the big things Trump wanted from Europe have been delivered, so it is now up to Europe to say 'a deal's a deal, no more tariff threats' and to point out that they need time to implement changes through legal processes rather than executive orders.

“we're in a moment now where I feel the big things that President Trump wanted from Europe, the Europeans have done, right? So it's now up to Europe to say, well, a deal's a deal, you know, no more further tariff threats, you know, like it'll take us a bit longer to implement it because you know, we can't just do an executive order. We have to go through the legal process and that's how Europe works. And you know, that they can finally start on a more positive agenda, right?”

The second Trump administration doesn't seem to have the most optimistic transatlantic future in mind; this suggests the relationship is at risk under current US leadership.

“I'm not sure that that's the the future that this administration has has in mind per se.”

Merz is concerned that next year France will have a far-right person in the Elysée (presidency), which will leave him with very little to work with on European integration.

“Merz is worried that this time next year you'll have a far right person in the Elysée in Paris and that you'll have very little to to work with there when it comes to European integration and so on.”

Markets reacted to the Greenland crisis not based on whether Greenland belongs to Denmark or the US, but because Europeans signaled they were willing to stand up, which spooked markets into fear of trade war; had Europeans folded, markets probably would not have reacted the same way.

“I don't think that the markets really care whether Greenland belongs to Denmark or to the United States, right? Had Europeans folded, had they signaled that, 'Hey, you know, fine, impose more tariffs, and it's all going to be, you know,' actually, markets probably would not have reacted the way they did. And so, markets reacted the way they did because they thought, 'Oh my god, these Europeans are reacting, trade war, trade war, and therefore we get spooked.' So, I actually think that these things are very closely connected.”

Germany, by the end of the decade, will invest or spend the same amount of money on defense as France and the UK combined, fundamentally transforming how Europe thinks about defense and how it can act.

“the amount of money, I mean, if you think about Germany, by the end of the decade, will invest or will will spend the same amount of money on defense as France and the UK combined, right? That's going to transform the kind of the way Europe thinks about defense, the way it can act.”

The third ingredient is courage, exemplified by leaders like Volodymyr Zelensky and Mette Frederiksen (Denmark PM), whose popularity rose as a result of taking stands like the Greenland moment.

“I think the third key ingredient is courage. I think that if you think about leaders like well, actually, you know, Zelensky to name the obvious one, but I would also add, you know, someone like Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark. Her popularity, I mean, she was not actually doing that well. Her popularity started, you know, rising once again actually as a result of the Greenland moment, right?”

Ukraine represents a middle category of European response: Europeans show willingness to say 'we stand up for Ukraine even if Washington is in cahoots with Moscow,' but they have been bending over backwards to keep Trump on side despite the fact that the US no longer provides military support and only shares intelligence.

“I kind of put Ukraine in a mid- middle category. I think that there has been a European willingness to say, 'We stand up for Ukraine even if um Washington basically is in cahoots with Moscow.' However, I also think that basically Europeans have been bending over backwards to try and keep Trump on side. Now, you could say, 'Well, you know, they still need US support.' But, the truth of the matter is that the United States no longer provides that support, right?”

What confuses Europeans is that the Trump administration's China policy is unclear, the Middle East policy end game is unclear, and the overall strategic direction is unclear, making it very hard for Europe to come up with a coherent policy when constantly getting unexpected things thrown at them.

“They just simply don't know. So it's very hard to come up with a kind of coherent policy if you're constantly get things thrown at you that you that you didn't expect.”

The European Commission has played its hand on trade and sanctions quite well but has been held back by member states who are not allowing it to play this role fully and are basically tying its hands.

“I would like to see in in many ways the EU I feel like the commission on on the trade side and on some of on sanctions and things I think has played its hand pretty well, but it's been held back by member states like not allowing it to play this role and you know, saying well, make a deal or like basically tying its hands if you want.”