
The Top Risks of 2025 with Ian Bremmer & Eurasia Group | GZERO Media Live
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What's the world's #1 concern for the year ahead? Join us January 6 at 12 pm ET for a livestream with Ian Bremmer and global experts to discuss the Top Risks of 2025 report from Eurasia Group.
The much-anticipated annual forecast of the ten biggest geopolitical risks to watch in 2025 will be released that morning. Evan Solomon, GZERO Media's publisher, will moderate the conversation with @Ian_Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media; Cliff Kupchan, Eurasia Group's chairman and a leader of the firm's global macro coverage; Susan Glasser, staff writer at the New Yorker; and Jon Lieber, Eurasia Group's head of research and managing director, United States.
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Eurasia Group argues that 2025 faces a fundamental geopolitical breakdown due to the absence of global leadership and the shift toward transactional, power-based international relations—a 'G-Zero world'—where the U.S. abandons multilateral institutions while adversaries grow emboldened, creating systemic instability comparable to the 1930s.
- The post-WWII international order (UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank) is structurally weakening as the U.S. prioritizes unilateralism over leadership of rules-based institutions
- Ten distinct geopolitical and economic risks (ranked Mexican standoff to G-Zero wins) compound from this absence of coordinating power, with no mechanism to manage cascading crises
- The risk environment is more dangerous than 2017 because adversaries (Russia, Iran, China) are either emboldened or in decline, while U.S. allies are weakened and vulnerable to Trump's transactional demands
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The US and China disagree on governance in outer space, particularly on the moon, and with the proliferation of satellites this year, the chance of a satellite collision or incident radiating back to Earth is pretty high.
“we have included space in thinly governed spaces space thinly governed space space but okay in outer space the two great Powers us and China disagree on governance on the moon on the moon we're going to have a lot of satellites this year the chance of a satellite Collision or or incident radiating back to Earth is pretty high”
Many Republican China Hawks in Trump's administration (including Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio in key National Security positions) advocate for regime change in China and containment strategies that go beyond typical Cold War approaches, creating internal pressure for a harder China policy.
“several of his National Security appointees including the people in key positions like Mike Waltz the incoming National Security adviser Marco Rubio the the senator from Florida who's slated to be Secretary of State they are really China Hawks”
The world order is no longer aligned with the balance of power: the most powerful countries (US and China) no longer support international institutions aligned with values like rule of law, free trade, and democracy that the US created, creating a 'geopolitical recession.'
“the world order uh is no longer aligned with the balance of power so if you think about the most powerful countries in the world they are overwhelmingly first the United States second China um the United States has for decades promoted a bunch of international institutions that were aligned with its values promoting the idea of the US leading as the global sheriff... that is no longer something that the Americans have any interest in um it's not something the Chinese are aligned with”
Putin has been leader of Russia for 25 years, the longest since Stalin, and has consistently surprised the West by being more ruthless and disruptive than predicted, while clearly signaling his intentions (existential war with Ukraine and the West) that the West refuses to process.
“Putin is celebrating his 25th New Year this year like 25 years... that Putin would be the longest serving leader of Russia uh since Stalin in the Soviet times”
Russia, Iran, and North Korea are forming an increasingly dangerous partnership where North Korea is sending 11,000 troops to die in Ukraine in exchange for a Russian promise to help it develop a warhead that can reenter the atmosphere and hit the US.
“increasingly dangerous Russia Iran North Korea partnership it was born from Russian needs during the war but it's become more right now and the really hot issue here is what is Kim J Yun after for sending 11,000 troops that are now dying North Koreans are dying what's the ask he wants a warhead that can reenter the atmosphere and hit countries like the United States”
The world order is no longer aligned with the balance of power—the U.S. has promoted international institutions aligned with American values and free trade for decades, but the U.S. no longer has interest in that model, China does not align with it, and other countries are too weak to fill the gap, creating a geopolitical recession.
“the world order uh is no longer aligned with the balance of power so if you think about the most powerful countries in the world they are overwhelmingly first the United States second China um the United States has for decades promoted a bunch of international institutions that were aligned with its values promoting the idea of the US leading as the global sheriff or leading free trade architecture globally or promoting democracy common values rule of law around the world that is no longer something that the Americans have any interest in um it's not something the Chinese are aligned with and other countries are far too weak to try to take that slack up”
Open-source AI models like Meta Llama are being tested to show they can provide instructions on harmful acts (e.g., how to kill someone with arsenic or assassinate CEOs), and while Eurasia Group is not misusing them, there are actors globally who will.
“our organization we were taking a look at uh meta Lama which is their uh open source some of our folks downloaded it uh to see what was and wasn't possible um when they give it their own instructions and they found that they could use it to figure out how to kill someone with arsenic or how to assassinate CEOs of companies now we're not doing that but there are people glad you mentioned we're not doing that no no but there are people out there that will use AI for those purposes”
Trump avoids consequences for impeachments and legal indictments due to Republican loyalty and legal strategies, giving him latitude to act without congressional pushback.
“we've seen this over the years uh the fact that he was able to avoid two impeachments in his first term um and you know there's a lot of unpredictability about what exactly he's going to do”
Trump is by inclination a dealmaker with anyone regardless of values or political system; he operates on a transactional model where if you spend more money on his property he will sell to you, and this is consistent across his business career, sometimes working out (e.g., freeze-for-freeze with North Korea under Trump) and sometimes failing (relationship deteriorated under Biden).
“Trump uh is by inclination a dealmaker with anyone he doesn't care um what your values are what kind of political system he has it's just like real estate if you're going to spend more money on his property he's going to sell it to you right so I mean it's consistent he's been that way for a long time and sometimes it works out for him um remember Kim Jong-un you know he developed his he had a couple of summits and people said oh we didn't get anything done actually there was a freeze for freeze the the North Koreans froze their missile tests and the Americans froze their um Miss military exercises with the South Koreans and and actually the relationship deteriorated under Biden”
Loose fiscal policy means consumers get more money in their pockets and taxes remain low, but there is a lot of treasury debt issuance which is a concern for markets over the long term.
“loose fiscal policy means you get both stimulus consumers have more money in their pockets and taxes remain low but there's a lot of issuance of treasury debt which is a concern for the markets over the long term”
Trump's transactional, personal approach to governance means business leaders and foreign leaders must now cultivate personal relationships with Trump, his family, and inner circle to influence policy, making business navigation highly dependent on personal access rather than institutional processes.
“Trump's very transactional he's very uh interpersonal he believes in making connections with people whether that's foreign leaders or Business Leaders in the US and this means that that's a factor that a lot of companies are going to have to think about When approaching the United States over the next four years is what kind of relationship do you have personally with Donald Trump with members of his interner circle with his family can you leverage those relationships to try to gain uh more uh more power and influence”
For the last 30 years, the US presented itself as an exceptionalist power promoting rule of law, free trade, democracy, and international institutions; it tried to bring China into this system as a 'responsible stakeholder,' but China refused.
“the United funny for the last 30 years the US has been as an exceptionalist power that believed that it had values that other countries needed to look up to it was trying to get China to align more with the United States it said look you guys are not responsible stakeholders we are the internationalists we are us-led multilateralist we want you to support those institutions too support rule of law support global stability support free trade we bring them into the WTO turns out China's unwilling to do all of that”
Even if a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, Russia will remain at war with NATO through asymmetric action (assassinations, critical infrastructure attacks, long-range missile targeting) as long as sanctions remain and frozen assets are not returned.
“there's going to be escalation there will be more assassinations more long-range missile targeting more critical infrastructure hit... even once you get a ceasefire if the Russians are still under maximum sanctions as they will be if hundreds of billions of their assets are still frozen as they will be they will still be at war with Frontline NATO States”
Russia is now the world's leading revisionist, angry major power, and there are going to be many fuses for Russia to light over coming years as regional power vacuums emerge.
“we have a truly revisionist angry major power Russia and there are going to be lots of fuses for Russia to light over coming years uh Cliff you're tipping dangerously close to revealing one of our risks”
The relentless pace of AI technological development proceeds with inadequate safeguards and governance frameworks, creating systemic misuse risks that will be discovered through trial and error.
“the Relentless pace of technological development the Unbound inadequate safeguards and governance issues”
We don't yet know what exact number Trump will define as mass deportations, but we should expect this policy to happen in a way that many Americans and businesses have not fully appreciated the extent of disruption it will cause, and it will come very early in the Trump Administration.
“now in all caps Trump made very few at least specific promises in the campaign that he just won uh when it comes to traditional kind of policy discourse it was mostly absent uh this is one that was a highly specific promise from Trump...do we know the exact number that will constitute mass deportations now for Donald Trump we don't really uh and uh uh yet we do know and should expect that this is really going to happen in a way that perhaps many Americans and many American businesses have not fully appreciated the extent to which this is going to be a disruptive factor and it's going to come very early on in uh the new Trump Administration”
Trump has shown very few fixed principles, but belief in the magical transformative power of tariffs is one of them, as evidenced by his famous statement 'I am tariff man' and his historical embrace of tariffs in the first administration.
“Trump is uh highly open to whatever is the suggestion of the person he spoke with most recently however and this is a very important caveat he he has very few fixed principles a belief in the almost magical transformative power of tariffs is one of them uh and I think that uh you know I am tariff man one of his most famous quotes from uh his Twitter feed back in the first Trump Administration uh it shouldn't have been a surprise to people when he finally sort of uh closed down the yearslong internal feuding in the first couple years between his economic advisors over imposing those tariffs and went ahead with them”
The Rule of Man risk reflects a shift in US governance where power is highly concentrated in Trump personally, he has consolidated control over the Republican party and Congress, and the normal checks and balances that constrained him in his first term (Republican resistance, career officials) are now weakened.
“you've got one a lot of power concentrated in one person in the US now he's got a lot of control over the Republican party in Congress that's not unusual for a president but the Republicans have had trouble uh coring themselves and Rowing in the same direction over the last several years and as we saw last week with the vote Around Speaker Mike Johnson Trump is clearly calling the shots right now”
The US is in a stronger position relative to its adversaries in 2025 than it was in 2017: China's economy is doing badly, Russia is in serious decline, Iran is falling apart, and the US has more leverage to get deals done with less resistance.
“the fact is that the US is in a much stronger position now both Visa its adversaries because China's econom is doing so badly Russia's in serious decline Iran is falling apart”
Risk #8 AI Unbound: The UK has rebranded its AI safety summit as the AI action summit, signaling that Europeans believe they over-regulated and now want to focus on investment and entrepreneurship; the U.S. will repeal the Biden executive order on early-stage AI regulation written with systemically important AI companies; the U.S.-China AI dialogue will probably end under Trump; and the U.S. will end the EU trade and technology council.
“the UK um has a summit coming up it was the AI safety Summit they've rebranded it as the AI action Summit uh that tells you pretty much everything you need to know uh the Europeans feel like they went too far in terms of Regulation and now they're being left behind they need to focus on more investment more entrepreneurship the Americans going to rip up um the old um Biden executive order order on AI that was early stage regulation written together with the systemically important AI companies the um the US China just beginning to have an AI dialogue that'll probably be ended under the Trump Administration so too they'll end um the US EU trade and Technology council”
Russia has become the world's leading rogue power now that Iran has lost its power projection capability, and Russia stands out as a structural rogue country posed to light many fuses over coming years.
“Russia has become a structural Rogue country by far the world's leading power now that Iran as Ian just talked about has lost its power projection capability so so Russia really stands out right now”
Putin has been able to play weak hands into strong ones by oscillating between periods of real difficulty and seeming to emerge stronger, and this year he needs to end or suspend the war to have time to rest and rebuild despite still intending to take more territory and remove Zelensky from power.
“Putin's had this one of his talents as a leader slot has been playing a weekend into a strong hand I mean this guy oscillates between things going real bad and then he he seems to emerge stronger...he needs to end the war too at least suspend it because I mean he's having a hard time raising and throwing Fighters into the wood chipper um he's having a hard time at home economically uh it would be good for Putin to have six months a year to rest and rebuild he still intends to take more territory to remove zinski from power and the rest that's not going to change”
Sheinbaum also has to deal with the overhang from AMLO's constitutional reforms, especially judicial reform, which has crushed the peso and Mexican markets over the last couple months, leaving her with little room to get things wrong.
“she also has to deal with overhang from Amo because of the Constitutional reforms especially judicial reform which has crushed the peso and Mexican markets over the last couple months so she really doesn't have much room to get things wrong”
Tariffs and anti-immigration policy should be inflationary on balance, but the deregulatory agenda could unleash productivity growth in the United States, creating an uncertain net effect that markets are currently pricing as primarily positive.
“on balance these should be inflationary uh we just don't know how far Trump's going to go with all of this his deregulatory agenda could be the Leading Edge of the spear that ends up really unleashing a lot of productivity growth in the United States and that's kind of what you see the markets pricing in right now”
In industries extremely exposed to trade or to foreign workers, Trump's policies could mean a slowdown and make it harder to hire people in construction and agriculture, and domestic production could suffer under new trade barriers.
“but on the other hand particularly in industries that are uh extremely exposed to trade or to foreign workers this could be bad news and it could mean a Slowdown it could be harder to hire people in construction and Agriculture and domestic production all of these things could suffer under these new barriers that are going to be erected”
Trump comes in with much more acceptance of who he is and what his administration means, and with a unified government he will have a lot of latitude to get things done, making 'Trump fails' an unlikely red herring because conditions are more favorable for Trump success than in his first term.
“this is an Administration that's set up to succeed at least for the first 12 months um certainly with the Unified Government there's a lot they can do in terms of legislation and on the world stage you know Trump's got plans that you know we think will come to pass we think there will be a ceasefire in Ukraine we think that he's probably going to rack up at least a couple of apparent winds in the Middle East as those conflicts die down and we think that the guard uh you know the relationship between the US and China is on a worsening trajectory but doesn't lead to a full breakdown that uh you know undermines the global economic growth so this this is 2025 is set up to be a decent year for Trump and it's it's not like uh you know the he he's coming in with a lot more acceptance kind of of who he is”
Ungoverned spaces and failing states exist across multiple regions: in the Middle East (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Libya), in Africa (Sudan), in Southeast Asia (Myanmar), in Latin America (Haiti), and now in outer space (satellite collision risk).
“there are a lot of problems... something called ungoverned spaces conflict and humanitarian crisis in places obviously like Gaza Sudan Myanmar Haiti... what's notable and different about this year is the number of ungoverned spaces in the Middle East uh s Gaza West Bank Lebanon Syria Yemen Libya I mean much of the non-persian gulf part of the Middle East is very thinly governed”
Emerging market countries will be faced with a really tough choice between letting Chinese imports crush valuable sectors like electric vehicles and raising protectionist barriers which have their own real downsides.
“a lot of countries are going to be faced with a really tough choice between letting Chinese Imports crush a valuable sector like EVS um and raising protectionist barriers which have their their own real downfalls”
Iran is in its weakest geopolitical position in decades after losing its 'axis of resistance' (Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas) largely to Israeli military action, with its economy failing and ethnic minorities in insurgency.
“Iran suffered a series of setbacks they have never been weaker in decades their geopolitical position has been dealt recent blows obviously the collapse of Syria the collapse of their major proxy Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and and Hamas”
Trump will inherit a strong economic position (solid growth, substantial job gains, mostly controlled inflation) but the macroeconomic conditions are worse than his first term: debt levels are higher, interest rates are higher, and company multiples are much higher, leaving less room for his playbook to work.
“they're inheriting a pretty good economic Outlook growth has been solid uh job grow job gains have been substantial in the B Administration and inflation seems like it's mostly under control”
Mexico also has to deal with overhang from AMLO's constitutional reforms, especially judicial reform, which has crushed the peso and Mexican markets over the last couple of months, leaving Sheinbaum with little room to get things wrong.
“she also has to deal with overhang from Amo because of the Constitutional reforms especially judicial reform which has crushed the peso and Mexican markets over the last couple months so she really doesn't have much room to get things wrong”
Republicans in the House and Senate are pushing toward more restrictions on China, more export controls on companies considered a national security threat, broader definitions of national security, and tougher technology controls on semiconductors.
“the Republicans in the House and Senate are pushing towards more restrictions on China more export controls more companies that you can't do work with a a broader definition of National Security uh in how the Americans shouldn't be engaging with China uh tougher te technology controls on semiconductors”
Justin Trudeau is potentially the first international casualty of 2025's top risks, having damaged his standing by flying to Mar-a-Lago and being publicly humiliated by Trump calling him the 'F 51st Governor,' and this pattern may repeat with other leaders throughout the year.
“Justin Trudeau one could argue is kind of the first International casualty um of of these top risks this year he was the guy that couldn't get out of the spotlight in fact he decided to put himself more into it when Trump beat him up he goes and he flies down to Mara Lago right and uh it goes very badly for him Trump keeps calling him the F 51st uh Governor um and now and now he's no longer I I suspect there's going to be uh we'll have a number of names we'll be able to add to that list over the course of the year”
Putin has framed the Ukraine invasion since the beginning as a war against a country (Ukraine) whose legitimacy he does not accept, and explicitly as a war between Russia and the United States and the West.
“Putin has said since the beginning really of this Invasion that it is a war uh first of all against a country whose legitimacy he does not accept he does not believe that Ukraine is a legitimate country he is at War uh in an existential sense with Ukraine but he has also framed it very explicitly to his own public as a war between Russia and the United States and the West”
A shift from the rule of law to rule of a man has consequential implications for U.S. governance, with concentrated power in one person (Trump) who calls the shots over the Republican Party in Congress.
“you've got one a lot of power concentrated in one person in the US now he's got a lot of control over the Republican party in Congress that's not unusual for a president but the Republicans have had trouble uh coring themselves and Rowing in the same direction over the last several years and as we saw last week with the vote Around Speaker Mike Johnson Trump is clearly calling the shots right now”
The Trump Administration's lalist approach will cement U.S. abdication of global leadership, and even if a multilateralist Democrat succeeds Trump, the U.S. will have permanently lost credibility due to being perceived as a country that flip-flops every four years.
“the Trump Administration with this l lalist approach is going to you know cement us abdication of leadership and even if we get a multilateralist Democrat next time succeeding Trump like Biden the us will have a reputation of being a country that flip-flops every four years it just won't have credibility anymore”
We have systematically underestimated Putin both in terms of his staying power and his willingness to take maximally disruptive and violent steps over the past 25 years.
“we would not have predicted uh 25 years ago that Putin would be the longest serving leader of Russia uh since Stalin in the Soviet times uh and by the way he's still young enough to surpass Stalin's actual record and I think if you look back over those two decades what have we systematically done is sort of underestimate Putin both his staying power and his willingness uh to take maximally uh disruptive and uh violent steps”
Several of Trump's incoming National Security appointees, including Mike Waltz (National Security Adviser) and Marco Rubio (Secretary of State), are real China Hawks, which will create a push-pull dynamic where hawks push for containment while Trump is more accommodationist.
“several of his National Security appointees including the people in key positions like Mike Waltz the incoming National Security adviser Marco Rubio the the senator from Florida who's slated to be Secretary of State they are really China Hawks and in many ways uh I think you're going to see to a certain extent the kind of push pull that happened in the first Trump Administration over Russia where you had kind of Russia Hawks in a lot of these national security jobs but Trump himself obviously uh taking a very different view a much more accommodationist view toward Putin and toward Russia I think that's going to be kind of what you see on China policy in in a second term where you have these kind of China Hawks”
The U.S. is oriented toward breaking global commitments and architecture, pulling out of agreements, and pursuing unilateralism, while the rest of the world hopes the U.S. does not turn its attention toward them first.
“the US is oriented towards breaking Global commitments an architecture pulling out of such agreements getting itself unilateralism globally and the rest of the world is trying to say I hope they don't pay attention to me first”
Trump has focused on loyalty and made sure not to bring in people to his administration who would actively oppose his agenda, which was a major problem in his first term where Republicans appointed by Trump or career officials often opposed him.
“people are right when they say you know Trump 2.0 he's made real focus on loyalty on making sure that he didn't bring in people to his White House and to his ad Administration who uh would be there to actively oppose his agenda that really was the case remarkably in some of the key positions throughout the Trump uh first term”
Mass deportations are one of the few highly specific campaign promises Trump made, and not only is it a specific commitment, but Trump believes it is core to why he won reelection, as his supporters are most motivated by anti-immigration views.
“mass deportations now in all caps Trump made very few at least specific promises in the campaign that he just won uh when it comes to traditional kind of policy discourse it was mostly absent uh this is one that was a highly specific promise from Trump and not only that but he believes its core to why he won reelection to the White House in the first place is this idea that his supporters are most motivated by his uh uh anti-immigration views and Promises”
Ungoverned spaces and power vacuums are emerging across the Middle East (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Libya) as Israeli tactics become rougher and other states fail to govern effectively.
“what's notable and different about this year is the number of ungoverned spaces in the Middle East uh s Gaza West Bank Lebanon Syria Yemen Libya I mean much of the non-persian gulf part of the Middle East is very thinly governed you know more misery in Gaza the West Bank becoming more like Gaza Israeli tactics are getting very very rough there destroying Homes Lebanon will remain a failing State”
Syria could become a power vacuum and a very dangerous one for extremism, creating space for ISIS to regenerate itself.
“Syria could become a Power vacuum and a very dangerous one for extremism a place where Isis can regenerate itself”
Approximately 3.5 million Ukrainians will be living permanently in annexed or Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine and will fall off the radar of the West, representing a forgotten population.
“there are 3.5 million ukrainians not a large number not a small number that are going to be living in permanently an next whatever you want to call it parts of Russia they're going to fall off the radar of the West”
Trump has a much more consolidated Republican party and administration under him in his second term compared to his first, giving him more capacity to execute his agenda on tariffs, deportations, and border policy.
“he has a much more Consolidated Republican party and administration under him to get it done”
Norm erosion has been happening in the U.S. for a while, with recent examples including Biden pardoning his son and Biden using CPP authority to block the U.S. Steel acquisition by Nippon Steel for political reasons.
“a lot of this is not brand new uh you know a lot of this happened in the Biden Administration under under previouse uh presidents uh we've seen Norms eroding in the US for a while I mean two recent examples would be Biden pardoning his son and then Biden using the CPUs process to block the acquisition of us Steel by nepon Steel because of his own political interests”
An increasingly dangerous Russia-Iran-North Korea partnership is forming, born from Russian needs during the war but now becoming more structured, with North Korea sending 11,000 troops to die in the conflict.
“increasingly dangerous Russia Iran North Korea partnership it was born from Russian needs during the war but it's become more right now and the really hot issue here is what is Kim J Yun after for sending 11,000 troops that are now dying North Koreans are dying”
The biggest long-term risk is Trump's plans for the FBI, Justice Department, and American intelligence community under figures like Kash Patel; Republicans will give him a 'free hand' on these institutional changes, and the damage to these institutions will survive the Trump presidency.
“the biggest risk factor that I would underscore and and maybe even more so than your very good Eurasia report does today that would be on the side of risk to the institutions of our government to democracy uh the name cash Patel hasn't been mentioned here uh what Trump proposes to do with the FBI the justice department the American intelligence Community uh those are things where I see much more Unity much more willingness on the part of Republicans to give him a free hand and much greater potential for really long-term damage that survives uh uh the Trump presidency itself”
The United States has unrivaled military might but the Trump Administration's isolationist approach will cement US abdication of leadership; even if a multilateralist Democrat replaces Trump later, the US will have lost credibility as a country that flip-flops every four years.
“the US is in many ways uh still the leading power unrivaled military might uh yet the Trump Administration with this l lalist approach is going to you know cement us abdication of leadership and even if we get a multilateralist Democrat next time succeeding Trump like Biden the us will have a reputation of being a country that flip-flops every four years it just won't have credibility anymore”
G-Zero is a condition where there is an absence of global leadership without a global governing framework; Trump is the leading symptom and principal beneficiary of the G-Zero condition, not the root cause, and all antiestablishment and anti-incumbency waves are manifestations of it.
“that's the principal disorder um that helps you understand the world today um I mean Trump is not the top risk Trump is the leading symptom and in many ways the most powerful beneficiary of the g0 and so too all of the antiestablishment wave that we've seen anti-incumbency Trends across the world in so many democracies last year and this year playing out it is an absence of Global Leadership there's a lot of leadership in the world it's not Global”
The G-Zero World (the top risk of 2025) means an absence of global leadership and functioning international institutions, with power vacuums, emboldened rogue actors, weak guardrails, and high risk of dangerous accidents and miscalculations.
“the Eurasia group Top risk of 2025 is the g0o wins that means as Cliff spoke about earlier the new and expanding power vacuums the emboldened Rogue actors or strongman leaders the heightened risk for dangerous accidents conflicts or miscalculations and the geopolitical iCal risk grows and maybe the guard rails are thinner”
The internal political weaknesses of the West (e.g., Capitol Hill dysfunction) are becoming international stories with global consequences, not purely domestic issues.
“the instability comes with that uh is one where the political weaknesses inside uh the West become their own kind of international story and I think that's that's the big thing that anti-incumbency doesn't stay at home uh that uh you know internal dysfunction on Capitol Hill uh uh is not something that is purely a matter for the US this time around”
The structural weakening of post-WWII institutions (UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO) makes middle powers who relied on these institutions vulnerable to pressure from larger powers.
“we have a structural weakening of the postor War II International order it's the UN it's the World Bank it's the IMF it's the WTO which is already for you know completely broken another way sorry of thinking about it is what Ian was getting to it's kind of everybody first it's not just America First and and when you get everybody first you know you you you have a very very very chaotic world”
A ceasefire in Ukraine is likely in 2025 (Trump promised to do it quickly), but a lasting peace agreement is unlikely because Russia is winning the war militarily and has little incentive to stop.
“the war is going to get worse in the earlier part of this year but you know Trump will come in and I do think that zanski is gonna want to ceasefire he's losing the war... the Putin's going to be a tougher cell because he's winning the war”
Trump's policy mix includes deregulation, anti-immigration policy, higher tariffs, and potentially loose fiscal policy—a combination that cuts in multiple different directions with different distributional effects.
“Trump's coming in with this mix of deregulation uh uh anti-immigration uh policy higher tariffs and potentially loose fiscal polic policy and that's a that's an unusual uh combination of things that kind of cuts in multiple different directions”
Deregulation will be felt most strongly in financial services and oil and gas sectors, where regulatory constraints have been binding.
“deregulation is going to be felt most strongly in financial services um in oil and gas”
Countries will face a tough choice between allowing Chinese imports to crush valuable domestic sectors (like EVs) and raising protectionist barriers, which have their own serious costs.
“a lot of countries are going to be faced with a really tough choice between letting Chinese Imports crush a valuable sector like EVS um and raising protectionist barriers which have their their own real downfalls”
The 1930s comparison is apt: that era had chaotic politics, absence of global leadership, and rising revisionist powers—and it led to WWII. We are in an analogous period of danger.
“I think we have a deepening and really rare absence absence of Global Leadership more chaos than at any time since the 30s and that was the runup to World War II”
The risk of AI misuse is that we will have to discover where the landmines are 'trial by action' because we do not have sufficient governance capacity to manage growing risks from misuse by individuals, companies, and governments.
“so I mean the concern is that um we're going to have to find out it's going to be trial by action um where the landmines are in AI explosion um in the use for individuals and for companies and and and governments many of whom are not aligned with stability and prosperity for the world”
Political dysfunction in Washington (Capitol Hill) is no longer just a domestic issue; it has become an international story because US political weaknesses now translate directly into geopolitical instability.
“the instability comes with that uh is one where the political weaknesses inside uh the West become their own kind of international story and I think that's that's the big thing that anti-incumbency doesn't stay at home uh that uh you know internal dysfunction on Capitol Hill uh uh is not something that is purely a matter for the US this time around”
Internal Democratic politics will see ideological conflicts (e.g., between Evangelical voters pushing for national abortion restrictions and pragmatic politicians like Trump who won't touch social issues) but more importantly, Republicans will unite behind Trump's institutional power plays (against FBI, Justice Dept, intelligence agencies).
“there are fault lines in this party there are ideological disagreements uh you know between the Evangelical voters who uh were core to Trump getting elected both times and who want to pursue national uh abortion restrictions and those uh who are more pragmatic political Allah Trump himself who won't want to touch those of social issues but put aside the ideological and the policy fights that will definitely occur and I think the biggest risk factor that I would underscore... would be on the side of risk to the institutions of our government to democracy uh the name cash Patel hasn't been mentioned here uh what Trump proposes to do with the FBI the justice department”
A geopolitical recession can only be resolved through one of three paths: building new institutions that reflect the balance of power, reforming existing institutions to align with those who hold power, or breaking things through conflicts and war—and in 2025, overwhelmingly the third path is getting the most energy.
“the only way out of it is you have to either build new institutions that better reflect your balance of power um or you reform your existing institutions so they're more aligned with the people that are have power or you break things and you end up in conflicts and War well all three are happening but this year overwhelmingly it's the third that's getting most of the energy”
The US is now pursuing an 'America First' unilateralist model that embraces a transactional, law-of-the-jungle worldview previously associated with China, rejecting the multilateralist values-based model it promoted for 70 years.
“the US is oriented towards breaking Global commitments an architecture pulling out of such agreements getting itself unilateralism globally”
Trump is not the top risk; he is the leading symptom and beneficiary of the G-Zero disorder, part of a global anti-establishment wave and anti-incumbency trend across democracies.
“I mean Trump is not the top risk Trump is the leading symptom and in many ways the most powerful beneficiary of the g0 and so too all of the antiestablishment wave that we've seen anti-incumbency Trends across the world in so many democracies last year and this year playing out”
Trump's promised tariffs (particularly 60% on China, with an average applied tariff of 25% globally) are not bluster but a fixed belief that will likely be implemented, though not exactly as campaigned and with room for negotiation by sector.
“Trump has benefited in many ways politically certainly here in the US from uh the tendency to see a lot of what he says as sort of you know Bluster or maybe he means it maybe he doesn't there's room for interpretation... he has very few fixed principles a belief in the almost magical transformative power of tariffs is one of them”
Risk #1: G-Zero Wins—a world characterized by new and expanding power vacuums, emboldened rogue actors and strongman leaders, and heightened risk for dangerous accidents, conflicts, or miscalculations, where geopolitical risks grow and guard rails are thinner.
“the Eurasia group Top risk of 2025 is the g0o wins that means as Cliff spoke about earlier the new and expanding power vacuums the emboldened Rogue actors or strongman leaders the heightened risk for dangerous accidents conflicts or miscalculations and the geopolitical iCal risk grows and maybe the guard rails are thinner”
We are witnessing a rare and possibly unique case in diplomatic history where a country that established the international order is now taking it down and abdicating its leadership throne, creating dangerous dynamics prone to vacuums and misperceptions.
“we're witnessing something really rare in diplomatic history a pretty much unique case of a country that established International order then taking it down abdicating its Throne I can't think of a of a pre case and that's a it's a dynamic that will be very prone to vacuums and misperceptions”
The biggest risk factor to U.S. democratic institutions is not ideological or policy-based infighting but Trump's proposed changes to the FBI, Justice Department, and American intelligence community, particularly through appointees like Kashf Patel.
“when it comes to this question of how much uh uh change can Trump wreak or you know damage depending on your perspective I would make a distinction between the uh what I expect to be the endemic uh ideological and political infighting that will still occur in the Trump ified Republican party uh you know there are fault lines in this party there are ideological disagreements uh you know between the Evangelical voters who uh were core to Trump getting elected both times and who want to pursue national uh abortion restrictions and those uh who are more pragmatic political Allah Trump himself who won't want to touch those of social issues but put aside the ideological and the policy fights that will definitely occur and I think the biggest risk factor that I would underscore and and maybe even more so than your very good Eurasia report does today that would be on the side of risk to the institutions of our government to democracy uh the name cash Patel hasn't been mentioned here uh what Trump proposes to do with the FBI the justice department the American intelligence Community”
China First works well as long as China is not dealing with the US, but in those interactions China loses because the US has superior power; similarly, Canada First would be workable if Canada were not in proximity to the US.
“China first works pretty well as long as they're not dealing with the us if they're dealing with smaller countries it's all China first right I mean Canada first if there were countes smaller than Canada would would be a a workable model Evan”
The most important factor for 2025 is not any one specific development but rather that we no longer have an international model to respond to global opportunities and challenges—that model has broken down.
“the most important factor to look at for 2025 is is not any one of these developments but rather the fact that we no longer have um a a international model to respond to Global opportunities and challenges that has broken down and so that's what we mean when we say the g0o wins”
Iran has suffered a series of setbacks and is now weaker than it has been in decades, having lost its axis of resistance (Hezbollah, Hamas) mostly at the hands of Israel, and the U.S. certainly helped.
“they have have as you say uh lost their axis of resistance mostly at the hands of Israel uh the US certainly helped out”
Russia attempted to assassinate the CEO of Germany's largest defense company just last year, demonstrating ongoing covert operations against NATO allies.
“this is a country Russia that attempted to assassinate just last year the head the CEO of the largest German defense company”
Debrief interviews with nearly 300 people who served in the first Trump administration show remarkably consistent accounts that Trump encourages conflict and dysfunction.
“that really was the case remarkably in some of the key positions throughout the Trump uh first term and that's something that you know we chronicled in our book The divider we debriefed about 300 people who served in that Trump Administration almost all of them Republicans appointed by Trump himself or nonpartisan you know career officials of some type remarkably consistent accounts”
The G-Zero world is the same thing from two perspectives: 'America First' from the US viewpoint and G-Zero from everyone else's viewpoint. When everyone pursues 'everybody first,' you get chaos and no international model to respond to global challenges.
“the g0o world and a consolidated America First are the same thing but just from different perspectives g0 is what happens with everybody else and America First is what happens with the Americans and China first works pretty well as long as they're not dealing with the us if they're dealing with smaller countries it's all China first right I mean Canada first if there were countes smaller than Canada would would be a a workable model Evan”
Trump will likely attempt to deal with Xi Jinping (potentially with Elon Musk's involvement) and may achieve a 'huge deal' due to his willingness to apply maximum pressure at a time when China is weak; however, this is unlikely (5-10% probability) because Elon Musk will not use his capital to stabilize US-China relations and instead will focus on other political goals.
“it is absolutely plausible that Trump will get on the phone with chian p and maybe Elon will be on the phone too as he has been with like zalinski for example and other leaders erdoan um and and Trump will as he said before Xin ping he's very smart he's a strong leader I respect him a lot maybe they'll talk for a couple of hours and they'll talk about a deal”
Trump's reputation for unpredictability has benefited him politically in the past, but it is unclear whether this will help him avoid a major international crisis in his second term, given how much more dangerous the external environment is.
“I don't know whether it will help him avoid a major crisis internationally in his second term and that to me is a big question that comes from uh uh where we are now that was very different than eight years ago”
The global markets are riding high on the back of US performance, but they are set for disappointment as the world's two largest economies (US and China) are exporting disruption: China is exporting overcapacity and the US will export higher interest rates and a strong dollar under Trump.
“Global markets are riding very high right now most most on the back of the us and we think they're in for a disappointment the the world's two largest economies are exporting disruption which I find very interesting to the rest of the world China is exporting overc capacity the US under Trump will likely export higher than expected interest rates and a strong dollar”
A critical unknown is whether Trump's unpredictability will help or hurt him in avoiding a major international crisis; his reputation for unpredictability helped him in his first term, but the world is more dangerous now.
“I think that's that's the big question that comes from uh uh where we are now that was very different than eight years ago and I don't know whether it will help him avoid a major crisis internationally in his second term and that to me is a big question that comes from uh uh where we are now”
Thinly governed space includes outer space, where the U.S. and China disagree on governance, and on the moon specifically there will be many satellites launched in 2025, creating a high chance of satellite collision or incident with radiation effects reaching Earth.
“we have included space in thinly governed spaces space thinly governed space space but okay in outer space the two great Powers us and China disagree on governance on the moon on the moon we're going to have a lot of satellites this year the chance of a satellite Collision or or incident radiating back to Earth is pretty high”
Iran has an 85-year-old supreme leader with serious health problems who has not figured out his succession, adding to Iran's institutional vulnerability.
“you've got an 85-year-old supreme leader with serious health problems who hasn't figured out who his replacement is going to be”
A 78-year-old Trump will not fundamentally change; he will encourage conflict, infighting, uncertainty, and dysfunction in his administration as he has in every organization he has led, creating endemic ideological and political infighting.
“Donald Trump is a 78-year old man 78y old men do not change uh and they just become more like themselves... Donald Trump is still going to be Donald Trump what does that mean it means he encourages conflict infighting uh you know a state of uncertainty and dysfunction that is that is endemic to who Donald Trump is and in any institution and any organization he's ever been associated with”
Many people in the Republican Party and Trump's team believe the US policy should be to contain and defeat the Chinese Communist Party, a goal that does not exist in the Biden Administration and makes US-China coexistence seem impossible from this perspective.
“there are a lot of people that advise Trump that really believe that these two countries can't actually coexist that America's policy should be to contain and defeat the Chinese Communist party that's that's number one number two the Republicans in the House and Senate are pushing towards more restrictions on China more export controls more companies that you can't do work with a a broader definition of National Security uh in how the Americans shouldn't be engaging with China uh tougher te technology controls on semiconductors”
The geopolitical recession can only be resolved through three pathways: building new institutions aligned with the current balance of power, reforming existing institutions to reflect those with actual power, or breaking things and ending up in conflicts and wars—and in 2025, overwhelmingly the third pathway is getting the most energy.
“the only way out of it is you have to either build new institutions that better reflect your balance of power um or you reform your existing institutions so they're more aligned with the people that are have power or you break things and you end up in conflicts and War well all three are happening but this year overwhelmingly it's the third that's getting most of the energy”
We consistently fail to listen to what Putin himself is saying, not because he is not often a liar and conspiracy theorist, but because he has signaled in quite clear ways what he intends that we refuse to process because they contradict our worldview.
“we've consistently failed to take him to listen to what he's saying uh not because he's not you know often a a liar and a conspiracy theorist but because he has also signaled in in quite clear ways that we simply have refused to process because they're at odds with our own worldview”
The unmanaged U.S.-China decoupling will petrify mutual suspicion between the two powers, preventing the kind of dialogue needed to manage risks.
“it will kind of petrify aify Mutual suspicion”
Trump is very transactional and interpersonal in his approach, believing in making connections with people (foreign leaders, business leaders), and this means companies must consider whether they have a personal relationship with Trump or his inner circle to navigate policy.
“Trump's very transactional he's very uh interpersonal he believes in making connections with people whether that's foreign leaders or Business Leaders in the US and this means that that's a factor that a lot of companies are going to have to think about When approaching the United States over the next four years is what kind of relationship do you have personally with Donald Trump with members of his interner circle with his family can you leverage those relationships to try to gain uh more uh more power and influence and can you use those relationships to try to steer policy in a way that helps your business and hurts others”
In a G-Zero world, 'America First' and 'China First' and 'Elon gets what he wants' operate on the same principle: might makes right, and smaller countries must do what the powerful say.
“that's the way it runs and if you want to win in that world you better do what the American say it's an American first model so the g0o world and a consolidated America First are the same thing but just from different perspectives g0 is what happens with everybody else and America First is what happens with the Americans and China first works pretty well as long as they're not dealing with the us if they're dealing with smaller countries it's all China first right I mean Canada first if there were countes smaller than Canada would would be a a workable model”
Trump's first-term freeze-for-freeze deal with North Korea (US-South Korea military exercises paused, North Korean missile tests paused) was actually more successful than commonly acknowledged, but replicating this with China will be harder due to Republican hawks and broader structural antagonism.
“remember Kim Jong-un you know he developed his he had a couple of summits and people said oh we didn't get anything done actually there was a freeze for freeze the the North Koreans froze their missile tests and the Americans froze their um Miss military exercises with the South Koreans and and actually the relationship deteriorated under Biden”
Iran is unlikely to make a rapid dash for a nuclear weapon in the near term because it is risk-averse, understands it lacks an effective deterrent against Israel and the US, and is only 6-12 months away from weaponization—making the window risky.
“in the near term the likelihood that they would do that in my view is very low they've been very risk averse over the last year precisely because they understand they don't actually have an effective deterrent against Israel which is you know over a thousand miles away they don't have an effective deterrent against the US escalation dominance is in the hands of their enemies and they are 6 months away from weaponizing a nuke probably a year from being able to stick it on a missile um and while that if they're trying to make that Dash to a weapon they're going to get attacked”
A long-term peace treaty in Ukraine is highly unlikely; the more realistic expectation is a temporary ceasefire followed by continuing Russian hostility toward NATO, not a durable settlement.
“it's not the likelihood of some long-term peace deal uh you know treaty signed in Paris that lasts for the ages highly highly unlikely but more more than that I think uh you know it suggests a a a not only a rogue power but one that's willing to take measures again and again and again that we refuse to believe he's going to take until he actually does them”
Lebanon will remain a failing state even after a ceasefire because the government is still very weak.
“Lebanon will remain a failing State it's a ceasefire but the government is still very very weak”
Mexico-U.S. relations will end up in the right place over the next four years, but the start will be much more fractious, and it will hurt the economy and markets.
“I think that over the next four years Mexico us relations will end up in the right place but it's going to start in a much more fractious way and it's going to hurt the economy and the markets”
The low-hanging fruit of tax cuts and deregulation was largely picked in Trump's first term; the macroeconomic conditions are worse now with higher debt levels, higher interest rates, and much higher company valuation multiples, leaving less room for Trump's playbook to generate growth and market enthusiasm.
“the loow hanging fruit was largely picked in the first term and the macroeconomic conditions are worse right debt levels are higher interest rates are higher um you know the uh the multiples that companies are trading at right now are are much higher than they were before so there's just not not as much room for Trump's Playbook that got him a lot of enthusiasm and Market pump and growth the first time for him to get that again”
Trump inherited a pretty good economic outlook when taking office: growth has been solid, job gains have been substantial, and inflation seems mostly under control.
“Trump ecomics is this really interesting mix of policies that the new administration's coming in with now they're inheriting a pretty good economic Outlook growth has been solid uh job grow job gains have been substantial in the B Administration and inflation seems like it's mostly under control”
Mexico's new president Claudia Sheinbaum (a PhD environmental scientist from Berkeley) will have an even harder time navigating Trump than AMLO did because of their demographic mismatch and her environmental orientation, despite her desire to cut a deal with Trump.
“she's very oriented towards cutting a deal with Trump but she's a p PhD environmental scientist from Berkeley I I I can't think of a demographic that would have a harder time individually getting on with Trump it's going to be harder than amlo did uh with Trump in the first Administration”
Europe is unlikely to break apart in 2025; instead, European governments (Germany, France, EU leadership) are consolidating in response to Russian threat, and they will spend 3% of GDP on defense outside EU structures to prevent Hungarian veto.
“actually Europe will hold together and wouldn't surprise me if they're even stronger on balance because of the crisis at the end of 2025 then we saw saw coming into it... the new German government coming in is going to be much stronger and aligned with macron than Schultz has been the new EU leadership with vand derline with people like metsola with kayak Callis these are actually very strong unified leaders just as the former Dutch PM Mark Ruta who has now taken over NATO and they know that Russia is a very serious crisis for them for European Security in fact they're now working on 3% of GDP spend on defense which they're going to do outside the EU so that the hungarians can't veto it”
Over the next four years, US-Mexico relations will end up in the right place but will start in a much more fractious way and will hurt the economy and the markets.
“I think that over the next four years Mexico us relations will end up in the right place but it's going to start in a much more fractious way and it's going to hurt the economy and the markets”
Iranians are definitely heading towards collapse but how much the Israelis and Trump Administration are prepared to push to help is an open question.
“definitely they are heading towards collapse how much the Israelis and the Trump Administration are prepared to push to Help Is An Open question we'll find out real soon”
Mass deportations are one of Trump's few specific policy promises in his 2025 campaign and he views it as core to his electoral victory and his supporters' primary motivation; unlike tariffs or other policies, this is likely to be implemented aggressively and early.
“Trump made very few at least specific promises in the campaign that he just won uh when it comes to traditional kind of policy discourse it was mostly absent uh this is one that was a highly specific promise from Trump and not only that but he believes its core to why he won reelection to the White House in the first place is this idea that his supporters are most motivated by his uh uh anti-immigration views and Promises”
You will see more populism in Europe in 2025, but Europe will likely hold together and may be even stronger on balance by the end of 2025 due to the external crisis.
“over the course of this year yes you'll see more populism you'll see more governments like you're seeing in Austria right now that'll Orient towards a trumpist sort of policy but actually Europe will hold together and wouldn't surprise me if they're even stronger on balance because of the crisis at the end of 2025 then we saw saw coming into it”
Trump coming in will put much more pressure on Iran through more sanctions and more economic pressure at a time when Iran's economy is already failing.
“Trump coming in um is going to put much more pressure on Iran more sanctions more economic pressure at a time that their economy is already failing”
Mexico's new president Claudia Sheinbaum, though very popular, faces huge flashpoints with the Trump Administration regarding trade deficits, Chinese goods flowing through Mexico, fentanyl, and illegal migration, and as a PhD environmental scientist from Berkeley, she has a demographic profile that will make it harder for her to build rapport with Trump than AMLO did.
“there are a lot of problems that the Trump Administration has uh with Mexico right now it's the trade deficit it's Goods coming through Mexico from China it's fenel it's illegal migration bunch of issues she's going to have a hard time navigating that she wants to she's very oriented towards cutting a deal with Trump but she's a p PhD environmental scientist from Berkeley I I I can't think of a demographic that would have a harder time individually getting on with Trump it's going to be harder than amlo did uh with Trump in the first Administration”
Global markets are riding very high right now, mostly on the back of the U.S., but the world's two largest economies are exporting disruption to the rest of the world: China is exporting overcapacity, and the U.S. under Trump will likely export higher-than-expected interest rates and a strong dollar.
“Global markets are riding very high right now most most on the back of the us and we think they're in for a disappointment the the world's two largest economies are exporting disruption which I find very interesting to the rest of the world China is exporting overc capacity the US under Trump will likely export higher than expected interest rates and a strong dollar”
In the near term, the likelihood that Iran would weaponize nuclear weapons to remedy its weakness is very low because they understand they lack an effective deterrent against Israel (1000+ miles away) and against U.S. escalation dominance.
“in the near term the likelihood that they would do that in my view is very low they've been very risk averse over the last year precisely because they understand they don't actually have an effective deterrent against Israel which is you know over a thousand miles away they don't have an effective deterrent against the US escalation dominance is in the hands of their enemies”
The Ukraine war will get worse in the earlier part of 2025, though Zelensky will want a ceasefire because he is losing the war, while Putin will be a tougher sell because he is winning, but he faces his own manpower and economic problems that may force a pause.
“the war is going to get worse in the earlier part of this year but you know Trump will come in and I do think that zanski is gonna want to ceasefire he's losing the war he's losing the war he's got to stop it somehow the Putin's going to be a tougher sell because he's winning the war my Russian contacts are kind very uncertain about what he's going to do but I think they've got their own Manpower and economic problems coming and Putin is going to want to you know invest in this really really strange relationship with Trump”
Trump is capable of getting on the phone with Xi Jinping and cutting a deal, possibly with Elon Musk on the call as he has been with other leaders like Zelensky and Erdogan, but a major breakthrough is unlikely because Trump cannot convince China to make sufficient concessions.
“it is absolutely plausible that Trump will get on the phone with chian p and maybe Elon will be on the phone too as he has been with like zalinski for example and other leaders erdoan um and and Trump will as he said before Xin ping he's very smart he's a strong leader I respect him a lot maybe they'll talk for a couple of hours and they'll talk about a deal but but I don't think that you can get from there to the Chinese giving enough to break through on what Trump wants”
Elon Musk is unlikely to spend his political capital trying to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship; he is much more willing to go after political opponents in the UK, Germany, Canada, and the U.S., which aligns with Trump.
“I don't think that Elon Musk is willing to use his personal capital on that issue I think he's much more willing to do things that he'll win with like go after political opponents in the UK and Germany and Canada and at home in the United States that he's fully aligned with Trump on I think it would be a challenging one for for for Elon to go full on publicly and say I'm going to stabilize I'm going to be Kissinger I'm going to stabilize this relationship”
Trump is so committed to America First that it highlights and amplifies the dangers of a G-Zero world where everyone pursues their own interests without coordination.
“Trump is so much America First that it puts the dangers of an everybody first world way out in front”
Trump at 78 years old is unlikely to change; he will become more like himself, which means he encourages conflict, infighting, uncertainty, and dysfunction in institutions.
“Donald Trump is a 78-year old man 78y old men do not change uh and they just become more like themselves so let's let's stipulate to that uh Donald Trump is still going to be Donald Trump what does that mean it means he encourages conflict infighting uh you know a state of uncertainty and dysfunction that is that is endemic to who Donald Trump is”
Putin oscillates between periods where things go badly for Russia and then emerges stronger, demonstrating a tactical skill at playing a weakened hand into a strong one.
“Putin's had this one of his talents as a leader slot has been playing a weekend into a strong hand I mean this guy oscillates between things going real bad and then he he seems to emerge stronger”
Justin Trudeau is the first international casualty of the top risks of 2025, unable to navigate the Trump pressure after his failed visit to Mar-a-Lago.
“by the way Justin Trudeau one could argue is kind of the first International casualty um of of these top risks this year he was the guy that couldn't get out of the spotlight in fact he decided to put himself more into it when Trump beat him up he goes and he flies down to Mara Lago right and uh it goes very badly for him Trump keeps calling him the F 51st uh Governor um and now and now he's no longer”
Biden's pardon of his son and use of the CFIUS process to block Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel for political reasons are examples of norm erosion that will be supercharged under Trump.
“I mean two recent examples would be Biden pardoning his son and then Biden using the CPUs process to block the acquisition of us Steel by nepon Steel because of his own political interests but we think all of that gets supercharged in the upcoming Trump Administration”
Trump does not like a unified Europe and favors Brexit, but European consolidation is actually occurring: new EU leadership is strong and aligned with France, and NATO has new leadership under Mark Rutte who will coordinate European defense spending.
“Trump does not like unified Europe he doesn't like the EU he likes brexit when he used to meet with macron he used to always say when are you going to do what the UK did when are you going to do a brexit right no that's not going to happen actually the European are much more Consolidated the new German government coming in is going to be much stronger and aligned with macron than Schultz has been the new EU leadership with vand derline with people like metsola with kayak Callis these are actually very strong unified leaders just as the former Dutch PM Mark Ruta who has now taken over NATO”
Europeans are working outside the EU framework to achieve 3% of GDP defense spending to prevent Hungary from using veto power, showing coordinated response to Russian threat.
“they're now working on 3% of GDP spend on defense which they're going to do outside the EU so that the hungarians can't veto it”
Higher interest rates and a stronger dollar will tighten financial conditions, especially for emerging markets, making 2025 a tough macroeconomic environment globally.
“a stronger and higher rates are really going to tighten Financial conditions EMS will pay especially but it's going to be a tough macroeconomic environment out there”
Despite Trump's endemic dysfunction, his chief of staff is looking to enable and facilitate his policy goals rather than confront him, which may initially improve policy execution even as it reduces institutional checks.
“you can reliably expect that there will be uh that uh not with understanding you know the sort of somewhat more positive initial surround sound of having a chief of staff who's who's uh looking not to confront him but to uh enable and to facilitate his policy goals”
The US is in a much stronger position relative to allies as well, as evidenced by the leadership changes and alignments in South Korea, Japan, Germany, France, and Canada, all of which are facing domestic challenges or leadership transitions.
“vises its friends look at where the South Korea Government isn't right now or Japan or Germany or France or Canada so I mean the US just has a lot more Le to get stuff done if Trump is making major demands uh his his government is more Consolidated despite the chaos that we will surely see as Susan noted um and the environment is much more dangerous”
The UK rebranded its AI Safety Summit as the AI Action Summit, signaling that European regulatory caution has given way to prioritizing investment and entrepreneurship, reflecting a perception that earlier regulation went too far.
“the UK um has a summit coming up it was the AI safety Summit they've rebranded it as the AI action Summit uh that tells you pretty much everything you need to know uh the Europeans feel like they went too far in terms of Regulation and now they're being left behind they need to focus on more investment more entrepreneurship”
The Trump Administration will rip up the Biden executive order on AI (early-stage regulation co-written with systemically important AI companies), the U.S. will end the China AI dialogue, and will end the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council.
“the Americans going to rip up um the old um Biden executive order order on AI that was early stage regulation written together with the systemically important AI companies the um the US China just beginning to have an AI dialogue that'll probably be ended under the Trump Administration so too they'll end um the US EU trade and Technology Council”
AI technology has been tested to determine its capability for harmful uses: researchers downloaded Meta's Llama (open-source AI) and discovered they could use it to figure out how to kill someone with arsenic or how to assassinate CEOs of companies.
“our organization we were taking a look at uh meta Lama which is their uh open source some of our folks downloaded it uh to see what was and wasn't possible um when they give it their own instructions and they found that they could use it to figure out how to kill someone with arsenic or how to assassinate CEOs of companies now we're not doing that but there are people out there that will use AI for those purposes”
Trump fails to execute his agenda is a red herring—the Trump administration is set up to succeed, at least for the first 12 months, with unified government control and clear policy plans.
“I think this is an Administration that's set up to succeed at least for the first 12 months um certainly with the Unified Government there's a lot they can do in terms of legislation and on the world stage you know Trump's got plans that you know we think will come to pass we think there will be a ceasefire in Ukraine we think that he's probably going to rack up at least a couple of apparent winds in the Middle East”
3.5 million Ukrainians will live permanently in Russian-occupied territory and will fall off the radar of Western attention as a result of the likely Ukraine ceasefire.
“there are 3.5 million ukrainians not a large number not a small number that are going to be living in permanently an next whatever you want to call it parts of Russia they're going to fall off the radar of the West”
It is unclear whether Trump would support Israel going after Iran's nuclear program; Israel cannot do it by themselves, and many in the Trump Administration and Netanyahu's government believe this is a unique window to get Iran when they are weak and push for regime change.
“it's unclear whether or not Trump would be willing to support support Israel in going after their nuclear program Israel can't do it by themselves and and certainly there are many in the Trump Administration and many in nyah's government that believe that this is a unique time to get Iran when they are weak when they're at their weakest and and that means hit them hard and hope for regime change”
The critical question is whether Russia will provide reentry warhead technology to North Korea, which is a major unknown risk factor for 2025.
“will the Russians do that it's a very important question let me leave it at that”
Tariffs will not be applied at the maximum rate (60% across all countries) and will not hit every country with which the U.S. has a trade deficit—there will be deals cut and exemptions granted.
“it it's not going to be as hard and as fast as his campaign Pro promises I mean 60% across the board on China no one really expects that it's not going to be every country the US has a trade deficit there will be deals that are cut”
The U.S.-China relationship is set to undergo a breakdown driven by four main factors: Trump's tariffs (50-60% range), tougher U.S. tech export controls and licensing, attempts to delegitimize the Chinese Communist Party, and Taiwan irritants.
“there's four main drivers that we see of mostly on the US side of of a breakdown in the relationship and use that word breakdown it's a strong word we've talked about the tariffs we don't know exactly what they are but you know if he's in the range of a 506 60% top rate in the range of an average applied Tariff of 25% that's just too much too much to to swallow for China secondly US tech policy export controls we'll see tougher licensing requirements we'll see more controls coming out of the Trump Administration we'll see would the Chinese perceive as efforts to delegitimize the Chinese Communist party when Trump you know two two weeks before he left office last time he ban visas for members of the party if they start to do that again and the hills already talking about it the the Chinese you know will just Grimace finally Taiwan not the main problem right now because the Chinese are satisfied with their ability to and a course William lie at least for now but it will be an irritant”
We don't know the exact scale of 'mass deportations' for Trump, but we should expect it to be truly disruptive in ways American businesses and the public have not fully appreciated.
“now do we know the exact number that will constitute mass deportations now for Donald Trump we don't really uh and uh uh yet we do know and should expect that this is really going to happen in a way that perhaps many Americans and many American businesses have not fully appreciated the extent to which this is going to be a disruptive factor and it's going to come very early on in uh the new Trump Administration”
Trump's willingness to use the Washington Post's reporting against its own reporting (contradicting a transition team leak about scaling back tariffs with a Truth Social post) shows his unpredictability and control over the narrative.
“just this morning we saw the Washington Post reported with a couple of sources from inside the Trump transition uh process saying that they were going to scale back some of the tariffs that Trump has been planning across the board tariffs and then Trump came over the top and said in a truth social uh post that that's absolutely not going to happen”
Trump has 25 years of continuous rule like no other major power leader has had; he is still young enough to surpass Stalin's actual record of tenure as the longest-serving leader of Russia since Stalin in Soviet times.
“Putin would be celebrating his 25th New Year this year like 25 years you know as I used to say in Afghanistan you guys got the watches we've got the time this guy never seems to leave what's what's the risk here here yeah I mean look I I agree with everything that that Cliff just said uh we were in Moscow together uh in the early years of uh Putin's long tenure we would not have predicted uh 25 years ago that Putin would be the longest serving leader of Russia uh since Stalin in the Soviet times uh and by the way he's still young enough to surpass Stalin's actual record”