Trump To Force Ukraine Peace on Europe - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Americans provide the glue that holds Europe together because you have massive collective action problems when 20+ nations try to figure out what to do on economic or security front.

“We provide the glue, right? Exactly. I mean we're not simply the pacifier because you have massive collective [1:08:02] action problems when you have, you know, 20 plus nations trying to figure out what to do either on the economic front if you're talking about the EU or on the security front if you're talking about NATO.”

The West has undermined the Minsk agreement, canceled the 2019 peace mandate that Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted for, and sabotaged the Istanbul agreement, all done under the idea of the righteous thing to do.

“I've seen them undermining the Minsk agreement. I've seen them being able to undermine and effectively cancel the 2019 peace mandate that the Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted for. I've seen them sabotage the Istanbul agreement. I mean, what's been done to Ukraine is quite horrible, but also it's has all been done under this idea of how we wish that [45:39] the world would be”

It is essential that the US, Russia, and Europeans come to understanding about how to deal with conflicts so that conflicts do not result in the catastrophe that has occurred in Ukraine.

“I think that in the interests of Europe, the United States, and the Russians coming to some kind of understanding about how to deal with these conflicts so that these conflicts do not result in the kind of catastrophe that we have had over Ukraine is absolutely essential and in everybody's interests.”

Trump has held his first phone call with Putin in what appears to be a deliberate effort to initiate negotiations on ending the Ukraine war, marking a significant shift from Biden administration policy.

“Trump has held his first phone call with Putin, at least the first one we know of, and uh well, the Europeans are in shock”

Keir Starmer's public statement that Ukraine is on an 'irreversible course' to NATO membership directly contradicts Trump administration policy and represents European obstruction of peace negotiations.

“it's clear that the Russians have had two central demands since at least June 14th of this year. One is that Ukraine will be a genuinely neutral country. It won't be in NATO uh either de jure or de facto. Uh and number two, that the West and Ukraine will recognize uh the annexation of those four oblasts in the east of Ukraine plus Crimea. And Heggseth said quite clearly that Ukraine is not going to be in NATO”

Ukraine has suffered extensive destruction of infrastructure, industrial capacity, electric grid, loss of millions of population to emigration, and deaths of young males, making post-war reconstruction extremely difficult regardless of peace terms.

“so many millions of people have left the country so many young men have died their industries are destroyed their natural resources are half of or something is under Russian control electric grid is destroyed I mean it's terrible”

Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, has stated she does not believe in diplomacy with Russia because Putin is a war criminal, which prevents the EU from engaging in peace negotiations independently.

“the foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, that is the top diplomat, says she doesn't actually believe in diplomacy. First, she said that you know, Putin is a dictator and war criminal, and she doesn't talk to war criminals, so she won't have any talks at all.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has signaled flexibility, stating that NATO never actually promised Ukraine NATO membership in any peace deal, suggesting Europeans can be pragmatically accommodated if given minor diplomatic cover.

“the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he came out and he said, "Well, we never actually promised Ukraine NATO membership and in in any deal." Um now, of course it hasn't really been mapped out exactly what Hegseth meant when he said no NATO.”

Putin, despite the picture most people have of him in the West, is not a highly aggressive individual and in fact gets beat up in Russian social media for not being aggressive enough and not waging the war aggressively enough in Ukraine.

“Uh and uh and Putin despite the picture that most people have of him in their heads in the West is not a highly aggressive individual. And in fact if anything he gets beat up in uh social media inside [1:06:59] Russia for not being aggressive enough, for not waging the war aggressively enough in uh Ukraine.”

Putin is not a highly aggressive individual and actually faces domestic criticism in Russia for not being aggressive enough in conducting the Ukraine war—contradicting Western media narratives.

“Putin despite the picture that most people have of him in their heads in the West is not a highly aggressive individual. And in fact if anything he gets beat up in uh social media inside Russia for not being aggressive enough, for not waging the war aggressively enough in uh Ukraine.”

After the 2014 Ukrainian coup, the CIA, MI6, and the new Ukrainian security chief agreed to a trilateral arrangement that included using Ukraine as a base for intelligence operations against Russia, with explicit acknowledgment that Ukraine-Russia cultural similarity would make intelligence gathering easy.

“after the coup in in 2014, uh you know, there's a New York Times article which came out in 2024, I think, which argued that you know, on the first day after the coup in 2004, you had the CIA, MI6 and the new security agency well, the new security chief of the intelligence agency in in Ukraine who had well, obviously been handpicked or approved by Washington, you know, they they they agreed to this trilateral agreement between the three security institutions and one of the things was the Americans were cheering on the CIA saying, 'Well, how wonderful it is now to have the Ukrainians. We can really infiltrate the Russians here because when the Ukrainians meet the Russians, it's like they're brothers. They don't even think that they're handing over information.'”

The first major tranche of NATO expansion was 1999 when Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic were brought in; the Russians could live with this.

“the first tranche of expansion, major tranche, was '99 when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were brought in. And then the second big tranche was in 2004 when the Baltic states, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria were brought in. We got away with those and the Russians could live with those two [1:05:56] tranches of expansion.”

If the Minsk agreement had been implemented in 2015, Ukrainians could have reintegrated Donbas with only autonomy and minority rights like religious rights and language rights.

“if we would have accepted implemented the Minsk agreement from 2015 the [53:25] Ukrainians could have reintegrated Donbas even only with some autonomy some minority rights like religious rights and language rights”

The April 2008 decision to expand NATO to Ukraine was fatal because it crossed a Russian red line that was not crossed by previous tranches.

“But it was the April 2008 decision that was fatal. Uh if they had stopped uh uh after the 2004 decision and they had actually then gone on to work out some sort of meaningful security relationship with the Russians to cover those areas that weren't covered by uh NATO and that was not a lot of territory by the way.”

Before 2014, no one in Russia was laying any claims to Crimea, but after the coup and continued NATO expansion, Russia annexed Crimea, showing how Western actions created the situation.

“back in 2000 before 2014 no one in Russia was laying even claims to even Crimea no one you know there was nothing and then after the coup then you have Crimea”

France would prefer American presence in Europe to manage German power, so French preference for American withdrawal is overstated; in reality French diplomacy has shifted toward defending the hegemonic system with Americans present.

“And if I could just go back to the fact that the French had all those doubts back in the 1990s and of course they now prefer the hegemonic system with the Americans present. They prefer a hegemonic system with the Americans present to the alternative that they would be faced today which is a system where there are no Americans present. In the 1990s the Americans would still have been there.”

Obama administration understood that starting a hot war against Russia in Ukraine would be unwise because Russian geographical proximity gives them logistical advantage and Ukraine represents an existential interest to Russia.

“even Obama back in his day recognized that it would be a very bad idea to start a war in Ukraine, a hot war against the Russians given that with the proximity, the Russians would have the advantage of logistics. And I would add, more importantly, this is much more important to the Russians. They will fight all the way because this is a threat to their existence”

The Biden administration pursued a policy of confronting both Russia and China simultaneously, which multiple Trump administration figures describe as strategically irrational given the finite resources and need for prioritization.

“the Biden people who seem to think that the right way was to take them on both on at the same time.”

The West has no viable military alternative to accepting Russian terms, and pretending an alternative exists is dangerous fantasy that prolongs suffering.

“if one takes a logical, realistic view, then eventually after this tantrum ends, we will have we will start to come around and to accept the reality and move forward with whatever peace is eventually comes out of this process. The trouble is, there hasn't been much logic or realism and reality from Europe up to now.”

The April 2008 NATO summit decision was not the subject of serious media scrutiny or public debate at the time, despite being one of the most consequential decisions in post-Cold War history.

“Um a fact that is not acknowledged in Europe, of course, in West in Europe at all, but which we needed to acknowledge. We need to understand the um momentousness and the recklessness of that decision which wasn't even properly thought through or discussed at the time. It was certainly not the big media story as I remember.”

If NATO had stopped after 2004 and worked out meaningful security relationship with Russians for remaining areas, there would be a peaceful situation in Eastern Europe because Russia didn't have intentions or capabilities to overrun Ukraine, Belarus, or Eastern Europe.

“Uh you and I believe have a very peaceful situation [1:06:27] in Eastern Europe today simply because I don't think the Russians had either the intentions or the capabilities to overrun Ukraine, Belarus, Eastern Europe, whatever, right? The Russians were just interested in getting their own house in order.”

NATO expansion was packaged with EU expansion and color revolutions, including efforts to foment color revolution inside Russia when Michael McFaul was US ambassador to Moscow.

“Glenn, and thank you for giving me the opportunity to make this, but you want to remember that NATO expansion was packaged together with two other strategies. One was EU expansion and the other were the color revolutions. And the color revolutions are usually thought of in terms of the Orange [1:11:41] Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. But we were interested in fomenting a color revolution inside of Russia. When Michael McFaul was the US ambassador to Moscow, he was in a very important way pushing for a color revolution inside of Russia. And as you can understand, this really spooked the Russians.”

The Trump administration's concessions on Ukraine are not actually concessions to Russia but recognitions of hard military facts, because the alternative to negotiating on these terms is indefinite war that Ukraine cannot win.

“I just want to make a point based on what uh yeah, John said as well because I think the Europeans are misunderstanding a bit what what Americans are saying because the whole point of Hexeth was that, you know, they're not making concessions to Russia. They're not giving anything away. Uh this is just yeah, the the reality of the situation because be What what is the alternative to uh to accepting some of Russia's basic terms? Uh the the alternative will be, you know, not to have all the territory back or to join NATO. The alternative will be to even have more Ukrainian deaths, to have even more territory lost.”

Marco Rubio and other Trump administration figures are articulating a genuinely multipolar world view where great powers compete but also negotiate and respect each other's security interests, representing a fundamental shift from the unipolar mindset.

“Rubio's really quite astonishing points about the fact that we are in a system of competing great powers, a multipolar system where there are great powers, and that there should be diplomacy again, and that the purpose of diplomacy is to resolve conflicts.”

Europeans are so subservient to the United States because they fear U.S. abandonment, but this subservience has gotten them into real trouble because they've never acted independently and now have nowhere to go when the U.S. wants to reduce commitments.

“one of the reasons that the Europeans are so subservient to the United States is because they fear that we'll leave. Right? So, they're just very good to us uh and do what we want. But what you're saying now, which of course is quite correct, is that's gotten them into real trouble because they've never acted independently in the past. They're completely subservient to the United States. And now the United States wants to sort of cut their legs out from under them”

If you fight and lose a war, the terms of the peace that follows will inevitably be disadvantageous, and the thing in that situation is to make sure you don't fight a war which you're likely to lose.

“absolutely if you fight and lose a war then inevitably the terms of the peace that follows are [54:58] going to be disadvantageous to yourself that's that is the nature of war um in the the the thing in that kind of situation is to make sure you don't fight a war which you are likely to lose”

If you lose a war militarily, the terms of any subsequent peace agreement will necessarily be disadvantageous to you, and the only way to avoid terrible peace terms is not to fight wars you cannot win.

“if you fight and lose a war then inevitably the terms of the peace that follows are going to be disadvantageous to yourself that's that is the nature of war um in the the the thing in that kind of situation is to make sure you don't fight a war which you are likely to lose”

The concept of 'indivisible security' that Russia historically proposed for Europe was rejected by the West in favor of NATO expansion, but Russia's core security interest in preventing NATO on its borders has never changed.

“when the United States began to or mid-'90s more correctly began to suggest that perhaps we should go with a different security system. So instead of having a security system based on, you know, the no dividing lines, having indivisible security, the Americans began to suggest to how about we just expand NATO”

If the West had implemented the Minsk II agreement (2015) as negotiated, Ukraine could have reintegrated Donbas with only autonomy and minority language/religious rights, avoiding the subsequent massive casualties and territorial losses.

“if we would have accepted implemented the Minsk agreement from 2015 the Ukrainians could have reintegrated Donbas even only with some autonomy some minority rights like religious rights and language rights”

Russians have had two central demands since at least June 14th: Ukraine will be genuinely neutral and not in NATO either de jure or de facto, and the West and Ukraine will recognize the annexation of four oblasts in eastern Ukraine plus Crimea.

“the Russians have had two central demands since at least June 14th of this year. One is that Ukraine will be a genuinely neutral country. It [6:46] won't be in NATO uh either de jure or de facto. Uh and number two, that the West and Ukraine will recognize uh the annexation of those four oblasts in the east of Ukraine plus Crimea.”

Huge numbers of people in the West operate under the illusion that Ukraine is doing fine and all we need to do is give them more weapons and fine-tune the fighting machine and they will stymie the Russians and eventually roll them back.

“The problem is that huge numbers of people in the West don't understand that. They operate under this illusion that Ukraine is doing fine and [39:57] all we have to do is give them a bit more weaponry and fine-tune the fighting machine and they'll stymie the Russians and eventually roll them back.”

John McCain and other Western figures threatened Russia after Arab Spring by using rhetoric like 'Moscow next,' indicating Western intention to pursue regime change in Russia after succeeding in other regions.

“You know, John McCain, he even made this threat as well. You know, he tweeted something after Arab Spring, 'Moscow next' or you know, something along those lines. It's just it couldn't be more obvious that after Ukraine, obviously we were coming for Russia as well.”

After the 2014 coup in Ukraine, a New York Times article from 2024 documented that CIA, MI6, and new Ukrainian security chief agreed to trilateral agreement where Americans said they could infiltrate Russians through Ukrainians because they're like brothers.

“after the coup in in 2014, uh you know, there's a New York Times article which came out in 2024, I think, which argued that you know, on the first day after the coup in 2004, you had the CIA, MI6 and the new security agency well, the new security chief of the [1:12:44] intelligence agency in in Ukraine who had well, obviously been handpicked or approved by Washington, you know, they they they agreed to this trilateral agreement between the three security institutions and one of the things was the Americans were cheering on the CIA saying, "Well, how wonderful it is now to have the Ukrainians. We can really infiltrate the Russians here because when the Ukrainians meet the Russians, it's like they're [1:13:15] brothers. They don't even think that they're handing over information."”

There was no acceptance of new status quo, just continuous pivot closer to Russia, and limits exist on how much territory you can take but not on moving military infrastructure closer, which is what made Russians draw red line.

“Are we going to build bases all around in Crimea? Are we going to you know, build missiles missile place missiles on the border in you know, in Kharkov?" There was nothing. There was no limitations at all and there was no acceptance of a new status quo. It's just this continuous pivot closer and closer to Russia. Again, there's a limits of how much territory you can take, but in terms of moving the military infrastructure, I think this refusal to accept any new status quo is really something that made the Russians [1:10:07] simply draw a red line”

Europeans are caught in a strategic trap: they fear American abandonment if peace is reached in Ukraine, so they resist peace agreements hoping continued conflict will keep US troops in Europe, but this strategy is self-defeating because resistance makes the Americans more eager to leave.

“coming back to this problem, this fear that haunts them. If they think that a peace agreement in Ukraine is going to result in the Americans leaving Europe, and that's what the Americans are practically saying, that will again predispose many, many people in Europe to be against a peace agreement, because they hope that without a peace agreement, if there is a continued conflict, and of course a conflict can continue after a war, that that will somehow keep the the Americans in Europe.”

Michael McFaul, as US ambassador to Moscow, actively pushed for color revolution inside Russia, which the Russians perceived as direct American attempt at regime change.

“When Michael McFaul was the US ambassador to Moscow, he was in a very important way pushing for a color revolution inside of Russia. And as you can understand, this really spooked the Russians.”

In 2022, Russia was willing to negotiate withdrawal of forces from Ukraine in exchange for neutrality, making that the last point at which a relatively favorable negotiated settlement for Ukraine was possible before current catastrophic situation.

“even in 2022 the Russians were willing to pull back their forces in return for neutrality”

In the 1990s, the phrase 'expand or die' became associated with NATO, suggesting that NATO needed to expand or would wither on the vine.

“But in the '90s and I remember it very well, uh this phrase uh popped up regarding NATO uh and it was expand or die. And the idea was that if NATO didn't expand it would more or less wither on the vine.”

The United States now has the president of Russia and president of the United States in direct dialogue, with both sides organizing negotiating teams, Trump mentioning specific negotiators, Russians talking about their own teams, and a potential summit meeting in Saudi Arabia discussed.

“We now have the president of Russia and the president of the United States in direct dialogue with each other. We have talk about negotiating teams being organized. Trump has mentioned who he wants to be a part of those negotiating teams. The [4:08] Russians have talked about further their own negotiating teams. There's talk about a summit meeting in Saudi Arabia”

Russians continue to advance and Ukrainians continue to fall back with very heavy losses; a situation described as 'hopeless'.

“every day we get more news that the Russians continue to advance, the Ukrainians continue to fall back, and they continue to suffer very heavy losses”

While negotiations proceed, Russians are winning on the battlefield and it is possible that discourse about peace will sow doubts in Ukrainian military minds, making them less willing to fight and facilitating the breakdown of the Ukrainian army, allowing Russians to conquer more territory.

“it's going to take time to make this work. And in the meantime, the Russians are [10:54] winning on the battlefield. And it is possible that all of this discourse over the past few days will sow further doubts in the minds of soldiers in the Ukrainian military, make them less willing to fight, uh and facilitate the breakdown of the Ukrainian army, in which case the Russians will conquer more territory.”

Europeans fear that a peace agreement will result in the Americans leaving Europe, and this fear will predispose many people to be against a peace agreement, hoping that continued conflict will somehow keep Americans in Europe.

“coming back to this problem, this [27:24] fear that haunts them. If they think that a peace agreement in Ukraine is going to result in the Americans leaving Europe, and that's what the Americans are practically saying, that will again predispose many, many people in Europe to be against a peace agreement, because they hope that without a peace agreement, if there is a continued conflict, and of course a conflict can continue after a [27:55] war, that that will somehow keep the the Americans in Europe.”

Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, has stated she doesn't believe in diplomacy and won't talk to Putin because she views him as a dictator and war criminal; she has also talked about splitting Russia into smaller countries.

“the foreign policy chief of the EU, Kaja Kallas, that is the top diplomat, says she doesn't actually believe in diplomacy. First, she said that you know, Putin is a dictator and war criminal, and she doesn't talk to war criminals, so she won't have any talks at all. And also she talked about, you know, splitting Russia up to smaller countries.”

The Russians want and will only negotiate with the Americans because they have agency and determine policy, while Europeans simply do what Americans tell them, making Russian negotiation with Europeans pointless.

“Why would the Russians negotiate with us now? They've [26:21] seen what we are like. They've seen that we do exactly what the Americans tell them. We They've They've heard how we speak. They've heard how negative we are about them. If the Russians could talk to the Americans who have agency, they will negotiate with the Americans. They won't have any incentive to talk with us.”

Russia will not be generous in negotiations because it's not in their strategic interest to be generous when dealing with the United States, which has a history of taking advantage of others; Russia is now in the driver's seat on the battlefield.

“they have a powerful incentive to weaken Ukraine as much as possible. Uh and what this means is that it will be harder to get a deal. Uh the Russians are not going to be generous because it's not in their strategic interest to be generous when you're dealing with the United States of America, because the United States will take advantage of you.”

The Europeans have abdicated all responsibility by enthusiastically supporting the proxy war rather than engaging in preventative diplomacy—making them complicit in the current disaster and responsible for their own predicament.

“instead of engaging in diplomacy, instead of trying to prevent the war in Europe from happening at all, instead of discussing making, you know, agreements with the Russians, which would have prevented that. Um they went along with this proxy war. It's important to say that at no point in time, at no stage, have the Europeans acted in any way that showed any lack of enthusiasm for this proxy war.”

Ukraine has pursued a remarkably foolish policy, particularly under Zelenskyy and with American support under Biden, which has put the country in a situation where the outcome can't be anything short of disastrous—but the question becomes how disastrous, not whether it will be.

“the Ukrainians themselves, mainly in the form of Zelensky, and the Americans, mainly in the form of Joe Biden, have pursued this remarkably foolish policy and put us in this uh terrible situation, which is not easy to get out of”

Russia has a powerful incentive to conquer substantial territory because Russia doesn't trust US reliability—given Trump's mercurial nature, Russia is right to seek maximum territorial control as insurance against future American betrayal.

“the Russians have a powerful incentive to conquer a lot of territory. Yeah. And they have a powerful incentive to weaken Ukraine as much as possible. Uh and what this means is that it will be harder to get a deal. Uh the Russians are not going to be generous because it's not in their strategic interest to be generous when you're dealing with the United States of America, because the United States will take advantage of you.”

The idea that Americans 'sold out' Ukraine is contradicted by the fact that Ukraine and the West deceived Ukrainians about NATO membership prospects and potential Western military intervention, leading Ukrainians to continue fighting under false pretenses.

“this whole idea now that, you know, the Americans are selling out the Ukrainians you know, they Who really betrayed him? There was this deceit by pretending as if they would be able to join NATO. This deceit that perhaps in the future the the West would intervene in the war. I mean, this has been a big talking thing talking point along Ukrainian circles. If they just fight a little bit longer, if they show their determination to the West, then we would eventually intervene and come to their assistance. So, this was never going to happen and this yeah, this deceit aimed to get keep the war going.”

It is essential that people be brutally honest about what's going on in national security issues, regardless of whether they like it, because basic intellectual integrity is essential for good strategy.

“so basic intellectual integrity is essential and I think intellectual integrity has suffered enormous damage since the Cold War ended uh in 1989 and that's in good part why we're in so much trouble today”

China is what the Trump administration has on its mind—Trump people, J.D. Vance, and Hegseth are always talking about China now, showing it is the real priority.

“If you listen to the Trump people, if you listen to things that J.D. Vance has been saying over the last few hours, you can absolutely see that China is what they have on their minds. Pete Hexeth said the same. They're always talking about China now.”

Ukraine has lost the war and there's nothing that can be done anymore—so millions have left the country, so many young men have died, industries are destroyed, natural resources are under Russian control, electric grid is destroyed.

“we lost the war we went to war against Russia a proxy war and we lost and it's the Ukrainians which will bear the main burden and it's horrible what's happened to them and it's this peace is going to be terrible as well they're not going to have have so many millions of people have left the country so many young men have died their industries are destroyed their natural resources are half of or something is under Russian [54:27] control electric grid is destroyed”

The Trump administration wants to have good relations with the Russians and peel the Russians away from the Chinese, following the Nixon administration model that brought China to the American side to avoid China-Soviet alliance.

“And I think what's happening here is that the Trump administration wants to have good relations with the Russians and in effect peel the Russians away from the Chinese. Uh I think that the Trump administration is trying to do what the Nixon [42:01] administration did when it changed our relationship with China because we didn't like the idea of China and the Soviet Union being on the other side of the fence. We brought the Chinese to our side of the fence. I think in this case what Trump and company are trying to do uh is bring the Russians over to our side of the fence”

The US proxy war in Ukraine has from an American point of view gone as far as it can and really cannot be taken further, and should be wound down because Ukraine will not join NATO, will not recover lost territories, and the US will not deploy troops in Ukraine.

“giving every indication that this project, if you like, the proxy war in Ukraine has from an American point of view gone as far as it can, and it really can't be taken further, and that it should be wound down.”

Hegseth, speaking for the administration, was saying that the US accepts the two principal demands that the Russians have made about Ukrainian neutrality and territorial annexation, which represents a major turnaround.

“Heggseth, who was speaking for the administration, was saying that we accept the two principal demands that the Russians make. And that is a major turnaround. I certainly didn't expect it, and uh it [7:48] opens the possibility that you'll get an agreement here.”

Ukraine and the West would be better off reaching a settlement now based on accepting Russian territorial gains, but this settlement will be disastrous from Ukraine's point of view because we have pursued a remarkably foolish policy for so long.

“They would be better off reaching some sort of agreement now. But uh I'm not making the argument that that would be a good agreement from Ukraine's point of view. It's disastrous, but it's the least bad alternative at this point in time. We have pursued this remarkably [20:42] foolish policy for so long now that we've put ourselves in a situation where the outcome for Ukraine can't be anything short of disastrous.”

Nothing has been said or done by the American side regarding NATO membership or Ukraine that is not reversible, and Russia has made no substantive concessions on its core demands.

“there's been nothing said and done so far on the American side which is which is not reversible. And the Russians have made no substantive concessions on their demands at all.”

The Russian Defense Ministry has changed its language recently from saying territory 'was captured' to saying it 'was liberated,' a significant indicator that Russia is now thinking of staying in the Kharkiv region territories they hold outside the four oblasts.

“the Russian Defense Ministry has changed its language recently. Now, what they're saying what they used to say when they captured territory outside the four oblasts in Kharkiv region, which is not part of the four oblasts, they used to say that so-and-so village or settlement or whatever has been captured. Now, over [32:09] the last couple of weeks, they've changed and they say so-and-so village or settlement in this territory in Kharkiv region has been liberated. It is a significant difference. And as I said, it's it tells you that they're now thinking of staying.”

The Russians have shifted their military language in recent weeks, changing from 'captured territory in Kharkiv region' to 'liberated territory in Kharkiv region,' signaling a strategic intention to stay and consolidate control rather than conduct a temporary operation.

“the Russian Defense Ministry has changed its language recently. Now, what they're saying what they used to say when they captured territory outside the four oblasts in Kharkiv region, which is not part of the four oblasts, they used to say that so-and-so village or settlement or whatever has been captured. Now, over the last couple of weeks, they've changed and they say so-and-so village or settlement in this territory in Kharkiv region has been liberated. It is a significant difference. And as I said, it tells you that they're now thinking of staying.”

Claims that the peace deal only takes into account Russian security while ignoring Ukraine's suffering are both true but miss the reality that there is no better alternative, and that continuing to fight leads to worse outcomes.

“it's very unfair it's horrible for the Ukrainians they suffered so much the peace will be humiliating they will get no security after this either no secure proper security guarantees but this is also [52:55] reality and because what is the alternative no one has shown the alternative instead this assumption that we can always uh get a better deal that we will always come out on top always pushing us to double down”

The French had doubts about NATO expansion in the 1990s but now prefer the hegemonic system with Americans present to the alternative where Americans are absent, showing how context changes preferences.

“And if I could just go back to the fact that the French had all those doubts back in the 1990s and of course they now prefer the hegemonic system with the Americans present. They prefer a hegemonic system with the Americans present to the alternative that they would be faced today which is a system where there are no Americans present. In the 1990s [1:02:44] the Americans would still have been there. Now there's a real chance that they might go.”

Men will not look at things the way they really are, but as they wish them to be, and for this they are destroyed or ruined—a Machiavelli quote that summarizes how the West has been approaching Ukraine.

“But Machiavelli, he wrote that um um yeah, men men men will not look at things the way they really are, but as they wish them to be. And uh yeah, for this they are destroyed or ruined or something.”

At some point Trump will have to bring the Europeans and Ukrainians into a deal, making it not just a US-Russia deal, and the Ukrainians and Europeans will be roadblocks because they are opposed to the terms being discussed.

“One is at some point Trump is going to have to bring the Europeans and Ukrainians into the deal. It just can't be a US-Russia deal. Uh and I think the Ukrainians and the Europeans are going to be roadblocks. Uh if you listen to Keir Starmer, he said today, to my utter amazement, uh [10:23] that it's inevitable that uh Ukraine is going to be brought into NATO.”

What Pete Hegseth said is more interesting and important than what Trump has said, because Hegseth articulated realities that Europeans and Ukraine do not want to face: Ukraine will not join NATO, will not recover lost territories, and the US will not deploy troops in Ukraine.

“listening not so much to, you know, not reading so much what Trump has said [4:40] to Putin or following too closely what Trump's been saying, which is not always consistent. Perhaps even more interesting and important has and alarming for people in Europe is what Pete Heggseth has been saying. Because he's been talking about the realities and realities which are indeed realities, but which people in Europe and to some extent Ukraine don't want to face.”

Taking Americans away from Europe leaves you with a number of independent nations that sometimes will be at each other's throats, not a unified 'Europe'.

“Uh and the idea that you can take the Americans away and you're going to have this thing called Europe. Uh I don't think it's going to look like that. I think you're going to have a number of independent nations and sometimes they're [1:08:34] going to be at each other's throats.”

Russia will not completely rupture its relationship with China for American benefit, but a Russia with good US relations won't cause problems if US becomes engaged in China competition in the Pacific.

“the Russians are not going to rupture their relations with China uh for our benefit. But having good relations or at least better relations with Russia, maybe not good relations, but better relations, having a calm situation in Europe, having a situation where if the United States transfers troops and materials and resources from Europe to Asia means that the Americans can do that and the Russians won't rush to take advantage.”

The core issue in the Middle East conflict is that Western discourse on Israel is even more detached from reality than discourse on Ukraine, resulting in foolish policies despite genuine intelligence about the situation.

“the discourse in the west especially in the United States on Israel and its various wars is probably even worse than the discourse Ukraine in Europe and in the west more generally it's really remarkable how out of touch with reality the discourse on Israel and on the Middle East is in the United States and in Europe and the end result is you get remarkably foolish policies truly amazing”

If Russia conquers additional oblasts beyond the four currently in Russian hands, it will be 'wickedly difficult' to convince Russia to abandon those extra territories to make a deal palatable to Ukrainians and Europeans.

“it's one thing to talk about signing a deal where the four oblasts plus Crimea are lost. It's another thing to talk about a situation where the Russians control eight or nine or seven, however many, oblasts, a really big slice of the country, and getting the Russians to abandon those all additional oblasts that they've conquered, so that you can make the deal palatable uh to the Ukrainians and to the Europeans, it's going to be wickedly difficult.”

Without the U.S., Europe cannot negotiate with Russia because Russia views European negotiators as mere extensions of U.S. policy with no independent agency or authority to make binding decisions.

“Why would the Russians negotiate with us now? They've seen what we are like. They've seen that we do exactly what the Americans tell them. We They've They've heard how we speak. They've heard how negative we are about them. If the Russians could talk to the Americans who have agency, they will negotiate with the Americans.”

The idea of military disarmament and reduced military spending makes sense if you believe the world is becoming multipolar, because in a multipolar system security derives from mitigating security competition and having mutual disarmament, rather than from the excessive military dominance needed for global primacy.

“This makes sense [34:48] if uh you believe that the world is becoming more multipolar you don't need this much military. This excessive military dominance is a strategy of global primacy. If you want to dominate the entire international system. If your security derives from no one being able to compete with you that's the military budget you have. But if you recognize that the world has become multipolar and security derives from mitigating the security competition and having mutual disarmament, then you know, all of this is starting to make a [35:18] lot of sense.”

If Trump wants a peace deal, he has no choice but to accept the Russians' two principal demands (neutrality and territorial recognition), because there is no alternative—if he doesn't accept those demands, the war will continue indefinitely.

“I think that uh if you want a peace deal here, uh which Trump does, you simply have no choice but to accept the Russians' two principal demands. There's just no alternative here. As Alexander said, we have no cards to play. Uh So, if you want to end it, you send Pete Hexaf out, and he says there will be a [19:05] neutral Ukraine, and we will recognize the fact that Russia has annexed certain pieces of territory. There'll be a debate over what that territory should be, but Trump really has no choice here. And if he doesn't accept those demands, the war is just going to go on.”

America's problem is that if they don't make a deal, they're pushing Russia into the hands of China, and if they don't make a deal, it's going to be a much worse deal the longer they wait.

“America doesn't want to be stuck in Europe as you said, John. They rather go to China and instead now they're pushing Russia into the hands of China. And anyways, if they don't make a deal, it's going to be much, much worse deal the longer they wait.”

The Middle East is also racked by war with a single origin point: the Palestinian crisis, and the longer conflicts play out there, the more disadvantageous the terms will be because victory is unachievable and defeat will follow.

“there is that other region of the world which is racked by war which is the Middle East and I'm going to suggest that it's practically the same there it's obviously playing out in a [57:00] different way over a very very very much longer term but again the longer the war that the the conflicts go on there and they all have one origin one point of origin which is the Palestinian crisis at the core of it the longer they play out the more disadvantageous the terms are going to be because again in the end victory there is unachievable and defeat will follow [57:30]”

The unipolar era created a curse where one power dominates and doesn't have to take into consideration anyone else, so the US and political West could decide not to continue fighting but had the final say in global affairs.

“yeah but I think it's also a curse of the unipolar era because during the global primacy the whole premises there's one power that dominates you don't have to take into consideration anyone else so at the end of the day the US and the political West would get the final say”

It seems very rational that Trump wants to pivot away from Europe and concentrate on China competition, and is a huge shift especially after 3 years of war, but the war has been lost and there's no way to reverse it.

“It's a bit strange the reactions because it seems very rational. I mean, it is a huge shift in US policy and especially after 3 years of war as well, but in all fairness, the war has been lost. There's nothing that can be done to reverse it.”

The difficulty of putting an agreement together combined with the danger that Russians will end up capturing a lot more territory makes it very hard to see how a successful peace agreement will work out.

“I think that given the difficulty of putting an agreement together and the danger that the Russians will end up capturing a lot more territory makes it even harder to see how this is all going to work out.”

J.D. Vance was making the point in Munich that the ideological straitjacket is like the Soviet Union used to be in Europe, preventing open discourse.

“JD Vance was making this point in Munich [49:48] uh when he said that you know it's a lot like the Soviet Union used to be here in Europe right there's this ideological straitjacket”

It is shocking that it has taken Donald Trump to break through and bring understanding of this obvious principle, and even more shocking that Europe, which invented modern diplomacy, doesn't seem to understand this.

“it is frankly shocking that it has taken Donald Trump in the United States to break through and to bring us to that point of understanding but you know there were so many other clever people in the apparently clever people in the United States could could have seen it and it is even more shocking in Europe where we know all about wars or say we do and we've had our long history [56:29] and where we invented modern diplomacy so we don't seem to understand this either”

Europeans haven't done any diplomacy for 3 years, making it unlikely they will play a helpful role in negotiations, so why include them when they're not relevant.

“they don't really have that much to influence in order to assert a role. And and furthermore, as you pointed out correctly, I think both the Russians and the Americans view them as spoilers. [13:31] They very much said that they're against the terms of these negotiations. They don't like it already. And they uh uh yeah, they pretty much haven't done any diplomacy for 3 years. So, it's it's it doesn't look like they will play a helpful role.”

Europeans might be won over if they can be allowed to sit in the corner and have something to say, and might come around as reality sets in and they recognize they don't have many options.

“There's still some minor details they can they can discuss, and I'm thinking the Europeans would have they could be won over if they can [23:16] at least be allowed to sit in the corner and uh you know have something to say, I guess. So uh I think just the Europeans, they paint themselves in the corner because also with Biden's support, the we all had to adhere to the same slogans”

Europe doesn't have any neutral countries anymore, so negotiations cannot be met in Europe as they would have been in the past (like Finland or Switzerland), and instead must be held in Saudi Arabia.

“They're going to meet now in Saudi Arabia. Now, back in the good old days, that is 3 years ago, [14:04] they would have met perhaps in Finland or in Switzerland. But these days, you know, Europe doesn't have any neutral countries anymore. So, now we can't even meet in Europe.”

Europeans during Biden's time adhered to the slogans that Ukraine decides when the war ends and cannot negotiate before achieving a Ukraine-favorable position, requiring more weapons, but now this position is becoming untenable.

“So uh I think just the Europeans, they paint themselves in the corner because also with Biden's support, the we all had to adhere to the same slogans, that is, you know, Ukraine decides when the war ends. Uh we can't negotiate before, you know, we we have a Ukraine favorable position, so they need more weapons.”

Europeans may be overestimating the extent to which they will resist Trump's peace proposal; much of their current reaction is shock, and once reality sets in and they realize they have few alternatives, they may come around to accepting the terms.

“I I I wonder if we're overestimating the extent to which the Europeans will resist this though, because I think a lot of it's shock. Keep in mind Hegseth came to Europe and said, "There will be no NATO membership. The territory won't be recovered. No American security guarantees, and plus we're leaving your continent." I mean, this is a lot delivered for a extremely dependent Europe.”

Even Obama back in his day recognized that it would be a very bad idea to start a war in Ukraine against the Russians, given Russian proximity logistics advantage and that Ukraine is much more important to Russia's existence than to the West.

“And I would add, more importantly, this is much more important to the Russians. They will fight all the way because this is a threat to their existence irrespective of the denial we get from Europe. So, [46:09]”

A broad European security agreement would take longer to negotiate but would actually be the best possible option because everyone could benefit from it rather than a series of conflicts.

“it would take even longer to get some sort of meaningful agreement I think that would actually be the best possible option though because with European security agreement something that focuses on positive some gain. [59:36] Everyone could effectively benefit because as you point out there's all these other conflicts just waiting to play out unless the underlying foundation, the reason why we had this war and this other conflict emerge”

There must be acceptance that the hegemonic model is finished and something else must come in its place, especially if the Americans are leaving Europe.

“we really have to find something to address which is but then there has to be an acceptance that this is not just a war of Ukraine. This is you know, a war over a collapse of pan-European security. Hegemonic model [1:01:41] is finished but something else has to come in its place especially if the Americans are leaving.”

The Americans haven't conceded anything that wasn't going to happen anyway—they are simply recognizing the realities given that the war is being lost.

“I wouldn't see that as conceding points to the Russians. Simply recognizing the realities given that the war is being lost.”

Rubio's points about competing great powers and multilateral diplomacy are revolutionary if true, and if the entire American government has accepted this view, it would represent a revolutionary change, though it remains uncertain whether Rubio and Trump have truly adopted this framework.

“Well, I hope that that is partly what we're seeing. I mean, it's what we're seeing with Ukraine is consistent with that. But I I wonder whether um the entire American government has [38:25] accepted that view and whether um Rubio and Trump ultimately have done as well. Because if they have it's a revolutionary change. But I I'm afraid we're going to have to wait and see uh to what extent that is really the case.”