Chris Blattman on Why We Fight

Chris Blattman, an economist at the University of Chicago, discusses his framework for understanding armed conflict with host Russ Roberts. The conversation centers on why war is rare rather than common: because fighting destroys wealth that rivals could divide through negotiation, bargained settlements almost always beat combat. Blattman argues that the small fraction of rivalries that do erupt into violence requires explanation through structural forces rather than through the psychology or ambition of individual leaders. The five mechanisms he identifies—uncertainty, commitment problems, unchecked leaders, intangible incentives, and misperception—account for why countries and groups periodically fail to reach peaceful bargains despite mutual incentive to avoid the costs of war.

The discussion moves across several domains. Blattman distinguishes between misperception born of imperfect information and simple miscalculation; both sides may rationally attack to learn opponent strength under uncertainty, much as in poker. The commitment problem emerges when a rising power cannot credibly promise not to exploit future dominance—a logic Blattman traces through World War I, the Iraq invasion, and Russia's current fears about NATO. He argues that over-centralized power is the deepest root, because it insulates leaders from war's costs while simultaneously sharpening uncertainty, commitment failures, and psychological projection bias. The analysis resists personalizing conflict around Putin; instead, Blattman emphasizes how bureaucracies and coalitions constrain even autocrats, and how rational leaders may fight to preserve power despite national economic ruin. Roberts and Blattman also examine whether appeasement and recent sanctions have inadvertently made peace less attractive to Russia's leadership.